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ABSTRACT 
The thesis offers new paradigms for advancing socio-economic rights in Africa. Many 
States Parties to human rights instruments have failed to promote the common welfare of 
their citizens partly because of the justiciability debate, which continues to complicate 
intellectual and practical efforts at advancing socio-economic rights. The debate also 
prevents the normative development of these rights through adjudication. Furthermore, 
traditional human rights theory and practice have been state-centric, with non-state actors 
largely ignored in the identification, formulation, and implementation of human rights 
norms. Yet, the involvement of non-state entities in international arena has limited states’ 
autonomies considerably, with serious implications for human rights. Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) have capacities to foster economic well-being, development, 
tenchnological improvement, and wealth, but they also often cause deleterious human 
rights impacts through thei employment practices, environmental policies, relationships 
with suppliers and consumers, interactions with governments, and other activities. 
 
The thesis argues that socio-economic rights are normative and justiciable. It argues that 
traditional approaches are no longer sufficient to secure human rights and calls for a 
dismantatling of some structures erected by doctrinal systems; for realignment of 
relationships among social institutions; and for integrated bundles of fundamental 
interests that harness benefits of human rights norms and widen the landscape to commit 
both formal and informal regimes. Fashioning out a new paradigm for advancement of 
socio-economic rights requires addressing state capacity. It requires an integrative and 
global interpretive framework. It requires, finally, a new paradigm to commit non-state 
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actors in Africa. The illustrative chapter uses the rights to work and to social security as 
templates for some prescriptions towards reaslising socio-economic rights in Africa. 
 
 
  
 
 
INTRODUCTORY 
 
1. Background 
Contemporary international law response to human wrongs began after World War II, in 
reaction to the destruction and expendability of human beings that characterised that war. 
The human rights order erected from the ashes of that war later became a product of the 
preferences of the Cold War inter-State community, which focused on civil and political 
rights under the heavy impact of the “voice of the North”. Phenomena such as poverty, 
malnutrition, destitution, illiteracy, and unemployment were not then on the front burner 
of international law and politics. Even where positive international and municipal law 
recognised these phenomena as rights, the international community treated them as 
orphans in the human rights family, according socio-economic rights1 second-class status 
in practice. As Chapman puts it: “Despite a rhetorical commitment to the indivisibility 
and interdependence of human rights, the international community, including the 
international human rights movement, has consistently treated civil and political rights as 
more significant, while consistently neglecting economic, social and cultural rights”.2 
                                                 
1 Throughout this thesis, I shall employ the term ‘socio-economic rights’ rather than the standard “economic, social, and 
cultural rights”, because the focus is on protections like health, food, education, housing, work, social security, rather than 
cultural rights. 
2 AR Chapman ‘A “Violations Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 23 26. Cf M Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (1995) 9 (observing that socio-economic rights in practice have been 
“largely ignored”); P Alston ‘Economic and Social Rights’ in L Henkin & JL Hargrove (eds) Human Rights: An Agenda 
for the Next Century (1994) 137 149 (“[T]here is not a single important indicator that would show anything other than the 
relative neglect, and often also the absolute neglect, of economic, social and cultural rights in practice”). 
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Every now and then, debates still spring up on the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights, that is, the question whether courts can, and at least sometimes will, provide a 
remedy for aggrieved individuals claiming a violation of those rights. Others argue that 
socio-economic rights are fundamentally different from civil and political rights and that 
attempts to describe economic and social concerns as rights are misguided, but as this 
thesis seeks to demonstrate, it is the attempt to deny normative entitlements to these 
concerns that are misguided. 
In Africa, the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU), reconstituted into the 
African Union (AU) in 2000, worked assiduously to develop international human rights 
law, including those on socio-economic rights. The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights,3 adopted, paradoxically, by a poverty-stricken region, remains 
exemplary in this regard. Many states have also incorporated socio-economic rights into 
their basic, constitutional law, foremost of which is the South African Constitution of 
1996. Problems, however, remain in the actualisation of these rights. Many governments 
have notoriously failed to promote the common welfare of their citizens, taking cold 
comfort in bland arguments that socio-economic rights require costly programmes for 
their realisation.  
Discourses on implementation of socio-economic rights have often focused on the 
role of courts. Of course, courts can, should, and, indeed, do play pivotal roles in 
advancing rights by interpreting and enforcing relevant human rights instruments. Such 
interpretations help governments to understand their obligations, the positive 
consequences for implementing them and negative ones for non-implementation. 
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However, like in many other regions, the justiciability debate continues to complicate 
intellectual and practical efforts at advancing these rights. It also acts as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, by preventing the normative development of these rights through adjudication.4 
Traditional human rights theory and practice have been state-centric, understandably 
because, in the absence of legal restraints, states wield absolute socio-economic and legal 
power over the individual.5 Non-state actors—all actors operating at a sub-state or 
transnational level6—have largely been ignored in the identification, formulation, and 
implementation of human rights norms, including those on socio-economic rights. Yet, 
the involvements of these actors in international economic and, sometimes, political 
arenas have limited states’ autonomies considerably, with serious implications for human 
rights. Transnational corporations (TNCs), in particular, have, on the one hand, capacities 
to foster economic well-being, development, technological improvement, and wealth and, 
on the other, capacities to cause deleterious human rights impacts on the lives of 
individuals through their employment practices, environmental policies, relationships 
with suppliers and consumers, interactions with governments, and other activities. 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted 27 June 1981 entry into force 21 Oct 1986 Doc 
OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1982) 21 International Legal Materials 59 [hereinafter African Charter or Charter]. 
4 See D Marcus ‘The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights through Supranational Adjudication’ (2006) 42 
Stanford Journal of International Law 53 55 (arguing: “The perception of non-justiciability and the normative 
underdevelopment of socioeconomic rights act as codependent parts of a negative feedback mechanism: States oppose 
adjudication because the rules of decision are vague and imprecise, and these characteristics prevent the application of the 
‘judicial craft’ to clarify and develop their content”).  
5 See F Raday ‘Privatising Human Rights and the Abuse of Power’ (2000) 13 Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 
103 108-10. 
6 Thus broadly defined, non-state actors include individuals, corporations, intergovernmental organizations, armed 
groups—such as insurrectional movements—and other organized entities. See JA Hessbruegge ‘Human Rights Violations 
Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors’ (2005) 11 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 21 22. In the context of this 
thesis, non-state actors will be limited to transnational corporations (TNCs) and non- and inter-governmental organisations. 
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2. Purpose and Assumptions 
This thesis seeks to fill in some gaps in the existing literature on socio-economic rights, 
by offering new paradigms or propositions for their advancement in Africa. Paradigms 
are key theories, instruments, values and metaphysical assumptions that comprise a 
disciplinary matrix. Fourez defines a paradigm as a mental structure, conscious or not, 
that is useful to classify the world and approach it.7 Thus, while the thesis affirms the 
continued relevance of traditional approaches, including roles of governments as 
representatives of public interest and of courts as guardians of fundamental freedoms, it 
will argue that these approaches are now insufficient. It calls for the dismantling of some 
structures erected by doctrinal systems; for a realignment of relationships among social 
institutions; and for integrated bundles of fundamental interests that harness benefits of 
human rights norms and widen the landscape to commit both formal and informal 
regimes. TNCs, in particular, must become catalysts for socio-economic transformation 
and combating of social exclusion especially in Africa, given the absence of strong 
institutional structures for realising socio-economic rights. 
This thesis is based on some assumptions and/or fundamentals. The first is that socio-
economic rights are normative, that is, they are standards or principles deemed to be 
binding on members of a group and guiding and regulating acceptable behaviour in a 
society. The second assumption is that human rights theory is an experimental science; 
like medical science, its goal is to prevent or cure particular forms of diseases or 
disabilities, not merely to describe, or make verbal commitments to, certain normative 
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instruments. A fortiori, socio-economic rights guarantees are meaningless in Africa if 
they do not have practical impacts on lives and livelihoods of Africans.  
The third and related assumption is that socio-economic rights are implementable in 
Africa, a truth that was not lost on the OAU when it declared in 2001:  
 
The resources, including capital, technology and human skills, that are required to 
launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance [in 
Africa], and are within our reach. What is required to mobilise these resources and to 
use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed to 
a sustained human development effort and poverty eradication.8  
 
This thesis will argue that by changing and/or modifying our institutional frames of 
reference, that is, by looking at the same problem from a different point of view, we 
could change the way we respond to socio-economic rights challenges in Africa. The 
thesis employs Keohane’s definition of ‘institutions’, as “persistent and connected sets of 
rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations. They can take the form of formal intergovernmental or non-governmental 
organisations, international regimes, or informal conventions”.9 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 See G Fourez A Construção Das Ciências (The Construction of Sciences) (1995) 103. See, in general, T Kuhn A 
Estrutura Das Revoluções Científicas (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) (1997). 
8 See OAU The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Oct 2001) [hereinafter NEPAD] para 6 available at 
www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/oau/keydocs/NEPAD.pdf. 
9 R Keohane & L Martin ‘Institutional Theory, Endogencity and Delegation’ (April 1999) Working Paper Series No 99-07 
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Harvard University 2. 
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3. Methodology 
The methodology is largely desktop, involving a systematic survey and exposition of 
available materials and literature, drawing logical conclusions and offering relevant 
prescriptions. The research relies on primary and secondary sources, including human 
rights treaties and constitutional provisions. It employs the jurisprudence of global, 
regional and national human rights institutions, and soft laws as aids to interpretation. It 
is empirical comparative, establishing how other legal systems address similar issues, and 
relies on textual-analytical, teleological and systematic methods of treaty and 
constitutional interpretations. Although the thesis’ accent is on sequential logic, it 
employs social narratives to interrogate legal narratives. An interdisciplinary 
methodology is necessary to respond to challenges posed by socio-economic rights in 
Africa. 
Few of the comparatively large body of literature on socio-economic rights are 
written from an Africanist perspective. This thesis, therefore, is unashamedly Africanist 
in its length and breadth. There are, of course, some dangers in “broad prognostications” 
and “sweeping conclusions” on human rights issues in Africa, given “the internal 
dynamics of individual countries”10 and variations in political and ideological orientation. 
However, many states exhibit certain homogeneity to allow for drawing of some uniform 
conclusions on what is usually termed Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).11 Among these are 
their post-colonial status; their a priori problematic relationship on their territorial 
                                                 
10 J Oloko-Onyango ‘Human Rights and Sustainable Development in Contemporary Africa: A New Dawn or Retreating 
Horizons?’ (2000) 6 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 39 40-41. 
11 Some employ the term “Sub-Saharan Africa” (SSA) to describe those countries of Africa that are not considered part of 
North Africa. This division has also arisen from historical and geopolitical considerations. The West generally perceives 
North Africa’s inhabitants to be predominantly Caucasoid. However, the exact position of the dividing line between the 
two regions remains blurred due to break points between national boundaries, ecologies, and ethnicities. 
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jurisdictions; their heavy involvement in a restricted resource base—primarily 
agricultural; their relatively undifferentiated albeit ethnically heterogeneous social 
infrastructure; the centralisation and consolidation of power by the post-colonial 
inheritance elites; and the pervasive external context and dependency.12  
 
4. Scope of Study 
The thesis has six main chapters, excluding the summary and conclusion. Chapter One 
provides the theoretical foundation; it revisits debates on the normativity of socio-
economic rights, as a platform for literature review. I conclude by re-affirming the 
indivisibility and interdependence of all rights. Chapter Two examines the notion of 
obligations, focussing on states as duty bearers and interrogating the minimum contents 
of such obligations in relation to socio-economic rights. Chapter Three examines the 
nature of post-colonial African states and institutions and the implications of weak 
structures and other pathologies on socio-economic, indeed all human, rights. Since the 
realisation of human rights largely depends on the manifestations of state power, I argue 
that any serious attempt to fashion out a new paradigm for the advancement of socio-
economic rights must address state capacity. Chapter Four interrogates the role of courts, 
as agents of states, in the implementation of socio-economic rights and call for an 
integrative and global interpretive framework. 
Chapter Five interrogates the role of non-state actors and attempts to establish a legal 
and moral framework to commit such actors internationally and domestically. I argue for 
a paradigm shift on obligations to make for the legal attribution of responsibilities on 
                                                 
12 See M Doornbos ‘The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect’ (1990) 28(2) The Journal of Modern 
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non-state actors for breaches of human, in particular socio-economic, rights in an 
increasingly globalised and liberalised society. Chapter Six is an illustrative study; it 
applies principles in previous chapters to rights to work and to social security in Africa 
and attempts some prescriptions for the visible realisation of these rights. The final 
chapter—Summary and Conclusion—reflects on key themes of this thesis. 
                                                                                                                                                 
African Studies 179 180.  
  
Chapter One 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW:  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AS NORMATIVE STANDARDS  
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The notion of rights has been a subject of much legal and philosophical speculation; it 
defies definition. The reason for the elusiveness of definition is that such questions as 
rights are intrinsically ambiguous. The same form of words may be used to demand a 
definition or the origin, cause or purpose, of a legal institution.1 Thus, the term ‘right’ 
may be used to describe a variety of legal relationships, each invoking different 
protections and producing variant results. Sometimes the term is used in the strict sense 
of a right-holder’s claim to something, with a correlative duty in another. It is used at 
other times to indicate a privilege or liberty to do something. Still on other occasions, it 
stands for immunity from having one’s legal status altered by another person’s act. 
Lastly, the word may refer to a power to alter the legal relations—rights and duties—of 
others.2 
                                                 
1 See, in general, HAL Hart Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence (1953). 
2 See, in general, WN Hohfeld Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1919). Commentators on Hohfeld’s system have often 
proposed minor variations in terminology.  For example, Hohfeld used the word “right” and “no-right” in place of the 
words “claim” and “no-claim”, since he considered the correlative of a duty to be a reasonable synonym. He used the word 
“privilege” for the opposite of a duty, although he suggested ”liberty” as a possible synonym; but one problem with the 
word “privilege” is that it also connotes a special legal advantage. Furthermore, Hohfeld used the word “disability” for the 
opposite of a power; but might the word “no-power” be a better substitute, to emphasise the structural similarity to the 
concept of a “no-claim”? 
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As “claim” rights, “human rights” are entitlements that individuals make on the 
society by virtue of their humanity;3 or, to use Gewirth’s exact phrase, “rights which all 
persons equally have simply insofar as they are human”.4 Human rights are fundamental 
and hence inalienable or unalienable; otherwise stated, they are not awarded by human 
power and so cannot be surrendered. As ethical standards that uphold the minimum 
thresholds individuals everywhere require to live in dignity, human rights serve as ends 
and means. They provide their holders with an “argumentative threshold” against 
probable objections,5 “trump[ing] over some background justification for political 
decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole”.6 
A fundamental right may be infringed by limiting protected activities or by failing to 
fulfil a positive obligation, which explains why contemporary scholarship generally 
distinguishes between different categories of rights—civil and political, on the one hand, 
and economic, social, and cultural rights on the other. Certain terms of art are used to 
denote these classifications. Civil and political rights are termed libertarian, that is, rights 
relating to the exercise of free will. Economic, social, and cultural rights are termed 
egalitarian, in that they relate to social equality and the just distribution of economic and 
social goods. Sometimes, this classification is also denoted in terms of negative and 
positive rights or freedoms. 
                                                 
3 See L Henkin ‘Human Rights’ in R Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (vol 1 1992) 886. 
4 A Gewirth ‘The Epistemology of Human Rights’ in P Frankel et al (eds) Human Rights (1984) 1. 
5 See D Lyons ‘Utility and Rights’ in D Lyons (ed) Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory (1994) 147 152.  
6 R Dworkin ‘Rights as Trumps’ in J Waldron (ed) Theories of Rights (1984) 153 153. Cf R Dworkin Taking Rights 
Seriously (1977) xi (referring to rights as ‘trumps’, that is, their claims take precedence over considerations about the 
maximizing of social utility). 
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The notion of libertarian freedom is associated with the classical political 
philosophers, such as Locke, Hobbes, Smith, and Mill. Egalitarian freedom is associated 
with thinkers such as Hegel, Rousseau, Herder, and Marx. The libertarian theory claims 
that there are only “negative” rights, with duties correlating with rights7 and requiring 
each person to refrain from interfering with another’s freedom. Berlin defines negative 
liberty as the absence of constraints on, or interference with, agents’ possible action8 and 
positive liberty as self-mastery or the capacity to determine oneself, that is, to be in 
control of one’s destiny.9 Or to borrow Fabre’s chracterisation: “[N]egative rights ground 
negative duties of non-interference, they are not assigned to scarse goods and therefore 
do not conflict with one another; by contrast . . . positive rights ground positive duties to 
help and resources”.10  
Socio-economic rights, which are the subjects of this enquiry, are often regarded as 
positive because “they enhance the power of the government to do something for the 
person, to enable her or him in some way”.11 “Social rights” give people security, as they 
live together and learn together; “social and economic rights” give people social and 
economic security, including the right to food, shelter and health. Both categories of 
                                                 
7 See S van Duffel ‘Libertarian Natural Rights’ (2004) 16(4) Critical Review 353. 
8 I Berlin Four Essays on Liberty (1969) 121-2 (asking, “What is the area within which the subject—a person or group of 
persons—is or should be left to do or be what he is able to be, without interference by other persons?”). 
9 Above, 122 (asking, “What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this 
rather than that?”). 
10 C Fabre ‘Constitutionalising Social Rights’ (1998) 6 Journal of Political Philosophy 263 264. 
11 NJ Udombana ‘Articulating the Rights to Democratic Governance in Africa’ (2003) 24 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1209 1224. 
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rights “display a highly social orientation in the sense that they evolve to temper the 
equally highly individualistic orientation of first-generation rights”.12  
This Chapter defends the position that socio-economic rights constitute binding force 
of law or are parts of laws that can be broken or responded to in a non-determinative way.  
It argues that problems associated with these classes of rights are those of applicability, 
not validity,13 a distinction that is vital for clear and logical reasoning. Often, rights-
holders are unable to exercise their rights for a number of reasons, such as economic 
indigence and the social and political vulnerability of rights holders. Regarding economic 
indigence, available statistics show that the majority of Africans live in absolute 
poverty.14 (Poverty, in this sense, is defined in terms of per capita income, though such a 
criterion is usually defective for not taking into account other dimensions, such as lack of 
empowerment, opportunity, capacity and security.)15 Regarding social and political 
vulnerability of the rights-holder, Raz writes: 
 
People will go to court and insist on their rights only if they believe that they will not 
as a result lose their jobs and become unemployable, that their children will neither 
be expelled from their schools, nor persecuted in them, that their houses or cars will 
not be fire-bombed, etc.16 
                                                 
12 Above. 
13 See M Scheinin ‘Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights’ in A Eide C Krause & A Rosas (eds) Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (1995) 29. 
14 See, in general, World Bank World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (2000).  
15 See ‘More or Less Equal?’ The Economist 13 Mar 2004 73 75 (arguing that the “dollar-a-day threshold” for measuring 
poverty is “a crowded part of the global income distribution”). 
16 J Raz ‘The Importance of Rights and their Limits’ in A Sajo (ed) Western Rights? Post-Communist Application (1996) x. 
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1.2 The Problematic 
Certain policy makers, scholars, and segments of the civil society contest the claim that 
all human rights are normative and obligatory. Some even caution that a contrary claim 
could undermine the protection of those rights that are uncontroversial, presumably civil 
and political.17 According to critiques, an entitlement qualifies as a human right if it is 
fundamental and universal, definable in justiciable form, clear on who has the duty to 
uphold or implement the right, and has a responsible agency with capacity to fulfil its 
obligation in relation to the right.18 Since socio-economic rights do not meet these 
criteria, critiques conclude, they do not qualify as ‘legal’ rights.  
Thus, when some Western governments include the promotion of human rights in 
their foreign policy goals, their concerns are for basic freedoms—respect for life and 
limb, personal liberty, freedom of religion, conviction, movement, information and 
expression—rather than some ‘nebulous’ phenomena as poverty, malnutrition, disease, 
destitution, illiteracy, or unemployment. Even those governments that support equal 
status for socio-economic rights have generally failed to take steps necessary to provide 
concrete protections.19 Yet, these Western countries are not immune from the morbidities 
that afflict the rest of humanity. The 2005 Katrina disaster in the United States (US) 
                                                 
17 See eg D Miller (ed) The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (1987) 224 (“Declarations of rights have 
sometimes been presented as statements of self-evident truths which therefore require only to be announced. This approach 
is, at best, implausible and invites the opponent of human rights to dismiss them as no more than a set of prejudices”). 
18 See D Beetham ‘What Future for Economic and Social Rights?’ (1995) 43 Political Studies 41 41-42. Cf EW Vierdag 
‘The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1978) 9 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 69 (“In order to be a legal right, a right must be legally definable; only then 
can it be legally enforced, only then can it be said to be justiciable”). 
19 See S Leckie ‘The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Right to Adequate Housing: 
Towards an Appropriate Approach’ (1989) 11 Human Rights Quarterly 522 525-26 (discussing the relative lack of state 
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demonstrated that “the rich also cries”; it exposed the terrible vulnerability of some of its 
populations—mostly African-Americans. Sen rightly maintains that: 
 
The richer countries too often have deeply disadvantaged people, who lack basic 
opportunities of health care, or functional education, or gainful employment, or 
economic and social security. Even within very rich countries, sometimes the 
longevity of substantial groups is no higher than that in much poorer economies of 
the so-called third world.20 
 
Where certain international instruments seek to protect socio-economic rights, states 
generally interpret them as programmatic clauses, obligating governments and 
legislatures to pursue economic and social policies without creating individual claims. 
The problem started during the drafting of the international human rights covenants. The 
United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights (CHR), recently reconstituted into 
the Human Rights Council, was split on the question of whether to elaborate one or two 
covenants to give legal effects to the rights guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).21 When the General Assembly (GA) was seized of the question 
in 1950, it emphasised the interdependence of all categories of rights and called on the 
CHR to adopt a single covenant.22 The CHR itself came to favour this line of thought, 
                                                                                                                                                 
action in spite of numerous resolutions affirming the indivisibility of human rights and the legal validity of socio-economic 
rights). 
20 See A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 15. 
21 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 10 Dec 1948 GA Res 217 A (III) GAOR 3d Sess [hereinafter 
UDHR] pmbl. 
22 See GA Res 421(V) of 4 Dec 1950. 
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insisting that all rights are deserving of equal protection and thus “all rights should be 
promoted and protected at the same time”.23  
By 1952, however, Western states succeeded in lobbying the GA to reverse the 
decision. The GA asked the CHR to divide the rights contained in the UDHR into two 
separate covenants.24 The result of this Cold War aberration was the two Human Rights 
Covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights25 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.26 These two 
instruments, together with the UDHR, constitute the international bill of rights. 
Finally, when non-governmental organisations (NGOs), especially first-generation 
NGOs,27 campaign against abuses of human rights by states, they invariably focus on 
protection of life, limb, and liberty, arguably because the human rights movement 
evolved out of concern for political dissidents. Some leading international NGOs have 
been openly hostile to the idea of recognizing socio-economic concerns as legal 
entitlements. Human Rights Watch (HRW), for example, considered socio-economic 
concerns as “equities” and advanced what Mutua calls “its own nebulous interpretation of 
‘indivisible human rights’ which related civil and political rights to survival, subsistence, 
                                                 
23 Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights UN GAOR 10th Sess Annex Agenda 
Item 28 pt II ch V at 8 UN Doc A/2929 (1955). 
24 See M Nowak Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime (2003) 78-9. See also J Morsink The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent (1999) ch 1 (for an in-depth discussion of the drafting process 
and ultimate decision to divide the Covenant into two treaties). 
25 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted 16 Dec 1966 entry into force 23 Mar 1976 GA Res 
2200 A (XXI); UN GAOR 21st Sess Supp No 16 UN Doc A/6316 (1966) 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
26 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted 16 Dec 1966 entry into force 23 Mar 1976 
993 UNTS 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
27 The first-generation NGOs included Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and Human Rights 
Watch. The notable exception in terms of advocacy for socio-economic rights was the New York based Centre for 
Economic and Social Rights. For a critique of NGOs and their restrictive mandates, see J Gathii & C Nyamu Note, 
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and poverty, ‘assertions’ of good that it did not explicitly call rights.”28 In 1993, Aryeh 
Neier, then Executive Director of HRW, expressed a position that probably reflected the 
ideology of first generation human rights NGOs. According to Neier: 
 
When it comes to the question of what are called economic rights, I’m on the side of 
the spectrum which feels that the attempt to describe economic concerns as rights is 
misguided. I think that when one expresses this opinion, it is often thought that one is 
denigrating the significance of economic misery and inequities. I would like not to be 
accused of that. I regard economic equity and economic misery as matters of enormous 
significance. I just don’t think that it’s useful to define them in terms of rights.29 
 
The next segment examines some traditional claims against socio-economic rights, as 
a template for literature review. It asserts that socio-economic rights are human rights, 
embodying legal obligations and entrusting their holders with powers to enforce them, 
whether or not they actually do so.30  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Reflections on United States-Based Human Rights NGOs’ Work on Africa’ (1996) 9 Harvard Human Rights Journal 285 
291. 
28 M Mutua ‘The Ideology of Human Rights’ (1996) 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 589 618.  
29 A Neier Remarks to East Asian Legal Studies & Human Rights Program Symposium (Harvard Law School) (8 May 
1993) in Human Rights and Foreign Policy: A Symposium (1994) 16 cited in Mutua ‘The Ideology of Human Rights’  
(note 28 above) 618. 
30 See Raz (note 16 above) ix (arguing, however, that, the exercise of legal rights are subject to the extent to which courts 
are willing to enforce them and that courts do not often fulfil their functions as enforcers of rights, “given the nature of 
their political culture, and the forms of recruitment to the judiciary and the terms of service of judges; as above, x). 
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1.3 Examining the Claims 
Critics assert that socio-economic rights are incapable of meeting the purported criteria 
for recognition as human rights. They argue that such ‘rights’ are not justiciable, that is, 
they are not such that courts could provide a remedy for aggrieved individuals claiming 
their violations.31 They claim that socio-economic rights are mutually exclusive vis-à-vis 
civil and political rights; that they are couched in language that makes their judicial 
enforceability difficult, if not impossible; and that they require costly programmes of 
positive state action for their implementation. How could we treat a thing that depends on 
the availability of, often, scarce and unpredictable resources as a right in the real sense of 
the term? 
For analytical convenience, these claims could be labelled the divisibility, policy, 
vagueness and cost arguments. I shall interrogate each of these arguments in turn, but 
with liberty to take reasoned personal positions. I will argue that the justiciability debate 
is more ideological or cultural than jurisprudential. 
 
1.3.1 The Divisibility Argument 
Arguments on the divisibility of human rights have bearings on the justiciability of socio-
economic rights. Some Western States have failed to ratify a number of treaties dealing 
with socio-economic rights on the ground that they are merely “aspirational”. During the 
                                                 
31 For views on justiciability, see, in general, Report of the Expert’s Roundtable Concerning Issues Central to the Proposed 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2002); M Craven ‘The 
Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in R Burchill D Harris & A Owers (eds) Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Their Implementation in UK Law (1999) 1; De Vos P ‘Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Human 
Rights? Social and Economic Rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution’ (1997) 13 South African Journal of Human 
Rights 67; M Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its 
Development (1995); C Scott & P Macklem ‘Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a 
New South African Constitution’ (1992) 141 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1; and Vierdag (note 18 above). 
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Cold War, the US Government classified this category of entitlements as a socialist 
manifesto thinly veiled in the language of rights. Except for the Carter and, to a limited 
extent, Clinton administrations, every post World War II US Administration has treated 
socio-economic rights with scepticism, sometimes with open hostility. The Reagan 
administration particularly took the view that these concepts were “societal goals” rather 
than human rights,32 which probably explains why the US has failed to ratify ICESCR, 
though President Carter signed it in 1977.33 
Whatever else is true, it is emphatically not true that socio-economic, civil and 
political rights are mutually exclusive; rather, the contemporary norms of human rights 
form an indivisible and interdependent whole. “The linkages between different types of 
freedom,” says Sen, “are empirical and causal, rather than constitutive and 
compositional”.34 Designers of the UDHR—the world’s Magna Carta—were definitely 
conscious of these linkages when they included civil and political as well as socio-
economic rights as integrated and interrelated scheme of rights.35 The UDHR declares: 
“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law”;36 and 
there is no reason why this right to an effective remedy should apply only to civil and 
political rights.  
                                                 
32 See US statement in UN Doc A/40/C3/36 5 (1985). See also B Stark ‘Economic Rights in the United States and 
International Human Rights Law: Toward an ‘Entirely New Strategy’’ (1992) 44 Hastings Law Journal 79 82. 
33 See NH Kaufman Human Rights Treaties and the Senate: A History of Opposition (1990) 74-78. 
34 See Sen (note 20 above) xii (arguing, “there is strong evidence that economic and political freedoms help to reinforce 
one another, rather than being hostile to one another (as they are sometimes taken to be”)). 
35 See, in general, UDHR (note 21 above) art 3-21 (covering civil and political rights) and art 22-28 (covering economic, 
social and cultural rights). 
36 Above, art 8. 
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As previously stated, the two treaties that implement the UDHR—the ICCPR and 
ICESCR—divide the rights into separate documents, but they both declare that the full 
and equal enjoyment of all human rights is a prerequisite to human freedom.37 Both the 
UN Declaration on the Right to Development (DRD)38 and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC)39 adopt integrated approaches to human rights and reinforce their 
indivisibility and interdependence. The DRD, which is a norm-candidate on the right to 
development, provides: “All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and 
interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the 
implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights”.40 
The CRC was the first universal human rights treaty to integrate civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights. It deals with four broad categories of rights. The first 
category is survival rights, such as adequate food, shelter, clean water and primary health 
care. The second category is protection from abuse, neglect and exploitation, such as the 
right to special protection in times of war. The third category is developmental rights, 
such as the upbringing of a child in a safe environment, through formal education, 
constructive play and advanced health care. The last category is participatory rights, such 
as a child’s participation in the social, economic, religious and political life of the 
                                                 
37 See ICCPR (note 25 above) pmbl (“Recognizing that, in accordance with the [UDHR], the ideal of free human beings 
enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created 
whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights....”); and 
ICESCR (note 26 above) pmbl (“Recognizing that, in accordance with the [UDHR], the ideal of free human beings 
enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his 
economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights...”). 
38 Declaration on the Right to Development GA Res 41/128 4 Dec 1986 [hereinafter DRD]. 
39 Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted 20 Nov 1989 UN Doc A/44/736 (1989) 1577 UNTS 3 reprinted in 
(1989) 28 International Legal Materials 1457 [hereinafter CRC]. 
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community, expression of opinions, and the right to a say in matters affecting the child’s 
life. 
The international community reaffirmed the indivisibility and interdependence of all 
human rights during the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna. The 
subsequent Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action clearly stated: 
 
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, 
on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national 
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds 
must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic 
and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.41 
 
Some regional human rights instruments also bridge the dualities between civil and 
political rights and their socio-economic counterparts. This integration is probably the 
most significant contribution that the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights42 
makes to the development of international human rights.43 The Charter predates the CRC 
and other universal human rights treaties that also integrate all rights. The imperative to 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 DRD (note 38 above) art 6(2). 
41 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action A/CONF157/23 12 July 1993 para 5 (1993) 32 International Legal 
Materials 1661. 
42 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted 27 June 1981 entry into force 21 Oct 1986 Doc 
OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev5 (1982) 21 International Legal Materials 59 [hereinafter African Charter or Charter]. 
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integrate all rights in Africa predates even the African Charter. In 1979, the then OAU 
mandated its Secretary-General to organise a meeting of experts to prepare a preliminary 
draft of an African human rights treaty.44 The document containing that mandate stressed, 
inter alia, 
 
the importance that the African peoples have always attached to the respect for 
human dignity and the fundamental human rights bearing in mind that human and 
peoples’ rights are not confined to civil and political rights but cover economic, 
social and cultural problems and that the distinction between these two categories of 
rights does not have any hierarchical implications but that it is nevertheless essential 
to give special attention to economic, social and cultural rights in future.45 
 
Thus, rather than distinguish between the various categories of rights, the African 
Charter affirms the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights in these 
eloquent words:  
 
[I]t is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right to development 
and … civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and 
cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 See F Viljoen ‘Africa’s Contribution to the Development of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ 1 
African Human Rights Law Journal (2001) 18 20. 
44 See OAU Decision on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Africa AHG/Dec 115 (XVI) Rev1 (1979) para 2(b). 
45 Above, pmbl. 
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economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights.46 
 
The Charter guarantees civil and political, socio-economic, and even solidarity 
rights47 and imposes absolute and immediate obligations for all categories48 of rights that 
everyone must enjoy without discrimination.49 Subsequent Africa’s regional human rights 
treaties have followed the African Charter’s template, notably the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child,50 and the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights 
of Women in Africa.51  
A corollary to the divisibility argument is the question whether the realisation of 
socio-economic rights requires any particular form of government or economic system. 
The myth in the human rights literature is that the Western approach to human rights rests 
on a near exclusive commitment to civil and political rights; that, “[i]n Western capitalist 
states economic and social rights are perceived as not within the purview of state 
responsibility”.52 Yet, as Donnelly rightly argues, “it is hard to imagine that anyone 
                                                 
46 See African Charter (note 42 above) pmbl. 
47 See, in general, arts 3 – 24. For analysis, see NJ Udombana ‘Between Promise and Performance: Revisiting States’ 
Obligations under the African Human Rights Charter’ (2004) 40(1) Stanford Journal of International Law 105 112-118. 
48 See African Charter (note 42 above) art 1. 
49 Above, art 2. 
50 Cf African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child adopted 11 July 1990 entry into force 28 Nov 1999 OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/TSG/Rev 1 [hereinafter African Child Charter]. 
51 Cf Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa adopted 11 July 
2003 [hereinafter Women Protocol]. 
52 A Pollis & P Schwab ‘Introduction’ in A Pollis & P Schwab (eds) Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives 
(1980) xiii. 
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looking at the welfare state of Western Europe could make such claims seriously”.53 
Within the African milieu, it may be argued that the realisation of socio-economic rights 
does not require nor preclude any particular form of government or economic system 
being used as the necessary vehicle, whether democratic or autocratic governments or 
socialist, capitalist, mixed, centrally planned, or laissez-faire economic systems. 
In sum, the present writer joins the company of earlier scholars in asserting the 
indivisibility and inter-relatedness of all human rights. It is futile to split rights, just as it 
is futile to split life up into politics, economics, humanities, and religion. These things are 
completely integrated and mutually supporting. Numerous judicial testimonies from 
diverse jurisdictions fortify this conclusion. In the Grootboom case, the South African 
Constitutional Court observed: “There can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and 
equality, the foundational values of our society, are denied those who have no food, 
clothing or shelter”.54 Affording socio-economic rights to all enables them to enjoy civil 
and political rights as well. Social opportunities of education and health care, says Sen, 
complement individual opportunities of economic and political participation while also 
helping to foster individuals’ initiatives in overcoming their respective deprivations.55 For 
De Vos, “[s]tarving people may find it difficult to exercise their freedom of speech while 
                                                 
53 J Donnelly Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd ed 2003) 111. See also J Donnelly ‘Human Rights, 
Democracy and Development’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 608 629-30 (noting the use of the welfare system by all 
existing liberal democracies to compensate some of “those who fare less well in the market” and that this system “remains 
a powerful force in all existing liberal democratic regimes and a central source of their legitimacy”). 
54 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Ors [2000] 11 BCLR 1169 para 23 (CC) [Grootboom 
case]. Cf Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) [hereinafter Certification case] (holding that the right of access to adequate housing 
cannot be viewed in isolation and its close relationship with other socio-economic rights must be taken into account in 
determining state obligations, together with its social and historical context). 
55 Sen (note 20 above), xii. 
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a restriction of freedom of speech may make it difficult for individuals to enforce their 
right of access to housing”.56 These observations are true at all times and in all places. 
 
1.3.2 The Policy or Separation of Powers Argument 
Another principal objection to the justiciability of socio-economic rights rests on three 
separation of power concerns.57 Critics claim that socio-economic rights relate to claims 
to delivery of goods and that they “raise policy decisions about the redistribution of 
resources [and] fundamental decisions should be made politically rather than 
judicially”.58 Only the legislature and not the judiciary, the argument continues, has the 
power to make allocations for socio-economic funding59 and insisting on their 
justiciability means that courts must direct the way government distributes state’s 
resources, a task they are ill suited to perform. Courts, says Ruth Ginsburg, “are 
accustomed to telling government what it may not do; they are not, by tradition or 
staffing, well-equipped to map out elaborate programs detailing what the government 
                                                 
56 De Vos (note 31 above) 71. See also WT Milner T Wesley & C Steven ‘Security Rights, Subsistence Rights, and 
Liberties: A Theoretical Survey of the Empirical Landscape’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 403 413 (underscoring the 
inextricable link between abuses of personal integrity inherent in not being free from wants and violations of political 
liberties). 
57 See MS Kende ‘The South African Constitutional Court’s Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective’ (2003) 6 Chapman Law Review 137 150-54 (for a review of these objections). See, in general, M Tushnet 
‘Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review’ (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1895 (reviewing reasons for the 
judicial non-recognition of social welfare rights). 
58 Y Ghai ‘An Approach to the Implementation of Economic and Social Rights’ a paper prepared for Interights Advisory 
Council Meeting London 7-9 July 2000 cited in Lord Lester & C O’Cinneide ‘The Effective Protection of Socio-Economic 
Rights’ in Y Ghai & J Cottrell (eds) Economic, Social & Cultural Rights in Practice: The Role of Judges in Implementing 
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (2004) 17 18 [hereinafter Economic, Social & Cultural Rights in Practice]. 
59 See eg P Monahan Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme Court of Canada (1987) 126 
(noting the fiscal implications of judicially enforced social welfare rights); and Tushnet Social Welfare Rights (note 57 
above), 1897. 
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must do”.60 The judiciary is said to be an elite and undemocratically appointed branch of 
state, thus lacking “the democratic legitimacy necessary to decide the essentially political 
question of how to divide social resources between factions, groups, and communities in 
society”.61 
Objections persist even for constitutions that recognize judicially enforceable socio-
economic rights, that when courts enforce such rights, they have to get legislatures to 
raise or divert taxes. Thus, “[t]he conventional wisdom concludes that constitutions with 
judicially enforceable social welfare rights are even more strongly counter-democratic 
than those with traditional civil liberties and civil rights”.62 Some judicial authorities, 
particularly in the US, support these claims. In Dandridge v Williams,63 the US Supreme 
Court maintained, “the Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state 
officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare 
funds among the myriad of potential recipients”.64 In Lindsey v Normet,65 the Court 
confirmed its reluctance to ‘interfere’ in public welfare issues when it held: “Absent 
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord 
tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions”.66  
                                                 
60 RB Ginsburg ‘An Overview of Court Review for Constitutionality in the United States’ (1997) 57 Louisiana Law 
Review 1019 1026. 
61 J de Waal I Currie & G Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook (2001) 433 (5th ed 2004). 
62 Tushnet Social Welfare Rights (note 57 above), 1897. 
63 Dandridge v Williams 397 US 471 (1970).   
64 As above, 487 (stressing that the “problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this 
Court”). 
65 Lindsey v Normet 405 US 56 (1972). 
66 As above, 74. 
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The second objection is that the judiciary lacks the competence to make ‘intractable’ 
decisions that socio-economic rights entail.67 In San Antonio Independent School District 
v Rodriguez,68 the US Supreme Court stressed that the judiciary does not possess “the 
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise 
decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues”,69 adding that its 
“lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference 
with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels”.70 The third objection is 
the presumption that it is easier for courts to enforce ‘negative’ civil and political rights 
than ‘positive’ socio-economic rights. Judges, says Tushnet, “may believe that their 
efforts to direct legislatures to raise substantial revenues are more likely to be 
systematically disregarded than their efforts to direct legislatures to modify particular 
laws”.71  
These objections raise a fundamental question about the nature of human rights 
remedies. The essential question is whether a right to an effective remedy must always 
involve or require a judicial remedy? The drafting history and adoption of the Human 
Rights Covenants may have provided the first sets of weapons for the battles on 
justiciability. Whereas the ICCPR required its States Parties to “develop the possibilities 
                                                 
67 See Dandridge v Williams (note 63 above) 487. See also DM Davis ‘The Case Against the Inclusion of Socioeconomic 
Demands in a Bill of Rights Except as Directive Principles’ (1992) 8 South African Journal of Human Rights 475. 
68 San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez 411 US 1 (1973) (ruling that Texas’ public education financing 
scheme was consistent with equal protection and substantive due process, despite dramatic school district disparities in per 
student funding). The Court maintained that the law did not burden either a suspect class nor a fundamental right. Above, 
54-55. 
69 As above, 41. 
70 As above, 42. 
71 Tushnet Social Welfare Rights (note 57 above), 1897 n 10. 
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of judicial remedy”,72 there was no equivalent provision in the ICESCR. A contrario, it 
was suggested—during the drafting of the ICESCR—that complaints “could only refer to 
insufficient programme in the attainment of certain goals and it would be impossible for 
the committee to determine what the rate of progress in any particular case should be”.73 
The fact is that justiciability itself is “not a legal concept with a fixed content or 
susceptible of scientific verification”;74 it is a variable concept that largely depends on the 
issue to be adjudicated upon and the constitutional role envisaged for the court.75 Three 
things, in general, are necessary to make a matter justiciable. The first is the nature of the 
disputes; the second is the interest of the parties to the disputes; and the third is the 
availability of a remedy.76 Otherwise stated, a matter will be regarded as justiceable if it 
affects a person’s legal rights or relations; or if the person making the allegation is able to 
show that the violation has injuriously affected his legal rights or relations by the 
infliction of actual harm or threat of it; or if a judicial remedy is available for the redress 
of the wrong or violation complained of.77 The last requirement—the availability of a 
remedy—is “perhaps the most difficult element in the concept of justiciability”,78 but the 
answer turns on the nature of judicial power.  
                                                 
72 ICCPR (note 25 above) art 2(3)(b). 
73 UN Doc A/2929/C3 124 para 41 cited in Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(note 31 above) 101. 
74 Poe v Ullman (1961) 367 US 497 508. 
75 See Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (note 31 above) 28. 
76 See BO Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (1977) 15-16. 
77 Above. 
78 Above, 16. 
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A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces rights and liabilities as they 
stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.79 Although 
enforcement is an attribute of judicial power, it is not an essential element of every 
judicial decision. A judicial function may stop short of enforcement. It may simply 
ascertain and declare existing rights; and “[a] declaration of right is not any less judicial 
because it is not coupled with a coercive order”.80 Human rights, in this view, are not less 
justiciable because the rights-holder may stop short of obtaining some judicial awards for 
breaches. Sometimes, all that is required is an injunctive relief to prevent some actions 
(for example, compulsory acquisition of farmlands) that could impinge on human 
welfare. Socio-economic rights can, at the very minimum, be negatively protected from 
improper invasion.81 
The right to an effective remedy need not be interpreted as always requiring a 
judicial remedy.82 The ordinary laws of a state are not always in courts and they are not 
less normative because courts have not made pronouncements on them. Human rights 
certainly do require implementation and making socio-economic rights justiciable helps 
to clarify their legal basis and puts their human-rightness beyond any reasonable doubt, 
but their relevance is not necessarily exhausted by litigation.83 Indeed, “to define a right 
                                                 
79 See Prentis v Atlantic Court Line Co 211 US 210 266. 
80 N Udombana ‘Concept of Judicial Review’ (1991) 11(2) Justice 53 56. 
81 See Certification case (note 54 above) para 78. Cf Grootboom case (note 54 above) para 34 (where the Constitutional 
Court read into section 26 of the South African Constitution “a negative obligation placed upon the state and other entities 
and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to adequate housing”). 
82 See ‘The Domestic Application of the Covenant’ Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General 
Comment 9 UN Doc E/C12/1998/24 3 Dec 1998 para 9 [hereinafter General Comment 9]. 
83 See J Cottrell & Y Ghai ‘The Role of the Courts in the Protection of Economic, Social & Cultural Rights’ in Economic, 
Social & Cultural Rights in Practice (note 58 above) 58 60 (noting further: “Human rights have a moral force which can 
be mobilised even in the absence of judicial enforcement”). As above. 
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by reference to the ability of the party upon whom the obligation lies—the state—to 
provide it immediately” or by the existence of a legal course of action to vindicate it is 
not the test of existence of rights under international law.84 If, as An-Na’im persuasively 
advances, “[t]he essential purpose of human rights is to ensure the effective protection of 
certain fundamental entitlements for all human beings, everywhere, without distinction 
on such grounds as race, sex or religion”, then it does not matter if such entitlements are 
protected through courts or other mechanisms.85 
The UDHR does not limit the choices open to states for the implementation of the 
rights it declares. It simply urges states to create whatever social and international orders 
that are necessary for their protection.86 Claims based on socio-economic rights are not 
incapable of being justiciable merely because they would require courts to dictate to the 
state how it should allocate scarce resources. While it may be true that courts are ill-
equipped to decide such matters, this does not bar consideration of the substantive claim. 
The question of whether a conventional or constitutional right exists can be addressed 
without being concerned with whether, or how much of, a state’s expenditure is 
necessary to secure the right, something that is non-justiciable.87  
                                                 
84 R Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994) 99-100 (adding, “to the international 
lawyer, the existence of a right is tested by reference to the sources of international law”). See also MF Tinta ‘Justiciability 
of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights: Beyond 
Traditional Paradigms and Notions’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 431 434. 
85 A An-Na’im ‘To Affirm the Full Human Rights Standing of Economic, Social & Cultural Rights’ in Economic, Social & 
Cultural Rights in Practice (note 58 above) 7 8. See also A Eide ‘Future Protection of Economic and Social Rights in 
Europe’ in A Bloed et al (ed) Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing International Procedures and Mechanisms 
(1993) 187 214. 
86 UDHR (note 21 above) art 28. 
87 Cf Gosselin v Attorney General of Quebec & Ors [2002] SCC 84 [Canadian SC] (particularly the dissenting opinion of 
Arbour J). 
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It is not even entirely correct to assert that courts are incapable of striking a balance 
between the goal of social justice and the necessity of management to achieve the 
effective use of resources, since the two discourses are complementary and 
interdependent and not antagonistic or even alternative. Deciding on the full operational 
definition of a right, as the South African Constitutional Court demonstrated in 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal,88 requires “agonizing choices” to be 
made about cost efficiency and vexing trade-offs. Such intertwined decisions, according 
to Steiner, “are vital to the very content and significance of the right”.89 
 
1.3.3 The Vagueness Argument 
The third claim against socio-economic rights is that they are often couched in languages 
that are too imprecise to be judicially enforceable, compared to their civil and political 
counterparts.90 Vierdag has written that the word “right” in the ICESCR appears to be 
used in a moral and hortatory sense91 and that “except in circumstances of minimal or 
minor economic, social or cultural relevance”, these rights “are of such a nature as to be 
legally negligible”.92 Some commentators further argue that treaties guaranteeing socio-
economic rights tend to be drafted more in the form of state obligations rather than of 
                                                 
88 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SALR 765 (CC) [hereinafter Soobramoney case] (refusing 
to hold that a seriously ill patient asking the state to provide him with life-saving treatment could rely on the right to life 
provision in the Bill of Rights). 
89 HJ Steiner ‘Social Rights and Economic Development: Converging Discourses?’ (1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law 
Review 25 33. 
90 See RR Churchill & U Khaliq ‘The Collective Complaints System of the European Social Charter: An Effective 
Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic and Social Rights?’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International 
Law 417 419. 
91 Vierdag (note 18 above) 103. 
92 As above 105. 
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rights, whereas those guaranteeing civil and political rights are usually couched in 
languages that directly establish individual rights.  
To illustrate, the ICCPR commits its State Parties “to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals ... the rights recognized in the present Covenant”.93 Under the ICESCR, each 
State Party “undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”.94 Such a lack of clarity is 
said to have normative implications.95 The key argument, according to McGoldrick, was 
that, “whatever the merits of the debate as to the primacy of the categories of rights, the 
nature of the general obligation to implement was different and the two categories called 
for different implementation systems”.96 
The ICESCR was not the first treaty to adopt a progressive realisation clause; some of 
the earliest conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted the 
“means test” to cater for the low level of development in some less industrialised 
countries. The Convention on Social Security (Minimum Standards)97 allowed a state, in 
                                                 
93 ICCPR (note 25 above) art 2(1). 
94 ICESCR (note 26 above) art 2(1). Some constitutional guarantees are similarly worded. The Constitution of South 
Africa 1996 urges the State to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the right to adequate housing. Constitution of South Africa 1996 sec 26(2). Cf sec 27(1)–(2) 
(declaring that the state must take “reasonable . . . measures, within its available resources” to provide everyone with 
healthcare services). 
95 See P Alston ‘No Right to Complain About Being Poor: The Need for an Optional Protocol to the Economic Rights 
Covenant’ in A Eide & J Helgesen (eds) The Future of Human Rights Protection in a Challenging World: Fifty Years Since 
the Four Freedoms Address: Essays in Honour of Torkel Opsahl (1991) 79 86 (mentioning articles 6 to 9 of the ICESCR 
as notable exceptions). 
96 D McGoldrick ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ in M Freeman (ed) Children’s Rights (vol II 
2004) 79 80. 
97 The Convention on Social Security (Minimum Standards) (No 102) of 1952 [hereinafter Convention 102]. 
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the case of insufficient financial or medical capacity, to ratify the Convention and avail 
itself of temporarily less stringent conditions concerning the duration of benefits and 
categories of protected persons.98 A comparison of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR)99 and the European Social Charter (ESC)100 also reveals verbal 
differences. The ECHR, which guarantees essentially civil and political rights, provides: 
“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law.”101 The ESC, which deals with socio-economic rights, provides: “With a view to 
ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social security, the Contracting Parties 
undertake: (1) to establish the effective exercise of the right to social security”.102  
The vagueness problem, says critics, is compounded by the weak institutions usually 
established to implement socio-economic rights, compared to their civil and political 
counterparts, which usually provide for a system of individual complaints. Periodic 
reports are the most often used mechanisms for international supervision of socio-
economic rights. The ICESCR provides: “The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to submit in conformity with this part of the Covenant reports on the measures 
                                                 
98 Above, art 3. 
99 See eg European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms opened for signature 4 
Nov 1950 ETS No 5 213 UNTS 221 as amended by Protocol No 11 (entry into force 1 Nov 1998) ETS No 155 (1994) 33 
International Legal Material 960 [hereinafter European Convention or ECHR]. 
100 See eg European Social Charter adopted 18 Oct 1961 entry into force on 26 Feb 1965 (1965) UKTS 38 Cmnd 2643; 
529 UNTS 89-139; 35 ETS [hereinafter ESC]. 
101 ECHR (note 99 above) art 5. 
102 ESC (note 100 above) art 12. 
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which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights 
recognized herein”.103 To say that a right is “enforceable”, says Vierdag, 
 
mean[s] that an authority of the state (or, for that matter, an international authority) is 
competent to receive complaints about violations of the right by anyone—executive 
state organ, official or private person—and to give redress by cancelling or rectifying 
the violating act or regulation, or by awarding compensation for damage, or both. If 
the authority in question is a court of law, the term ‘justiciable’ may be preferred.104 
 
These claims are valid partial truths, but false total truths. They beg the question 
whether the international community can treat certain treaties as law while rejecting 
others, though the all passed the treaty-making criteria and were duly executed by states 
parties. Assuming, without conceding, the vagueness argument, it remains “the essence 
of the judicial craft” to give “some precise, principled content” to “even the most vague 
and general text”.105 In any event, many civil and political rights are not necessarily more 
precise in their nature. The actual meaning of torture has achieved precision not through 
its legal prohibition, but through the judicial construction of relevant treaty and 
constitutional provisions.106 The same holds for other civil and political rights.  
                                                 
103 ICESCR (note 26 above) art 16(1). Procedurally, such reports are submitted to the UN Secretary-General, who 
transmits copies to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for consideration, in accordance with the provisions of 
the Covenant. As above, art 16(2)(a). 
104 Vierdag (note 18 above) 73. 
105 A Scalia ‘The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules’ (1989) University of Chicago Law Review 1175 1183. 
106 See Tinta (note 84 above) 434 (arguing that by depriving judicial enforcement mechanisms to treaties on socio-
economic rights, states, in fact, have deprived precision to these rights and prevent the development of the content of 
obligations and the judicial means to vindicate them). As above. 
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It is not even true that the language of socio-economic rights is vague in all treaties. 
The socio-economic rights provisions in the Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990)107 are couched in precise 
language. As an example, the Convention provides:  
 
Migrant workers and members of their families shall have the right to receive any 
medical care that is urgently required for the preservation of their life or the 
avoidance of irreparable harm to their health on the basis of equality of treatment 
with nationals of the State concerned. Such emergency medical care shall not be 
refused them by reason of any irregularity with regard to stay or employment.108 
 
All rights in the African Charter are worded in precise language, such as, “Every 
individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental 
health”;109 or, “Every individual shall have the right to education”.110 
 Second, there is nothing inherent in socio-economic rights preventing judicial 
determination of their contents. The ‘1503 Procedure’, established by the CHR,111 does 
not make any distinction as to the categorisation of rights in question. Some right-specific 
                                                 
107 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, GA Res 45/158 18 
Dec 1990 (not yet in force). 
108 Above, art 28. 
109 African Charter (note 42 above) art 16(1). 
110 Above, art 17. 
111 The 1503 procedure, called after the resolution of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) that established it 
[ECOSOC Res 1503 (XLVII) of 27 May 1970], is the oldest human rights complaint mechanism in the UN system. Under 
this procedure the CHR, a political body composed of State representatives, generally deals with situations in countries 
rather than individual complaints. The procedure was substantially amended in 2000 by the ECOSOC to make it more 
efficient, to facilitate dialogue with governments concerned and to provide for a more meaningful debate in the final stages 
of a complaint before the CHR. 
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treaties also cover a broad spectrum of different rights and impose absolute and 
immediate obligations for all categories of rights that they guarantee and make 
allowances for the means available to states to fulfil them. Among these are the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,112 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,113 the 
African Child Charter and the Women Protocol. The Race Convention, which establishes 
the right of individual petition,114 does not distinguish between the different types of 
rights protected by its Article 5. 
The rights-oriented character of the ICESCR is evident right from its preamble, 
which declares that socio-economic rights are based on the inherent dignity of all human 
beings, and respond to the ideal that all human beings may be free “from fear and want”. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) cites certain 
provisions of the ICESCR that are capable of immediate implementation,115 such as those 
relating to equality;116 fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value;117 the 
right to unionise, including the organic right to strike;118 and special measures of 
                                                 
112 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination opened for signature 7 Mar 1966 
entry into force 4 Jan 1969 660 UNTS 195 [hereinafter Race Convention]. 
113 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women opened for signature 1 Mar 1980 27 
UST 1909 TIAS No 8289 1249 UNTS 14 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
114 See Race Convention (note 112 above) art 14. 
115 See CESCR General Comment 3 ‘The Nature of State Parties’ Obligations (art 2(1) para 1 of the Covenant)’ (5th session 
1990) UN Doc E/1991/23 Annex III para 5. The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, though a soft-law, also establishes a list of violations of socio-economic rights with a view to facilitating an 
adjudicative exercise. ‘The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 
Human Rights Quarterly 691 693–94 [hereinafter Maastricht Guidelines]. 
116 See ICESCR (note 26 above) art 3. 
117 Above, art 7(a)(i). 
118 Above, art 8. 
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protection and assistance to children.119 Others are provisions relating to primary 
education, liberty of parents to choose their children’s schools, and liberty to establish 
educational institutions;120 and freedom to undertake scientific research and creative 
activity.121 The CESCR envisages the use of judicially determined local remedies for 
violations of ICESCR and insists on recognising ICESCR norms in appropriate ways 
within their domestic legal order.  
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has also shown that the 
protection of socio-economic rights is possible; in any event, the African Charter affords 
such protection. The Social & Economic Rights Action Centre v Nigeria122 is emblematic 
of the emergent international case law on socio-economic rights in Africa. There, the 
Commission held that “collective rights, environmental rights, and economic and social 
rights are essential elements of human rights in Africa … [and that] there is no right in 
the African Charter that cannot be made effective”.123 As the present writer remarked, 
“SERAC and its progeny will have great significance in the development of human rights 
jurisprudence in Africa, as these decisions have the ability to positively affect domestic 
courts’ interpretation and application of [socio-economic] rights”.124 
                                                 
119 Above, art 10(3). 
120 Above, art 13(2)(a) (3) & (4). 
121 Above, art 15(3). 
122 See Social & Economic Rights Action Center & Anor v Nigeria Comm No 155/96 2001–2002 African Annual Activity 
Report Annex V [hereinafter SERAC case]. 
123 Above, para 68 (italics supplied). 
124 Udombana ‘Between Promise and Performance’ (note 47 above) 130. 
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The Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter, which provides for a 
System of Collective Complaints,125 recognises the rights of relevant international 
employers, labour unions, and international NGOs to submit complaints before the 
Committee of Independent Experts alleging unsatisfactory application of the Charter.126 
Similarly, the 1988 San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights127 allows a right to individual petition on rights to education and to organise.128 
The Protocol was the subject of an advisory opinion by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights of 17 September 2003129 challenging receiving-country governments to 
justify the curtailment of employment and labour rights for unauthorised migrant 
workers. The Court concluded that employment and labour rights must extend to all 
workers equally, regardless of their immigration status. This conclusion, according to 
Beth Lyon, “represents a significant expansion of labour and employment rights for 
unauthorized workers within the international legal community”.130 
As this thesis will illustrate in subsequent chapters, municipal jurisprudence clearly 
indicates that socio-economic rights are capable of judicial enforcement. The Indian and 
                                                 
125 See Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints concluded 9 
Nov 1995 entry into force 1 July 1998 ETS no 158 [hereinafter Addition Protocol to the ESC]. 
126 See above, art 1. 
127 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1988 (1988) OAS Treaty Series 69 (setting forth numerous labour, employment-related, and economic rights). 
128 Above, art 19(6). 
129 See Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants Inter-Am Ct HR (17 Sept 17 
2003) [hereinafter OC-18]. Mexico requested the advisory opinion, in response to a US Supreme Court decision that 
severely curtailed the labour law remedies available to unauthorised workers in the United States. See Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds Inc v NLRB 535 US 137 (2002) (involving an unauthorised Mexican worker who was fired after supporting a 
union organising campaign). 
130 B Lyon ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Defines Unauthorised Migrant Workers’ Rights for the 
Hemisphere: A Comment on Advisory Opinion 18 (2004) 28 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 547 
548. 
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South African courts have interpreted obligations in their constitutions and given 
remedies in ways that are both creative and inspiring. With the proposed adoption of the 
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, advocates of non-justiciability of socio-economic 
rights will soon be preaching to the choir.131 The proposal, which has reached an 
advanced stage of elaboration, is based largely on the first Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR132 and other communication procedures under existing UN human rights system. 
It empowers the CESCR to receive and consider individual complaints. Although debates 
about the desirability of such a complaint mechanism had been in the air for some 
years,133 the CESCR began studying the question of an optional protocol in 1990 and 
submitted a draft proposal for the CHR’s consideration in 1996.134 When the Optional 
Protocol is adopted, ratified and becomes international law, then decisions of the CESCR 
should constitute authoritative interpretations of the legally binding obligations of States 
Parties to the ICESCR, like its ICCPR counterpart. This means that violations of the 
ICESCR will attract liabilities and remedies, including the award of compensations.135 
                                                 
131 The decision to establish the Working Group was made pursuant to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Res 
2002/24 (Apr 22) para 9(f). For the subsequent ratification by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), see ECOSOC 
Dec 2002/254 (July 25). 
132 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR adopted 16 Dec 1966 999 UNTS 171. 
133 Proponents of a strong enforcement complaint mechanism argue that its absence in the ICESCR has marginalised 
socio-economic rights and stymied their full realisation. See M Dennis & D Stewart ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Should There be an International Complaint Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, 
Housing, and Health?’ (2004) 98(3) American Journal of International Law 462 463. See, in general, K Arambulo 
Strengthening the Supervision of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Theoretical and 
Procedural Aspects (1999); F Coomans & F van Hoof (eds) The Right to Complain about Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1995); M Nowak ‘The Need for an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (1995) Review of the International Commission of Jurists 153; K Tomasevski ‘Justiciability of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (1995) Review of the International Commission of Jurists 203; Alston ‘No Right to Complain 
About Being Poor’ (note 95 above) 79; and P Alston ‘Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 332. 
134 See UN Doc E/CN4/1997/105 annex (1996). 
135 Dennis & Stewart (note 133 above) 468. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
39
In summary, “the possibility and role of judicial enforcement should be assessed and 
developed in relation to each human right, instead of denying it to some purported class 
of rights because they do not fit the model of judicial enforcement of certain civil and 
political rights”.136 
 
1.3.4 The Cost Argument 
A final argument against socio-economic rights is that they are too expensive to 
implement, as they depend on ‘costly’ programmes of positive state action, compared to 
civil and political rights that require only negative action from the state—a “hands off” 
obligation. Vierdag asserts that because socio-economic rights are resource-intensive, 
their implementation should properly be a matter of politics rather than of law or 
rights.137 Some scholars on the African human rights system are strangely more strident 
in making this claim. Rembe argues that socio-economic rights are neither implementable 
nor enforceable in Africa, because of “the limitations and constraints of the African 
States”.138 For Gittleman, the realities of African economic development render socio-
                                                 
136 An-Na’im (note 85 above) 7. 
137 Vierdag (note 18 above) 103. 
138 NS Rembe The System of Protection of Human Rights Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Problems and Prospects (Lesotho 1991) 12. 
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economic rights merely “promotional and not protective”.139 Umozurike also maintains 
that African states cannot guarantee a right to work.140 
Studies show a linkage between economic development and the fulfilment of basic 
human needs;141 and the lack of resources or underdevelopment could truly hinder the 
fulfilment of socio-economic rights, but a failure to implement treaty or constitutional 
obligations does not derogate from their normativity.142 Even states that hoist the 
normative flag of civil and political rights cannot lay claim to a good conscience in terms 
of their implementation. A country’s prosperity and economic development is not 
necessarily a guarantee that its government will satisfy the basic needs of its citizens.143 
The decision to put two sets of rights in different treaties—ICCPR and ICESCR—
and to establish different supervisory mechanisms were well considered at that time and 
the underlying reasons for those distinctions appear to remain valid even today. However, 
as Dennis and Stewart argue, “[t]heir treatment in no way disqualified economic, social, 
and cultural rights as rights or relegated them to a lower hierarchical rung. It did reflect 
an assessment of the practical difficulties that states would face in implementing 
                                                 
139 R Gittleman ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis’ (1982) 22 Virginia Journal of 
International law 667 687. Cf RM D’sa ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Problems and Prospects for 
Regional Action’ (1987) 10 Australian Yearbook of International Law 101 114 (contending that under-development and 
acute economic crises of African states are the reasons behind the non-enforcement of socio-economic rights). See also M 
Haile ‘Human Rights in Africa: Observations on the Implication of Economic Priority’ (1986) 19 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 299 300-01. 
140 See UO Umozurike ‘The Significance of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in AU Kalu & Y Osinbajo 
(eds) Perspectives on Human Rights (1992) 44 48. 
141 See eg HS Park ‘Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 405 410-13 
(revealing that economic development is the strongest predictor of improved basic needs achievement). See also BE Moon 
& WJ Dixon ‘Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross National Study’ (1985) 29 American Journal of 
Political Science 661 689-90. 
142 A Gewirth The Community of Rights (1996) 5. 
143 See N Chomsky ‘The United States and the Challenge of Relativity’ in T Evans (ed) Human Rights Fifty Years on: A 
Reappraisal (1998) 24 33-40. 
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generalized norms requiring substantial time and resources”.144 An element of all rights, 
whether civil and political or socio-economic, is an entitlement to governmental action 
and the qualified and progressive obligations under such treaties as the ICESCR “are still 
binding obligations in international law”.145 
Obviously, socio-economic rights point mostly towards positive state actions for 
their realisation146 and giving effect to them often involve some complexities. The 
CESCR holds that the following presumptions and entitlements constitute the right to 
housing: (a) measures that give security of tenure in its variety of forms to those lacking 
protection; (b) policies that ensure that the percentage of housing-related costs is, in 
general, commensurate with income levels; (c) policies ensuring availability of building 
materials; (d) protection against unreasonable rent levels or rent increases; (e) adoption of 
measures against forced evictions; (f) provision of sustainable access to natural and 
common resources, safe drinking water, energy, sanitation and washing facilities, means 
of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services.147 It is easy to 
understand why even rich and capitalist countries object to the implementation of socio-
economic rights!148 
                                                 
144 Dennis & Stewart (note 133 above) 465. 
145 P Sieghart The International Law of Human Rights (1983) 62. 
146 See, in general, P Alston & G Quinn ‘The Nature and Scope of State Parties’ Obligations Under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156. 
147 See CESCR General Comment No 4 1999 para 8. 
148 See Cottrell & Ghai (note 83 above) 63. 
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The truth is that all rights have costs and a state without funds cannot protect 
rights.149 All rights require both negative and positive actions at different levels and “the 
expenditure of collective resources is required to protect both negative and positive 
rights”.150 Of course, socio-economic rights will almost inevitably give rise to more 
budgetary implications, but this fact alone should not bar their justiciability.151 
Conversely, some socio-economic rights require only negative state action, for example 
the right not to be evicted from one’s home. States, according to Sieghart, also “require 
no costly programmes in order to comply with their obligations to ensure ‘equal 
opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher 
level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence”.152  
Civil and political rights, on the other hand, have demonstrably been shown to 
demand positive state action and interference for their realization—le droit a la 
resistance et a la defense, as opposed to le droit a l’obtention et a l’exigence; indeed, 
some civil and political rights require only positive state action.153 The ICCPR contains 
an affirmative undertaking by States “to respect and to ensure … the rights [so] 
recognized”;154 and “[t]he obligation to respect and ensure, even with regard to the 
traditional “liberal” rights, can give rise to affirmative state obligations to intervene in 
                                                 
149 See S Holmes & CR Sunstein The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (1998) (explaining, for example, that 
“[u]nder the First Amendment’s protection of free speech, states must keep streets and parks open for expressive activity, 
even though it is expensive to do this, and to do it requires an affirmative act”). As above, 52. 
150 R Hirschl ‘“Negative” Rights vs. “Positive” Entitlements: A Comparative Study of Judicial Interpretations of Rights in 
an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order” (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 1060 1073. 
151 Cf Certification case (note 54 above) para 78. 
152 Sieghart (note 145 above), 125. 
153 See eg I Hare ‘Social Rights as Fundamental Human Rights’ in B Hepple (ed) Social and Labour Rights in a Global 
Context: International and Comparative Perspectives (2002) 159 (illustrating how rights other than socio-economic rights 
may impose positive obligations on the state). 
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order to see that the rights are realized”.155 Primarily, such affirmative obligations have  
been limited to inhuman treatment and health conditions in prisons under Articles 7 and 
10 of the ICCPR. Among the positive obligations engendered by those two articles 
include the duty to train appropriate personnel: enforcement personnel, medical 
personnel, police officers, any “any other persons involved in the custody or treatment of 
any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention, or imprisonment”.156  
There is also no sound reason to exclude life, dignity, non-discrimination, equality 
before the law, and fair trial from the list of “cross-cutting rights”.157 The right to life 
might entail one receiving life-saving medical treatment at state expense. In commenting 
on the right to life in the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) stated: 
 
The expression “inherent right to life” cannot properly be understood in a restrictive 
manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures. 
In this connection, the Committee considers that it would be desirable for States 
parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life 
expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and 
epidemics.158 
                                                                                                                                                 
154 ICCPR (note 25 above) art 2. 
155 PG Carozza ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97(1) American Journal 
of International Law 38 48. 
156 Human Rights Committee General Comment No 20 (Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or 
Punishment (art 7) (1992) para 10 [hereinafter General Comment No 20]. A similar obligation is engendered under the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 10 Dec 1984 art 
10 1465 UNTS 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention]. 
157 For a brief discussion on “cross-cutting rights” in the African Charter, see CA Odinkalu ‘Analysis of Paralysis or 
Paralysis by Analysis? Implementing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 327 337–39. 
158 Human Rights Committee Report at 93 UN GAOR 37th Sess Supp No 40 UN Doc A/37/40 (1982). 
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Sieghart similarly argues that— 
 
liberty and security, arrest and detention, the rights of accused persons and the 
provision of fair trials all require substantial expenditure by the State in training and 
maintaining competent police forces, a responsible public prosecution service, and a 
competent, independent, and impartial judiciary – as well as providing, where 
necessary, free legal assistance and court interpreters.159  
 
There are other examples of costly ‘negative’ rights. The enforcement and 
preservation of property rights—a classic negative right—requires a detailed registration 
and protection apparatus, which the state has traditionally sponsored. The right to free 
speech or expression is generally regarded as immunity against intrusion, but it includes 
“an obligation to create conditions favourable to the freedom to demonstrate (police-
escort, police-protection, etc.) and to pluralism in the press and media in general”.160 This 
right can be enforced only if there is a judicial system in place that is capable and willing 
to protect it against state and private intrusions. A state that fails to adequately fund its 
judiciary in order to provide effective remedy to complainants violates rights, just as if 
the state tortures its citizens.161  
                                                 
159 Sieghart (note 145 above), 125. 
160 GJH van Hoof ‘The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Rebuttal of Some Traditional Views’ in P 
Alston & K Tomassevski (eds) The Right to Food (1984) 97 107. 
161 Cf Sieghart (note 145 above) 126. 
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The European Court of Human Rights has also developed affirmative obligations on 
civil and political rights, with an extensive jurisprudence covering the right to life, the 
right to respect for family and private life, and the right to a fair trial.162 At the municipal 
level, the South African Constitutional Court has found positive obligations with respect 
to civil and political rights. In the Certification case, the Court observed that “many of 
the civil and political rights entrenched in the NT [new draft Constitution] will give rise 
to similar budgetary implications without compromising their justiciability”.163 In August 
v Electoral Commission,164 the Court held that “the right to vote by its very nature 
imposes positive obligations upon the legislature and the executive”.165 The exercise of 
this right demands the state to provide for electoral offices and officers, construct poling-
booths, conduct voters’ registration exercises, and print election materials, including 
voter’s cards. All this, of course, involves huge costs.  
The Canadian Supreme Court has also exposed the superficiality of the 
negative/positive obligation. According to Arbour J: 
 
As a theory of the Charter as a whole, any claim that only negative rights are 
constitutionally recognised is of course patently defective. The rights to vote (section 
3), to trial within a reasonable time (s 11(b)), to be presumed innocent (s 11(d)), to 
trial by jury in certain cases (s 11(f)), to an interpreter in penal proceedings (s 14), 
                                                 
162 See, in general, P van Dijk ‘“Positive Obligations” Implied in the European Convention on Human Rights: Are the 
States Still “Masters” of the Convention?’ in M Castermans-Holleman et al (eds) The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st 
Century (1998) 17. 
163 Certification case (note 54 above) para 78. 
164 August v Electoral Commission, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC). 
165 Above, para 16. 
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and minority language education rights (s 23) to name but some, all impose positive 
obligations of performance on the state and are therefore best viewed as positive 
rights (at least in part).166 
 
The cost argument misses a vital point, which is that human rights do not always 
require price tags. All rights, by definition, are both inherent and instrumental goods;167 
they play (which is the same thing, in other words) “constitutive” and “instrumental” 
roles. The constitutive role of freedom “relates to the importance of substantive freedom 
in enriching human life”.168 The instrumental role deals with the way different kinds of 
rights, be they civil and political or socio-economic, contribute to the expansion of 
human freedom in general and, thus, promote development.169 The right to free speech is 
an inherent good and a means of enriching the marketplace of ideas and, hence, cultural 
and political processes.170 “The effectiveness of freedom as an instrument”, according to 
Sen, “lies in the fact that different kinds of freedom interrelate with one another, and 
freedom of one type may greatly help in advancing freedom of other types. The two roles 
                                                 
166 Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General) (2002-12-19) SCC (referencing  (Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General) [2001] 
3 SCR 1016; [2001] SCC 94), where the Court also found that the state has a positive obligation in certain cases to ensure 
that its labour legislation is properly inclusive, thus finding a positive dimension to the s 2(d) right to associate). 
167 See Steiner (note 89 above) 30 (stressing that this dual character of freedoms informs many parts of the human rights 
framework, including civil and political rights). 
168 See Sen (note 20 above) 36 (listing, as examples of substantive freedom, “elementary capabilities like being able to 
avoid such deprivations as starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as well as the 
freedoms that are associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and 
so on”). 
169 Above, 37. 
170 See Steiner (note 89 above) 30. 
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are thus linked by empirical connections, relating freedom of one kind to freedom of 
other kinds”.171 
 
1.3 Developments in Africa 
Treaty and constitutional guarantees of socio-economic rights in Africa fortify the 
normativity of these rights. This segment examines these developments while reflecting 
on the yawning gap between vision and reality. 
 
1.4.1 Treaty and Constitutional Guarantees 
African states have made formal commitments to numerous human rights instruments 
both at the global and regional levels, some of which guarantee socio-economic rights. 
About 46 African states are parties to the ICESCR,172 representing 30.8 percent of 149 
States Parties world-wide173 but 86.7 percent of the 53 Member States of the African 
Union (AU). Many African states are parties to the African Child Charter and the Women 
Protocol,174 but the African Charter remains the most significant human rights treaty in 
the Continent, in terms of its formal commitments by states.175 Many countries have also 
incorporated the Charter (including its socio-economic guarantees) into their 
                                                 
171 Sen (note 20 above) 37. 
172 For ratification status of universal human rights treaties, see Status of Ratifications of the Principal International 
Human Rights Treaties available at <www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf> [hereinafter Status of Ratifications]. Three African 
states—Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, and South Africa—have signed the ICESCR but have not yet ratified. Six African 
countries—Botswana, Comoros, Mauritania, Mozambique, and United Arab Emirates—have neither signed nor ratified. 
See above. 
173 See above. 
174 For status of ratifications of all regional human rights instruments in Africa, see AU website. 
175 All African countries are parties to the Charter, except Morocco. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
48
constitutions; others have transformed the Charter into their municipal laws through 
domestic legislation. 
The African Charter reflects “Africa’s cultural fingerprint”,176 by balancing the 
interest of the individual with that of the community and enshrining both rights and 
duties.177 Nguema describes the Charter as— 
 
one of the finest gems, designed by Africa with a view to endowing itself with 
proper self-awareness, creating a new image in the chain of peoples of the world, 
giving itself a place of choice in the concert of nations, and playing, henceforward, a 
significant role in the management and conduct of the world’s affairs.178  
 
Five of the Charter’s articles are devoted to typical socio-economic rights, which 
must be enjoyed by every individual “without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic 
group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social 
origin, fortune, birth or other status”.179 The Charter guarantees the right to property, 
which may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general 
interest of the community;180 the “right to work under equitable and satisfactory 
                                                 
176 M Mutua ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties’ (1995) 
35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339. 
177 On duties, see African Charter (note 42 above) arts 27 – 29. 
178 I Nguema ‘Africa, Human Rights and Development’ (1998) 7 Review of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 91. 
179 African Charter (note 42 above) art 2. 
180 Above, art 14. 
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conditions”;181 and “the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental 
health”.182 Others are the right to education, including the individual’s participation in 
cultural life;183 and the protection of the family, regarded as “the natural unit and basis of 
society”.184 The Charter holds states to their minimum core obligations in relation to 
these rights.185 
The Charter conspicuously omits such vital socio-economic rights as housing. Some 
attributes the omission to “an endeavour not to guarantee rights which have no chance of 
being realized.”186 A more plausible explanation might be the bad faith of then 
authoritarian rulers in Africa,187 who were more interested in politics of patronage and 
social fragmentation than in the equitable distribution of national wealth. However, in the 
SERAC case, the African Commission found a right to housing through an integrative 
interpretation of the Charter. It inferred a right to shelter or housing from the combined 
effect of the right to enjoy the “best attainable state of mental and physical health”, the 
right to property, and the protection accorded to families, which forbids the destruction of 
property.188 
                                                 
181 Above, art 15. 
182 Above, art 16. 
183 Above, art 17. 
184 Above, art 18. 
185 For a discussion of the nature of these obligations, see Chapter two. 
186 P Kunig ‘Regional Protection of Human Rights: A Comparative Introduction’ in P Kunig et al (eds) Regional 
Protection of Human Rights by International Law: The Emerging African System (1985) 45. 
187 See E Brems Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (2001) 127. 
188 SERAC case (note 122 above) para. 60. 
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In 2000, African leaders adopted the Constitutive Act of the AU189 “to take up the 
multifaceted challenges that confront our continent and peoples in the light of the social, 
economic and political changes taking place in the world”.190 The AU Act is 
revolutionary in a number of respects, in particular its emphasis on economic 
development and human rights. The Act promises to promote and protect human and 
peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter and other relevant human rights 
instruments,191 which obviously includes the ICESCR. It promises to “[p]romote 
cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African 
peoples”192 and to “[w]ork with relevant international partners in the eradication of 
preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent”.193 Like with the 
Africa Charter, all African States are parties to the AU Act, with the exception of 
Morocco. 
Furthermore, most national constitutions in Africa contain generous provisions on 
socio-economic rights.194 All but four constitutions—DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, 
Somalia, and Swaziland—guarantee the right to property.195 Several others guarantee the 
                                                 
189 Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) adopted 11 July 2000 entry into force 26 May 2001 CAB/LEG/23.15 (as 
amended by the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union 11 July 11 2003) [hereinafter AU 
Act]. 
190 Above, pmbl. 
191 Above, art 3(h). 
192 Above, art 3(k). 
193 Above, art 3(n). 
194 This overview is based on constitutional extracts in C Heyns (ed) 2 Human Rights Law in Africa (2004). 
195 These are, alphabetically, Algeria (sec 52), Angola (sec 10), Benin (sec 22), Botswana (sec 8), Burkina Faso (sec 15), 
Burundi (sec 36), Cameroon (prmbl), Cape Verde (sec 68), Central African Republic (sec 14), Chad (sec 17&41), Comoros 
(pmbl), Congo (sec 17), Cote d’Ivoire (sec 15), Djibouti (sec 12), Egypt (sec 32&34), Equatorial Guinea (sec 27(d)&29), 
Eritrea (sec 23), Ethiopia (sec 40), Gabon (sec 1(10)), Gambia (sec 22), Ghana (sec 18,20&36), Guinea (sec 13), Kenya 
(sec 70&75), Lesotho (sec 4&17), Liberia (sec 11&22), Libya (sec 7&8), Madagascar (sec 34), Malawi (sec 28), Mali (sec 
13), Mauritania (sec 15), Mauritius (sec 3&8), Morocco (sec 15), Mozambique (sec 86), Namibia (sec 16), Niger (sec 21), 
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rights to education,196 to work,197 to social security,198 to health,199 to housing,200 and to 
food.201 Some constitutional guarantees are amenable to adjudication; others are not (at 
least in principle), but are regarded as “directive principles of state policy”. The South 
African Constitution requires the state “to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in 
the Bill of Rights”202 and empowers the Court to grant appropriate relief for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nigeria (sec 43&44), Rwanda (sec 23), Sao Tome & Principe (sec 46), Senegal (sec 8&15), Seychelles (sec 26), Sierra 
Leone (sec 15&21), South Africa (sec 25), Sudan (sec 28), Tanzania (sec 24), Togo (sec 27), Tunisia (sec 14), Uganda (sec 
26&237), Zambia (sec 11,16&17), and Zimbabwe (sec 16). 
196 These are, alphabetically, Algeria (sec 53), Angola (sec 28(2)&49), Benin (sec 12), Burkina Faso (sec 18&27), Burundi 
(sec 34&44), Cameroon (pmbl), Cape Verde (sec 49&77), Central African Republic (sec 6&7), Chad (sec 35), Comoros 
(pmbl), Congo (sec 23), Cote d’Ivoire (sec 7), Egypt (sec 18,19&20), Equatorial Guinea (sec 23), Eritrea (sec 21), Ethiopia 
(sec 41&90), Gabon (sec 1(16))), Gambia (sec 30&217), Ghana (sec 25&38), Guinea (sec 21), Lesotho (sec 28), Liberia 
(sec 6), Libya (sec 14), Madagascar (sec 23&24), Malawi (sec 13&25), Mali (sec 17), Mozambique (sec 52&92), Namibia 
(sec 20), Niger (sec 11&19), Nigeria (sec 18), Rwanda (sec 26), Sao Tome & Principe (sec 30&54), Senegal (sec 22), 
Seychelles (sec 33), Sierra Leone (sec 9), South Africa (sec 29), Sudan (sec 12,14&28), Tanzania (sec 11), Togo (sec 35), 
and Uganda (sec 30). 
197 These are, alphabetically, Algeria (sec 55), Angola (sec 46(1)), Benin (sec 30), Burkina Faso (sec 18&19), Burundi (sec 
45), Cape Verde (sec 60), Central African Republic (sec 9), Chad (sec 32), Congo (sec 24), Cote d’Ivoire (sec 16&17), 
Djibouti (sec 15), Egypt (sec 13&15), Equatorial Guinea (sec 25), Ethiopia (sec 41(2)), Gabon (sec 1(7)), Ghana (sec 
24,34(2)&36), Guinea (sec 18), Guinea Bissau (sec 46), Lesotho (sec 29(1)), Liberia (sec 18), Libya (sec 4), Madagascar 
(sec 27), Malawi (sec 24&29), Mali (sec 19), Mauritania (sec 12), Morocco (sec 13), Mozambique (sec 88(1)), Namibia 
(sec 21(1)(i)), Niger (sec 25&30), Nigeria (sec 17(3)(a-e)), Rwanda (sec 30), Sao Tome & Principe (sec 41), Senegal (sec 
8&25), Seychelles (sec 35), Sierra Leone (sec 7&8), South Africa (sec 22), Swaziland (sec 23), Tanzania (sec 11,22&23), 
Togo (sec 37), and Uganda (sec 14(b)&40). 
198 These are, alphabetically, Algeria (sec 59), Angola (sec 47&48), Benin (sec 26), Burkina Faso (sec 18), Cameroon 
(pmbl), Cape Verde (sec 69), Chad (sec 40), Congo (sec 30), Cote d’Ivoire (sec 6), Egypt (sec 16&17), Eritrea (sec 21), 
Ethiopia (sec 41&90), Gabon (sec 1(8)), Gambia (sec 216), Ghana (sec 37(2)(b),6(b)), Guinea (sec 17), Liberia (sec 7), 
Libya (sec 6), Madagascar (sec 30), Malawi (sec 13), Mali (sec 17), Mozambique (sec 95), Niger (sec 19), Nigeria (sec 
16(2)), Sao Tome & Principe (sec 43&53), Seychelles (sec 36&37), Sierra Leone (sec 8), South Africa (sec 27), Sudan (sec 
11), Tanzania (sec 11), Togo (sec 33), and Uganda (sec 7&14). 
199 These are, alphabetically, Algeria (sec 54), Angola (sec 47), Benin (sec 8), Burkina Faso (sec 18&26), Burundi (sec 39), 
Cape Verde (sec 70), Comoros (pmbl), Congo (sec 30), Cote d’Ivoire (sec 7), Egypt (sec 16&17), Equatorial Guinea (sec 
22), Eritrea (sec 21), Ethiopia (sec 41&90), Gambia (sec 216(4)), Ghana (sec 30&36(10)), Guinea (sec 15), Lesotho (sec 
27), Liberia (sec 8), Libya (sec 15), Madagascar (sec 19), Malawi (sec 13), Mali (sec 17), Mozambique (sec 54&94), Niger 
(sec 11&49), Nigeria (sec 17), Sao Tome & Principe (sec 49), Senegal (sec 8), Seychelles (sec 29), Sierra Leone (sec 8(3)), 
South Africa (sec 27), Sudan (sec 13), Tanzania (sec 11), Togo (sec 34), and Uganda (sec 20). 
200 These are, alphabetically, Burkina Faso (sec 18), Cape Verde (sec 71), Ethiopia (sec 90), Mali (sec 17), Nigeria (sec 
16(2)), Sao Tome & Principe (sec 48), Seychelles (sec 34), South Africa (sec 26), and Uganda (sec 14). 
201 These are, alphabetically, Ethiopia (sec 90), Gambia (sec 216(4)), Ghana (sec 36(e)), Malawi (sec 13), Nigeria (sec 
16(2)), Sierra Leone (sec 7), South Africa (sec 27), and Uganda (sec 21&22). 
202 See South Africa Constitution sec 7(2). 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
52
infringement of any right entrenched therein.203 Conversely, Chapter II of the Nigerian 
Constitution is titled: “Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy”. 
Although this section contains provisions similar to those in human rights instruments 
guaranteeing socio-economic rights, the same Constitution provides that the judicial 
powers shall not extend to any issue or question covered by Chapter II.204 Such 
provisions continue to perpetuate the misconception that socio-economic rights are non-
justiciable.  
 
1.4.2 Between Vision and Reality 
The international law recognition of socio-economic rights, with a mechanism for their 
safeguards, is one of Africa’s major contributions to the development of human rights 
norms. This, plus developments at municipal levels, laid the foundation for the human 
rights movement and mobilisation in Africa, providing a rallying point for all those 
concerned with promoting human dignity and well-being. These instruments have also 
jolted many states into adopting some poverty alleviation policies, though there is still a 
great gulf between vision and reality. 
In certain communities in some parts of Africa, a privileged group of persons 
collectively have vastly more than they need to maintain an adequate standard of living, 
but massive poverty, unemployment, crime, homelessness and other pathologies 
                                                 
203 Above, sec 38. Cf Certification case (note 54 above) para 78 (affirming the justiciability of socio-economic rights under 
the South African Constitution); and Grootboom case (note 54 above) para 20 (holding, “the courts are constitutionally 
bound to ensure that they [socio-economic rights] are protected and fulfilled”). 
204 Nigeria Constitution sec 6(6)(c). 
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generally plague the majority of SSA and show no signs of abating.205 Life is brutish, 
nasty, and short in most of Africa, most of the time. The future is still uncertain and 
nothing paralyses as uncertainty. Many Africans live in extremely poor conditions and in 
squatter camps, as the facts of Grootboom case revealed: 
 
The conditions under which most of the residents of Wallacedene lived were 
lamentable. A quarter of the households of Wallacedene had no income at all, and 
more than two thirds earned less than R500 per month. About half the population 
were children; all lived in shacks. They had no water, sewage or refuse removal 
services and only 5% of the shacks had electricity. The area is partly waterlogged 
and lies dangerously close to a main thoroughfare.206 
 
In Niger, the world’s second poorest country after Sierra Leone, about 3.5 million 
people are facing extreme hunger and malnutrition. According to James Morris, Executive 
Director of UN World Food Program (WFP), “Whole families are suffering [in Niger] 
because of a desperate shortage of food, which has forced them to eat just one meal a day 
of maize, leaves or wild fruits”.207  
Africa still lags behind other continents in all indices of economic and human 
development. Few years ago, the OAU lamented: “We have noted, at the close of the 
                                                 
205 See NJ Udombana ‘The Summer Has Ended and We are Not Saved! Towards a Transformative Agenda for Africa’s 
Development’ (2005) San Diego International Law Journal 5 11. 
206 See Grootboom case (note 54 above) para 7. Cf CESCR ‘The right to adequate housing (Art 11 (1))’ General Comment 
4 para 4 [hereinafter General Comment 4] (“Despite the fact that the international community has frequently reaffirmed the 
importance of full respect for the right to adequate housing, there remains a disturbingly large gap between the standards 
set in article 11 (1) of the Covenant and the situation prevailing in many parts of the world”). 
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20th century, that of all the regions of the world, Africa is indeed the most backward in 
terms of development from whatever angle it is viewed and the most vulnerable as far as 
peace, security and stability are concerned”.208 Empirical studies show that poverty still 
pervades Africa. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates 
that the proportion of populations living on less than $1 a day in the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) in Africa209 has increased continuously since 1965–1969, rising from 
an average of 55.8 percent in those years to 64.9 percent in 1995–1999.210 Other sources 
put the figure of Africans living on less than $1 a day threshold at the dawn of the 
millennium at between 340 million211 to 600 million,212 with an average income of $0.65 
a day (calculated on the basis of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).213 Africa’s share of 
people living in extreme poverty in the world214 rose to 30 percent in 2000, from the 
                                                                                                                                                 
207 ‘As Niger’s Hunger Crisis Worsens, UN Agencies Greatly Increase Emergency Appeal’ UN News Service 3 Aug 2005 
available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/ 200508030291.html. 
208 See Yaounde Declaration (Africa: Preparing for the 21st Century) AHG Decl 3 OAU AHG/Res 247-257 (XXXII)(July 
1996) pmbl [hereinafter Yaounde Declaration]. Cf H Kissinger Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a 
Diplomacy for the Twenty-first Century (2002) 201 (noting the pervasiveness of poverty in Africa and stressing 
that the continent has the lowest economic growth rate of any continent and has lagged far behind in 
modernization). 
209 Of the 49 countries currently classified as LDCs by the UN thirty-four are from Africa. They are: Angola, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, The Comoros, D R Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principé, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, The Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of 
Tanzania and Zambia. See African Union (AU) Commission Africa Our Common Destiny: Guideline Documents (2004) 4 
[hereinafter Africa Our Common Destiny] (noting also that “nearly three-fifths of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa 
live in the LDCs”; as above). 
210 See UNCTAD Economic Development in Africa: From Adjustment to Poverty Reduction: What is New? 
UNCTAD/GDS/AFRICA/2 (2002) 2. 
211 See OAU The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Oct 2001) para 4 [hereinafter NEPAD] available at 
www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/oau/keydocs/NEPAD.pdf. 
212 See Africa Our Common Destiny (note 209 above) 8. 
213 Above. 
214 Half of the world’s population lives on less than US $2 per day, while a fifth live on less than US $1 per day. See 
NEPAD (note 211 above) para 36. 
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initial 25 percent.215 Available statistics indicate that Africa is unlikely to meet any of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG)216 by 2015 or even in a decade thereafter. The 
World Bank maintains that even if Africa were to achieve a projected growth rate of 1.6 
percent per capita, it would still be at the low end of the developing-country growth 
spectrum, “inadequate to make much of a dent in poverty and other MDGs”.217  
Among the internal factors that have brought leanness to Africa is states’ failure to 
address the structural problems that could reduce dependence on social safety nets. 
Spending on public health, housing and education and other social services has been 
severely curtailed over the years, resulting in a sharp decline in the quality of life in 
African countries. Food production has also fallen in proportion to the expanding 
population.218 While Sudan and Ethiopia similarly wield mass starvation as a weapon of 
war,219 Zimbabwe has pursued a devastating policy of evictions for residents of slums 
across the country in what tantamount to a gross human rights violation and, in fact, an 
economic crime against humanity.220 There is also the problem of corruption and 
mismanagement of resources. Nigeria, like many African countries, is rich in natural 
                                                 
215 See Africa Our Common Destiny (note 209 above) 8. 
216 See Millennium Development Goals 2000 para I–2 available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ [hereinafter 
MDG]. 
217 World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2004: Realizing the Development Promise of the Doha Agenda (2003) 43 
[hereinafter Global Economic Prospects 2004]. 
218 See OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking 
Place in the World AHG/Decl 1 (XXVI) (July 1990) [hereinafter Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic 
Situation in Africa] para 6. 
219 See, in general, D Marcus ‘Famine Crimes in International Law’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 245. 
220 See AK Tibaijuka Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation 
Murambatsvina (2005) 7 available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/HMYT-6EJM2G? 
OpenDocument. 
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resources,221 but political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor 
macroeconomic management have hobbled the country. The result of such endogenous 
factors is that majority of Nigerians have been victims rather than beneficiaries of these 
resources. I shall examine these challenges in Chapter Three in detail. 
States’ compliance with reporting obligations under existing treaties protecting socio-
economic rights remain relatively poor, as the practice of the African Commission shows. 
19 countries were yet to submit a report to the Commission in 2003, including Botswana, 
Zambia, and Cote D’Ivoire.222 Of the fifty-three State Parties to the African Charter, 
twenty-three have not submitted a single report since their ratification of the Charter,223 
several others are in arrears, and not a single country is up-to-date with its reporting 
obligations. Some countries submit reports without sending representatives to the African 
Commission to present them. The Commission has repeatedly postponed consideration of 
the only report submitted by Seychelles because the government did not send 
representatives to present it.224 
An empirical understanding of Africa’s peculiar situation, as highlighted above, is of 
crucial importance in the task of advancing socio-economic rights. African states should 
not only respect human and peoples’ rights; they should also adopt positive measures to 
                                                 
221 Nigeria is blessed with abundant natural resources: natural gas, petroleum, tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, 
zinc, arable land. Nigeria has a proven oil reserve of 36 billion bbl and proven natural gas reserve of 4.007 trillion cu m. 
See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) The World Factbook: Nigeria at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html (last visited 14 Feb 2006). 
222 African Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights Status on Submission of State Periodic Reports to the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (May 2003) available at the ACHPR Web site. 
223 The twenty-three states are Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, DR Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, 
Niger, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Zambia. 
224 See NJ Udombana ‘Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights’ (2002) 17 
American University International Law Review 1177 1240 (discussing the frustrations of the African Commission with 
respect to reporting obligations of states under the African Charter). 
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implement their commitments to human rights instruments.225 Similarly, legislative 
measures alone will not lead to the actualisation of socio-economic rights. Appropriate, 
well-directed policies and programmes aimed at expeditiously and effectively advancing 
these rights must support such measures.226  
Mere indignation at poverty is a generous passion, but it is not enough. Poverty is an 
evil, “the affliction which actually or potentially includes all other afflictions”.227 
Poverty, says Appadurai, “is many things, all of them bad. It is material deprivation and 
desperation. It is lack of security and dignity. It is exposure to risk and high costs for thin 
comforts. It is inequality materialized. It diminishes its victims”.228 Deep poverty is an 
assault on human dignity, as it excludes its victim from full participation in the life of the 
society. It increases desperation and tempts the poor to take the law into his hands or to 
turn into prostitution or crime in order to escape destitution. The most dangerous creation 
of any society is that man who has nothing to lose. Such inglorious actions devalue not 
only the actor but also the entire society. 
The society must find practical ways to alleviate poverty, “lest it steal[s] away 
patience and humility from those who suffer and plant[s] anger and cynicism in their 
stead”.229 I hold the view, with Soyinka,  
 
                                                 
225 On the notion of obligations, see Chapter Two below. 
226 See Grootboom case (note 54 above) para 42. 
227 CS Lewis The Problem of Pain (1940) 96. 
228 A Appadurai ‘The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition in V Rao & M Walton (eds) Culture and 
Public Action (2004) 59 64. 
229 Lewis (note 227 above) 96. 
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that there should be no beggars in society, that it is the responsibility of the state, the 
community, to look after its less fortunate, either create a means of livelihood for 
them or else house and feed them in some kind of commune, not leave them on the 
streets, dependent on the uncertain generosity of others.230 
 
1.5 Conclusion: In Solidarity with Socio-economic Rights 
The proposition that all rights are interwoven and equally important is not merely a 
theoretical postulate, but a “fundamental tenet” of the international community’s 
commitment to human rights.231 Justiciability is not necessarily a matter of perfectly 
dissecting and distinguishing the inseparable, but of finding the key relations between 
apparently separate notions. The indivisibility of human rights has practical significance 
in a society founded on human dignity, equality, and freedom and is fundamental to 
evaluation of the reasonableness of a state action, requiring all stakeholders to take into 
account the inherent dignity of human beings.232 Socio-economic rights, in particular, 
have “implications for the methodology and philosophy that we deploy in interpreting, 
explaining, or communicating all rights”.233 They task societies to devise creative ways to 
provide remedies, which can take a myriad of forms. 
                                                 
230 W Soyinka You Must Set Forth At Dawn: A Memoir (2006) 324. C S Lewis also reflects on the basic functions of a 
state thus: “The State exists simply to promote and to protect the ordinary happiness of human beings in this life. A 
husband and wife chatting over a fire, a couple of friends having a game of darts in a pub, a man reading a book in his 
own room or digging in his own garden—that is what the state is there for. And unless they are helping to increase and 
prolong and protect such moments, all the laws, parliaments, armies, courts, police, economics, etc., are simply a waste 
of time”. CS Lewis Mere Christianity (1944) 167. 
231 See A Eide ‘Realization of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold Approach’ (1989) 10 Human 
Rights Law Journal 35. 
232 See Grootboom case (note 54 above) para 83. 
233 Odinkalu ‘Analysis of Paralysis or Paralysis by Analysis?’ (note 157 above) 335-36. 
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Scholars concerned with utilitarian ends of law must continue to refute claims and 
prejudices that have long hampered efforts towards the actualisation of socio-economic 
rights. If these prejudices are allowed to fester, they could “constitute an incentive to 
decision-makers not to pursue policies designed to bring about a more effective 
implementation of everyone’s rights”.234 Another reason to press forward with the banner 
of socio-economic rights is the increasing dangers that these rights face in an era of 
corporate-led globalisation. As Justice Cançado of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights bluntly stated: “In times of the so-called ‘globalization’ (the misleading and false 
neologism which is en vogue in our days), the frontiers have opened to the capitals, 
goods and services, but have sadly closed themselves to human beings”.235 The non-
enforcement of socio-economic has already marginalised the poorest, most vulnerable, 
groups in society and ridiculed the so-called autonomy of the individual.236 Their claims 
                                                 
234 Hoof (note 160 above) 98. 
235 Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants Inter-Am Ct HR (17 Sept 2003) para 
16 (Cançado J concurring) [hereinafter OC-18 Cançado Concurrence]. 
236 SC Agbakwa ‘Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of African Human 
Rights (2002) 5 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 177 184 (arguing: “Adequate socio-economic 
conditions must exist as a precondition to personal autonomy”) citing D Warner ‘An Ethics of Human Rights: Two 
Interrelated Misunderstandings’ (1996) 24 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 395 411. 
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remain “the only means of self-defense for millions of impoverished and marginalized 
individuals and groups all over the world”.237 
 
 
                                                 
237 R Kunnemann ‘A Coherent Approach to Human Rights’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 323 332. 
  
Chapter Two 
 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE NOTION OF OBLIGATIONS  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The assumption, express or implied, that all legal relations may be straight-jacketed into 
“rights” and “duties” and that such simple categorizations are adequate for analysing 
even the most complex legal interests has often hindered a clear understanding of, and 
true solution to, legal problems. Hohfeld wrote his seminal work—Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions—to remove such possible hindrances.1 He placed (human) rights in the first 
category of jural relations, meaning that they entail correlative duties or obligations 
towards rights-holders.2 This Chapter interrogates the nature of such duties vis-à-vis 
socio-economic rights as well as the bearers of these duties. This question is important 
because, as Shue argues, “[a] complete account of a human right must specify the 
correlative duties and the relevant agents: what needs to be done in order to fulfill the 
right and who ought to do it”.3  
The development of human rights has primarily been state-centric, for many reasons. 
First, states alone have the right to use force to uphold international law and, a fortiori, 
                                                 
1 See, in general, WN Hohfeld Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning (WW Cooke ed 1919). 
2 See eg E Brems Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (2001) 424 (“For each right, there are not only right-holders, 
but also duty-bearers, against whom the right can be invoked”). 
3 H Shue ‘The Interdependence of Duties’ in P Alston & K Tomasevski (eds) The Right to Food (1984) 83 83.   
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human rights.4 Second, the state is the primary raison d’etre for the corpus of human 
rights, a predator that must be contained to safeguard human freedom.5 My central thesis 
is that institutional paradigm shifts are necessary to complement states’ implementation 
of obligations arising from socio-economic rights. While this Chapter examines the 
traditional characterization of obligations, Chapter Five will go beyond this 
characterization and argue for a horizontal application of human rights obligations to 
non-state actors operating in Africa.  
The first segment of this Chapter examines states’ obligations under treaty and 
constitutional law. The second segment examines the typology of obligations, using the 
jurisprudence of the African Commission as a template for analysis. The final segment 
examines the “minimum core content” of obligations on socio-economic rights, a 
necessary exercise in determining the scope of states’ obligations to develop reasonable 
legislative and other measures to realise human rights. 
 
2.2 Examining State Obligations on Socio-Economic Rights 
International law draws no differentiation regarding the legal origin of an international 
obligation, but treaties constitute one of the principal sources of such an obligation.6 
Multilateral treaties, in particular, contribute to the formation of international human 
rights law. Henkin has written that the purpose of international human rights law “is to 
                                                 
4 See HN Bull The Anarchical Society (1977) 68. 
5 See HJ Steiner ‘The Youth of Rights’ (1991) 104 Harvard Law Review 917 928-33 (reviewing L Henkin The Age of 
Rights (1990)). See M Mutua ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ (2001) 42 Harvard 
International Law Journal 201 220. 
6 See M Fitzmaurice ‘The Identification and Character of Treaties and Treaty Obligations Between States in International 
Law’ (2003) 73 British Yearbook of International Law 141 144 (noting: “Treaties, as a source of international obligations 
and of responsibility arising from a breach of such obligations, are not distinct from other sources of international law”). 
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influence states to recognize and accept human rights, to reflect these rights in their 
national constitutions and laws, to respect and ensure their enjoyment through national 
institutions, and to incorporate them into national ways of life”.7 These obligations rest 
on the fundamental principle pacta sunt servanda, which, by interpretation, means that 
agreements are binding on parties to it and they must implement them in good faith.8 
As a principle of customary and treaty law, pacta sunt servanda is “an absolute 
postulate of the international legal system and manifests itself in one way or another in all 
the rules belonging to international law”.9 The principle operates both at the domestic and 
international plane. Although states may have varying domestic attitudes regarding the 
status of international law, treaty laws, in particular, are binding upon parties on the 
international level, regardless of any internal law to the contrary.10  
This segment examines the development of states’ obligations under treaty law as 
well as under constitutional law, with emphasis on socio-economic rights.  
 
2.2.1 Universal International Law on State Obligations 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)11 is 
justly the template for considering multilateral treaty obligations on socio-economic 
                                                 
7 L Henkin ‘International Human Rights and Rights in the United States’ in T Meron (ed) Human Rights in International 
Law: Legal and Policy Issues (1984) 25 25. 
8 Cf Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 23 May 1969 UN Doc A/conf 39/27 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention] art 26. The Vienna Convention is largely a codification of customary law. See M Shaw International Law 
(2003) 811; I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (5th ed 1998) 608 (noting that many articles of the Vienna 
Convention are declaratory of existing law and that those which are not certainly constitute presumptive evidence of 
emergent rules of general international law); and North Sea Continental Cases (1966) ICJ Reports 12. 
9 IA Shearer Starke’s International Law (11th ed 1994) 22. 
10 See Vienna Convention (note 8 above) art 27 (providing that a “party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty”). 
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rights, as it was the first treaty to focus specifically on this specie of rights. The ICESCR 
is particularly relevant to the understanding of the nature of obligations under regional 
and national human rights guarantees in Africa, with the CESCR General Comments as 
aids to interpretation. Though the General Comments are descriptive of how states 
comply with their obligations under the ICESCR, they serve “as a means of developing a 
common understanding of the norms by establishing a prescriptive definition”.12 
Chapter One spotlighted some of the rights that the ICESCR guarantees, but the 
Covenant also creates several obligations in respect of those guarantees. Article 2 reads: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation ... to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures”.13 When rights entail positive duties, it may be 
preferable to specify those duties, which is more concrete than proclaiming rights.14  
Thus, the undertaking “to take steps”, in French s’engage à agir (“to act”) and in Spanish 
a adoptar medidas (“to adopt measures”), is an alternative way of formulating rights. 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted 16 Dec 1966 entry into force 23 Mar 1976 993 
UNTS 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
12 M Craven The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its Development 
(1995) 91. 
13 ICESCR (note 11 above) art 2(1). 
14 Cf above, art 3 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure …”); African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights adopted 27 June 1981 entry into force 21 Oct 1986 Doc OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev5 (1982) 21 
International Legal Materials 59 [hereinafter African Charter] art 1 (“The Member States … shall recognize …”); and art 
25 (“States Parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote and ensure …”); and art 26 (“States Parties to the 
present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee …”). 
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Such an undertaking is “not qualified or limited by other considerations”15 and, though 
the steps include the adoption of legislative measures, it is by no means exhaustive of 
states’ obligations.16  
The general obligation in the ICESCR has “a dynamic relationship with all of the 
other provisions of the Covenant”.17 To give effect to its provisions in domestic law, “the 
Covenant norms must be recognized in appropriate ways within the domestic legal order, 
appropriate means of redress, or remedies, must be available to any aggrieved individual 
or group, and appropriate means of ensuring governmental accountability must be put in 
place”.18 While each State Party reserves the liberty to decide the most appropriate means 
with respect to each right, a state must bear in mind that the “appropriateness” of means 
chosen is not always self-evident.19 The CESCR maintains that while the full realization 
of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps taken towards this goal should 
be “within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s entry into force for the States 
concerned [and] … should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible 
towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant”.20  
Furthermore, the ICESCR commits States Parties to guarantee the rights enunciated 
in the Covenant “without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, 
                                                 
15 CESCR General Comment 3 ‘The Nature of State Parties’ Obligations (art 2(1) para 2 of the Covenant)’ (5th session 
1990) UN Doc E/1991/23 [hereinafter CESCR General Comment 3] reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies at 18 UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 5 (2001). 
16 Above, para 4. 
17 Above, para 1. 
18 ‘The Domestic Application of the Covenant’ Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General 
Comment 9 UN Doc E/C12/1998/24 3 Dec 1998 para 2 [hereinafter General Comment 9]. 
19 Above. 
20 Above, para 2. 
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religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status”.21 Most UN human rights instruments prescribe non-discrimination in an article of 
general application, expressed to extend to all the specific rights that they declare.22 The 
UN Charter, which contains the shortest non-discrimination catalogue,23 provides the 
touchstone for these other instruments prohibiting discrimination. The ICESCR further 
commits states “to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights” as set out in the Covenant.24  
The principles of equality and non-discrimination are closely linked. Equality is a 
positive expression of non-discrimination; and non-discrimination is fundamental to the 
concept of human rights. First, it is an explicit guarantee of equal—and thus all—human 
rights for every person.25 What distinguishes human rights from other rights is their 
universality, meaning that the rights “inhere” in every human being by virtue of their 
humanity alone.26 Second, human rights seek to protect the uniqueness of each 
individual, which underpins the concept of integrity and dignity. For these and other 
reasons, human rights law does not permit discrimination against individuals, though it 
                                                 
21 ICESCR (note 11 above) art 2(2). 
22 See eg Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 10 Dec 1948 GA Res 217 A (III) GAOR 3d Sess [hereinafter 
UDHR] arts 2 & 7; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted 16 Dec 1966 entry into force 23 Mar 
1976 GA Res 2200 A (XXI); UN GAOR 21st Sess Supp No 16 UN Doc A/6316 (1966) 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR] arts 2(1) 3 & 26. 
23 See UN Charter, arts 1(3) 55(c) & 76(c) (limiting the prohibited grounds only to the four factors of race, sex, language, 
and religion). 
24 ICESCR (note 11 above) art 3. 
25 See J Donnelly Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2003) 225. Cf African Charter (note 14 above) pmbl 
(providing that human rights stem from the attributes of human beings, which justifies their international protection). 
26 See P Sieghart The International Law of Human Rights (1983) 75. 
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may be legitimate, from the legal or ‘ordinary’ rights perspective, “to differentiate 
between individuals in different circumstances and for different reason”.27 
The ICESCR also contains specific obligations relating to specific rights. It commits 
states to “take appropriate steps to ensure the realization” of “the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”.28 Such steps 
should take into cognisance “the essential importance of international co-operation based 
on free consent”.29 The CESCR gives a holistic interpretation to the term “housing” 
sense.30 The term “housing”, according to the Committee, derives from the right to an 
adequate standard of living and should be interpreted in a way that takes account of a 
variety of other considerations. Thus, “housing” should be defined as “adequate 
housing”, meaning the right to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.31  
In relation to the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health, the ICESCR obligates states to take necessary steps to improve all 
aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;32 to prevent, treat, and control epidemic, 
endemic, occupational and other diseases;33 and to create conditions that assure medical 
                                                 
27 Above, 17. 
28 ICESCR (note 11 above) art 11(1). 
29 Above. 
30 General Comment No 4 The Right to Adequate Housing (art 11 para 1 of the Covenant (13 Dec 1991) [hereinafter 
CESCR General Comment 4] para 7. 
31 Above. 
32 ICESCR (note 11 above) art 12(2)(b). 
33 As above, art 12(2)(c). 
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service and medical attention to all in the event of sickness.34 Later multilateral human 
rights treaties are more specific in addressing health issues, for example the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child,35 which obligates states to provide all children with “adequate 
nutritious foods and clean drinking water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks 
of environmental pollution”.36 Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women37 obligates states to ensure to women the right to 
“enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, 
electricity and water supply”.38 
The ICESCR also contains an undertaking by States Parties to submit, in conformity 
with the Covenant, “reports on the measures which they have adopted and the progress 
made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized herein”.39 State reporting on 
socio-economic rights constitutes an important source of obligation. Such reporting forms 
part of the practice of states, a vital ingredient for the formation of customary law. In 
general, the reporting process provides a unique form of international accountability for 
how states implement their international human rights obligations. It is also a tool for 
policy development and planning and for the promotion of rights. The ICESCR report, in 
particular, assists each State Party to fulfil its obligations under the Covenant and 
                                                 
34 As above, art 12(2)(d). 
35 Convention on the Rights of the Child 20 Nov 1989 144 UNTS 123. 
36 Above, art 24. 
37 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women GA Res 180 UN GAOR 34th Sess Supp 
No 34 at 193 UN Doc A/34/46 (1981). 
38 Above, art 14(2)(h). 
39 ICESCR (note 11 above) art 16(1). Cf ICCPR (note 22 above) art 40(1) (providing that the parties to the Covenant 
“undertake to submit periodic reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognised herein 
and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights”). 
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provides a basis for the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to discharge its 
responsibilities for monitoring States’ compliance with their obligations. More 
importantly, it facilitates the realization of socio-economic rights.40  
 
2.2.2 Regional (African) International Law on State Obligations 
Architects of the African Charter were careful to avoid the irritating “progressive 
realization” clause of the ICESCR, since the satisfaction of socio-economic rights is a 
guarantee to the enjoyment of their civil and political counterparts.41 Everyone is entitled 
to enjoy the rights that the Charter guarantees without distinction of any kind, whether on 
the basis of race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.42 (The Charter, however, 
qualifies some socio-economic rights; for example, it provides for the right to enjoy the 
“best attainable” state of physical and mental health.43) These grounds are not intended to 
be exhaustive but are listed as examples, which explains why such other international 
instruments like the American Declaration adds “or any other factor”.44  
                                                 
40 See General Comment No 1 Reporting by States Parties E/1989/22 (1989) [hereinafter CESCR General Comment 1] 
para 1 (discussing the objectives of state reporting). See also, in general, P Alston ‘The Purposes of Reporting’ in Manual 
on Human Rights Reporting under Six Major International Human Rights Instruments UN Doc HR/PUB/91/1 at 13-16 
(1991) (delineating seven stages of State reporting system in international human rights law, each stage serving specific 
functions). 
41 See African Charter (note 14 above) pmbl. 
42 Above, art 2. Cf UDHR (note 22 above) art 2 with the common arts 2(1) of ICESCR and ICCPR. 
43 Above, art 16(1). 
44 American Declaration, art 11. Cf ACHR art 1(1) (omits “property” or “other status” from its catalogue and substitutes 
“economic status” and “any other social condition”). 
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The African Charter enjoins States Parties to alter their laws and practices that allow 
discrimination,45 though certain legal inequalities might be used to correct factual 
inequalities. In the Belgian Linguistic case (No 2),46 the European Court stressed that in 
determining whether there has been discrimination, a Court must not disregard the legal 
and factual features characterizing the life of the society in the State concerned.47 
The principle of non-discrimination is essential to the spirit of the African Charter.48 
Furthermore, the Charter is unique in its inclusion of ethnicity among the prohibited 
grounds of differentiation, probably to underscore the central importance of ethnicity in 
Africa. There are no equivalent provisions in the UDHR, the Human Rights Covenants, 
or the American Convention; the closest approximation is the ECHR’s “association with 
a national minority”.49 Ethnicity as a ground of discrimination was canvassed before the 
African Commission in Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture and Association 
Internationale des juristes (C.I.J.) Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v 
Rwanda.50 In that case, the Government of Rwanda denied numerous rights to 
individuals, on account of their nationality or membership of a particular ethnic group. 
The Commission held that such denials violated Article 2 of the Charter. 
                                                 
45 See African Charter (note 14 above) art 2. 
46 Belgian Linguistic case (No 2) A 6 (1968) 1 EHRR 252. 
47 As above, para 10 (holding also that “the principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no objective 
and reasonable justification”). 
48 See Purohit v The Gambia Comm No 241/2001 para 64 2002-2003 African Annual Activity Report Annex VII 
[hereinafter Purohit v The Gambia] para 49. 
49 ECHR art 14. 
50 Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture and Association Internationale des juristes (CIJ) Union Interafricaine des 
Droits de l’Homme v Rwanda Comm Nos 27/89 46/91 49/91 & 99/93. 
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The Charter obligates states to recognize all rights, duties and freedoms that it 
enshrines and to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them.51 Legislative 
measures obviously include enactments that bring domestic laws in conformity with the 
Charter. A ratifying state that fails to do so defeats “the very object and spirit of the 
Charter” and is in violation of Article 1.52 The phrase “other measures” also provides 
State Parties with a wide choice of measures, including budgetary measures, to use in 
dealing with human rights problems in Africa.53  
The African Charter further calls on states to “promote and ensure” respect of the 
rights and freedoms contained therein “through teaching, education and publication” and 
“to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties 
are understood”.54 The high degree of illiteracy in Africa may have informed this unique 
provision. Bello believes that the “[d]issemination of information about human rights in 
the African Charter is [probably] the greatest need that the peoples’ of the African 
continent have at this present moment”.55 If this obligation is acted upon “with 
imagination”, it “could prove useful in developing a useful program of human rights 
education in Africa”.56 
                                                 
51 Above, art 1. 
52 See Lawyers for Human Rights v Swaziland Comm No 251/2002 2004 Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission EX.CL/199 (VII) Annex III (2005) [hereinafter Lawyers for Human Rights v Swaziland] para 51. 
53 Above, para 50. 
54 African Charter (note 14 above) art 25. Cf art 45(1) (on the promotional mandate of the African Commission). 
55 E Bello ‘The Mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1988) 1 African Journal of 
International Law 31 34. 
56 T Buergenthal International Human Rights in a Nutshell (1995) 239. 
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Other obligations in the African Charter includes the elimination of all forms of 
foreign and domestic economic exploitation of natural resources57 and, what is especially 
African, the obligation to “assist the family which is the custodian of morals and 
traditional values recognized by the community”.58 The African Charter also enjoins 
States Parties “to guarantee the independence of the Courts and … [to] allow the 
establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the 
promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present 
Charter”.59 The Charter’s provision clearly envisions the establishment, funding, and 
protection of courts, which, traditionally, have been a bastion of the individual’s rights 
against the abuse of state power.60 Of course, “the purpose of requiring that courts be 
“established by law” is that the organisation of justice must not depend on the discretion 
of the Executive, but must be regulated by laws emanating from parliament”.61 
It is not clear from the Charter’s provisions if “national institutions” refer only to 
governmental and non-governmental institutions, but both types of bodies are essential to 
giving meaning and content to the rights guaranteed in the Charter. They could, in 
particular, “play an important promotional role in legitimating the human rights debate in 
individual African countries”.62 The African Commission has also encouraged and 
supported the establishment of national human rights commissions as engines for the 
                                                 
57 See African Charter (note 14 above) art 21. 
58 Above, art 18. 
59 Above, art 26. 
60 See Civil Liberties Organisation (in re Nigerian Bar Ass’n) v Nigeria Comm No 101/93 1994–1995 African Annual 
Activity Report Annex VI [hereinafter CLO v Nigeria] para 14. 
61 Civil Liberties Organisation, Legal Defense Center, Legal Defense and Assistance Project v Nigeria Comm No 218/98 
2000-2001 African Annual Activity Report Annex V [hereinafter Civil Liberties et al v Nigeria] para 26. 
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promotion of human rights. In this effort, the Commission adopted a resolution inviting 
“all the States, parties to the Charter, where no national institutions as yet exist for the 
promotion and protection of human rights, to take appropriate measures to establish such 
institutions”.63 
In 1993, the then OAU adopted the Resolution on the African Commission,64 which 
requested all States Parties to implement Article 26 of the African Charter by establishing 
and strengthening national institutions with responsibility for promoting and protecting 
human and peoples’ rights. Pursuant to, or in spite of, these resolutions, many states have 
established national human rights institutions. One of the earliest countries to do so was 
Togo, which established an autonomous National Human Rights Commission in 1987 to 
protect and promote civil and political rights; organize seminars and symposia; and 
generally enlighten the population on human rights. The Commission also expresses 
views and recommends measures to the government aimed at protecting and promoting 
human rights.65 Ghana established the office of Ombudsman in 1980—“due to the 
complexity of the administrative functions and structures of the modern state”—“to 
                                                                                                                                                 
62 Buergenthal International Human Rights in a Nutshell (note 56 above) 239. 
63 ‘Resolution on the Establishment of Committees on Human Rights or Other Similar Organs at National, Regional or 
Sub-Regional Levels’ in Recommendations and Resolutions adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 12. Cf ‘Recommendation on Modalities for Promoting Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in Recommendations and 
Resolutions adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights [hereinafter Modalities for Human Rights 
Promotion] 13 (calling on state parties to the African Charter to “establish national and regional institutes of human and 
peoples’ rights responsible for conducting studies and researches in co-operation with the African Commission . . . and for 
disseminating the knowledge and information on human and peoples’ rights”). 
64 See ‘Resolution on the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ OAU AHG/Res 227(XXIX) Rev I (June 
1993). 
65 See Togo Constitution sec 156. 
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provide simpler and cheaper redress for persons who suffered from unreasonable or 
unlawful actions of administrative bodies and officials”.66 
At the beginning of 2000, 24 African countries had provisions in their laws for 
national human rights bodies.67 These institutions, which take the form of commissions or 
ombudspersons, are created to ensure the application of international human rights norms 
in the domestic sphere and to monitor the observance of human rights nationally.68 They 
are administrative in nature and have ongoing, advisory authority with respect to human 
rights at the national and/or international level. They may pursue their purposes either in 
a general way, through opinions and recommendations, or through the consideration and 
resolution of complaints submitted by individuals or groups. 
Like most human rights instruments, the African Charter provides for State reporting 
obligations: “Each State party shall undertake to submit every two years, from the date 
the present Charter comes into force, a report on the legislative or other measures taken 
with a view to giving affect to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the 
present Charter”.69 The reporting obligation, says the African Commission, “enables the 
States to constantly check the whole government machinery as it forces the relevant 
government institutions from all the departments and ministries to evaluate legal 
regulations, procedures and practices vis-à-vis the provisions guaranteed in the 
                                                 
66 See EF Short ‘The Role of the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice under Ghana’s Fourth 
Republic’ (1997) 9 African Society of International & Comparative Law Proceedings 185. 
67 ME Tsekos ‘Human Rights Institutions in Africa’ (2002) 9 Human Rights Brief 21 21. 
68 See B Pityana ‘South Africa’s Inquiry into Racism in the Media: The Role of National Institutions in the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights’ (2000) 99 African Affairs 525. 
69 African Charter (note 14 above) art 62. See also Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Amended) adopted 6 Oct 1995 Rule 81(1) Doc ACHPR/RPT/XIX [hereinafter ACHPR Rules]. 
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Charter”.70 State reports under the African Charter vary widely in their quality and 
content; likewise the character of the discussions. Usually, they contain information on 
national constitutions and other legislation affecting human rights, organization and 
functioning of courts, status of the judiciary, the Supreme Court, and the bar.71 
In general, the obligations under the African Charter are peremptory, that is to say 
states shall undertake.72 A State’s obligation under the ICCPR is “to respect and to 
ensure” those rights and freedoms for the beneficiaries,73 whereas under the ECHR, it is 
to “secure” the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention.74 Under the American 
Convention, States “undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized [therein] and 
to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those 
rights and freedoms”.75 
 
2.2.3 Municipal (Constitutional) Law on State Obligations 
As highlighted in Chapter One, many national constitutions guarantee socio-economic 
rights, but they also contain specific obligations in relation to these rights, the rationale 
                                                 
70 African Commission, State Reporting Procedure: Information Sheet No 4 [hereinafter Reporting Procedure] available at 
the ACHPR Web site. 
71 See, in general, A Danielsen The State Reporting Procedure under the African Charter (1994). 
72 See Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia Comm No 211/98 2000-2001 Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission Annex V [hereinafter Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia] para 62. 
73 ICCPR (note 22 above) art 2(1). 
74 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms opened for signature 4 Nov 1950 
ETS No 5 213 UNTS 221 as amended by Protocol No 11 (entry into force 1 Nov 1998) ETS No 155 (1994) 33 
International Legal Material 960 [hereinafter European Convention or ECHR] art 1. 
75 American Convention on Human Rights (also known as the Pact of San Jose Costa Rica) entry into force 18 July 1978 
OATS No 36 at 1 OAS Doc OEA/Ser K/XVI/1 1 Doc 65 Rev 1 Corr 1 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention] art 1(1). 
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being that it is within national legal systems that people live their everyday lives.76 
Several of these constitutions couch their obligations in general terms, while others 
simply embed these obligations in the specific rights. The Constitution of Ghana 
represents the former while that of Angola represents the later. The Constitution of Ghana 
contains this general provision:  
 
The fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter shall be 
respected and upheld by the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary and all other organs 
of government and its agencies and, where applicable to them, by all natural persons 
in Ghana, and shall be enforceable by the courts as provided for in this 
Constitution.77 
 
The Angolan Constitution commits the state, “with the collaboration of the family 
and society”, to “promote the harmonious development of the personality of young 
people and create conditions for the fulfilment of the economic, social and cultural rights 
of the youth, particularly in respect of education, vocational training, culture, access to a 
first job, social security, physical education, sport and the use of leisure time”.78 In 
relation to the right to work, the Constitution of Benin commits the state to recognize 
such a right to all citizens and to “strive to create conditions which shall make the 
enjoyment of this right effective and [to] guarantee to the worker just compensation for 
                                                 
76 See NJ Udombana ‘So Far So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 1 9 (stating that rights, like charity, must 
begin at home). 
77 Constitution of Ghana sec 12(1). 
78 Constitution if Angola sec 31 (italics supplied). 
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his services or for his production”.79 In respect of the right to education, the Constitution 
of Sao Tome and Principe couches the obligation thus: “It is the responsibility of the 
State to promote the elimination of illiteracy and permanent education, in accordance 
with a national system of instruction. The state ensures basic compulsory and free 
education. The state gradually promotes the possibility of equal access to the other levels 
of education”.80 
 Some constitutions contain both general and specific obligations. The South African 
Constitution commits the state to implement socio-economic rights81 and to “respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”,82 a provision that Brand says 
“is central to the transformative ethos of the Constitution”.83 Concerning some specific 
rights, the Constitution commits the state to “take reasonable legislative and other 
measures” to make it possible for citizens to gain access to land,84 to adequate housing,85 
and to health care services.86 It also obligates the state to take “reasonable legislative and 
other measures” to ensure that “[e]veryone has the right to have the environment 
protected”.87 It directs the state to take “reasonable measures” to ensure that the right to 
                                                 
79 Constitution of Benin sec 30 (italics supplied). 
80 Constitution of Sao Tome & Principe sec 54(2)-(3) (italics supplied). 
81 Constitution of South Africa sec 2. 
82 Above sec 7(2) (italics supplied). 
83 D Brand ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution’ in D Brand & C Heyns (eds) Socio-
Economic Rights in South Africa (2005) 1 9. 
84 Constitution of South Africa sec 25(5). 
85 As above sec 26(2). 
86 As above sec 27(2). 
87 Above sec 24(b). 
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education is “progressively available and accessible”.88 These provisions, again to cite 
Brand, are intended to serve as “blueprints for the state’s manifold activities that 
proactively guide and shape legislative action, policy formulation and executive and 
administrative decision-making”.89  
 
2.3 The Typology of Obligations 
This segment examines the typology of human rights obligations, which is not 
necessarily exclusive but is dictated by the jurisprudence of human rights tribunals and 
writings of publicists. It was Shue who first suggested in 1980 that every basic right, and 
most other moral rights, could be analysed using a simple tripartite typology of 
interdependent duties of avoidance, protection, and aid.90 This typology, according to 
Shue, mixes together in various proportions in the implementation of almost every 
right.91 Other commentators have revised Shue’s typology and categorized human rights 
obligations as involving the duty to respect, protect, ensure, and promote human rights.92 
The African Commission adopted this later typology in its analysis of human rights 
obligations in the now famous SERAC case;93 likewise the Inter-American Court of 
                                                 
88 Above sec 29(1)(b). 
89 Brand ‘Introduction’ (note 83 above) 2. 
90 See H Shue Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (1980). 
91 Cf Shue ‘The Interdependence of Duties’ (note 3 above) 84. 
92 See eg GJH Van Hoof ‘The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal of Some Traditional 
Views’ in The Right to Food (note 3 above) 97 106-108. Cf A Eide ‘The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right’ UN 
Doc E/CN4/Sub2/1983/25. 
93 See Social & Economic Rights Action Center & Anor v Nigeria Comm No 155/96 2001–2002 African Annual Activity 
Report Annex V [hereinafter SERAC case]. See, in general, NJ Udombana ‘Between Promise and Performance: Revisiting 
States’ Obligations under the African Human Rights Charter’ (2004) 40(1) Stanford Journal of International Law 105. 
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Human Rights, in the Velazquez Rodriguez case.94 I shall use the SERAC case as a 
template for analysis, given that this thesis is Africanist in outlook.  
The communication in the SERAC case alleged a concerted violation of several of 
African Charter’s rights by the Nigerian government and its multinational oil 
collaborators, which violations have caused environmental and health problems to 
Nigeria’s Ogoni peoples.95 The communication contended that Shell’s exploitation of oil 
in Ogoniland had no regard for the health or environment of the local communities and 
that they regularly dispose toxic wastes into the environment and local waterways, in 
gross violation of applicable environmental standards.96 The communication further 
asserted that the multinational oil corporation neglected to maintain its facilities, resulting 
in “numerous avoidable spills in the proximity of villages”, which caused the 
contamination of water, soil, and air.97 This contamination, in turn, allegedly created 
serious health problems, “including skin infections, gastrointestinal and respiratory 
ailments, and increased risk of cancers, and neurological and reproductive problems”.98 
The Nigerian government, the petition continued, “neither monitored operations of 
the oil companies nor required safety measures that are standard procedure within the 
industry”.99 The communication alleged that “[d]espite the obvious health and 
environmental crisis in Ogoniland . . . the [Nigerian] Government [did] not require[…] 
                                                 
94 Velazquez Rodriguez case Judgment of 29 July 1988 Series C No 4. 
95 SERAC case (note 93 above) paras 1 & 43. 
96 Above, para 2. 
97 As above. 
98 As above. 
99 Above, para 4. 
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oil companies or its own agencies to produce basic health and environmental impact 
studies regarding hazardous operations and materials relating to oil production”.100 It 
further stated that “the [Nigerian] Government [did] not require oil companies to consult 
oil-bearing communities before commencing operations, withh[e]ld information from 
these communities on the dangers created by oil activities,101 and . . . denied scientists 
and environmental organizations permission to enter Ogoniland”.102 The government, the 
communication further claimed, ignored concerns of Ogoni communities regarding oil 
development, and responded to protests with massive violence.103 The communication 
alleged that the government placed “the legal and military powers of the State at the 
disposal of the oil companies” for “ruthless military operations”, including “wasting 
operations coupled with psychological tactics of displacement”.104 
In October 2001, the African Commission announced its decision in the SERAC case, 
finding for the plaintiffs and concluding that Nigeria had violated several provisions of 
the African Charter. In so doing, the Commission outlined the following typology of 
human rights obligations: 
 
Internationally accepted ideas of the various obligations engendered by human rights 
indicate that all rights—both civil and political rights and social and economic—
generate at least four levels of duties for a state that undertakes to adhere to a rights 
                                                 
100 Above, para 5. 
101 Above, para 4. 
102 Above, para 5. 
103 Above, paras 3 & 8. 
104 As above. 
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regime, namely the duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil these rights. These 
obligations universally apply to all rights and entail a combination of negative and 
positive duties.105 
 
The remainder of this segment analysis this typology in comparative perspectives. 
 
2.3.1 The Obligation to Respect Human Rights 
The first level of obligation recognized in the SERAC case is the obligation to respect 
human rights. This obligation, which is analogous to the traditional obligation of non-
interference,106 forbids the State from acting in any way that would directly encroach 
upon recognized rights or freedoms. This obligation finds expression in the UN Charter, 
wherein Member States pledge themselves to promote universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction.107 This 
obligation entails that “[t]he state should respect right-holders, their freedoms, autonomy, 
resources, and liberty of their action”;108 and a failure to ensure respect for human rights 
                                                 
105 Above, para 44 (emphasis in the original). 
106 Van Hoof (note 92 above) 106. 
107 See UN Charter arts 55 & 56. 
108 SERAC case (note 93 above) para 45. Cf CESCR ‘The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the 
ICESCR)’ General Comment 14 E/C12/2000/4 [hereinafter General Comment 14] para 33 (stating, with respect to the 
right to health, that “[t]he obligation to respect requires States to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the 
enjoyment of the right to health”; italics in the original). 
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constitutes a violation of international law.109 In considering whether a state has breached 
this obligation, it is immaterial that the state or its agents are not the violators.110 
The obligation to respect human rights finds concrete expression in many aspects of 
socio-economic rights. The obligation involves, in relation to the right to food, 
recognizing the needs and realities of food production and refraining from taking 
measures that undermine food security. It prevents governments, in relation to housing, 
from engaging in any “practice, policy or legal measure” that infringes upon an 
individual’s freedom to use resources in a way that is appropriate to the satisfaction of the 
individual or, by extension, family, household, or community housing needs.111 It also 
forbids governments from carrying out forced evictions without due process of law or 
providing alternative accommodation. It “implies that a government may not expropriate 
land from people for whom access to control over that land constitutes the only or main 
asset by which they satisfy their food needs, unless appropriate alternative measures are 
taken”.112  
In cases where limitation or deprivation of the right to access to housing is 
unavoidable, the state must take steps to mitigate such interference by finding alternative 
accommodation for the evictees.113 A government violates human rights if it adopts a law 
                                                 
109 Avocats Sans Frontières ex rel Gaëtan Bwampamye v Burundi Comm No 231/99 2000–2001 African Annual Activity 
Report Annex Annex V para 31 (holding that a Burundian law “does not comply with the country’s treaty obligations 
emanating from its status as a State party to the African Charter”). 
110 Mouvement Burkinabé des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples v Burkina Faso Comm No 204/97 2000–2001 African 
Annual Activity Report Annex V para 42. 
111 SERAC case (note 93 above) para 61. Cf S Leckie ‘The Right to Housing’ in Y Ghai & J Cottrell (eds) Economic, 
Social & Cultural Rights in Practice: The Role of Judges in Implementing Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (2004) 107 
113. 
112 Van Hoof (note 92 above) 107. 
113 See Brand ‘Introduction’ (note 83 above) 9-10. 
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or policy that allows poor peoples’ homes to be demolished and replaced by luxury 
housing that the original inhabitants could not afford and without provision of alternative 
housing on reasonable terms.114 In the SERAC case, the African Commission similarly 
held that the state has a duty—  
 
to respect the free use of resources owned or at the disposal of the individual alone or 
in any form of association with others, including the household or the family, for the 
purpose of rights-related needs.  And with regard to a collective group, the resources 
belonging to it should be respected, as it has to use the same resources to satisfy its 
needs.115 
 
Breaches of the right of access to housing, of course, occur regularly in Africa, a 
classic example being the 1990 Moroko episode in Nigeria’s Lagos State. On 7 July 
1990, the then military Governor of Lagos State, Colonel Rasaki, announced, through the 
media, that the Maroko settlement in Lagos would be demolished in 7 days. The 
government never served any quite notice on residents, as required by law; yet, from 14 
to 25 July of that year, bulldozers razed down thousands of homes, destroying properties 
worth millions of Nigeria’s naira. Armed soldiers protecting the demolition crew 
reportedly raped women who were trying to salvage the little they could of their 
belongings.116 The government provided grossly inadequate resettlement housing for the 
evacuees. Although it paid some compensation to the landowners, the government made 
                                                 
114 See Van Hoof (note 92 above) 107. 
115 SERAC case (note 93 above) para 45. 
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no transfer plans for the over 10,000 students whose education was interrupted by the 
destruction of their schools in Maroko.117 Several years after, most of the evacuees are 
still squatting in various places in Lagos State, while Maroko itself has become a 
‘Paradise regained’ and home to several affluent Nigerians, courtesy of the same 
government that forcefully dispossessed the poor from their homes. Some peoples’ 
tragedies turned out to be other peoples’ comedies. 
The obligation to respect human rights entails, in relation to the right to health,  
 
refraining from denying or limiting equal access for all persons, including prisoners 
or detainees, minorities, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, to preventive, 
curative and palliative health services; abstaining from enforcing discriminatory 
practices as a State policy; and abstaining from imposing discriminatory practices 
relating to women's health status and needs. Furthermore, obligations to respect 
include a State's obligation to refrain from prohibiting or impeding traditional 
preventive care, healing practices and medicines, from marketing unsafe drugs and 
from applying coercive medical treatments, unless on an exceptional basis for the 
treatment of mental illness or the prevention and control of communicable 
diseases.118  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
116 See Civil Liberties of Nigeria Executive Lawlessness in the Babangida Regime (1991) 13-14. 
117 As above. 
118 Above, para 34. 
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The obligation to respect human rights attaches to a state even under conditions of 
crisis. In Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v Chad,119 the 
government of Chad tried to use the existence of a civil war as a defence for its violation 
of human rights. The Commission refused to accept this alibi, insisting, “the government 
has the responsibility to secure the safety and the liberty of its citizens, and to conduct 
investigations into murders”.120 The Commission found serious and massive violations of 
human rights, including failure of the government “to intervene to prevent the 
assassination and killing of specific individuals”. It stated, more importantly, that a civil 
war “cannot be used as an excuse by the [s]tate for violating or permitting violations of 
rights [declared] in the African Charter”;121 and this holding, it is submitted, applies to 
socio-economic rights as well. 
The obligation to respect also compels states to remove any impediments that would 
prevent individuals from enjoying guaranteed rights. Foreclosing avenues of appeal to 
“competent national organs”, as the Nigerian Government did in Constitutional Rights 
Project v Nigeria,122 is a violation of the obligation to respect human rights, since such 
acts “increase[…] the risk that severe violations may go unredressed”.123 Ouster 
clauses124 are prohibited by the obligation to respect human rights. The African 
                                                 
119 Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v Chad Comm No 74/92 1995–1996 African Annual 
Activity Report Annex VI. 
120 Above, para 22. 
121 Above, para 21. 
122 Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria Comm No 60/91 1994–1995 African Annual Activity Report Annex VI (finding 
a violation of article 7(1)(a) of the Charter). 
123 Above, para 11. 
124 An ouster clause is a provision in an enactment, usually a military decree, that prohibits civil courts from having 
jurisdiction to consider acts taken, or purported to be taken, under the enactment. Decrees of this sort abounded during the 
military era in Nigeria. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
86
Commission has found that denying citizens access to courts of their country through 
such clauses “create[s] a legal situation in which the judiciary can provide no check on 
the executive branch of government”125 and makes citizens “highly vulnerable to 
violation of their rights”.126 It further notes that a government that ousts a court’s 
jurisdiction on a broad scale “reflects a lack of confidence in the justifiability of its own 
actions, and a lack of confidence in the courts to act in accordance with the public interest 
and rule of law”.127 
The African Commission has also held that “[t]he right to enjoy the best attainable 
state of physical and mental health . . . in Article 16(1) of the Charter and the right to a 
general satisfactory environment favourable to development” in Article 16(3) precludes 
governments from directly threatening the health and environment of their citizens”.128 In 
sum, states must refrain from “carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any practice, policy 
or legal measure[…] violating the integrity of the individual”.129 Such interpretations 
have far-reaching implications for a country like Nigeria, which, for many years, excused 
its abrogation of group rights by relying upon the domanial theory of land ownership.130 
Sadly, majority of African states may not respond positively to progressive 
pronouncements such as those in SERAC, given the legislative and other measures that 
                                                 
125 Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria Comm Nos 140/94 141/94 145/95 1999-2000 African Annual Activity Report 
Annex V para 41. 
126 Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria Comm No 102/93 1998-1999 African Annual Activity Report Annex V para 33. 
127 Above para 81. 
128 SERAC case (note 93 above) para 52. 
129 Above. 
130 The Nigerian Constitution provides that “the entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural 
gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone 
of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed 
by the National Assembly”. Nigerian Constitution 1999 sec 44(3). 
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are required to give effect to them. Even local courts are increasingly reluctant to make 
far-reaching pronouncements on group rights. 
 
2.3.2 The Obligation to Protect Human Rights 
The obligation to protect is a positive duty that requires a state to “take measures to 
protect beneficiaries of the protected rights against all political, economic and social 
interferences”.131 This obligation applies to all human rights.132 It is an obligation of due 
diligence and not of result, entailing no more than taking “reasonable and appropriate 
measures”,133 since human rights law must not place an impossible or disproportionate 
burden on the authorities.134 The prohibition of torture, for example, requires states “to 
take preventive measures such as stopping secret detentions, the search for effective 
solutions in a transparent legal system and continuation of investigations of allegations of 
torture”.135 Thus, the obligation to protect demands “an aggregate pattern of social 
interactions in which all individuals and groups are protected in the utmost freedom of 
choice and subjected to the least possible coercion, governmental or private”.136  
                                                 
131 See SERAC case (note 93 above) para 46.  Cf ICCPR (note 22 above) art 6(1) (providing that the inherent right to life 
“shall be protected by law”). 
132 See CESCR General Comment 3 (note 15 above) para 8. 
133 See William Eduardo Delgado Páez v Colombia Communication 195/85 UN GAOR Human Rights Commission 39th 
Sess Supp No 40 at 43 para 5.6 UN Doc A/45/40 (1990) Annex IX sect D 43-49 reprinted in 1990 HRLJ 313 para 5(5); 
Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v Austria 139 Eur Ct HR (ser A) para 34 (1988). Cf Joaquín David Herrera Rubio et al v 
Colombia Communication No 161/1983 2 Nov 1987 UN GAOR Human Rights Commission at 192 para 10(3) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) (requiring “effective measures”). 
134 See Osman v UK 1998-VIII Eur Ct HR 3124. 
135 The Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan Comm Nos 222/98 229/99 2002-2003 African Annual Activity Report 
Annex VII [hereinafter Suleiman v Sudan] para 46. 
136 MS McDougal et al Human Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human 
Dignity (1980) 7. 
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The African Commission held that the obligation to protect human rights also 
requires a state to create and maintain an atmosphere or framework conducive to the 
effective interplay of laws and regulations, “so that individuals will be able to freely 
realize their rights and freedoms”.137 The rationale for this positive obligation is that 
human rights are better protected where appropriate laws and administrative policies are 
supported by equally appropriate governmental machinery—courts, police, and penal 
institutions—as well as a system of health, social, and educational services.138 Without 
the provision of these and other structures to enable individuals to redress violations, the 
state fails in its obligation to protect human rights.139 
A perplexing question is whether a state’s obligation to protect human rights includes 
the duty to enact domestic laws to protect the human rights of individuals within the 
state’s jurisdiction from all violations. Is a state obliged to provide effective remedy for 
human rights violations committed by private entities in addition to those committed by 
the state itself? Is it obliged to take steps to prevent others within its jurisdiction from 
violating human rights? Should a state enact a law to prevent employers from dismissing 
employees who engage in trade union activities simply because it is bound by treaty to 
respect “freedom of association”?140 
Publicists and international case law answer these questions in the affirmative. 
According to Van Hoof, “[t]he obligation to protect goes further, in the sense that it 
                                                 
137 SERAC case (note 93 above) para 46. 
138 See Z Stavrinides ‘Human Rights Obligations under the United Nations Charter’ (1999) 3 International Journal of 
Human Rights 38 45–46. 
139 See Jawara v The Gambia Comm Nos 147/95 149/96 1999–2000 African Annual Activity Report Annex V [hereinafter 
Jawara v Gambia] para 74. 
140 See Sieghart (note 26 above) 43. 
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forces the State to take steps—through legislation or otherwise—which prevent or 
prohibit others (third persons) from violating recognized rights and freedoms”.141 The 
basis for taking this position, which I subscribe, is that a state’s human rights 
responsibility extends to everything within its jurisdiction, and jurisdiction is the ambit of 
a state’s “judicial, legislative, and administrative competence” and extends, as a 
minimum, to the state territory.142 
The African Commission takes a similar position. In Commission Nationale des 
Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v Chad,143 several people were directly and indirectly 
harassed and arbitrarily arrested by members of the security services. The Commission 
held: “Even where it cannot be proved that violations were committed by government 
agents, the government [has] a responsibility to secure the safety and the liberty of its 
citizens, and to conduct investigations into murders”.144 In Amnesty International v 
Sudan, the petitioners alleged that “prisoners were executed after summary and arbitrary 
trials and that unarmed civilians were also victims of extra-judicial executions”.145 The 
African Commission stated: “Even if Sudan is going through a civil war, civilians in 
areas of strife are especially vulnerable and the state must take all possible measures to 
ensure that they are treated in accordance with international humanitarian law”.146  
                                                 
141 Van Hoof (note 92 above) 106. 
142 Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (note 8 above) 301. 
143 Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v Chad Comm No 74/92 1995-1996 African Annual 
Activity Report Annex VI. 
144 Above, para 22. Cf SERAC case (note 93 above) para 57. 
145 Amnesty International v Sudan Comm Nos 48/90 50/91 52/91 89/93 1999-2000 African Annual Activity Report Annex 
V [hereinafter Amnesty International v Sudan] para 48. 
146 Above, para 50. 
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In the realm of socio-economic right to food, the obligation to protect includes 
preventing distortions and developing protective legislation.147 For the right to health, it 
entails regulating private health care provisions to protect citizens against exploitation by 
private institutions and providing effective remedy where such exploitation occurs.148 For 
the right to work, it entails regulating and monitoring the treatment of workers by their 
employees. And for the right to environment, it involves taking measures that enable 
local populations confronted with harmful corporate activities to make informed 
decisions and to have their voices heard. The African Commission elaborates this 
“process rights” obligation thus (in the context of multinational oil activities): 
 
Government compliance with the spirit of Articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter 
must also include ordering or at least permitting independent scientific monitoring of 
threatened environments, requiring and publicizing environmental and social impact 
studies prior to any major industrial development, undertaking appropriate 
monitoring and providing information to those communities exposed to hazardous 
materials and activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be 
heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.149  
 
                                                 
147 See J Cottrell & Y Ghai ‘The Role of the Courts in the Protection of Economic, Social & Cultural Rights’ in Economic, 
Social & Cultural Rights in Practice (note 111 above) 58 64 (referencing A Eide Right to Adequate Food as a Human 
Right (1989)). 
148 See Brand ‘Introduction’ (note 83 above) 10. Cf CESCR General Comment 14 (note 108 above) para 33 (“The 
obligation to protect requires States to take measures that prevent third parties from interfering with article 12 guarantees” 
(italics in the original)). 
149 SERAC case (note 93 above) para 53. 
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It could even be argued that this responsibility to protect applies diagonally. A state 
may be required to take reasonable protective measures against its non-state actors 
operating in another state especially where the host state is incapable or unwilling to 
prevent the human rights abuses itself.150 
In sum, a state’s culpability for human rights violations extends to all individuals and 
entities within its jurisdiction, and the duty of protection requires states to ensure that 
their laws render illegal any conduct that would be in breach of the treaty, whether or not 
the conduct is committed by the government or by a private entity.151 
 
2.3.3 The Obligation to Promote Human Rights 
The obligation to promote human rights requires a state to ensure that individuals are able 
to exercise their rights and freedoms. Although Van Hoof believes that this obligation 
“concerns more or less vaguely formulated goals, which can only be achieved 
progressively in the long term”,152 the African Commission stresses that the obligation 
involves “promoting tolerance, raising awareness, and even building infrastructures”.153 
This makes particularly good sense in a Continent as Africa, where the state largely 
controls the means of internal communications. Without such a positive obligation, the 
state might be unwilling to undertake the substantial investment involved in informing a 
                                                 
150 See JA Hessbruegge ‘Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors’ (2005) 11 Buffalo Human 
Rights Law Review 21 83 (arguing, “a developed state might have to take reasonable measures to prevent one of its 
transnational corporations from engaging in human rights infringing conduct in a developing state, if that developing state 
lacks the power, technical expertise or political will to fulfill its own diagonal obligations to protect”). Cf M Sornarajah 
‘Linking State Responsibility for Certain Harms Caused by Corporate Nationals Abroad to Civil Recourse in the Legal 
Systems of Home States’ in C Scott (ed) Torture as Tort (2001) 491. 
151 See Young James & Webster v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 38 para 49. 
152 Van Hoof (note 92 above) 106. 
153 SERAC case (note 93 above) para 46. 
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largely illiterate population of human rights guarantees and obligations entailed therein. 
This obligation extends to administrative bodies, which must promote the realization of 
socio-economic rights.154  
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)155 exhibits an obligation to promote that includes achieving a number of 
socio-economic rights. It commands the state to modify or transform existing cultural 
patterns and underlying beliefs. It makes detailed prescriptions in fields like education, 
employment, rural life, and family life. The African Commission, in its many resolutions 
and recommendations, has emphasized the importance of the promotional obligation and 
has encouraged states to take action accordingly. Noting that “ignorance is the main 
obstacle to […] respect for human and peoples’ rights” in Africa, the Commission has 
recommended that State Parties should “introduce the teaching of human and peoples’ 
rights at all levels of their educational systems . . . [and should] periodically broadcast, 
with the help of the African Commission . . . radio and television programmes on human 
rights in Africa”.156 
A state also promotes human rights through the reporting system, though, as Chapter 
One indicated, many State Parties are unfaithful in fulfilling this simple obligation. 
 
                                                 
154 See G Budlender ‘Justiciability of Socio-economic Rights: Some South African Experiences’ in Economic, Social & 
Cultural Rights in Practice (note 111 above) 33 37. 
155 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women opened for signature 1 Mar 1980 27 
UST 1909 TIAS No 8289 1249 UNTS 14 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
156 Modalities for Human Rights Promotion (note 63 above) 13. 
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2.3.4 The Obligation to Fulfil Human Rights 
The last layer of the SERAC obligations—the obligation to fulfil—is “a positive 
expectation” that the Member State will “move its machinery towards the actual 
realisation of the rights”.157 It requires the State, in the wordings of the Maastricht 
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,158 “to take appropriate 
legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full 
realization of such rights”.159  
 This obligation “is . . . very much intertwined with the duty to promote” human 
rights,160 requiring “more far-reaching measures on the part of the government in that it 
has to actively create conditions aimed at the achievement of a certain result in the form 
of a (more) effective realization of recognized rights and freedoms”.161 In relation to the 
right to health, for example, the CESCR has held that fulfilment incorporates promotion, 
given the critical importance of health promotion in the work of the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) and others.162 In relation to the right to food, this obligation entails 
incorporating aspects of food culture into development, establishing food control 
mechanisms, and formulating policies. 
                                                 
157 SERAC case (note 93 above) para 47. Cf CESCR General Comment 14 (note 108 above) para 33 (stating, “the 
obligation to fulfil requires States to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and 
other measures towards the full realization of the right to health”; italics in the original). 
158 ‘The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 
691 693–94. 
159 SERAC case (note 93 above) para 6. 
160 Above. Cf Van Hoof (note 92 above) 106 (“The obligation to ensure and the obligation to promote together encompass, 
inter alia, what traditionally are called ‘programmatic’ obligations within the framework of economic, social and cultural 
rights”); Brand ‘Introduction’ (note 83 above) 10 (“The duty to promote is difficult to distinguish from the duty to fulfil”; 
italics in the original). 
161 Van Hoof (note 92 above) 106. 
162 CESCR General Comment 14 (note 108 above) para 33 n 23. 
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The obligation to fulfil human rights also incorporates the obligation to facilitate and 
provide resources and services necessary for human rights. In order to secure the right to 
a fair trial, a state must provide counsel for an impecunious individual who otherwise 
would not be able to retain counsel for his defence in a criminal trial. Such examples 
again underscore the point made in Chapter One, as reinforced by Shue, that it is more 
fruitful to examine the relatively negative, positive, and the intermediate elements that are 
mixed in various proportions in the implementation of just about every right, rather than 
engage in “the artificial, simplistic, and arid exercise of attempting to classify every right 
as flatly either negative or positive”.163 
In practice, the African Commission gives a broad interpretation to the African 
Charter vis-à-vis states’ obligations to fulfil human rights. The Commission has found 
that the Charter’s guarantee of the right to a healthy environment or “a general 
satisfactory environment”164 imposes a number of “clear obligations upon a 
government”.165 It “requires the state to take reasonable and other measures to prevent 
pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an 
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources …”.166  Compliance 
with the spirit of their obligation, including the requirement to “take the necessary 
measures to protect the health of their people and to ensure that they receive medical 
                                                 
163 Shue ‘The Interdependence of Duties’ (note 3 above) 84. Cf Van Hoof (note 92 above) 107 (arguing that the typology 
herein examined “stresses the unity between civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural rights, as long as it 
is recognized that the various ‘layers’ of obligations can be found in each separate right or freedom”). 
164 African Charter (note 14 above) art 24. 
165 SERAC case (note 93 above) para 52. 
166 Above. 
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attention when they are sick”,167 demands that states periodically arrange for independent 
scientific monitoring of threatened environments. Governments themselves must 
undertake environmental and social impact assessments prior to major industrial 
developments and must publicize such studies. In the case of projects undertaken by third 
parties, governments must monitor and provide information to communities exposed to 
hazardous materials and activities, while also offering meaningful opportunities for 
individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their 
communities.168 
Municipal courts, however, have held that the fulfilment of certain human rights 
provisions is contingent upon the availability of resources for such purposes, despite the 
sweeping extensions of the fulfilment obligation. In Soobramoney v Minister of Health, 
KwaZulu-Natal,169 the South African Constitutional Court considered section 27(3) of the 
South African Constitution—providing for the right to emergency medical treatment— 
and maintained that the appellant’s case must be analysed in the context of available 
resources to the health services and the needs the health services had to meet.170 In 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Ors,171 the Constitutional 
Court, relying on Soobramoney, held that part of the State’s positive obligations imposed 
by section 26(2) (relating to housing) is to devise a comprehensive and workable plan for 
meeting them. This obligation is not absolute, but involves taking “reasonable legislative 
                                                 
167 African Charter (note 14 above) art 16. 
168 SERAC case (note 93 above) para 53. 
169 See Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SALR 765 (CC). 
170 Above, para 11. 
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and other measures … to achieve the progressive realisation of the right … within 
available resources.”172 Progressive realization means making housing accessible not 
only to a larger number of people over time, but to a wider range as well. Availability of 
resources is an important factor in determining reasonableness. 
 
2.4 Progressive Realization and the ‘Minimum Core’ Obligations 
As earlier stated, every state party to an international human rights treaty is expected to 
keep faith with the sacred principle pacta sunct servanda. Often, states are willing to 
perform their human rights obligations, but they are unable; otherwise stated, the ‘spirit’ 
may be willing, but the ‘flesh’ is often weak. Genuine limitations sometimes confront 
states, making it difficult for them to implement socio-economic rights.173 This realism 
probably explains why architects of most instruments guaranteeing socio-economic rights 
hardly intend their provisions to create individual rights on demand. During the 
elaboration of the South African Bill of Rights, the Ad Hoc Committee for the Campaign 
on Social and Economic Rights stressed the same point in its submission to the South 
African Constitutional Assembly (CA): 
 
Social and economic rights do not have as their only or primary remedy the 
provision of a commodity on demand. Rather, they require the creation of an 
                                                                                                                                                 
171 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Ors [2000] 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) [hereinafter Grootboom 
case]. 
172 Above, para 38. 
173 Cf CESCR General Comment 14 (note 108 above) para 5 (wherein the CESCR acknowledged “the formidable 
structural and other obstacles resulting from international and other factors beyond the control of States that impede the full 
realization” of the right to health in article 12 of the ICESCR). 
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environment and processes which enable individuals and communities to realize 
these rights . . . [T]he experience of people working with poor communities, both 
here and in other jurisdictions, has been that these communities realize that the 
constitutional entrenchment of social and economic rights will not necessarily 
translate into the immediate provision of material goods.174 
  
This tension between desire and fulfilment led to the development of minimum core 
obligations on socio-economic rights. This segment examines the essence and 
constituents of the “minimum core”, which is an important exercise given that a violation 
may consists of acts of commission of human wrongs or the omission to fulfil the 
minimum essentials for the enjoyment of rights. 
 
2.4.1 The Essence of the ‘Minimum Core’ 
Every State Party to human rights instruments guaranteeing socio-economic rights is 
bound to fulfil a minimum core obligation by ensuring the satisfaction of a minimum 
essential level of these rights.175 The essence of the minimum core is to bridge the gap 
between fundamental entitlements and scarce resources.176 The law does not expect a 
government to spend resources that it does not have or to spend all of its resources on 
satisfying only socio-economic rights, given other competing demands. One does not 
need to be an economist to know that resources available to a particular society are 
                                                 
174 Ad Hoc Committee for the Campaign on Social and Economic Rights Submission 16 May 1995 4 available at 
http://constitution.uct.ac.za/cgi-bin/catdoc/sh/cama/data/data/subs/4652.doc. 
175 See Grootboom case (note 171 above) para 30. 
176 S Russell ‘Minimum State Obligations: International Dimensions’ in D Brand & S Russell (eds) Exploring the Core 
Content of Socio-economic Rights: South African and International Perspectives (2002) 11 14. 
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limited whereas demands are unlimited. A state, thus, has a margin of discretion in 
selecting what means to implement its human rights obligations. However, such 
discretion does not extend to a refusal to fulfil these obligations, since that would 
undermine the raison d’etre of the treaty obligations altogether.  
The minimum core, thus, is the ‘lowest common multiple’ (LCM) below which a 
state cannot descend, “the floor beneath which the conduct of the state must not drop if 
there is to be compliance with the obligation”.177 As Friedman writes:  
 
States in which large segments of the population are denied effective access to 
education, basic health services, nutrition, housing, and safe drinking water are 
States in which not even the minimal essential levels of economic and social rights 
are satisfied. These States are not meeting their minimum core obligations under 
international law.178 
 
The CESCR also explained the principle in its General Comment 3 thus: 
 
On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the Committee, as well as by the 
body that preceded it, over a period of more than a decade of examining States 
parties’ reports the Committee is of the view that minimum core obligations to 
ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the 
                                                 
177 Cf Grootboom case (note 171 above) para 31. 
178 EA Friedman ‘Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step on a Long Journey’ (2000) 3 Yale Human Rights and Development 
Law Journal 191 197. Cf Grootboom case (note 171 above) para 30 (“[A] state in which a significant number of 
individuals is deprived of basic shelter and housing is regarded as prima facie in breach of its obligations under the 
Covenant”). 
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rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which 
any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential 
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of 
education, is prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If 
the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core 
obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’etre. By the same token, it 
must be noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum 
core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying within the 
country concerned. Article 2(1) obligates each State party to take the necessary steps 
“to the maximum of its available resources”.179 
 
It is, however, not enough for a state to attribute its failure to meet its minimum 
core obligations to lack of resources. To plead that alibi, a state must demonstrate 
that it has made every effort to use all its available resources to satisfy the minimum 
core of socio-economic rights.180 
 
2.4.2 Constituents of the ‘Minimum Core’ 
Each socio-economic right has a “minimum essential level” which a state must satisfy, 
but the CESCR does not specify this minimum. The starting point might be to examine 
the ICESCR itself, which, in several ways, goes beyond the bare articulation of rights and 
clarifies the mandate of states for the progressive achievements. The ICESCR spells out a 
                                                 
179 CESCR General Comment 3 (note 15 above) para 10. 
180 As above. 
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mini program and some elements of a time schedule. Articles 13(2) and (14), for 
example, provide for the sequential realization of free education in ways that establish 
priorities such as free and compulsory primary education. The South African Constitution 
follows this pattern in its guarantee on education. It provides, inter alia, “Everyone has 
the right— (a) to a basic education, including adult basic education, and (d) to further 
education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively 
available and accessible.”181 This also entails, in the particular context of South Africa, 
that children are not taught in a racist, homophobic or otherwise discriminatory manner. 
Are courts competent to determine the minimum core? The South African 
Constitutional Court answered this question in the affirmative in the Grootboom case, 
though it created some uncertainties in Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign.182 In the Grootboom case, the Constitutional Court adopted the CESCR’s 
position that socio-economic rights inherently include a preference for the poorest and 
most disadvantaged in society. It held that the minimum core obligation “is determined 
generally by having regard to the needs of the most vulnerable group that is entitled to the 
protection of the right in question”.183 Using the right of access to adequate housing as a 
template for analysis, the Court stated that the minimum core— 
 
requires more than bricks and mortar. It requires available land, appropriate services 
such as the provision of water and the removal of sewage and the financing of all 
these, including the building of the house itself. For a person to have access to 
                                                 
181 Constitution of South Africa sec 29(1). 
182 See Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign [2002] 5 SALR 721 (CC) [hereinafter TAC]. 
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adequate housing all of these conditions need to be met: there must be land, there 
must be services, there must be a dwelling.184  
 
Determining the minimum threshold for the progressive realisation of the right of 
access to adequate housing requires identifying the needs and opportunities for 
enjoyment of the right. This, in turn, varies “according to factors such as income, 
unemployment, availability of land and poverty”185 and depends on the economic and 
social history and circumstances of each country.186 
In the context of the right of access to housing, and probably of other rights, the 
Constitutional Court has stated that the reasonableness of measures taken by a state is 
“the real question”, in view of the diversity of needs and, hence, the difficulty of 
determining the minimum core.187 In general, “[i]ssues of development and social welfare 
are raised in respect of those who cannot afford to provide themselves with housing. State 
policy needs to address both these groups. The poor are particularly vulnerable and their 
needs require special attention”.188 Thus, the state must provide social assistance for those 
who cannot afford to pay for housing, which is the link between the right to housing and 
the other socio-economic rights.189 
                                                                                                                                                 
183 Grootboom case (note 171 above) para 31. 
184 Above, para 35. 
185 Above, para. 32. 
186 As above. 
187 As above, para 33 (stressing: “there are those who need land; others need both land and houses; yet others need 
financial assistance”). Above. 
188 Above, para 36 
189 As above (linking section 26 with 27 of the Bill of Rights). 
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In the TAC case, the Court questioned courts’ institutional competency to determine 
the constituents of a minimum core obligation, even for evaluating the reasonableness of 
government policies. Courts, it asserts, are ill equipped “to make the wide-ranging factual 
and political enquiries necessary for determining ... the minimum-core standards.”190 A 
synthesis could be attempted, which is that a court may not be able to undertake the 
required factual and political inquiries necessary to establish the factual predicate of a 
minimum core obligation, unless it is presented with sufficient information. 
International assistance is sometimes required in order to fulfil the ‘minimum core, 
and African states should not be ashamed in seeking such assistance through 
development aid. It is the law of the natural universe that no one can exist or survive 
solely on his own resources; everyone, everything, is indebted to everyone and 
everything else. The CESCR has stated, with regards to the right to food, that: “A state 
claiming that it is unable to carry out its obligations for reasons beyond its control 
therefore has the burden of providing that this is the case and that it has unsuccessfully 
sought to obtain international support to ensure the availability and accessibility of the 
necessary food”.191 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The protection of human rights depends on states’ commitments and continued 
willingness to honour their obligations as enshrined in the various human rights 
                                                 
190 Above para 37. Other practical difficulties in articulating the minimum core include the fact that different people need 
different levels of protection for a particular socio-economic right to be meaningful for them. See E Berger ‘The Right to 
Education under the South African Constitution’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 614 632 n 104. 
191 CESCR ‘The Right to Adequate Food (Article 11)’ General Comments 12 E/C12/1999/5 12 May 1999 [hereinafter 
General Comments 12] para 17. 
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instruments. As indicated in Chapter One, African states do not seem prepared to go far 
enough in honouring their various obligations. Their ratification of universal instruments 
and subsequent adoption of regional human rights treaties indicate formal commitments 
to finding bold solutions to human rights problems, but their reluctance to follow through 
on the implementation of these rights indicts and severely undermines their so-called 
commitments to human security. This reluctance is ill founded, given that “the legitimate 
exercise of human rights does not pose dangers to a democratic state governed by the rule 
of law”.192 Respect for human rights improves the conditions of those under a state’s 
jurisdiction, engenders their confidence in governance,193 and lightens the heavy burden 
of institutions charged with implementing human rights norms. 
Classifying States’ obligations into negative and positive is a difference without a 
distinction. It is actually dishonest for a state to pick and choose among rights that it will 
honour and to interpret others as optional, dispensable, non-obligatory, or even “unreal.” 
Non-consequentialist libertarianism is patently problematic, since most human rights are 
interrelated and cover different aspects of the same basic concerns—integrity, freedom, 
and equality of all human beings.194 Negative duties, which imply non-interference in the 
enjoyment of rights, are essential parts of freedom and of non-infliction of suffering. 
Construing them as the sole conceptions of rights leads to a society “consisting of 
atomized, mutually disregarding, alienated individuals with no positive consideration for 
cooperation in helping to fulfil one another’s needs or interests or for rectifying the 
                                                 
192 Amnesty Int’l v Sudan Communication No 48/90 para 79. 
193 Cf Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria Communication No 102/93 para 58 (holding that “general restrictions on 
rights diminish public confidence in the rule of law and are often counter-productive”). 
194 See A Eide ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in A Eide C Krause & A Rosas (eds) Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (1995) 21 22. 
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extreme inequalities of wealth and power that characterise most societies”.195 A 
contrario, construing rights integratively leads to a society where men and women are 
equally able to maximise their potentials.196 
Socio-economic rights are both normative and obligatory; they are negative and 
positive, entailing duties of non-interference in certain contexts and active assistance by 
respondents in vitally important economic and social contexts. Given the substantial 
benefits of recognizing all human rights, African states will eventually realize that there 
is no better alternative to respecting, protecting, promoting, and fulfilling these rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
195 A Gewirth The Community of Rights (1996) 31-2. 
196 See Grootboom case (note 171 above) para 23. 
  
 
Chapter Three 
 
THE AFRICAN STATE AND CHALLENGES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Post-colonial African states have striven to fashion themselves in the image of Western 
democracy and liberalism with very little success. Too frequently, they succumb to 
authoritarian, usually military or one-party, rule.1 As Kaplan rightly observed: “Tyranny 
is nothing new in Sierra Leone or in the rest of West Africa. But it is now part of an 
increasing lawlessness that is far more significant than any coup, rebel insurrection, or 
episodic experiment in democracy”.2 This gyration between democracy and 
authoritarianism has left most states in deep turmoil, with no significant improvement in 
the welfare of their citizens.3 Authoritarianism and other pathologies—for example, 
massive corruption, clientelism, and institutional collapse—are manifestations of 
incomplete state formations in Africa.  
                                                 
1 On problems associated with post-colonial states in Africa, see, in general, C Clapham Africa and the International 
System: The Politics of State Survival (1996); B Davidson The Blackman’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-
State (1992); N Chazan ‘State and Society in Africa: Images and Challenges’ in D Rothchild & N Chazan (eds) The 
Precarious Balance: State & Society in Africa (1988) [hereinafter The Precarious Balance] 325 (discussing the state’s 
problems, societal happenings, political changes, and the challenges faced by the states and society in Africa); and TM 
Callaghy ‘The State as Lame Leviathan: The Patrimonial Administrative State in Africa’ in Z Ergas (ed) The African State 
in Transition (1987) 87. 
2 RD Kaplan ‘The Coming Anarchy’ in RD Kaplan The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War 
(2000) 3 4. 
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Few governments, perhaps Ghana, South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, and Senegal, 
are admittedly labouring under difficult circumstances to improve the welfare of their 
people, but these are few good apples amid a barrel of bad ones. Most states in Africa 
suffer from arrested development. Many states have failed or are failing,4 among them 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, Sudan, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
A few others have descended into complete anarchy—the condition of a society without a 
government. This is the case with Somalia, where sovereign power has been transferred 
to warlords, “unrestricted by political institutions or a social order”.5 Indeed, Somalia has 
had no bilateral and multilateral relations for close to two decades. All foreign diplomatic 
missions in Mogadishu have been closed down and the country has no functional 
embassy abroad. It has not presented its annual credentials to the United Nations (UN) 
for over a decade and has also not participated in any UN General Assembly vote since 
1993.6  
                                                                                                                                                 
3 See O Oko ‘Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A Challenge for Lawyers in Africa’ (2000) 33 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law (2000) 575 577. 
4 State failure occurs when the authority is “unable to provide the most fundamental services that make up the state’s 
obligations in its contract with society”. See BN Dunlap ‘State Failure and the Use of Force in the Age of Global Terror’ 
(2004) 27 Boston Collage International & Comparative Law Review 453 458 (identifying the services that a failed state is 
unable to provide as physical security, basic health care, education, transportation and communications infrastructure, 
monetary and banking systems, and a system for resolving disputes). See also IW Zartman ‘Introduction: Posing the 
Problem of State Collapse’ in IW Zartman (ed) Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate 
Authority (1995) 1 (distinguishing between state collapse and anarchy and stressing that state collapse leads to ethnic 
nationalism as the residual, viable identity); see also G Kreijen State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness: Legal Lessons 
from the Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa (2004) 101 (noting that a failed state “lacks the ability to exert its rights, 
while the international community generally is unable to extract any obligations. Responsibility as a core notion of 
international law seems to be rendered obsolete. Failed States appear to escape the normative character of international 
law”). 
5 J Chopra ‘Achilles’ Heel in Somalia: Learning from a Conceptual Failure’ (1996) 31 Texas International Law Journal 
495 507 (continuing: “In an institutional vacuum, the factions were poised for mutual destruction in an unprecedented 
chaotic anarchy”).  
6 See eg Reports of the UN Credentials Committee UN Docs A/46/563 (1991) A/47/517 (1992) A/48/512 (1993) A/49/517 
(1994) A/50/559 (1995) A/52/719 (1997) and A/53/556 (1998). See also Kreijen (note 4 above) 71 (referencing the Bureau 
of International Organisation Affairs US Department of State 1998 Voting Practices of the UN Report to Congress 
submitted Pursuant to Public Law 101-67, which designates Somalia as a “non-participating UN member”); see also, in 
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This Chapter examines the effects of imperfect state formations and external 
dependency on the advancement of socio-economic rights in Africa. This inquiry is a 
necessary compliment to earlier chapters, but it is also central to this thesis. A state is not 
simply an inert abstraction, but “a collective agent of macropolitical process”.7 Its ability 
to deliver economic and social goods depends largely on the historicity of its formation 
and the imperatives that govern its behaviour. The Chapter will interrogate four major 
challenges: weak post-colonial states and institutions, unremitting conflicts, corruption 
and mismanagement of scarce resources, and the crisis of development under an unfair 
international economic order (IEO). It is important to emphasise that post-colonial state 
formations do not account for all human rights abuses in Africa. The Chapter will reflect 
on measures necessary to overcome these fault lines in order to advance human security 
in Africa. I argue, more especially, for entrenchment of democracy and good governance 
in theory and practice, since socio-economic rights often have broader enjoyment in 
democratic societies.8 Africa will need no foreign aid if its governments remove 
corruption and channel resources towards economic development rather than spending on 
acquisition of weapons of “mass destruction” and other white elephant projects.  
 
3.2 The State Structure in Africa 
                                                                                                                                                 
general, GB Helman & SR Ratner ‘Saving Failed States’ (1992-3) 89 Foreign Policy 3 (dealing with state collapse in 
Somalia). 
7 C Young ‘The African Colonial State and Its Political Legacy’ in The Precarious Balance (note 1 above) 25 29. 
8 Cf A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 178 (noting “that there has never been a famine in a functioning multiparty 
democracy”). 
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Many endogenous and exogenous factors are responsible for Africa’s failure to meet 
human security. This segment examines these factors, as necessary steps towards feasible 
and effective prescriptions. 
 
3.2.1 Weak Post-colonial States and Institutions 
Advancing all human rights depends on effective institutions: an independent judiciary, 
functional and efficient ministries and units for civil service delivery, good labour 
relations, functional units for health-care deliveries and educational administrations, et 
cetera. A vibrant, independent, media is also necessary to promote human rights through 
education and expose their abuses through reporting. In Africa, most, certainly not all, of 
these institutions have failed to deliver, due to structural weaknesses inherent in post-
colonial states. Some states have exhibited greater weaknesses than others, but most share 
a common heritage of colonialism and all depend on the global economic system.9 
Classical international law enumerates a permanent population, defined territory, 
government, and independence or the capacity to enter into relations as the criteria of 
statehood.10 Brownlie adds other criteria, such as permanence, willingness to observe 
international law, a certain degree of civilization, and sovereignty.11 Recognition 
constitutes the acknowledgement of the satisfactory fulfilment of these criteria—an 
                                                 
9 See V Azarya ‘Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement’ in D Rothchild and N Chazan 
(eds) The Precarious Balance (note 1 above) 3 4. 
10 See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States signed on 26 Dec 1933 art 1 (1934) 28 American Journal of 
International Law 75. 
11 I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (1998) 70 – 77. 
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essentially empirical test12—although state practice does not show a uniform and 
consistent pattern in relation to their application.13 The government of this “modern state” 
usually comprises three independent organs—the legislature, the executive, and the 
judiciary—functioning within a territory that is unambiguously defined.14 The Western 
system also presumes that a state will have a fully functioning civil society and a free 
press, with “organic” constitutions grounded on the soil and clearly defining the powers, 
rights, and responsibilities of all participants. Other criteria include the protection of 
human rights, meaning, “an entity unwilling or unable to respect human rights, especially 
the right to self-determination, should be barred from statehood”.15 
A cursory reflection shows that African and Western states are superficially similar 
but fundamentally different on most of the above criteria. African states absorbed certain 
Western values, through indirect rule, assimilation policy and other devices, but they lack 
the empirical and institutional features of statehood.16 A typical African state evolved 
from the thesis of colonialism and the anti-thesis of nationalism, producing a synthesis of 
“nation-statism [that] looked like a liberation”.17 Colonialism was “the cradle of 
contemporary forms of fragmentation in Africa”, weaved “from the material that the pre-
                                                 
12 See Kreijen (note 4 above) 109. See, in general, CJR Dugard Recognition and the United Nations (1987); and J 
Crawford The Creation of States in International Law (1979). 
13 Kreijen (note 4 above) 18 (noting that claims of statehood have to be judged in the light of the particular circumstances). 
14 See J Ojwang ‘Legal Transplantation: Rethinking the Role and Significance of Western Law in Africa’ in Peter Sack & 
Elizabeth Minchin (eds) Legal Pluralism: Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VII 99 (1986). Cf Brownlie 
Principles of Public International Law (note 11 above) 71 (writing that “the existence of effective government, with 
centralized administrative and legislative organs, is the best evidence of a stable political community.”). 
15 Kreijen (note 4 above) 23 (citing in support of this criterion, the demand of the then European Community that respect 
for certain human rights was a precondition for the recognition of the claims to independence of the states that 
disintegrated from the former Soviet empire). Above, 24. 
16 Above, 1-2 (“[T]he legal revolution that facilitated the decolonization of sub-Saharan Africa emphasized the juridical 
elements of statehood, while neglecting the empirical element”). 
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existing, pre-colonial sets of identities and relationships” provided.18 The colonial state 
displaced various pre-colonial formations, such that what today is called Africa is 
primarily what Europeans decided it was.19  
Colonialism left no valid structures for the future or for the immediate advancement 
of human rights. It built, instead, empty shells of representational politics erected on 
foundations of oppressive and alienating states.20 Colonialism, by its very nature, could 
not build institutions of statehood in Africa; it was not intended to. It constituted a 
historic disruption of the normal evolutionary process, with the old order shattered 
together with most of its binding institutions. In some places, colonialists tried to re-
invent the wheel; in other places, their intervention constituted a truly revolutionary 
restructuring of the political process. The result of these anomalies is that African states 
are more relevant internationally, but they are not domestically “authorised and 
empowered”.21 They remain deficient in the legitimate exercise of coercion within their 
boundaries; in financial self-sufficiency; in leadership of national political communities; and 
in the provision of basic services. 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Davidson (note 1 above) 10. 
18 See OC Okafor Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmentation in Africa (2000) 98. Cf 
NKA Busia Jr ‘The Status of Human Rights in Pre-Colonial Africa’ in E McCarty-Arnolds et al (eds) Africa, Human 
Rights, and the Global System: The Political Economy of Human Rights in a Changing World (1994) 226 (asserting that 
“the human rights performance of contemporary African States must essentially be traced to the structure and social forces 
of pre-colonial African society”). 
19 See AA Mazrui The Africans: A Triple Heritage (1986) 101. Cf M Mamdani Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa 
and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (1996) 287 (arguing that Europe did not bring a tropical version of the late nineteenth 
century nation-state but created multicultural and multiethnic states in Africa). 
20 See TA Aina ‘Reflections on Democracy and Human Rights’ African Topics Jan–Mar 2000 30 (arguing also that the 
institutions erected by colonialism had no real roots in the society in which they operated and that even “in the case of so-
called traditional institutions, these had been invented and/or perverted”). 
21 RH Jackson Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (1991). See also RH Jackson & CG 
Rosberg ‘Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood’ (1982) 35 World Politics 1. 
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The organisation of the colonial state was a response to the native question—how 
best a foreign minority could rule over an indigenous majority.22 One response to this 
dilemma was the ideology of segregation, which privileged Europeans and ‘civilized’ 
natives over ‘uncivilized’ natives; the former enjoyed citizenship and rights, but the latter 
were subjected to “an all-round tutelage”23 in the interests of social comfort and 
convenience. Lord Lugard explained the segregation policy: 
 
On the one hand the policy [of segregation] does not impose any restriction on one 
race which is not applicable to the other. A European is strictly prohibited from living 
in the native reservation, as a native is from living in the European quarter. On the 
other hand, since this feeling exists, it should in my opinion be made abundantly 
clear that what is aimed at is a segregation of social standards, and not a segregation 
of races. The Indian or the African gentleman who adopts the higher standard of 
civilization and desires to partake in such immunity from infection as segregation 
may confer, should be as free and welcome to live in the civilized reservation as the 
European, provided, of course, that he does not bring with him a concourse of 
followers. The native peasant often shares his hut with his goat, or sheep, or fowls. 
He loves to drum and dance at night, which deprives the European of sleep. He is 
sceptical of mosquito theories. “God made the mosquito larva”, said a Moslem 
                                                 
22 Mamdani Citizen and Subject (note 19 above) 16. 
23 As above, 17 (stressing, “a propertied franchise separated the civilized from the uncivilized”). 
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delegation to me, “for God’s sake let the larva live”. For these people, sanitary rules 
are necessary but hateful. They have no desire to abolish segregation.24 
 
Segregation is today still the dominant ideology in the majority of African states and 
manifests itself in various forms. Like their former colonial masters, the inheritance elite, 
rich, black rulers—the “Big Men” of African politics25—continuously taunt and look 
down from their pathological political kingdoms upon the poor people they rule. Achebe 
forcefully and admirably portrays this colonial heritage in his novels, A Man of the 
People26 and Anthills of the Savannah;27 the former fictionalises a “big man” ruler in 
Africa; the latter depicts the new native government’s adoption of the imperialist rhetoric 
for oppression and suppression of the poor. African states clearly represent the strongest 
and most apparent example of the unwavering reliance on colonial political forms.28 
The transfer of power from the coloniser to the colonised African peoples has 
generally been equated with the application of the rules of decolonisation according to 
the procedures of international law. This is a lie; decolonisation meant a transfer of 
rudimentary political powers to the formerly colonised with no real transformation in the 
structures of domination.29 As soon as the euphoria of decolonisation and legitimisation 
                                                 
24 FD Lugard The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1965) 149-50. 
25 See W Mutunga Constitution-Making from the Middle: Civil Society and Transition Politics in Kenya, 1992-1997 (1999) 
(providing a vivid description of the “Big Man” in African politics). 
26 C Achebe A Man of the People (1966). 
27 C Achebe Anthills of the Savannah (1987) (describing the Kangan struggle for a successful postcolonial self-
government, through the experience of three friends who are intricately involved in the Kangan government).  
28 See A Hansen ‘African Refugees: Defining and Defending Their Human Rights’ in Ronald Cohen et al (eds) Human 
Rights and Governance in Africa (1993) 139 161. 
29 SN Grovogui Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law (1996) 2 
(analysing the inadequacies of international law to meet the desire of colonised to achieve true sovereignty and self-
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of self-determination ebbed, the new political elites were confronted with the profound 
incompleteness of state formation and consolidation. The integration, disintegration, and 
deformation wrought by colonialism have led to continuous processes of confrontations 
and adjustments.30 The so-called “first liberation”—the transition from colonial to 
independent rule that swept Africa between 1957 and 1964, except the south—did not 
lead to “a restoration of Africa to Africa’s own history, but the onset of a new period of 
indirect subjection to the history of Europe”.31  
Decolonisation produced an anti-thesis of denial and alienation. As Kreijen argues, 
“decolonisation, or rather the morally instigated legal revolution on which it was 
premised, constituted a sudden swing from effectiveness to legality in international legal 
thought that was too much to handle for the essentially decentralised international legal 
order”.32 The inheritance elites did not have the capacity to discharge the functions 
associated with national sovereignties, such as the maintenance of the rule of law, 
regulation of borders, and provision of social services.33 Governments of these new states 
were expected to shoulder the burdens of formulating and implementing policies that 
would transform society, whether in agriculture, industrialisation, education, health or 
other sectors, unmindful that the new rulers lacked the historical precedent and 
                                                                                                                                                 
determination). Cf O Nnoli Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria (1995) 10 (arguing that post-colonial political and 
administrative structures subverted hitherto traditional structures, institutions, and values or make them subservient to the 
economic and political needs of the imperial powers). 
30 See M Doornbos ‘The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect’ (1990) 28(2) The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 179 181.  
31 See Davidson (note 1 above) 10. 
32 Cf Kreijen (note 4 above) 2. See also above, 141 (arguing: “Due to their rapid emergence as independent states many of 
the former colonies were extremely weak, from both an institutional-political and an economic perspective”). 
33 Cf L Emmerij ‘Co-responsibility versus Double Standards’ in A Adedeji (ed) Africa Within the World: Beyond 
Dispossession and Dependence (1993) 97 106 (“Sharply divided ethnic groups, little or no education for the majority of 
the people, and virtually no trained African administrators were but a few of the problems faced at independence”). 
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experience necessary to define and develop their positions and roles vis-à-vis the civil 
society.34 Predictably, they failed to deliver on the great expectations. “In case after case”, 
says Doornbos, “high expectations were followed by profound disillusionment, and the 
role attributed to the African state changed  from the prime mover of development to that 
of its main obstacle”.35 Africa’s institutions have failed to deliver public service works or 
to implement vital obligations of governments, including those on socio-economic rights. 
Postcolonialism is a primary and secondary cause of human rights violations in 
Africa, including polarization, ethnic domination, class conflict and geo-political 
competition, and elimination or reduction of political opposition or pluralism.36 A typical 
post-colonial state is a lame but partisan Leviathan,37 suspended above society, 
omnipresent but hardly omnipotent.38 It is “rooted in authoritarianism and ethnic 
divisions, widespread illiteracy, and extreme marginalisation of African peoples”.39 It 
constitutes a realm of “free, arbitrary action and discretion of personally motivated favor 
and valuation”.40 It concentrates all the social goods in the hands of the inheritance elites, 
                                                 
34 See Doornbos (note 30 above) 182 (“The state was to pull the whole society along in an all-out development drive on 
several fronts”). 
35 Above, 183. 
36 See HC Carey ‘The Postcolonial State and the Protection of Human Rights’ (2003) 22 Comparative Studies of Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East 59 61 (stressing that these pathologies are associated with postcolonialism because of the non-
democratic norms and institutions that colonialism established).  
37 See passim T Callaghy ‘The State as Lame Leviathan: The Patrimonial Administrative State in Africa’ in Zaki Ergas (ed) 
African States in Transition (1987); Young ‘The African Colonial State’ (note 7 above) 61. 
38 See, in general, M Mutua ‘Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Again: The Post-Colonial African State’ (1995) 21 Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law 5055. 
39 Algiers Declaration OAU Assembly 35th Ord Sess Res AHG/Dec1(XXXV) OAU Doc DOC/OS(XXVI)INF17a (1999) 
[hereinafter Algiers Declaration]. 
40 M Weber Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1978) 979. 
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who distribute it in a manner that has been anything but even.41 The disillusionment 
arising from state failure translated into revolts in many states. To suppress these revolts, 
states resorted to authoritarianism and the entrenchment of personal rule, which further 
eroded their legitimacy.42 The coercive and exploitative character of African states has 
“effectively trumped its ability to secure genuine widespread allegiance among the 
majority African population”.43  
The task of human rights protection in Africa, says Carey, “is more complicated 
because most postcolonial elites are products of or are influenced by the anticolonial 
movements, which often replicated colonial practices.44 Most of Africa has a centrally 
directed but uneven development,45 and public officials serve particular interests rather 
than the common good.46 Modern politics in Africa remains largely that of personal 
networks of obligations and exchange, what Bayart calls “the politics of the belly”—“the 
rush for spoils in which all actors—rich and poor—participate in the world of 
networks”.47 Legal-rational modes of governance, which rely on impersonal 
                                                 
41 See C Young ‘Ethnicity and the Colonial and Post-Colonial State in Africa’ in P Brass (ed) Ethnic Groups and the State 
(1985) 104. 
42 See Grovogui (note 29 above) 181. 
43 Okafor (note 18 above) 99 (discussing the historical development of contemporary forms of socio-cultural fragmentation 
within African states). 
44 Carey (note 36 above) 62. 
45 See Nnoli (note 29 above) 10 (arguing that colonialism laid an economic infrastructure that was “geared exclusively to 
satisfying the needs of the colonial metropolis”). 
46 See, in general, M Bratton & N de Walle Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative 
Perspective (1997); TM Callaghy The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (1984). 
47 J Bayart The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (1993) (providing a view of African inequality in which the 
African ruling class is given full marks for agency); contra Mamdani (note 19 above) 337 (arguing that clientelism is more 
an effect of the form of power rather than an explanation of it). 
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bureaucracies, are still the exception rather than the rule.48 Africa’s civil service generally 
lacks the human and material resources to discharge its functions properly.49 It has been 
deeply politicised, leading to a diluted credibility and integrity and a diminished sense of 
professional prospects, loss of motivation by workers, and apathy.50 Although the civil 
service exists to implement government policies, its ability to discharge its functions has 
depended on the form of government at any point in time. Its weakening has led to many 
unauthorised absenteeism, lateness, idleness, and, of course, poor output. The mentality 
of a typical civil servant in Africa tends to be, “It is not my father’s work. Work or no 
work, I must collect my salary”.51  
The African state is predatory in character. It gears most of its institutions towards 
crushing opposition in the name of forging a national unity and facilitating economic 
development.52 To keep power and avoid strong oppositions, many ‘modern’ African 
leaders emasculate many institutions of governance, including the judiciary, and prohibit 
multiparty political arrangements. They curb the freedom of expression, “through the 
harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention of journalists, victimisation of media”.53 The 
“hard, repressive conduct on the part of the police is regarded as legitimate” in many 
states, and such conduct “increases the likelihood of [further] police violations of human 
                                                 
48 See VT Le Vine ‘African Patrimonial Regimes in Comparative Perspective’ (1980) 18(4) Journal of Modern African 
Studies 657 659. 
49 See JA Sulemane & S Kayizzi-Mugerwa ‘The Mozambican Civil Service: Incentives, Reforms and Performance’ in S 
Kayizzi-Mugerwa (ed) Reforming Africa’s Institutions: Ownership, Incentives, and Capabilities (2003) 199 200. 
50 See M Salisu ‘Incentive Structure, Civil Service Efficiency and the Hidden Economy in Nigeria’ in Reforming Africa’s 
Institutions (note 49 above) 170 171. 
51 ST Ajayi, a former Nigerian Civil Service Commissioner, quoted in Salisu (above) 170. 
52 See M Carbone ‘Weak Civil Society in a Hard State: Lessons from Africa’ (2005) 1(2) Journal of Civil Society 170. 
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rights”.54 These predatory states also frustrate the growth of civil societies; adopt strict 
licensing and registration laws; and retain draconian powers of deregistration.55 
As states became enemies of the citizens, harsh governments or primitive 
dictatorships became the norm, with one dismal tyranny giving way to a worse one.56 
Many of these tyrants, though tired, have refused to retire. Zimbabwe is today sliding 
hastily towards anarchy under its patriarch Mugabe, who has ruled for twenty-six years, 
with no exit plan. His government, which masquerades as a passion for land restitution, is 
famous for continuous human rights violations, lack of respect for the rule of law, and a 
growing culture of impunity.57 His grotesque story is symptomatic of many others who, 
after a promising start, descend into tyranny, corruption and mismanagement.  
Reflecting on these pathologies, An-Na’im cautions that “it is unrealistic to expect the 
post-colonial African state to effectively protect human rights when it is the product of 
colonial rule that is by definition the negation of these rights”.58 Any serious efforts at 
meeting human security in Africa must begin with addressing its many pathologies, 
including restructuring the institutions of governance. Of course, colonial legacies and 
institutions might be difficult to change, but the tragedy lies in giving up in the attempt. 
                                                                                                                                                 
53 See Resolution on Freedom of Expression OAU Doc AHG/229 (XXXVII) (May 2001) pmbl para 4. See also NJ 
Udombana ‘Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights’ (2002) 17 American 
University International Law Review 1177 1229-1232. 
54 See N Uldriks & P van Reenan ‘Human Rights Violations by the Police’ (2001) 2 Human Rights Review 64 72. 
55 See W Maina ‘Kenya: The State, Donors and the Politics of Democratisation’ in AV Rooy Civil Society and the Aid 
Industry (1998) 137. 
56 See Davidson (note 1 above) 9. 
57 See Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in Zimbabwe 2005 Annual Activity Report of the African Commission 
Annex III (Dec 2005) pmbl (calling on Zimbabwean Government to cease from forced evictions throughout the country, to 
respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of expression, association and assembly, and to uphold the principle of 
separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary). See above paras 2 4 & 5. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
118
 
3.2.2 Conflicts 
Although Africa has broken the colonial yoke, it inherited a legacy of conflicts that still 
defines it. In 1996, the OAU declared that Africa, “at present, holds the record of inter-
state wars and conflicts”.59 Conflicts have become time bombs, exploding in several 
states like Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, DR Congo, Uganda, Sudan, 
Somalia, Burundi, and Cote d’Ivoire. In some countries, like Sudan and, until recently, 
Angola, warfare is written into the whole fabric of social relations, with a majority of the 
population living lives in a context of war and conflicts. While Africa tries to smother old 
fires of conflicts, as in Angola, Sierra Leone, DR Congo and Somalia, new ones rapidly 
brew up, as in Sudan’s Darfur. 
Extensive literature abounds on the causes of Africa’s conflicts,60 among them the 
endemic competition for resources—land, minerals, drugs, timber concessions, and other 
valuable commodities. Quantitative analysis demonstrates that easily taxed or looted 
primary commodities increase the likelihood of war, by providing the motivation, prize, 
and means of a violent contest for state or territorial control.61 The increasing poverty 
resulting from a cruel and unjust social system and the adverse exploitation of cultural 
                                                                                                                                                 
58 AA An-Na’im ‘The Legal Protection of Human Rights in Africa: How to Do More With Less’ in A Sarat & TR Kearms 
(eds) Human Rights: Concepts, Contests, Contingencies (2001) 89 98. 
59 Yaoundé Declaration OAU 32d Ord Sess OAU Doc AHG/Decl.3 (XXXII) (8-10 July 1996) [hereinafter Yaoundé 
Declaration] para 6. 
60 See, in general, A Adedeji (ed) Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and 
Good Governance (1999); T Ali & R Matthews (eds) Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution (1999). 
61 See, in general, P Collier Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy (2000). 
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diversities and religious specificities complicate these problems.62 In Angola, the 
exploitation of oil and diamonds financed and motivated the military operations, with 
international corporations and foreign powers playing an enabling role in the strategy of 
the belligerents.63 Western vested interests and, in particular, their participation in small 
arms deals and “conflict resources” fuels these conflicts. According to Cramer: 
“International arms markets, the use of external debt or foreign exchange, especially 
mineral based, to purchase arms, the integration of cross-border weapons and criminal 
networks, foreign military ‘aid’, are all characteristics of many modern ‘civil’ wars”.64 
These activities have rendered resolutions of Africa’s conflicts extremely difficult, if not 
almost impossible.65 
The colonial boundaries also engender Africa’s conflicts. The infamous Scramble at 
the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 saw the slicing of Africa into various spheres of 
influence. The European powers used artificial maps to define Africa’s boundaries, 
making territorial allocations solely to reduce armed conflicts among themselves rather 
than any regard for local inhabitants or geography.66 As Mazrui puts it, “what we regard 
                                                 
62 See OAU Ouagadougou Declaration OAU Doc AHG/Decl I (XXXIV) (June 1998) [hereinafter Ouagadougou 
Declaration] pmbl. 
63 See P Le Billon ‘Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds 1975-2000’ (2001) 100 African 
Affairs 55. 
64 C Cramer ‘The Economics and Political Economy of Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Center for Development Policy 
& Research Discussion Paper 1099 (1999) 5. 
65 See Commission for Africa Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa (2005) 150 [hereinafter Our 
Common Interest]. 
66 See J Herbst ‘The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa’ (1989) 43 International Organization 
673 678-85; S Touval The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (1972) 3-17. See, in general, M Mutua ‘Why Redraw 
the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’ (1995) 16 Michigan Journal of International Law 1113; T Pakenham, The 
Scramble for Africa: White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912 (1991); AD Smith National Identity: 
Ethnonationalism in Comparative Perspective (W Connor (ed) 1991) 15. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
120
as Africa today is primarily what Europeans decided was Africa”.67 Only Botswana, 
Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Morocco, Rwanda, Swaziland, and 
Tunisia have something that resembles pre-colonial territorial and political identity.68 
Other states are what Anderson calls “imagined communities”,69 where “members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”.70 
More frequently, several ethnic groups have found themselves in the same country,71 
living on either side of the administrative frontier. The Yorubas were previously united 
under the Oyo Empire, but they were divided into the colonies of Dahomey, Nigeria, and 
the Protectorate of Lagos.72 The Ewes were divided between Gold Coast and Togo, Efiks 
and Ibibios between Nigeria and Cameroon and the Somali between Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Kenya and Djibouti.73 The Asante of the Asante Empire found themselves in Ivory Coast 
(now Cote d’Ivoire) and Ghana. The Mossi were divided into Ghana and Burkina Faso 
(then called Upper Volta), while the Kanuri of Kanem-Bornu Empire became colonial 
subjects in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad.74 In southern Africa, Malawi, South Africa, 
Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe became countries that developed out of the 
                                                 
67 AA Mazrui The Africans: A Triple Heritage (1986) 101. 
68 See C Young ‘The Heritage of Colonialism’ in JW Harbeson & D Rothschild (eds) Africa in World Politics (1991) 19. 
69 B Anderson Imagined Communities (1992) 16 (explaining that a nation is always “a deep horizontal comradeship”, 
notwithstanding the actual inequality and hierarchy that may prevail within it). 
70 Above, 6. 
71 See M Palmberg National Identity and Democracy an Africa (1999) 11. 
72 Above. 
73 Above. 
74 Above. 
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actions of Shaka, the Zulu warrior, and the intrigues of British settlers led by Cecil 
Rhodes.75 
There is hardly any African state without a frontier problem with its adjacent 
neighbour;76 in fact, the former colonial rulers reportedly bequeathed 103 border disputes 
to Africa.77 To illustrate, Benin and Niger are in conflict over the Lete Island on the River 
Niger and the Mekrou region.78 Algeria disputes with Libya because of the latter’s claim 
over a part of the southeastern region.79 The islands of Anjouan (Nzwani) and Moheli 
(Mwali) in the Comoros have moved to secede from the French-administered Mayotte.80 
Most of the Congo River boundary with the Republic of the Congo is indefinite, with no 
agreement on the division of the river or its islands, except in the Pool Malebo/Stanley 
Pool area.81 Cameroon disputed for years with Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula, until 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided on the dispute in 2002.82 Nigeria, to its 
                                                 
75 Above. 
76 See A Asiwaju ‘The Conceptual Framework’ in A Asiwaju Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa’s 
International Boundaries, 1884-1984 (1984) 1 (“Since the attainment of political independence, there is hardly one of 
these states which has not had cause to worry about the position of its boundaries vis-à-vis its neighbours”). See also, in 
general, CG Widstrand (ed) African Boundary Problems (1964). 
77 See K Somerville ‘Border Dispute an African Legacy’ BBC News Online 10 Oct 2002 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2316645.stm (commenting on the Cameroon and Nigeria border conflict in the context of 
boundary problems in Africa). 
78 See ‘Benin, Niger Take Land Dispute to The Hague’ IRIN News Online 24 June 2001 available at 
http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,10,3634.jsp [hereinafter IRIN] (reporting that Benin and Niger have signed an 
agreement to submit their border dispute to the ICJ for resolution and giving a summary of current disputes being 
negotiated between African countries). 
79 Above. 
80 Above. 
81 Above. 
82 See Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: 
Equatorial Guinea Intervening) ICJ General List No 94 10 Oct 2002 available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_20021010.PDF [hereinafter Cameroon Case] (determining the 
boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria requesting each party to withdraw all administrative and military or police 
forces present on the territories falling under the sovereignty of the other party). 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
122
praise, has largely complied with the Court’s judgment and orders, thus avoiding another 
major military confrontation between two African states. In reaching its decision, the ICJ 
reflected on the artificial African boundaries. 
Egypt is claiming the “Hala’ib Triangle”, a barren area of 20,580 square kilometres 
under partial Sudanese administration defined by an administrative boundary that 
supersedes the treaty boundary of 1899.83 Besides its maritime disputes with Cameroon 
and Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea also disputes with Gabon over islands in Corisco Bay.84 
In Ethiopia, most of the southern half of the boundary with Somalia is a Provisional 
Administrative Line, besides disputes over the Ogaden. Ethiopia and Eritrea also dispute 
the alignment of boundary, which led to armed conflict in 1998 that is largely unresolved 
despite arbitration efforts.85 Administrative boundary between Kenya and Sudan does not 
coincide with international boundary, leading to periodic conflicts.86 The same goes for 
Gambia and Senegal, which has an indefinite boundary.  
Libya disputes with Tunisia over a 19,400 square kilometres in northern Niger and 
part of southeastern Algeria. In Madagascar, there are claims over Bassas da India, 
Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island, and Tromelin Island (all 
administered by France). Malawi disputes with Tanzania over the boundary in Lake 
Nyasa (Lake Malawi), while Morocco claims and administers Western Sahara, though 
sovereignty is unresolved and the UN is attempting to hold a referendum on the issue.87 
                                                 
83 See IRIN (note 78 above). 
84 Above. 
85 Above. 
86 Above. 
87 The recognition of Western Sahara by the then OAU led Morocco to withdraw from the body in 1984. 
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Spain controls five places of sovereignty (plazas de soberania) on and off the coast of 
Morocco—the coastal enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla which Morocco contests, as well as 
the islands of Penon de Alhucemas, Penon de Velez de la Gomera, and Islas Chafarinas.88 
Namibia disputes with Botswana over uninhabited Kasikili (Sidudu) Island in Linyanti 
(Chobe) River. The ICJ resolved the dispute in favour of Botswana in 1999, but there 
remains a contest over one other island in Linyanti River. Seychelles is claiming Chagos 
Archipelago in British Indian Ocean Territory. Meanwhile, Swaziland has asked South 
Africa to open negotiations on reincorporating some nearby South African territories that 
are populated by ethnic Swazis or that were long ago part of the Swazi Kingdom.89 The 
list is long and dismal.  
The uti possidetis juris principle—that disastrous sword of Damocles that enshrines 
the inviolability of frontiers inherited from colonialism—compounds Africa’s boundary 
problems cum conflicts. Both the UN and the OAU/AU flatly reject any ex ante right to 
secession, insisting on the cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic solution under all circumstances, 
even if, as Skurbaty points out, “the professed Pollyanna of democracy plus minority 
rights threatens to turn (in some specific cases) into forced cohabitation”.90 In the Burkina 
Faso v Mali case,91 the ICJ emphasized that uti possidetis juris constituted a general 
                                                 
88 See IRIN (note 78 above). 
89 Above. 
90 Z Skurbaty As If Peoples Mattered: A Critical Appraisal of ‘Peoples’ and ‘Minorities’ from the International Human 
Rights Perspective and Beyond (2000) 27; cf UN GA Res 2625 (XXV) (1970); OAU Res 16(1) (1964); Constitutive Act of 
the AU adopted 11 July 2000 entry into force 26 May 2001 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23 15 479 (2000) (as amended by the 
Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the AU 11 July 2003) [hereinafter AU Act] art 4(b) (enshrining 
“respect of borders existing on achievement of independence”). 
91 Burkina Faso v Mali case (1986) ICJ Rep 554. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
124
principle, whose purpose was to prevent the independence and stability of new states 
from being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers.92 
Some publicists claim that uti possidetis juris is still relevant today, as evidenced by 
the practice of states during the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia, “apparently sanctifying the former internal administrative lines as 
interstate frontiers”.93 In the case of Africa, the principle is said to have had some 
external and internal purposes; among these are that internationally recognised 
boundaries helped to confer legitimacy on the emergent states; that it prevented 
irredentist tendencies by neighbours from turning into territorial claims and the possible 
use of force; and that it gave a clear notice to ethnic minorities that secession or 
adjustment of borders was not an option.94 Some commentators even argue that, given the 
current international system’s greater emphasis on preserving its constituent components 
as defined by internationally recognised boundaries, African states are much more secure 
than states of equivalent relative weakness.95 This is a possibility, though not a 
probability, but the present writer does not share this optimism.  
The impacts of Africa’s conflicts are everywhere evident; and they stretch beyond the 
countries immediately affected. War in surrounding countries has adversely affected 
countries like Tanzania and Cote d‘Ivoire, though the latter now exports refugees to 
                                                 
92 Above, 566–7; see also Award of the Tribunal in the Guinea-Guinea (Bissau) Maritime Declaration case (1985) 77 
International Law Reports 77 636 657 para 40; Award of the Tribunal in Guinea (Bissau)—Senegal Delimitation case 
(1989) 83 International Law Reports 1 22; and the Separate Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Ajibola in Territorial Dispute 
(Libya/Chad) case (1994) ICJ Rep 83-92. 
93 SR Ratner ‘Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States’ (1996) 90 American Journal of 
International Law 590 590; see eg Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States (1995) 34 International Legal 
Materials 1279 1283; SC Res 713 pmbl para 8 UN SCOR 46th Sess Res & Dec UN Doc S/INF/47 (1991) 42 42-3. 
94 See Ratner Drawing a Better Line (note 93 above) 595; see also Touval (note 66 above) 90. 
95 See J Ravenhill ‘Redrawing the Map of Africa’ in The Precarious Balance (note 1 above) 282 283. 
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neighbouring West African countries. Overall, violent conflicts in Africa have killed and 
displaced more people than in any other continent in recent decades.96 They have forced 
millions of people, including women and children, into drifting lives, deprived of their 
means of livelihood, human dignity, and hope.97 They drive poverty and exclusion and 
undermine development and growth. Several instruments of the OAU/AU attest to this 
problem, such as the Cairo Declaration, which states that conflicts “have brought about 
death and human suffering, engendered hate and divided nations and families . . . 
gobbled-up scarce resources, and undermined the ability of our countries to address the 
many compelling needs of our people”.98 The AU Act similarly stresses that conflict 
“constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent”.99 
“[N]o single internal factor”, according to the PSC Protocol, “has contributed more to 
socio-economic decline on the Continent and the suffering of the civilian population than 
the scourge of conflicts within and between our States”.100 
The tragedy in all this is that while the rest of the world increasingly concerns itself 
with bread-and-butter issues—such as jobs, health care and education—, Africa still 
grapples with war-and-peace issues—boundary disputes, conflicts, resource control, 
                                                 
96 Above, 250. 
97 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union adopted 9 July 2002 
[hereinafter PSC Protocol] available at www.africa-union.org [hereinafter AU Web site] pmbl; cf Declaration of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution, Assembly of Heads of State and Government OAU 29th Ord Sess OAU Doc 
AHG/Decl.3 (XXIX) (1993) para 9 [hereinafter Cairo Declaration] (“Conflicts have forced millions of our people into a 
drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope”); 
Our Common Interest (note 65 above) 250 (noting that conflict in Africa “has driven poverty and exclusion, undermined 
growth and development, and deprived many of their right to life, liberty, and security as enshrined in Article 3 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights”). 
98 Cairo Declaration (note 97 above) para 9. 
99 AU Act (note 90 above) pmbl. 
100 PSC Protocol (note 97 above) pmbl. 
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dictatorships, corruption and bad governance, and minority problems—in this twenty-
first century. These problems continue to derail Africa’s march towards sustainable 
development and the realisation of socio-economic rights for it citizens. Thirty-four of 
the forty-nine countries currently classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by the 
UN are from Africa.101 Africa is deeply in need of a new way beyond the darkness that 
repeatedly envelops it. 
 
3.2.3 Corruption and Mismanagement of Resources 
The post-colonial African governance suffers from a crisis of leadership, legitimacy, and 
integrity. Government’s inability to implement socio-economic rights is a problem more 
of nurture than of nature; it results from the mismanagement of available resources. The 
abuse of power has been a significant force in contributing to wide disparities in human 
lives and to gross human rights violations. Politics and power play make Africans 
seemingly more vulnerable to hunger and starvation than those of other continents. 
Africans are powerless over the uses and misuses of resources by their governments who, 
in turn, are impotent in global power relations. 
To state that Africa is corrupt is really to state the obvious. A typical African society 
has become an emblem of crass materialism, with leaders famous for financial excesses. 
A typical national media regularly carries stories of looted monies stashed in foreign 
banks, lost through endemic corruption and abuse of office. The modern African culture 
valorises wealth, however crooked and illicit the manner of its accumulation. Extensive 
governmental involvement in the economy and regulation of public life creates further 
                                                 
101 See UN Conference on Trade and Development, Statistical Profiles of the Least Developed Countries UN Doc 
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opportunities for brigandage. Political corruption has done the greatest harm to Africa’s 
economic, political and social development, undermining the legitimacy of public 
institutions. Access to public service is an opportunity for corrupt self-enrichment. The 
illicit acquisition of personal wealth by public officials and their cronies has had 
damaging effects on society, ethical values, justice, the rule of law, and sustainable 
development.  
The level of corruption and the figures involved often stagger belief; usually, the 
figures constitute a substantial proportion of the resources of the state concerned, enough 
to advance the socio-economic rights of citizens at the material point in time. Some of the 
“big men” of African politics are no better than armed-gangs. Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire 
(now Democratic Republic of the Congo), looted over $10 billion (US) from his 
country’s treasury.102 In Mali, former President Moussa Traore and several of his 
associates were recently charged for “economic crimes”; Traore, in particular, is accused 
of misappropriating 2 billion CFA francs (US $2.6 million).103 Numerous cases of large-
scale official corruption have been reported in Zimbabwe in recent years. The fraud 
department of the Zimbabwe Republic Police reported that 91 percent of the cases it 
investigated in 1998 had occurred in the government, and three-quarters of them had 
involved the award of tenders and contracts.104 In 1999-2001, misuse of resources in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
UNCTAD/LDC/Misc72 (2001) 5 [hereinafter UNCTAD/LDC]. 
102 See The Guardian [Nig] 9 Mar 2000 8. 
103 Expo Times (Sierra Leone) 26 Sept 2000 cited in Transparency International (TI) Global Corruption Report 2001 
(2001) 82 [hereinafter Global Corruption Report 2001]. 
104 Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Economic Report on Africa 2002: Tracking Performance and Progress (2002) 
133 [hereinafter ECA Report 2002]. 
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Zimbabwean government and in state-run companies cost the country close to $800 
million.105 
Nigeria presents a dramatic case study, as “egotistic” graft increasingly outweighed 
the “solidaristic” sort in governments.106 Successive military juntas107 cited corruption by 
civilians as one of their reasons for usurping constitutional authorities, only for these 
“messiahs” to become not more than pirates in power. “Successive governments”, says 
Human Rights Watch, “have misspent the oil wealth which the oil companies have 
helped to unlock, salting it away in foreign bank accounts rather than investing in 
education, health, and other social investment, and mismanaging the national economy to 
the point of collapse”.108  
The centralized structure of military administration, with its concentration of power in 
the hands of a maximum ruler or a clique of the ruling junta at the head of the hierarchy, 
makes massive corruption and other forms of gross abuse of power possible. Nigeria’s 
late General Abacha, arguably one of the most despicable despots in Africa’s post-
colonial history, reportedly looted $4.3 billion (US) from Nigeria’s treasury.109 In 1992, 
The Financial Times reported that 300 Nigerians own over US $30 billion in European 
and North American banks, which was far more than Nigeria’s total indebtedness to 
                                                 
105 Above. 
106 These terms are attributable to S Andreski The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernisation (1969) 
101-2. 
107 Between 1 October 1960, when Nigeria gained political independence, and May 1999, when the last military regime 
handed back power to the civilians, the military has ruled Nigeria for almost thirty years. 
108 Human Rights Watch The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil 
Producing Communities (1999) available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/Nigew991-01.htm#P190_8265. 
109 See The Guardian [Nig] 8 Feb 2000 1. 
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foreign creditors. Similar cases of mind-boggling foreign accounts by other Africans 
abound.110 
Even in the current Nigeria’s civilian dispensation, President Obasanjo routinely 
preaches what is right, but routinely practices what is wrong. He spent a staggering sum 
of money building a stadium in Abuja and thereafter lobbied to host the Olympics and the 
World Cup. He also habitually seeks legislative approvals to add new jets to his presidential 
fleet,111 in a country where the minimum wage for civil servants is N5,500 (less than $50) 
per month;112 where facilities needed for qualitative basic education are almost non-
existent, where “per capita spending on health is shockingly $3;” and where “[o]nly 38% of 
children are immunized against measles”.113 When “viewed from the perspective of the 
millions of beggars that litter the streets of those countries, the hit-or-miss level of their 
health delivery services or indeed the accessibility of the most basic structures of self-
fulfillment for their teeming generations in a modern, competitive world”,114 these 
structures and lifestyles are nothing but private mausoleums, paeans to human vanity at 
the expense of social actualities.  
Other African leaders, finding themselves in positions where the entire national 
treasury is placed at their disposal and without the responsibility for statutory accounting, 
                                                 
110 See A Babalola ‘Legal and Judicial Systems and Corruption’ in A Aderinwale (ed) Corruption, Democracy and Human 
Rights in West Africa (1994) 93 94. 
111 See eg DS Dauda ‘Misplaced Priorities and Claptrap Policies’ Amana Online, June 25 2003 available at 
http://www.amanaonline.com/Articles/art_391.htm (writing on the squandering of Nigeria’s resources on wasteful and 
diversionary projects, like procurement of presidential jets). 
112 See National Minimum Wage (Amendment) Act No 1 (2000) sec 2 (Nigeria) available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/LFN-2000.htm (providing, “as from the commencement of this Act, it shall be the duty of every employer (except as 
provided for under this Act) to pay a wage not less than National Minimum Wage of N5,500.00 per month to every worker 
under his establishment”). 
113 CN Okeke ‘The Debt Burden: An African Perspective’ 35 International Lawyer (2001) 1489 1496 n.51. 
114 W Soyinka The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis (1996) 113. 
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embarked on shear delusions of grandeur and bruising preoccupations. The late Felix 
Houphouët-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire replicated the St Peter’s Basilica in his hometown of 
Yamoussoukro in 1989 after also moving the nation’s capital there. In Kenya, poor 
economic governance has inhibited or hobbled development; “[w]eak infrastructure, 
widespread corruption, escalating insecurity, poorly managed public resources, and the 
public sector’s inability to deliver services efficiently have undermined development.”115 
Arab Moi’s Kenya was characterized by economic mismanagement, foreign debt, 
rampant corruption, political repression and ethnic tensions.  
Overall, corruption and mismanagement of Africa’s resources are obstacles to the 
enjoyment of socio-economic rights in Africa; they devastate the economic and social 
development of Africa and deepen poverty by distorting political, economic and social 
life. They undermine accountability and transparency in the management of public 
affairs116 and make many states fall short of their commitments to meet the basic needs of 
their peoples. 
 
3.2.4 The Crisis of Development under an Unfair IEO 
Development consists in a society’s ability to maximize resources in order to satisfy 
man’s needs in all aspects, tangible and intangible. Economic growth is a necessary 
condition of development and a society develops economically when its members 
increase their capacity for dealing with the environment, which, in turn, depends on 
                                                 
115 Global Corruption Report 2001 (note 103 above) 7 (noting also that these governance problems have hurt private 
sector activities in Kenya, as shown by the decline in investment; as above). 
116 See OAU The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Oct 2001) [hereinafter NEPAD] para 22 (noting, inter alia, 
that corruption and bad governance in many countries have hampered the development of accountable governments across 
Africa). 
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several variables. The first variable is science, that is, the extent to which the members of 
a society understand the laws of nature. The second variable is technology, that is, the 
extent to which the members of a society put that understanding into practice by devising 
tools. The third variable is entrepreneurship, that is, the manner in which work is 
organized. When these variables are absent, as they often are in Africa, then such a 
society may be said to be underdeveloped or, to put it mildly, developing.117  
Africa is a huge paradox. The continent has immense wealth, potential, market and 
culture. Twenty percent of its total area is made up of forests, making it “the planet’s 
second lifeline with fabulous bio-diversity (flora and fauna)”.118 Africa is endowed with 
immense mineral and energy resources—about 30 percent of global mineral resources, 
such as petroleum, gas, uranium, and hydroelectric basins.119 Yet, NEPAD announces 
that, “Africa remains the poorest continent despite being one of the most richly endowed 
regions of the world”.120 
Africa’s development crisis is a consequence of both internal and external factors. 
This Chapter has already examined some of the internal factors, such as corruption and 
conflicts. Among the external factors is the unfair IEO.121 Dependence, exploitation, the 
looting of Africa’s resources, and the introduction of zones of influence have marked 
international relations with “organized” or “institutionalised” disorder. Africa’s 
                                                 
117 See NJ Udombana ‘The Third World and the Right to Development: Agenda for the Next Millennium’ (2000) 22 
Human Rights Quarterly 753 756-7 (referencing W Rodney How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1982) 10-11). 
118 Commission of the AU Our Common Destiny: Guideline Document (2004) 5 [hereinafter Our Common Destiny]. 
119 Above. 
120 NEPAD (note 116 above) para 19. 
121 See, in general, NJ Udombana ‘The Summer Has Ended and We are Not Saved! Towards a Transformative Agenda for 
Africa’s Development’ (2005) San Diego International Law Journal 5. 
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development crisis dates back to slavery, which deprived the continent of its working 
force—a vital component of development. It continued through the period of colonialism, 
during which period the continent’s resources were exploited at abandon. Since its 
release to independence, the collusion of powerful nations with despotic leaders and their 
co-option into neo-liberal economic policies have ensured the maintenance of the status 
quo ante bellum. All this makes it difficult, if not impossible, for governments to fulfil 
their human rights obligations to their peoples.122 
There are alternative theories to Africa’s underdevelopment and poverty. Some 
scholars, pointing to the success of the high performing Asian economies, insist that the 
“dependency theory” is not credible, since other performing countries were equally 
victims of dependency and imperialism. The remarkable economic growth of some Asian 
countries, like Taiwan, has been projected to discredit the dependency theory.123 These 
scholars believe that the continuing underdevelopments of Africa are consequences of the 
internal political decisions of sovereign states.124 This is a true proposition, but no single 
theory can account for Africa’s underdevelopment. 
The current IEO was elaborated shortly before the end of World War II, when most 
of Africa—with the exception of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia—was colonized by the 
then European powers: Belgium, Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain. The IEO is now 
                                                 
122 See, in general, K Raffer & HW Singer The Economic North-South Divide: Six Decades of Unequal Development 
(2001) (analysing the ways in which global poverty and unequal development contribute to an increasing global rich-poor 
gap); JO Ihonvbere ‘Underdevelopment and Human Rights Violations in Africa’ in GW Shepherd Jr & MOC Anikpo (eds) 
Emerging Human Rights (1990) 57; and D Greenberg ‘Law and Development in Light of Dependency Theory’ in Law and 
Development (1992) 89. 
123 See eg M Tsai ‘Dependency, The State and Class in the Neoliberal Transition of Taiwan’ (2001) 22 Third World 
Quarterly 359.  
124 See Y Osinbajo & O Ajayi ‘Human Rights and Economic Development in Developing Countries’ (1994) 28 
International Lawyer 727 737. 
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symbolized in the trio of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and—with 
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994125—the World Trade Organization (WTO).126 
These three institutions form the backbone of a contemporary international economic 
legal system that focuses on global economic security. One of the goals of the WTO 
includes “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of 
and trade in goods and services”.127 The WTO Agreement also recognises the “need for 
positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least 
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate 
with the needs of their economic development”.128 The WTO ties the domestic goals of 
full employment, poverty reduction, and social stability to the international trading 
system, because of the belief, arguably, that economic growth through free trade leads to 
greater promotion and protection of human rights. 
The development-oriented goals of the Marrakesh Agreement correspond fairly with 
some socio-economic rights guaranteed in several human rights instruments. They 
correspond, for example, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ rights to 
                                                 
125 The Uruguay Round was launched in September 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. It took four years to prepare and 
seven years to complete in 1994. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations 15 Apr 1994 (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 1125 [hereinafter Final Act]. 
126 The WTO was established in 1995 to implement principles, rules, and disciplines of the Uruguay Round. See 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the [WTO] 15 Apr 1994 (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 1125 [hereinafter 
Marrakesh Agreement or WTO Agreement]. The WTO succeeds the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 30 Oct 1947 61 Stat A-11 55 UNTS 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. 
GATT 1947 was provisionally established to expedite the start of international negotiations on tariff reductions and their 
implementation, pending ratification and entry into force of the Havana Charter and establishment of the International 
Trade Organization (ITO). As the Charter never entered into force, GATT “was pressed into service by default to fill an 
institutional vacuum”. K Kennedy ‘A Review of Globalization and Its Discontent’ (2003) 35 George Washington 
International Law Review 251 252. 
127 See WTO Agreement (note 126 above) pmbl. 
128 Above. 
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work129 and to an adequate standard of living.130 They correspond with the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ right to “an adequate standard of 
living . . . including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions”,131 and “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”.132 They correspond with the  
Declaration on the Right to Development’s133 right of “access to basic resources, 
education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of 
income”.134 They correspond with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
rights to health,135 to education,136 and to development.137 Symmetries clearly exist 
between trade, development, and human rights. Economic development serves as the 
strongest predictor of improved basic needs achievement.138 
Trade, obviously, has always been an engine of growth, especially in this era of 
globalisation. Trade helped Japan to climb the ladder of economic development; and 
China’s economy started roaring when it became outward driven. Trade lies at the heart 
                                                 
129 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 10 Dec 1948 GA Res 217 A (III) GAOR 3d Sess [hereinafter 
UDHR] art 23. 
130 Above, art 25. 
131 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted 16 Dec 1966 entry into force 23 Mar 1976 
993 UNTS 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] art 11(1). 
132 Above, art 12(1). 
133 See Declaration on the Right to Development GA Res 41/128 UN Doc A/RES/41/128 (4 Dec 1986) [hereinafter DRD]. 
134 Above, art 8(1). 
135 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted 27 June 1981 entry into force 21 Oct 1986 Doc 
OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev5 (1982) 21 International Legal Materials 59 [hereinafter African Charter or Charter] art 16. 
136 Above, art 17. 
137 Above, art 22. 
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of the success stories of Taiwan, Singapore, Hong-Kong, South Korea and other newly-
industrialised nations. Why is Africa different? The answer lies in the lopsided 
implementation of international trade rules, which undermines Africa’s contribution to 
global trade, compounding its efforts at economic self-reliance and causing real-life 
devastation and a growing social and political backlash.139 The unfair IEO is compounded by 
such internal problems as absence of basic infrastructure, which increases the cost of doing 
business in Africa. Besides, most of Africa exports primary products, which lacks 
competitiveness and fetches less than ten percent of manufactured value at the global market.  
Africa’s report card on global trade has been dismal: “Africa in 20 years,” says the Blair 
Commission Report, “saw its share in world trade fall from six to two percent; just one 
percentage point of that fall represents more than $70 billion in foregone revenues 
annually.”140 In his forward to the Economic Report on Africa 2004, the Executive 
Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) lamented: 
 
Trade is one of the main drivers of growth and development; yet Africa’s trade 
performance is weak. The region’s share in world merchandise exports fell from 
6.3% in 1980 to 2.5% in 2000 in value terms. It recorded a meager 1.1% average 
annual growth over the 1980-2000 period, compared to 5.9% in Latin America and 
                                                                                                                                                 
138 See HS Park ‘Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 405 410-137. See 
also BE Moon & WJ Dixon ‘Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross National Study’ (1985) 29 American 
Journal of Political Science 661 689-90. 
139 See, in general, NJ Udombana ‘A Question of Justice: The WTO, Africa, and Countermeasures for Breaches of 
International Trade Obligations’ (2005) 38 The John Marshall Law Review 1153 (exploring some of the legal and 
developmental issues arising from the WTO trade regime, particularly as they affect Africa, and urging Africa to adopt 
unilateral measures to counterpoise breaches of international trade rules and strengthen its domestic economy and 
bargaining power in global trade negotiations, particularly as WTO remedies offer little prospects of 
effectiveness). For a defence of the liberal trade regime, see B McDonald The World Trading System: The Uruguay Round 
and Beyond (1998). 
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7.1% in Asia. Further, while about 70% of developing countries’ exports are 
manufactures, Africa has hardly benefited from the boom in these exports. Overall 
on the continent, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, progress on export 
diversification has been slow.141  
 
Thus, while the frontiers of globalisation have opened to capital, goods, and services, 
they have sadly closed to human beings.142 “Ushered in with promises of progress and 
prosperity for all”, globalisation has aroused fears by posing “serious threats to 
sovereignty, cultural and historical identities as well as gravely undermining [Africa’s] 
development prospects”.143 Africa remains a mere source of cheap labour for 
transnationals, while increasingly being marginalised in globalised trade—though some 
commentators insist that its marginalisation is a perception rather than a process.144 
The WTO “remains overwhelmingly oriented toward trade concerns”, 
notwithstanding that its influence “extends well beyond the trade arena.”145 It rejects a 
formal linkage between workers’ rights and trade liberalization146 and considers policies 
                                                                                                                                                 
140 Our Common Interest (note 65 above) 87. 
141 KY Amoako ‘Foreword’ UN Economic Commission for Africa [UNECA] Economic Report on Africa 2004: Unlocking 
Africa’s Trade Potential (2004) [hereinafter ERA 2004] xi. 
142 See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants 2003 Inter-Am Ct HR (ser A) No 18 at para 16 (17 
Sept 2003) (Cancado J concurring) available at www.corteidh.or.cr/serie_a_ing/sa_cancado _18_ing.doc. 
143 See eg Algiers Declaration OAU Assembly 35th Ord Sess OAU Doc AHG/Decl 1 (XXXV) (July 1999) para 5. 
144 See P Gayama ‘Africa’s Marginalization: A Perception, Not a Process’ in Africa Within the World (note 33 above) 73 75 
(stressing, “Africa can be marginalised only if it allows itself to be”).   
145 AT Guzman ‘Global Governance and the WTO’ (2004) 45 Harvard International Law Journal 303 305 (“This 
interaction between trade and non-trade issues will only grow stronger over time, and the pressure to address the 
conflicting priorities that result will continue to rise”). 
146 On the impact of WTO on labour rights, see, in general, R Bhala ‘Clarifying the Trade-Labor Link’ (1998) 37 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 11 (exploring the linkage between workers rights and a liberalized international trade 
regime); H Cooper et al ‘Up in Smoke: WTO’s Failure in Bid to Launch Trade Talks Emboldens Protesters’ Wall Street 
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that promote workers’ rights as barriers to trade. The 1996 WTO Singapore Ministerial 
Declaration invites challenges to laws that seek to enforce labour rights: “We reject the 
use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative 
advantage of countries, particularly low wage developing countries, must in no way be 
put into question”.147 A faulty logic underpins these anti-human, anti-labour, rights 
stance, namely that national “aberrations”, such as domestic laws permitting strikes, 
affect international trade and profits of foreign investors.148 With states abdicating their 
roles as primary sources of labour rights protection, the majority of workers in Africa and 
other parts of the developing world have been left to face multinational capacities 
directly;149 and the results of such unequal contests are predictable! 
The race to the bottom fuelled by globalisation and liberalization has lowered wages 
in many countries, “[d]espite efficiency and productivity gains”, creating unprecedented 
income inequality and a decrease in the standard of living for millions of people.150 The 
rapid dismantling of trade protection, deregulation of the capital and financial market, 
outsourcing of work and relocation of plants, technological and other developments, have 
led to adverse economic and social consequences in many countries.151 The so-called 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal 6 Dec 1999 at A1 (discussing the resistance of developing countries to the incorporation of labour standards in 
WTO agreements); and R Howse ‘The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Worker’s Rights’ (1999) 3 Journal 
of Small & Emerging Business Law 131 (examining the role of the WTO in protecting workers’ rights). 
147 WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(96)/DEC 13 Dec 1996 at 4. 
148 See A Sukthankar & S Nova ‘Human and Labor Rights Under the WTO’ in L Wallach & P Woodall (eds) Whose Trade 
Organization? A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO (2004) 219 219–20. 
149 See above.  
150 L Wallach & P Woodall Whose Trade Organization? A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO (2004) 284 (“Hunger has 
increased during the era of the WTO, not from a lack of food but from a lack of purchasing power by the poor.”). 
151 See, in general, G Biffl & J Isaac ‘How Effective are the ILO’s Labour Standards Under Globalisation?’ Paper 
Presented at the IIRA/CIRA 4th Regional Congress of the Americas Centre for Industrial Relations, University of Toronto 
(25 – 29 June 2002) available at http://www.cira-acri.ca/IIRA%20CIRA%20docs/Isaac%20and%20Biffl.pdf (arguing that 
globalisation has made some countries, motivated by market-oriented economic doctrine and by a perception of unions as 
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multilateral system is nothing but a projection of the “Washington Consensus” with its 
insistence that “the market is the most rational way to do things correctly”.152 As Stiglitz 
eloquently puts it, 
 
the net effect of the policies set by the Washington Consensus has all too often been 
to benefit the few at the expense of the many, the well-off at the expense of the poor. 
In many cases, commercial interests and values have superseded concern for the 
environment, democracy, human rights, and social justice.153 
 
Even if the global economic order is not the primary cause of poverty in Africa, an 
equitable economic system can contribute towards making people less miserable.154  
 
3.3 Confronting the Challenges to Realise Socio-economic Rights in Africa 
The patrimonial state formations and their pathological dysfunctions—repression and 
extraction, massive corruption, administrative bureaucracy, enormous waste, clientelism, 
institutional collapse, poor policy performance, debt and infrastructure crisis—these and 
other pathologies make it imperative for Africa to embark on political, economic, and 
institutional reforms. This thesis submits that a reform of the patrimonial, predatory, and 
vampire states in Africa is the first real step towards advancing human security. Africa’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
being obstructive to economic efficiency, to adopt unduly conservative economic policies and to enact legislation that are 
incompatible with ILO standards). 
152 D O’Hearn ‘Tigers and Transnational Corporations: Pathways from the Periphery?’ in R Munck & D O’Hearn (eds) 
Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm (1999) 117. 
153 J Stiglitz Globalization and its Discontents (2003) 20. 
154 See A Sajo ‘Socioeconomic Rights and the International Economic Order’ (2002) 35(1) New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 221 222. 
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governments must look inwards, redefine their priorities, empower their peoples, promote 
new strategies of politics and development, and re-articulate new holistic transformative 
agendas that will enable Africa to take its rightful place in the global divisions of labour 
and power and meet human security back home. 
 
3.3.1 Reforming Institutions of Governance 
The reformation of Africa’s continental organization was long overdue, as the OAU 
Charter had become “a dated instrument bearing very little likeness to today’s reality”.155 
It was not surprising that the AU Act sets for the AU the obviously difficult task of taking 
up the multifaceted challenges confronting Africa and its peoples, “in the light of the 
social, economic and political changes taking place in the world”.156 Refreshingly, the 
AU promises to ensure good governance and the rule of law, to “promote and protect 
human and peoples’ rights, [and to] consolidate democratic institutions and culture”.157 It 
also promises to “take all necessary measures” to strengthen common African 
institutions, and to provide them with the necessary powers and resources that would 
enable them [to] discharge their respective mandates effectively”.158 
On its part, the AU should demonstrate its commitment to democracy and human 
rights protection in Africa by sufficiently funding Africa’s regional institutions, 
especially the African Commission and Court. The Commission still suffers from acute 
                                                 
155 Editorial ‘Sirte and the Rest of Us’ African Topics Nov – Dec 1999 3 (noting that the compromises were necessary to 
reach an agreement and produced an internal inertia that hampered reforms). 
156 AU Act (note 90 above) pmbl. 
157 Above, pmbl para 9. 
158 Above, para 10. 
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financial problems almost two decades after its establishment;159 and this has often forced 
it to prioritise its activities, with adverse consequences on the promotion of social rights. 
It appears that the AU and its Member States presently use the African Commission and 
similar institutions largely as public relations outfits to enhance their human rights and 
democratic credentials before the global community. The AU should set a new paradigm 
by funding the cost of rights in Africa. A thing is worth just what it costs. 
The renovation of African economies and the realisation of socio-economic rights 
must start with political transformations, which requires building effective institutions 
that can make economic activity and entrepreneurship to flourish. Weak institutions will 
continue to pull Africa backward, with “shoestring” budgets, compromises, and external 
sources of power resulting in failure to fulfil treaty and constitutional obligations on 
socio-economic rights. African states must embark on internal political and institutional 
transformations, given the interdependence of good governance and economic 
development; neither is possible without the other. “Economic development stalls when 
governments do not uphold the rule of law”, and “upholding the rule of law requires 
institutions for government accountability”.160 
Given good and accountable governance, Africa can conveniently implement socio-
economic rights, both in their negative and positive connotations. Good governance will 
aid the faithful incorporation and implementation of international norms and ensure 
respect for human rights at the national level. Encouragingly, democratic governance is 
gradually taking roots in many African countries, though few others are sliding back into 
                                                 
159 See eg Sixteenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission 2002–2003 2. 
160 United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] Millennium Project Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to 
Achieve the Millennium Development Goals (2005) 31 [hereinafter Investing in Development]. 
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autocracy and even anarchy. Everyone seems to recognise that democracy represents the 
best hope for Africa’s future stability.161 Yet, if democracy must offer that hope, it must 
go beyond periodic elections to the delivery of basic needs to citizens. The ballot box is 
meaningful only if it puts food on the table of those who embrace it. A hungry man thinks 
about food, not democracy. 
Botswana’s economic successes clearly demonstrate that political stability and 
prudent economic management are critical to Africa’s renaissance and development.162 
Botswana not only has transparency in decision-making but also offers an example of 
“‘input that continually recharges the batteries’ of government, and that the ‘doors of 
government are open’”.163 This partially explains why the country escaped from the 
inglorious list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and is now a “‘middle income 
country’”.164 “With a population of about a million people in the 1960s, the country 
sustained an average per capita economic growth rate of 10 percent from 1960 to 1980, 
exceeding that of South Korea or Hong Kong”.165 Botswana is also the world’s number 
one producer of diamonds by value, with production worth $1.9 billion at an average 
                                                 
161 See, in general, NJ Udombana ‘Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in Africa (2003) 24 Michigan Journal 
of International Law 1209. 
162 See eg ‘Botswana: Africa’s prize democracy’ The Economist 6 Nov 2004 52 (noting how good governance and sound 
economic policies have made Botswana a prosperous country, where its “1.8 m people are among the continent’s 
wealthiest”). 
163 Panel on Issues in Democratization in SJ Kpundeh (ed) National Research Council Democratization in Africa: African 
Views, African Voices (1992) 47 (noting also that “‘elections [in Botswana] have been relatively honest; the government 
has, in fact, kept its promises by and large, and has remained popular; and the opposition continues to act as a loyal 
opposition, believing sincerely in the possibility of alternation’”). 
164 Africa’s Best Kept Secret: Botswana as “a Shining Liberal Democracy” (2003) ACP-EU Courier May-June 2003 54. 
165 P Clements ‘Challenges for African States’ (2001) 36 Journal of Asian and African Studies 295 303 (noting also that 
“[w]hile per capita private consumption throughout Sub-Saharan Africa declined at 2.1 percent a year from 1980 to 1997, 
in Botswana it increased at 2.3 percent”). 
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price per carat of $97.166 Its development record stands in sharp contrast to that of most 
African countries: 
 
3.3.2 Managing Conflicts 
There is symmetry between peace and security, on the one hand, and development, on the 
other. Peace and development are indivisible and none is possible without the other.167 
Conscious of this symmetry, Africa’s leaders have, in recent years, expressed their 
determination to confront conflicts in numerous instruments. The first instrument to 
consider is the CSSDCA Solemn Declaration, adopted in 2000168 pursuant to the report of 
the ministerial meeting of the Conference on the Security, Stability, Development and 
Cooperation in Africa. The Declaration recognises that “the problems of security and 
stability in many African countries have impaired their capacity to achieve the necessary 
level of intra and inter-African cooperation that is required to attain the integration of the 
continent and is critical to the continent’s socio-economic development and 
transformation”.169 
The CSSDCA process creates a synergy between the various activities earlier 
undertaken and seeks to consolidate Africa’s efforts in areas of peace, security, stability, 
development and cooperation. It affirms general and specific principles under four main 
                                                 
166 See J Brew ‘Confidence Grows in the Regional Economy’ African Topics Jan - Mar 2000 21. 
167 See Yaoundé Declaration (note 59 above) para 24. Cf AU Act (note 90 above) pmbl (stressing that the promotion of 
peace, security and stability is “a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda”); and 
Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations OAU Doc AHG/Decl.2 (XXX) (1994) reprinted in (1995) 3 
African Yearbook of International Law 382 [hereinafter Declaration on Code of Conduct] pmbl (noting that “every 
cooperation effort is doomed to failure in an environment devoid of stability, trust and security”). 
168 See CSSDCA Solemn Declaration OAU Assembly 36th Ord Sess AHG/Decl 4 (XXXVI) (2000) [hereinafter CSSDCA 
Declaration]. 
169 Above, para 6. 
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areas called “Calabashes”; these are security, stability, development, and cooperation.170 
Among the general principles include the interdependence of African states in matters of 
security, stability and development, which “makes it imperative to develop a common 
African agenda . . . [that] must be based on a unity of purpose and a collective political 
consensus derived from a firm conviction that Africa cannot make any significant 
progress without finding lasting solutions to the problem of peace and security”.171 
When African states later adopted the AU Act on 11 July 2000, they made the 
promotion of peace, security, and stability in Africa one of their goals.172 Underpinning 
these goals are certain principles, including the “[p]eaceful resolution of conflicts among 
Member States of the Union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by 
the Assembly” and “[p]eaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in 
peace and security”.173 The PSC now serves as the “appropriate means” for the resolution 
of conflicts in Africa within the AU legal framework, replacing the OAU Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR).174 Like its predecessor,175 
the PSC’s mandate extends to the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa; the 
anticipation and prevention of conflicts; and the promotion and implementation of peace 
                                                 
170 Above, para 9. 
171 Above, para 9(c); see also para 9(b) (“The security and development of every African country is inseparably linked to 
that of other African countries. Instability in one country affects the stability of neighbouring countries and has serious 
implications for continental unity, peace and development.”). 
172 See AU Act (note 90 above) art 3(f). 
173 Above, art 4(i). 
174 The MCPMR was intended “to bring to the processes of dealing with conflicts in . . . [Africa] a new institutional 
dynamism, enabling speedy action to prevent or manage and ultimately resolve conflicts when and where they occur”. 
Cairo Declaration (note 97 above) para 12. 
175 See PSC Protocol (note 97 above) art 22(1) (“The present Protocol shall replace the Cairo Declaration.”); see also same, 
art 22(2) (providing that the PSC Protocol provisions shall supercede resolutions and decisions of the OAU relating to the 
MCPMR in Africa, which are in conflict with the present Protocol). 
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initiatives.176 The PSC will also coordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the 
prevention and combating of terrorism; develop a common defence policy for the AU; 
and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law in Africa.177 
Even earlier instruments, such as the African Charter and the Protocol to the African 
Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,178 
were important for ensuring the promotion, protecting and observance of human rights as 
an integral part of Africa’s wider objective of promoting collective security for durable 
peace and sustainable development. NEPAD also pledges joint responsibility for 
strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at the 
regional and continental levels and for ensuring that these mechanisms are used to restore 
and maintain peace.179 It hopes to build the capacity of African states to set and enforce 
the legal framework and to maintain law and order.180 
More significantly, NEPAD develops an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 
expected to make a difference in the quality of governance in Africa. As a self-
monitoring mechanism, the APRM seeks— 
 
to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political 
stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-
                                                 
176 Above, art 3. 
177 Above. See also NJ Udombana ‘The Unfinished Business: Conflicts, The African Union and the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development’ (2003) 35 George Washington International Law Review (2003) 55 80-87. 
178 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights OAU Doc OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT (III) [hereinafter Human Rights Protocol]. 
179 See NEPAD (note 116 above) para 49. 
180 Above. 
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regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and 
reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies, and 
assessing the needs for capacity building of participating countries.181 
 
The APRM works through the sharing of experience and reinforcement of successful 
best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity 
building of participating countries.182 
The avalanche of normative and institutional frameworks on peace and security 
illustrates that the AU and its Member States are poised to chart a new course in 
checkmating the scourge of conflicts that has devastated Africa. The problem, as usual, is 
that the reality does not match rhetoric. Yet, since the responsibility for peace and 
security lies primarily with Africa’s governments183—as does responsibility for 
development184—the AU and its Member States must work harder to prevent or, at least, 
manage conflict. The establishment of peace and security will lead to Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and sustainable development. A measurable reduction in defence 
                                                 
181 Memorandum or Understanding on the African Peer Review Mechanism NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/MOU 
(2003) para 8 [hereinafter APRM MOU]. Cf Declaration on the Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development AU Assembly 1st Ord Sess AU Doc ASS/AU/Decl1 (I) (July 2002) para 6 [hereinafter Declaration on 
NEPAD]. 
182 On peer review generally, see F Pagani ‘Peer Review as a Tool for Co-operation and Change: An Analysis of an OECD 
Working Method’ (2002) 11(4) African Security Review available at www.iss.org.za/Pubs/ASR/11No4/Feature2.html. See 
also Joint Group on Trade and Competition Peer Review: Merits and Approaches in a Trade and Competition Context 
COM/TD/DAFFE/COMP(2002)4/ FINAL 6 June 6 2002 (analysing the use of peer review in a subject area). 
183 See eg CSSDCA Declaration (note 168 above) para 9(f). Cf Our Common Interest (note 65 above) 250 (“Responsibility 
for peace and security lies primarily with African governments.”). 
184 See eg Declaration on the Economic Situation in Africa OAU Assembly 21st Ord Sess OAU Doc AHG/Decl 1 (XXI) 
(July 1985) para 6 [hereinafter Declaration on Africa’s Economic Situation] (“We re-affirm that the development of our 
continent is the primary responsibility of our Governments and people”.); Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the 
Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World OAU Assembly 26th Ord Sess OAU Doc AHG/Decl 1 (XXVI) (July 
1990) para 8 [hereinafter Declaration on the Socio-Economic Situation in Africa] (“We reaffirm that Africa’s development 
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spending will also release scare resources towards raising production and services, create 
more job opportunities, achieve economic growth and development, and generally raise 
living standards in Africa. As the OAU stressed: 
 
The establishment of peace and security will not only lead to the reduction of 
defence expenditure, but will also enable us to redirect our resources towards raising 
the level of production and services, augmenting the living standards of our peoples, 
creating more job opportunities and achieving economic growth and development.185 
 
Most of Africa’s leaders treat state resources as means for increasing military power 
and military power as means for gaining control of resources. These leaders must cut 
down on their defence spending in order to save money for development and human 
freedom. They seldom, if at all, plead poverty and underdevelopment when investing 
huge public resources in procurement of weaponry to prosecute destructive wars, nut they 
often are quick to plead underdevelopment and lack of resources for their failure to create 
employment and provide social insurance or implement other forms of socio-economic 
rights. Yet, as the Limburg Principles declare: “In the use of the available resources due 
priority shall be given to the realisation of rights recognised in the [ICESCR], mindful of 
the need to assure to everyone the satisfaction of subsistence requirements as well as the 
provision of essential services”.186  
                                                                                                                                                 
is the responsibility of our governments and peoples”); NEPAD (note 116 above) para 205 (“In proposing the partnership, 
Africa recognises that it holds the key to its own development”). 
185 Cairo Declaration (note 97 above) para 14. 
186 See The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights adopted 8 Jan 1987 UN ESCOR Commission on Human Rights 43rd Sess Agenda Item 8 UN Doc 
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The resources used in prosecuting destructive wars in Africa could make it possible 
for governments to channel resources into human development objectives, to redirect 
resources towards raising the level of production and services, and to create more job 
opportunities. They could enable governments to revive the failed educational systems, 
acquire learning facilities, and hire new teachers. They could enable governments to 
develop infrastructures and raise living standards in Africa.187 They could also enable 
governments to establish hospitals and to open many clinics that have been padlocked 
and unused across Africa, thereby fulfilling the AU’s goal of working with relevant 
international partners to eradicate preventable disease and promote good health in 
Africa.188 I submit that every gun that is made and imported into Africa, every warship 
launched, every rocket or missile fired, “signifies, in a final sense, a shift from those who 
hunger and are not fed, from those who are cold and are not clothed”.189 
This thesis earlier commented on how post-colonial boundaries engender conflicts in 
Africa. I submit that African states should not smother the problem with the verbiage of 
uti possidetis juris. Nation status has never been an absolute or a constant, but has 
followed “the politics of conflict, interest, alliances, power, and even accident”.190 
Africa’s boundaries are not acts of nature; they are abnormalities of adventurism and, 
hence, negotiable. What is required is mutual understanding on fundamental issues, rather 
than governments behaving like the European imperialists who parcelled out the nations 
                                                                                                                                                 
E/CN4/1987/17/Annex (1987) art 28 reprinted in ‘The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 122. 
187 See AU Act (note 90 above) art 3(k). 
188 Above art 3(n). 
189 General Eisenhower quoted in CG Weeramantry ‘The Right to Development’ (1985) 25 Indian Journal of International 
Law 482 482. 
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in the first place. One option is to articulate the decision of the polity that actually makes 
up Africa’s nations.191 So long as Africa refuses to meaningfully confront and address its 
boundary problems, so long will they return to haunt the continent, like a snake that is not 
quite slain.  
 
3.3.3 Combating Corruption 
African states, individually and collectively, have joined other international actors in 
campaigning against corruption. Nigeria, for example, has churned out an impressive 
number of laws aimed at fighting corruption. In June 2000, the Obasanjo Government 
enacted legislation that prohibits corrupt practices and other related offences and 
prescribes punishment for such offences.192 It further enacted the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission Establishment (EFCC) Act in 2004 to combat financial and 
economic crimes. The Act empowers EFCC to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and 
penalise economic and financial crimes and to enforce the provisions of other laws and 
regulations relating to economic and financial crimes in Nigeria.193 
                                                                                                                                                 
190 See Soyinka The Open Sore of a Continent (note 114 above) 24. 
191 Above, 22 (arguing that “many nations on the African continent are only in a state of limbo, that they exist in a half way 
space of purgatory until, by mundane processes or through dramatic events, their citizens are enabled to raise the nation 
reality to a higher level”). 
192 See The Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act (2000) Cap 5 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2000 secs  
8–26 [hereinafter Corrupt Practices Act] available at http://www.nigeria-law.org.LFNMainPage.htm. For a commentary, 
see PD Ocheje ‘Law and Social Change: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Nigeria’s Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Act, 2000’ (2001) 45 Journal of African Law 173. 
193 Among the laws brought under the umbrella of the EFCC include the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004; the 
Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act 1995; the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial 
Malpractices in Banks Act 1994 (as amended); the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991 (as amended); and the 
Miscellaneous Offences Act. The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, for example, makes comprehensive provisions to 
prohibit the laundering of the proceeds of a crime or an illegal act. It provides appropriate penalties and expands the 
interpretation of financial institutions and scope of supervision of regulatory authorities on money laundering activities, 
among other things. 
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At the continental level, the AU has adopted a Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption194 to promote and strengthen the development of mechanisms for 
preventing, detecting, punishing, and eradicating corruption and related offences in 
Africa’s public and private sectors.195 The Convention sets its objectives within the 
context of African specificities, stressing the need to promote socio-economic 
development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of all human rights.196 This special 
emphasis is rightly situated, because a denial of socio-economic rights leads to poverty—
and poverty exacerbates other social ills like corruption—in the same way that political 
corruption leads to a denial of socio-economic rights. The Convention further aims at 
promoting, facilitating and regulating co-operation among its State Parties to ensure the 
effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption 
and related offences in Africa.197 It aims at co-ordinating and harmonising policies and 
legislation between State Parties for purposes of preventing, detecting, punishing, and 
eradicating of corruption in Africa.198 It seeks to establish the necessary conditions to 
foster transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs.199  
The Convention’s objectives are laudable, but the battle to combat corruption in 
Africa should not merely be legal. Corruption is a prism with many sides and requires 
legal and non-legal approaches, including morality. Anti-corruption efforts must also 
                                                 
194 See AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption adopted 11 July 2003 [hereinafter AU Corruption 
Convention] (text available at the AU Web site). For a commentary, see NJ Udombana ‘Fighting Corruption Seriously? 
Africa’s Anti-corruption Convention’ (2003) 7 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 447. 
195 See AU Corruption Convention (note 194 above) art 2(1). 
196 Above, art 2(4). 
197 Above, art 2(2). 
198 Above, art 2(3). 
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demonstrate serious intent to deal with the malaise, which can only occur by means of 
realistic and creative strategies for prevention, implementation and monitoring. 
Encouragingly, corruption is attracting scrutiny that is more public in the present than in 
the past; the secretive web that once shrouded it is fast disentangling. There is now a 
growing tide of awareness in Africa, as elsewhere, that combating corruption is integral 
to achieving a more effective, fair and efficient government. This awareness creates hope 
for Africa, which cannot bear the costs of corruption. 
Effective public budget and financial management together with mechanisms for 
ensuring accountability in the use of scarce resources are critical aspects of public actions 
to reduce poverty.200 The last remaining bulwark for development and survival is the 
stability of the public service, given the persistent instability of policies, if not regimes.201 
Transparency and accountability in the management of Africa’s resources will bring 
competitive advantages, increase credibility from ethical and economic perspectives, and 
promote development in Africa. All of this will make it possible, though by no means 
certain, for states to fulfil their socio-economic rights obligations to citizens. A contrario, 
so long as corruption and mismanagement of resources flourish, so long will the wealth 
of nations translate into the poverty of peoples.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
199 Above, art 2(5). 
200 See African Development Bank (ADB) ‘Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Africa: Progress, Prospects, 
and Policy Implications’ in Global Poverty Report 2002 (2002) 16 [hereinafter ADB Global Poverty Report]. 
201 See P Okigbo ‘The Future Haunted by the Past’ in Africa Within the World (note 33 above) 28 37. 
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3.3.4 Sustainable Development through Regional Economic Integration 
The proliferating literature on sustainable development generally associates the concept 
with ecologically sustainable human development. However, the development component 
includes economic and social development, peace and security, and human rights. The 
essential idea in sustainable development is the necessity of protecting and restoring the 
environment while fostering peace and security and economic and social development.202 
According to the defunct OAU, sustainable development “aims primarily at ensuring a 
better standard of living for present and future generations. . . . [It] is founded on 
democracy, human rights, good governance, human resource promotion, economic and 
social development, environmental protection, all with the human being, as the focal 
point.”203
 
 
There are many routes to attaining sustainable development and realising socio-
economic rights in Africa. An earlier, albeit failed, route was through the campaign for a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO). The campaign began in the early seventies 
of the twentieth century and led to the elaboration of the Declaration on the 
Establishment of a NIEO.204 The NIEO had three goals. First, it sought to eliminate 
developing countries’ economic dependence on developed countries. Second, it sought to 
accelerate developing countries’ economies based on the principle of self-reliance. 
Lastly, it sought to introduce appropriate institutional changes for the global management 
                                                 
202 See JC Dernbach ‘Achieving Sustainable Development: The Centrality and Multiple Facets of Integrated 
Decisionmaking’ (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 247 250 (“Put still another way, sustainable 
development redefines progress to include environmental protection or restoration as something to be achieved along with 
other goals, not something to be sacrificed in order to reach those goals. Yet like traditional development, sustainable 
development is directed toward achieving human freedom, opportunity, and quality of life”).  
203 Yaoundé Declaration (note 59 above) para 19. 
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of world resources in the interest of mankind as a whole. In particular, the NIEO espoused 
an equitable approach to international trade and economic relations between developed 
and developing countries and advocated preferential trade and investment treatment for 
developing countries. It also called for debt relief and grants-based assistance, access to 
technology transfers, and the recognition of the right to development.205 
The campaign for a NIEO also led to the adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States in 1974,206 which aimed at establishing a new system of international 
economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality, and the interdependent interests 
of developed and developing countries.207 Some doubts that the Charter is part of 
customary international law, given that it was adopted as a UN General Assembly 
resolution and without universal acceptance.208 Nonetheless, the principles embodied in 
this and similar instruments, including the Program of Action on the Establishment of a 
NIEO,209 “represent an expansion of the movement for permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, and continuation of the legal effort by Southern countries to find voice 
and to exercise more power over their political and economic destinies”.210 
                                                                                                                                                 
204 Declaration on the Establishment of a NIEO GA Res 3201 (S-VI) 3-4 UN Doc A/9559 (1 May 1974) [hereinafter 
Declaration on NIEO]. 
205 See, in general, R Sarkar Development Law and International Finance (2d ed 2002) (chapter seven discussing whether 
or not there is a human right to development); EP Reubens ‘An Overview of the NIEO’ in EP Reubens (ed) Challenge of 
the New International Economic Order (1981) 1. 
206 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in 1974 GA Res 3281 (XXIX) 50 UN Doc A/9631 (12 Dec 1974) 
[hereinafter Charter of Economic Rights and Duties or Charter]. 
207 See RF Meagher An International Redistribution of Wealth and Power: A Study of the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States (1979) 92-128. 
208 The Charter was adopted with 99 votes in favour, 8 against, and 29 abstentions. 
209 Program of Action on the Establishment of a NIEO GA Res 3202 (S-VI) 5 UN Doc A/9559 (1 May 1974) [hereinafter 
Program of Action on NIEO]. 
210 RE Gordon & JH Sylvester ‘Deconstructing Development’ (2004) 22 Wisconsin International Law Journal 1 57. 
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The global community subsequently elaborated other initiatives—multilateral, 
bilateral, and private—all aimed at promoting SSA’s economic renaissance and 
alleviating poverty. Past multilateral initiatives include the UN Transport and 
Communications Decade in Africa,211 the Industrial Development Decade for Africa,212 
and the Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 
(PAAERD),213 which led to the New Agenda for the Development of Africa (NADAF). 
These programs sought to invigorate African development and intensify global support 
for its economic reforms. The PAAERD and NADAF were particularly significant, 
targeting an average real growth rate of 6 percent of GDP and promoting a number of 
people-oriented objectives, such as promoting food production and developing agro-
industries and human resources. 
Whether the NIEO campaign changed the development trajectory of global economic 
relations and, in particular, whether SSA made any meaningful gains from it remains a 
matter of conjecture.214 Clearly, these initiatives have not established legal obligations for 
the West; rather, international law has “reinforced and reproduced the [current] economic 
and political inequities”.215 Some commentators take the view that the NIEO-based 
agenda has been partially successful in practical terms, citing the World Bank and other 
                                                 
211 UN Transport and Communications Decade in Africa GA Res 32/160 UN Doc A/RES/32/160 (19 Dec 1977). 
212 Industrial Development Decade for Africa GA Res 35/66B UN Doc A/35/592/Add.3 (5 Dec 1980). 
213 Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development GA Res S-13/2 UN Doc A/Res/S-13/2 (1 July 
1986) [hereinafter PAAERD]. 
214 See eg NS Rembe ‘Prospects for the Realisation of the New International Economic Order: An African Perspective’ 
(1984) 17 Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 322 (examining the NIEO initiative, its prospects, 
problems facing the realisation of an equitable and just international economic system, and options and responses of the 
African states). 
215 See Gordon & Sylvester (note 210 above) 7. See, in general, M Bedjaoui Towards A New International Economic Order 
(1979) (discussing the role of international law in shaping the IEO). 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
154
multilateral and bilateral institutions that are implementing large-scale debt relief.216 
Others point to the Bretton Woods institutions’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs), the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), and the 
Common Country Assessment and UN Development Assistance Framework 
(CCA/UNDAF), all of which “command the attention of decision makers, and make 
resources available for each country”.217 
Critics have questioned the international financial institutions (IFIs) so-called debt 
relief—even from a developing country’s perspective—arguably due to the implicit 
“moral hazard”, particularly if recipient nations appear not to be credit-worthy and 
unattractive to investors.218 Other critics argue that the NIEO is not serving the interests 
of Africa’s producers and exporters. The World Bank itself estimates that SSA lost half 
its market share in exports of primary products between 1970 and 1983.219 As an 
illustration, whereas a ton of African copper bought 115 barrels of oil in 1975, it bought 
only 58 barrels by 1980. Similarly, a ton of African cocoa could buy 148 barrels of oil in 
1975 but only 63 barrels by 1980; and while a ton of African coffee could buy 148 
barrels of oil in 1975, it could buy only 82 barrels by 1980.220 The reason for fluctuations 
in Africa’s fortunes is that developed countries determine the price of their products as 
well as those of developing countries. Africa, says Cameron Duodu, “has been 
                                                 
216 See World Bank The Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (2005) available at 
http://www.worldbank.org (on home page, follow topics—economic policy and debt— topics—HIPC). 
217 S Marks ‘The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality’ (2004) 17 Harvard Human Rights Law 
Journal 137 153. 
218 See eg B Crossette ‘Ex-Premier of Singapore Sees Pitfalls in Debt Relief’ New York Times 15 Oct 2000 4; R Sarkar 
‘Critical Essay: Theoretical Foundations in Development Law: A Reconciliation of Opposites?’ (2005) 33 Denver Journal 
of International Law and Policy 367 373. 
219 See World Bank Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s (1989) 2. 
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involuntarily locked into an earnings logjam on the international market, which keeps it 
poor when it sells to others, and poor when it buys from them”.221 
The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), adopted in 1980 by the now defunct OAU,222 also 
noted that the NIEO was flawed and biased against Africa. Its Preamble opened with the 
following scathing words: 
 
The effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies has been more 
sharply felt in Africa than in the other continents of the world. Indeed, rather than 
result in an improvement in the economic situation of the continent, successive 
strategies have made it stagnate and become more susceptible than other regions to 
the economic and social crises suffered by the industrialised countries. Thus, Africa 
is unable to point to any significant growth rate, or satisfactory index of general well-
being, in the past 20 years.223 
 
It is doubtful that Africa’s situation has changed dramatically for the better since 
1980, given the level of poverty that still pervades the continent. This thesis, therefore, 
advocates a robust regional economic integration as a way out of the sustainable 
development problems and as a route towards realising socio-economic rights in Africa. 
Economic groupings appear to be more highly evolved among advanced capitalist 
                                                                                                                                                 
220 See Davidson (note 1 above) 220. 
221 See C Duodu ‘Africa: The Key is Economic Justice’ New African July 2005 14-15 (also calling on Africa to vertically 
integrate its industries). 
222 OAU The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 28 Apr 1980 [hereinafter Lagos Plan of 
Action] available at http://www.uneca/org/itca/ ariportal/docs/lagos_plan.pdf. 
223 Above, pmbl. 
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countries than the least developed ones, but Africa has not been left out in the cooperative 
enterprise. The last few decades have witnessed the elaboration of various regional 
cooperation agreements and the establishment of customs unions.224  
Some commentators even trace the historicity of integration in Africa to the 
beginning of the 20th century, with the establishment of the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) in 1910.225 Our concern, however, is with contemporary developments. 
On this, it is worth reporting that several regional economic communities (RECs) have 
been established in recent memory in Africa. Among these are the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS),226 the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA),227 the East African Community (EAC),228 and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC).229 Some RECs are “customs union”230 and “common 
                                                 
224 See, in general, BM Carl Economic Integration Among Developing Nations: Law and Policy (1986) (giving details of 
treaties and protocols establishing regional economic groupings up to the time of her study). 
225 See Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (2004) 27 [hereinafter ECA 
Assessing Regional Integration]. 
226 Established pursuant to the Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1996) 35 International Legal Materials 660 [hereinafter Revised 
ECOWAS Treaty]. 
227 Established pursuant to the COMESA Treaty (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 1067 [hereinafter COMESA 
Treaty]. 
228 Established pursuant to EAC Treaty, signed 30 Nov 1999 entry into force 7 July 2000 [hereinafter EAC Treaty], 
available at <www.eac.int> (seeking to enhance co-operation in all areas for the mutual benefit of the States Parties 
through the establishment of a customs union, a common market, a monetary union and, ultimately, a political federation 
of the East Africa States). 
229 Established pursuant to the SADC Treaty (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 116 [hereinafter SADC Treaty]. 
Some of the current RECs in Africa, besides the ones noted in the text, include the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS); Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA); Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD); West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA); Mano River 
Union (MRU); Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC); Economic Community of Great Lakes 
Countries (CEPGL); Indian Ocean Commission (IOC); and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). 
230 A “customs union” is “a free trade area in which members impose common tariffs on nonmembers. Members may also 
cede sovereignty to a single customs administration”. ECA Assessing Regional Integration (note 225 above) 10. 
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market”231 arrangements; examples include ECOWAS, COMESA and EAC. However, 
whereas ECOWAS aspires for “economic and monetary union”,232 COMESA aspires for 
economic union. SADC aspires for “free trade area”,233 though its ultimate objective is 
“to build a Region in which there will be a high degree of harmonisation and 
rationalisation to enable the pooling of resources to achieve collective self-reliance in 
order to improve the living standards of the people of the region”.234 
Among the notable instruments on economic cooperation and integration at the 
continental level are the Monrovia Strategy for Economic Development (the Monrovia 
Declaration);235 the LPA;236 the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 
(AEC);237 the AU Act; and NEPAD. The AEC Treaty shall provide the template for 
analysis. It sets out its objectives within the context of earlier resolutions and declarations 
adopted by our OAU Assembly, providing that the economic integration was a pre-
                                                 
231 A “common market”, on the other hand, is “a customs union that allows free movement of the factors of production 
(such as capital and labour) across national borders within the integration area”. Above. Cf O Johnson ‘Economic 
Integration in Africa: Enhancing Prospects for Success’ (1999) 29(1) Journal of Modern African Studies 1 2 (defining 
“common markets” as “the most complete form of economic collaboration among states that also choose to remain 
independent political entities”). Such integration, according to Johnson, “involves a common external tariff, free 
movement of peoples and goods, and co-ordination of macro-economic policies to ensure mutual consistency of fiscal, 
monetary, external payments, and exchange rate policies of the member states.” Above. 
232 See ECA Assessing Regional Integration (note 225 above) 10 (defining “economic union” as “a common market with 
unified monetary and fiscal policies, including a common currency). 
233 Above (defining “free trade area” as “a preferential trade area with no tariffs on imports from other members. As in 
preferential trade areas, members can determine tariffs on imports from nonmembers.”). 
234 SADC History, evolution and current status available at 
http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page_id=about_history. 
235 See Monrovia Declaration of Commitment of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU on Guidelines and 
Measures for National and Collective Self-reliance in Social and Economic Development for the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order, adopted by the Assembly of States and Government of the OAU in July 1979 OAU Doc 
AHG/ST.3 (XVI) Rev.1 [hereinafter Monrovia Declaration]. 
236 See Lagos Plan of Action (note 222 above). 
237 See Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 3 June 1991 30 International Legal Materials 1241 
[hereinafter AEC Treaty] (defining the principles and objectives of African integration and areas of cooperation, 
coordination of activities and exchange of experiences at the national, regional and continental levels and among regional 
organizations and groupings). 
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requisite for the realization of the objectives of the OAU.238 Africa adopted the AEC “to 
share, in an equitable and just manner, the advantages of cooperation among Member 
States in order to promote a balanced development in all parts of the Continent”.239 Its 
comprehensive objectives are:  
 
(a) to promote economic, social, and cultural development and the integration of African 
economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and an indigenous and self-
sustained development; 
(b) to establish, on a continental scale, a framework for the development, mobilization 
and utilization of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve a 
self-reliant development; 
(c) to promote cooperation in all fields of human endeavour in order to raise the standard 
of living of African peoples and maintain and enhance economic stability, foster close 
and peaceful relations among member States and contribute to the progress, 
development and the economic integration of the continent; and  
(d) to coordinate and harmonize policies among existing economic communities in order 
to foster the gradual establishment of the Community.240 
 
Fashioned in the image of the EU Treaty, the AEC Treaty seeks to create an AEC by 
liberalising trade; abolishing customs duties on imports and exports and non-tariff 
                                                 
238 Above, pmbl (referring to resolutions and declarations adopted in Algiers in September 1968 and in Addis Ababa in 
August 1970 and May 1973). 
239 Above. 
240 Above, art 4(1). 
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barriers in order to establish a free trade area; and adopting a common trade policy vis-à-
vis third states. Other targets are harmonising national policies in agriculture, industry, 
transport and communications, energy, trade, money and finance, and science and 
technology;241 establishing a common external tariff; removing obstacles to free 
movement of persons, goods, services and capital, and the right of residence and 
establishment; and establishing a common market.242 The AEC Treaty affirms principles 
of solidarity and collective self-reliance; inter-state co-operation, harmonisation of 
policies and integration of programmes; and promotion of harmonious development of 
economic activities among Member States.243 It affirms observance of the legal system of 
the “Community”;244 peaceful settlement of disputes among Member States; active 
cooperation between neighbouring countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as 
a pre-requisite for economic development; recognition, promotion and protection of 
human and peoples’ rights; and accountability, economic justice and popular 
participation in development.245  
Most of the principles in the AEC Treaty, such as the pacific settlement of disputes 
and respect for human rights, are universal values shared even by most institutions 
focusing on economic issues. The EU Treaty, for example, requires each Member State to 
respect the fundamental rights of its citizens. In Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-
                                                 
241 Above, art 4(2). 
242 See above. 
243 Above, art 3. 
244 The AEC Treaty defines “Community” to mean “the organic structure for economic integration established under 
Article 2 of this Treaty and constituting an integral part of the [AU]”. Above, art 1(c)). 
245 Above, art 3. 
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Pfalz,246 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) explained: “In safeguarding [fundamental 
rights, the Court] is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, so that measures which are incompatible with the fundamental rights 
recognized by the constitutions of those states are unacceptable in the Community”.247 
The AEC is fashioned to provide a rallying point for RECs’ activities, both existing 
and future.248 Its Treaty set up detailed modalities for the establishment of the AEC in six 
stages of variable duration over a transition period not exceeding 34 years, from the date 
of its entry into force, that is, 1994. Each of the six stages consists of specific activities to 
be concurrently implemented.249 The first five years—stage one—was to be devoted into 
strengthening existing RECs and establishing new ones in regions where none exist.250 
The second stage of eight years involves stabilisation, at the level of each REC, of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers,251 customs duties and internal taxes at the May 1994 level; 
determining the time table for the gradual liberalisation of regional and intra-community 
trade; harmonising customs duties vis-a-vis third states; strengthening sectoral 
integration, particularly in fields of trade, agriculture, money and finance, transport and 
communications, industry and energy; and coordinating and harmonising activities of 
RECs.252 
                                                 
246 Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727 (ECJ). 
247 Above, 3728. 
248 See AEC Treaty (note 237 above) art 88. 
249 See generally above, arts 6 & 88 (for the elaboration of the different stages). 
250 See above, art 6(2)(a). 
251 See above, art 1(s) (defining “non-tariff barriers” as “barriers which hamper trade and which are caused by obstacles 
other than fiscal obstacles”). 
252 See above, art 6(2)(b). 
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The third stage, lasting ten years, involves the establishment of Free Trade Area and a 
Customs Union at the level of each REC.253 The fourth stage, lasting two years, involves 
coordinating and harmonising tariff and non-tariff barriers among various RECs leading 
to the establishment of a continental Customs Union.254 The fifth stage, lasting four years, 
involves establishing an African Common Market (ACM).255 The final stage, lasting five 
years, involves consolidating and strengthening structures of the ACM, including free 
movement of peoples and factors of production. It also envisages the creation of a single 
domestic market and Pan African Economic and Monetary Union (PAEM), African 
Central Bank (ACB) and African Currency; and the establishment of a Pan African 
Parliament (PAP).256 
The AEC Treaty deals with each of these sectoral issues in some details and provides 
for adoption of protocols to address others. Some specific matters it addresses include 
rules of origin;257 reduction and elimination of customs barriers;258 non-tariff barriers;259 
intra-community transit facilities;260 customs operation;261 simplification and 
harmonisation of trade documents and procedures;262 trade promotion;263 re-export of 
                                                 
253 See above, art 6(2)(c). 
254 See above, art 6(2)(d). 
255 See above, art 6(2)(e). 
256 See above, art 6(2)(f). 
257 See above, art 33. 
258 See above, arts 29 & 30. 
259 See above, art 31. 
260 See above, art 38. 
261 See above, art 39. 
262 See above, art 40. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
162
goods;264 and free movement of persons, right of residence, and right of establishment.265 
It also addresses food and agriculture;266 industry;267 science and technology;268 energy 
and natural resources;269 environment;270 transport, communication, and tourism;271 
education, training, and culture;272 human resources, social affairs, health, and 
population;273 standardisation, quality assurance, and measurement systems;274 and 
solidarity, development, and cooperation fund.275 
Most of the sectoral issues herein highlighted required the adoption of specific 
measures by States Parties for their realization. The provision on free movement of 
persons, for example, reads: “Member States agree to adopt, individually, at bilateral or 
regional levels, the necessary measures, in order to achieve progressively the free 
movement of persons, and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of residence and the right 
of establishment by their nationals within the Community”.276 The “necessary measures” 
                                                                                                                                                 
263 See above, art 42. 
264 See above, art 38. 
265 See above, art 43. 
266 See above, arts 46 & 47. 
267 See above, arts 48-50. 
268 See above, arts 51–53. 
269 See above, arts 54–57. 
270 See above, arts 58–60. 
271 See above, arts 61–66. 
272 See above, arts 68–70. 
273 See above, arts 71–76. 
274 See above, art 67. 
275 See above, arts 80 & 81. 
276 See above, art 43(1). 
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certainly include legislative enactment, though this is by no means exhaustive of the 
obligations of states.277  
NEPAD represents Africa’s current effort to redress the continent’s 
underdevelopment and poverty. Mwanza frightfully describes NEPAD as Africa’s “last 
hope”.278 It makes poverty eradication “a pressing duty”279 and notes, somewhat 
solemnly, that “African leaders have learned from their own experiences that peace, 
security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management 
are conditions for sustainable development. They are making a pledge to work, both 
individually and collectively, to promote these principles in their countries and 
subregions and on the continent”.280 Though not a legally binding instrument, NEPAD 
serves as an additional source of inspiration for the AU. 
As a Strategic Policy Framework and socio-economic development program of the 
AU, NEPAD seeks to arrest and reverse the steady decline in Africa’s economic 
performance. It develops a strategy for poverty eradication,281 including working with 
IFIs and UN agencies “to accelerate the implementation and adoption of the 
                                                 
277 Cf CESCR General Comment 3 ‘The Nature of State Parties’ Obligations (art 2(1) para 1 of the Covenant)’ (5th session 
1990) para 4 UN Doc E/1991/23 [hereinafter CESCR General Comment 3] reprinted in Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies at 18 UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 5 
(2001). 
278 S Mwanza ‘NEPAD is Last Hope for Africa—Magande’ Times of Zambia 14 Sept 2004 available at 
http//www.times.co.zm/ (search “Search the Site” for “nepad is last hope”) (quoting Ng’andu Magande, Zambia’s Finance 
and National Planning Minister). 
279 NEPAD (note 116 above) para 1. 
280 Above, para 71. 
281 Above, paras 4–5. 
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Comprehensive Development Framework, the Poverty Reduction Strategy and related 
approaches”.282  
The proliferation of regional economic instruments and institutions in Africa testifies 
to Africa’s longstanding recognition of the needs and benefits of economic integration. 
The RECs, LPA/FAL, AEC Treaty, AU Act, NEPAD, and similar instruments show 
clearly that Africa has mapped out its strategy for regional economic cooperation and 
integration. These instruments have been elaborated largely to encourage development, 
aid industrialisation, and enlarge Africa’s participation in the global economy.283 
Regional integration is the Chinese wall that will keep the tides of globalisation at bay. 
Properly implemented, integration policies could lead to “sustainability, increased 
investment, the consolidation of economic and political reforms, increased global 
competitiveness, the promotion of regional public goods, [and] the prevention of 
conflict”.284 Cooperative regimes also embody, at the civilisational level, commitments to 
democratic and pluralistic politics.285 Integration and cooperation will also serve as 
“building blocks on which future intra-Africa trade, investment and economic co-
operation can be based”.286 
                                                 
282 Above, para 119. 
283 See CSSDCA Declaration (note 168 above) para 13(a); MA Echols ‘Regional Economic Integration’ 31 International 
Lawyer (1997) 453 (discussing the expanding geographical and substantive coverage of free trade areas, customs unions, 
and common markets and describing the expanding web of overlapping regions). 
284 AO Konaré & KY Amoako ‘Foreword’ in ECA Assessing Regional Integration (note 225 above) x. See also D Brown 
‘The Role of Regional Organization in Stopping Civil Wars’ 41 AFL Review 235 (1997 (examining the new role of 
regional organizations in resolving conflicts, observing: “The newfound acceptance by the international community of 
regional action to stop civil wars has resulted in the formation of new norms in international law and relations;” as above 
266). 
285 SP Huntington The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) 302. 
286 CSSDCA Declaration (note 168 above) para 13(a). 
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In the Yaoundé Declaration, the OAU agreed that regional cooperation and economic 
integration help to promote the economies of scale and, thus,  
 
constitute the best means for Africa to regain its lost external competitiveness, to 
strengthen its capacity of negotiation in world affairs, to effectively open up its 
economies, to rapidly launch its industrial growth and enter the world market 
through diversification of exports, comparative advantages other than commodities 
and ultimately mitigate its marginalization.287 
 
In the Algiers Declaration of 1999, the OAU further stated: 
 
We, for our part, strongly believe that the promotion of economic co-operation and 
integration for the establishment of the [AEC] as provided for under the Abuja 
Treaty will help consolidate the efforts being deployed by our countries to revive and 
develop their economies and to address the major problems facing Africa, notably 
problems of refugees and poverty, illiteracy and pandemics including the scourge of 
AIDS, as well as environmental problems, namely water and desertification related 
issues and threats to bio-diversity.288 
 
                                                 
287 Yaoundé Declaration (note 59 above) para 14. See also para 13 (further arguing: “Regional cooperation and economic 
integration … are equally very essential not only for the self-fulfilment of the continent but also for securing an appropriate 
place in a world economy characterized, inter-alia, by a generalized wave of fundamental economic restructuring of 
economic entities spaces, oriented towards achieving a real continentalization of markets, and intensification and 
liberalization of trade and commerce”). 
288 Algiers Declaration OAU Assembly 35th Ord Sess OAU Doc AHG/Decl1 (XXXV) (July 1999) [hereinafter Algiers 
Declaration]. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
166
There are 15 landlocked countries in SSA289 and none of them has a chance to 
develop in the absence of a ready access to the coast with efficient low-cost 
infrastructure. Such access can come mainly through regional integration.290 Asante has 
also written that “a continent with over 600 million inhabitants scattered over fifty 
fragmented, balkanized, independent, and sovereign entities cannot be taken seriously as 
an important and effective partner in the global economy”.291 NEPAD itself 
acknowledges as much: 
 
Most African countries are small, both in terms of population and per capita 
incomes. As a consequence of limited markets, they do not offer attractive returns to 
potential investors, while progress in diversifying production and exports is retarded. 
This limits investment in essential infrastructure that depends on economies of scale 
for viability. These economic conditions point to the need for African countries to 
pool their resources and enhance regional development and economic integration on 
the continent, in order to improve international competitiveness.292 
 
The essential question is why has integration remained a beautiful utopian dream in 
Africa? Why have Africans been led into tantalizing glimpses, promises never quite 
fulfilled, echoes that died away just as they caught one’s ear? Many factors account for 
this glitch. Principally, African states are unwilling to surrender the degree of controls 
                                                 
289 See Investing in Development (note 160 above) 156. 
290 Above (arguing that regional integration is “important in achieving scale economies in infrastructure networks, such as 
electricity grids, large-scale electricity generation, road transport, railroads, and telecommunications;” as above). 
291 SKB Asante Regionalism and Africa’s Development: Expectations, Reality and Challenges (1997) 10. 
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over their financial and economic affairs that are indispensable for integration.293 
Otherwise stated, states are unwilling to concede their sovereignties. For example, States 
Parties to the AEC Treaty routinely take unilateral measures over the Community legal 
system that they voluntarily accepted on the basis of reciprocity, indifferent to the fact 
that such measures jeopardise the attainment of the Treaty objectives and, a fortiori, the 
AU Act. As Ghaddafi recently reflected: 
 
We do not accept diminished sovereignty and interference in our internal affairs 
from others, not even for the sake of the unity of Africa. But our national sovereignty 
is violated and threatened by the lack of African unity. That is why we agree to 
compromise our sovereignty to foreign powers and we accept this as a matter of fact. 
But when we talk about compromising any part of our collective sovereignty for the 
sake of the [AU], we say “no, we will not compromise our sovereignty”. So, we have 
sovereignty without unity.294 
 
The AU should stop brooding over marginalisation in globalisation; it should urge its 
Member States to pool their sovereignties in order to gain strength. Some sacrifices are 
necessary to actualise the AEC and maximise potentials of regional economic 
                                                                                                                                                 
292 NEPAD (note 116 above) paras 93-94. 
293 See G Naldi & K Magliveras ‘The African Economic Community: Emancipation for African States or Yet Another 
Glorious Failure?’ (1999) 24 North Carolina Journals of International and Commercial Regulation 601 630; NJ 
Udombana ‘A Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music of Integration in the African Union Act and the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development’ (2002) 13 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 185 202 (stressing that many 
African states “are not prepared to subordinate immediate national political interests to long-term regional economic goals 
or to cede essential elements of sovereignty to regional institutions”). 
294 Welcome address by Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya to the Fifth Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) Assembly 
in Sirte Libya in July 2005 New African Aug/Sept 2005 31 33. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
168
cooperation. The current IEO will be no less unjust or unfair in the immediate future. 
Globalisation, as conceived by the North and delivered in the South, is not a bowl of 
cherries; it is a rat race where the end justifies the means.295 
One of the critical issues that the AU should address is free movement of persons, 
which entails the right of “community citizens” to be treated in the host member state 
free from discrimination on grounds of nationality.296 The AU should pressurise its 
Member States to make genuine efforts towards removing roadblocks to the free 
movement of persons. Free movement of persons is an essential element of economic 
integration and an imperative for the accomplishment of the AEC’s goals.297 Its 
importance lies in its content and in the promise its holds out for the future.298  
“Community citizenship” is one of the fundamental freedoms of EU Law;299 and the 
EU has promoted citizenship through many regulations300 and directives.301 These 
secondary legislations have created further categories of persons who are entitled to free 
                                                 
295 See Udombana ‘A Question of Justice’ (note 139 above) 1203. 
296 See J Steiner & L Woods Textbook on EC Law (2003) 189. 
297 See B Thompson ‘Economic Integration Efforts in Africa: A Milestone—The Abuja Treaty’ (1993) 5 African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 743 753–54. 
298 Contra D O’Keeffe ‘Union Citizenship’ in D O’Keeffe & P Twomey (eds) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (1994) 
87 106. 
299 See eg Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern 1998 ECR I-2691 (ruling that EU-citizens have a right to 
equal treatment); Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie 1982 ECR 1035. See, in general, C Closa ‘The Concept 
of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 1137 (evaluating, from a political 
point of view, the condition of citizenship created by the EU Treaty). 
300 See eg Council Regulation 1612/68 Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the Community 1968 OJ (L 257) 2 (EC) 
as amended by Council Regulation 2434/92 1992 OJ 1992 (L 245) 1. 
301 See eg Council Directive 73/148 Abolition of Restrictions on Movement and Residence Within the Community for 
Nationals of Member States with Regard to Establishment and the Provision of Services 1073 OJ (L 172) 14 (EC); and 
Council Directive 75/34 Concerning the Right of Nationals of a Member State to Remain in the Territory of Another 
Member State After Having Pursued Therein an Activity in a Self-employed Capacity 1975 OJ (L 14) 10 (EC). 
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movement, such as retirees, students and persons of independent means.302 For Africa, 
especially, the mobility of workers could stimulate the human resource response to the 
requirements of employment market, promote mutual understanding, and create the social 
fabric essential to the emergence of a real, rather than an imaginary, “African Union”. 
The AU should take appropriate measures, such as suspension of membership, to penalise 
any Member State that fails to implement commitments under the AEC Treaty thereby 
causing a breach of AEC’s functioning.  
Barriers against free movement of goods, labour, capital and payments, services and 
the right of enterprises to establish themselves in another Member State are inimical to 
sustainable development and poverty eradication. It is no use preaching pan-Africanism if 
it is easier, as is presently the case, for an African to travel to Europe from his country 
than to cross the border of his country to a neighbouring African state for legitimate 
transactions. It takes a Nigerian between three and six months to obtain an exit visa to 
Kenya, all things being equal;303 whereas it will take the same Nigerian not more than 
one week to obtain an exit visa to Switzerland, again all things being equal.304 What 
manner of African unity or union is this? The absence of free movement of persons 
between Africa’s sub-regions has forced many Africans to look outwards.305  
The solution to these constraints is not to pretend that they do not exist; the solution 
lies in admitting and confronting them. Of course, states have inherent rights to take 
                                                 
302 See TC Hartley European Union Law in a Global Context (2004) 408. 
303 Based on experiences of Nigerians whom this author interviewed. Cf R Sankore ‘Africa: Killing Us Softly’ New 
African Nov 2005 9 12 (“Africans from some countries have to wait for over a month for a mere visitor’s visa to other 
parts of Africa . . . . In practice many are even completely excluded.”). 
304 Based on author’s personal experiences. 
305 Sankore (note 303 above) 12 (quoting Chidi Odinkalu). 
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restrictive measures to derogate on right of entry and residence, on grounds such as 
public policy, security, or health, but states should refuse entry or residence solely on the 
personal conduct of the individual concerned and not on economic grounds. The conduct 
that should justify denial of entry should be such that nationals are also punishable when 
they exhibit them, based on the principle of equality of treatment. Furthermore, restrictive 
measures should not be collective or reflect a wish to achieve general exclusion.  
A continent that is moving towards economic and political integration must adopt 
common positions on issues that are vital to integration and sustainable development. The 
AU cannot leave certain matters to the discretion of individual Member States. It should, 
for example, rationalise the several protocols that dot Africa in order to align them to 
continental objectives and secure the eventual convergence of sub-regional goals.306 It 
should rationalise its institutions and synergise its protocols with those of the AEC and 
RECs in order to build and strengthen them for political, economic and social integration. 
The RECs, on their part, should implement mechanisms that ensure a more expeditious 
approach to ratifying protocols. Sound macroeconomic policies and increased investment 
in infrastructure will trigger a positive response from the private sector and increase the 
scope of the market that accompanies an operating presence in Africa.307 These are some 
of the imperatives for an effective regional integration. 
The ECA believes that NEPAD should drive integration in Africa, by “working with 
the [RECs] to coordinate efforts and to mobilize and pool resources to strengthen 
                                                 
306 ECA Assessing Regional Integration (note 225 above) 3. Cf Ghaddafi (note 294 above) 33 (calling on African states to 
give the issue of ratification of protocols a priority). 
307 See Investing in Development (note 160 above) 156. 
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Africa’s physical integration.”308 This is an arguable proposition. The present writer takes 
the view that reviving and nurturing the AEC project is a sure route towards reducing 
Africa’s inequitable trading relationship with the North, lessening its reliance on foreign 
aid, and facilitating the development of Africa’s tremendous natural resources. Africa, by 
culture, is a group-oriented society; what it needs is to extend this civilisation to the level 
of economics and development politics in order to lift the masses from endemic poverty.  
The twenty-first century is one of technologically-driven industrialisation. Africa 
must also rise to the challenge of information and communications technology (ICT). It’s 
continued reliance on raw materials and energy exports for growth is patently short-
sighted. Governments must increasingly apply technology to support agriculture in order 
to produce sufficient food for domestic consumption and export. A country has no claim 
to any kind of sovereignty if it cannot feed its population. It is really a scandal that a 
continent that is most climatically suited for food production in the world is today a net 
importer of food and “currently the largest recipient of food aid in the world”.309 Africa 
should also decolonise the universities through massive support for self-reliant research 
in all fields of human endeavour, especially in ICT.310 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the various endogenous and exogenous challenges that 
confront and constrain African states in their attempts to meet the twin demands of 
                                                 
308 ECA Assessing Regional Integration (note 225 above) 4. 
309 Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa AU 2d Ord Sess AU Doc Assembly/AU/Decl7 (II) (July 2003) 
pmbl [hereinafter Declaration on Agriculture & Food Security]. 
310 See Okigbo (note 201 above) 36-7. 
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development and human security. Of course, the failure to provide a better life for 
Africans is not for want of attempts by post-independent inheritance elites and others.311 
The real impediments are the old ones: the absence of capacity and accountability. 
Africa’s economic resources are enough for Africa’s needs, but they are not enough for 
some of its leaders’ greed. Given a prudent management of these resources, it is possible 
for every child in Africa to have a free primary and secondary education and for every 
family to meet its nutritional needs. African leaders themselves affirm this proposition: 
 
The resources, including capital, technology and human skills, that are required to 
launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance [in 
Africa], and are within our reach. What is required to mobilise these resources and to 
use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed to 
a sustained human development effort and poverty eradication.312 
 
Africa should entrench the human dimension in all its development policies, since 
every action and pursuit aims at some good. The primary end and the principal means of 
development is the expansion of human freedom.313 This idea—that people are the real 
wealth of nations—was reflected in the writings of Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Adam 
Smith, Robert Malthus, and John Stuart Mill, to mention a few. Immanuel Kant argued 
                                                 
311 Cf Yaoundé Declaration (note 59 above) para 7 (“Africa’s plight is not, since independence, imputable to lack of ideas, 
anticipation, proposals, individual and collective efforts on the part of our countries, plans, strategies as well as decades 
devoted to Africa by the international community.”). 
312 NEPAD (note 116 above) para 6 (italics supplied). 
313 See DRD (note 133 above) pmbl & art 2(1) (stressing that humanity must remain the central subject, the main 
participant and the beneficiary of the development process); and A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) xii 36.  
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that human beings should be seen as ends, rather than as a means to other ends.314 
Humanity, thus, must be the objective and supreme beneficiary of development, else 
development becomes a meaningless vanity and vexation of the spirit. As the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) maintained: 
 
[C]omprehensive development cannot be fully achieved until the impoverished have 
gained access to the essential attributes of dignity; a goal that can be achieved only 
by combating all forms of destitution and marginalization and making enhanced 
solidarity among all members of the national community an essential basis for all the 
reforms introduced.315 
 
The now defunct OAU expressed the same sentiment in its 1996 Yaoundé 
Declaration: “Sustainable development aims primarily at ensuring a better standard of 
living for present and future generations… [It] is founded on democracy, human rights, 
good governance, human resource promotion, economic and social development, 
environmental protection, all with the human being, as the focal point.”316 Africa should 
translate such rhetoric into reality by uniting economic and social policies to spread 
protection against poverty to everyone. Indeed, every society must work in a deliberately 
                                                 
314 See I Kant Political Writings (Hans Reiss ed 1991) 23. 
315 UN Economic & Social Council [ECOSOC] Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Second Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant UN Doc 
E/1990/6/ Add 14 (8 Oct 1996) para 5 available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/ 
E.1990.6.Add.14.En?Opendocument. 
316 Yaoundé Declaration (note 59 above) para 19. 
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and carefully structured way to ensure the full enjoyment of human rights by all its 
members.  
The deprivations of elementary capabilities that many Africans experience call for 
public action to assist the deprived. Poverty is more severe in rural than in urban Africa. 
The reason is that “[h]ouseholds in remote areas, living on fragile lands, would be 
expected to have fewer opportunities and face greater risks and vulnerability than 
households in better-endowed areas”.317 Addressing spatial poverty depends on how 
states allocate resources to the poor—health, education, water and sanitation, and 
energy.318 It also depends on proper management of public finances, which is presently 
lacking in the majority of African countries, due to corruption and mismanagement of 
resources. Africa’s governments should devise specific policies and programmes aimed 
at ensuring respect for, and fulfilment of, socio-economic rights. The hope for survival, 
security, and contentment requires governments to direct their resources to the most 
urgent needs. 
 
 
  
                                                 
317 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Economic Report on Africa 2003: Accelerating the Pace of 
Development UN Sales No E03IIK1 (2003) 5. 
318 Above, 6. 
  
Chapter Four 
 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Any discourse on the effective realisation of socio-economic rights in Africa must 
necessarily interrogate the role of judicial institutions in such an enterprise. This thesis is 
not about abandoning the judicial route; it is about reforming and transforming that route 
to enhance the full enjoyment of human rights. Assigning a role for the judiciary in 
human rights implementation agenda ensures that states lives out their positive 
obligations to fulfil socio-economic rights beyond what the political and administrative 
organs are prepared to concede on their own accord.1 The concept of an obligation might 
lose much of its force if there is no notion of a sanction for failure to comply.2 The 
consciousness of ‘the judge over your shoulder’ reinforces the awareness and 
operationalisation of standards of behaviour.3 Utilising the judicial forum to articulate 
                                                 
1 See ‘The Domestic Application of the Covenant’ Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General 
Comment 9 UN Doc E/C12/1998/24 3 Dec 1998 para 10 [hereinafter General Comment 9]. Cf AA An-Na’im ‘To Affirm 
the Full Human Rights Standing of Economic, Social & Cultural Rights’ in Y Ghai & J Cottrell (eds) Economic, Social & 
Cultural Rights in Practice: The Role of Judges in Implementing Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (2004) 7 15 
[hereinafter Economic, Social & Cultural Rights in Practice] (“[A]n ESCR to shelter is not a human right at all if its 
provision is entirely left to the political and administrative will of the state, without any possibility of independent judicial 
supervision and guidance…”). 
2 See J Cottrell & Y Ghai ‘The Role of the Courts in the Protection of Economic, Social & Cultural Rights’ in Economic, 
Social & Cultural Rights in Practice (note 1 above) 58 60. 
3 As above, 65. 
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demands also serves as an effective part of a wider public education and mobilization 
campaign.4 
This Chapter’s thesis is that Africa’s judiciaries have equal responsibilities to address 
the vast poverty and misery in Africa through context-sensitive interpretations of relevant 
human rights instruments, both local and international. It urges these institutions—
constitutional courts properly so-called (like the South African Constitutional Court), 
civil courts having jurisdictions over human rights guarantees, and quasi-judicial human 
rights institutions such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights5—to 
be more forceful and dynamic in advancing socio-economic rights. Such a call raises a 
number of questions. Do courts have the skills necessary to grapple with the complexities 
of resource allocations in a polity? How can these institutions promote socio-economic 
rights without assuming the critical decisions that go to the heart of the political process? 
Answering these questions turns largely on the methodology for the interpretation of 
guaranteed or even unincorporated rights.  
I start by highlighting the nature of judicial function, followed by a close examination 
of interpretive methodology for the advancement of socio-economic rights in Africa. This 
approach admits of certain inherent limitations, which I take up in the last segment. 
 
                                                 
4 JM Woods ‘Emerging Paradigms of Protection for “Second-Generation” Human Rights’ (2005) 6 Loyola Journal of 
Public Interest Law 103 104 (adding: “Litigation strategies can also advance popular understanding of the inherent 
limitations of advocacy within legal frameworks and the need for more far-reaching solutions.”).   
5 High courts generally adjudicate most constitutional issues in Africa—including human rights—with the supreme courts 
exercising appellate jurisdictions. In states having both high courts and constitutional courts, the jurisdiction of the latter is 
usually exclusive and where constitutional questions arise in other courts, such questions are normally referred to the 
constitutional court while proceedings at the high court are suspended. See CJ Antieau Adjudicating Constitutional Issues 
(1985) 1. 
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4.2  The Judicial Function 
The political theory and constitutional doctrine of separation of powers has become 
almost a universal axiom, though many governments in Africa still grapple with its 
practicalities. This doctrine is based on the division of governmental powers through 
some scheme of allocation of authority. The legislature is allocated the primary 
responsibility for law-making; implementation of laws and formulation of national 
development programmes lies with the executive; and the judiciary interprets the laws in 
the course of arbitrating disputes.6 To this general proposition must be added a caveat 
that, in most of Africa, it is the executive that controls the legislative initiative. For states 
with parliamentary democracies, “ministers are members of the legislature and are 
thereby in a position to lead and control it.”7 
Separation of powers serves as an indirect limitation on governmental power, by 
making governmental cohesion difficult.8 It is as an important pillar of democratic 
governance and the rule of law and one that better protects individual liberties.9 In his 
dissenting opinion in Mayers v US,10 Justice Brandeis, referring to the US Constitution of 
1787, stated: “The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted … not to promote 
efficiency, but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid 
                                                 
6 See eg Nigerian Constitution 1999 secs 4 5 & 6 respectively. 
7 BO Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (1977) 49. 
8 See FR Strong Judicial Function in Constitutional Limitation of Governmental Power (1997) 7 (arguing: “Such diffusion 
of conceded authority should result in the lessening of arbitrary official conduct”). 
9 As above. 
10 Mayers v US 272 US 52 (1926). 
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friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident among the three departments, to 
save the people from autocracy”.11 
As one of the vital organs of government, the judiciary exercises judicial power, 
defined as “the power which the state exerts in the administration of public justice, in 
contradistinction from the power it possesses to make laws and the power of executing 
them”.12 Constitutionalism entails limitations on governmental powers and judicialism 
makes those limitations possible. The judiciary has “a separate procedure comprising a 
separate agency and personnel for an authoritative interpretation and enforcement of 
[law]”.13 One of its functions is to strike “a balance between the individual’s freedom and 
the right of the state to self preservation”.14  
Judicialism is “the backbone of constitutionalism, the practical instrument whereby 
constitutionalism may be transformed into an active idea in government; it is our best 
guarantee of the rule of law and therefore of liberty”.15 Judicialism requires judicial 
independence, which enables judges to say “no”—“no” to legislators, presidents, 
governors, municipal or local authorities, in short, “no” whenever “the needs of the 
political moment clash with constitutional guarantees”.16 Judicialism also serves as a 
legitimating force on governmental acts on occasions when courts hold challenged 
governmental measures valid or constitutional. 
                                                 
11 As above, 9. 
12 Huddart, Parker & Co Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330 383 per Justice Isaacs. 
13 BO Nwabueze Constitutionalism in the Emergent States (1973) 14 (italics in the original). 
14 BO Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (note 7 above) 139. 
15 Above, xi. 
16 The Hon MH Marshall ‘Speech: ‘Wise Parents do not Hesitate to Learn from their Children’: Interpreting State 
Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence’ (2004) 79(5) New York University Law Review 1633 1639. 
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The judiciary function is basically twofold: One is constitutional or statutory 
interpretation, that is, “the determination of legislative intent in formulation of policy;”17 
the other is executive oversight, that is, “the bounding within rationality of discretion in 
the administration of law.”18 These two functions—the interpretive and non-
interpretive—deserve brief introductions, though, as one commentator argues, what 
courts do in the law of judicial review is not something quite distinct from statutory 
interpretation.19 
 
4.2.1 Constitutional Interpretation 
A Constitution is the foundational norm of the legal system. It is a protocol of survival 
and continuity for any social grouping, ensuring that no one attains salvation or offers a 
program of salvation to the populace by another route. It provides a sense of citizenship, 
dignity and personality to all citizens and sets forth the general parameters of legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers. A Constitution embodies not only the fundamental 
principles of humanity but also the fundamental rights under the law. Constitutional 
interpretation,20 for Nwabueze, is “the most vital factor in constitutional government”,21 
but interpretation is a corollary of law-making and, hence, the function of the political 
                                                 
17 Strong (note 8 above) 12. 
18 As above. 
19 M Hunt Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (1998) 129. 
20 The word ‘constitution’ is used holistically in this chapter to include international human right instruments that are 
equally subject to interpretations. 
21 Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (note 7 above) 139. 
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organs.22 Although courts do engage in policymaking by interpreting vague constitutional 
and statutory provisions, interpretation is not their primary function.  
Courts interpret the constitution or other enactments only in the exercise of their 
judicial functions and as a last resort, “when impelled by the necessity of deciding 
ordinary adversary litigation between individual parties”.23 The rationale is to prevent 
them from usurping the supreme role of the legislature24 and attributing to themselves the 
primary power to receive, review and revise all legislative acts.25 This assumption 
probably explains why the African Charter, which gives the African Commission the 
mandate to interpret its provisions, provides that the Commission’s mandate must be 
exercised “at the request of a State Party, an institution of the OAU [now AU] or an 
African organization recognized by the AU”,26 thus underscoring the political nature of 
interpretation.  
 
4.2.2 Judicial Review 
Judicial review is a self-imposed responsibility that is rooted in the Lockian creed. The 
partisan conflict that culminated in Thomas Jefferson’s election in 1800 provided the 
opportunity for Chief Justice Marshall to establish and institutionalise the meliorative 
                                                 
22 See above, 50-51 (“[T]he interpretative function [of the legislature] is necessarily implied in its power to make laws. 
Every legislative act is an interpretative determination by the legislature that the act is within its powers under the 
constitution”). 
23 As above, 51. 
24 Harzard defines a ‘legislature’ to mean “a body whose chief function in government is to formulate general rules of law 
that primarily reflect the notions of utility and value held by its members.” GC Hazard ‘The Supreme Court as a 
Legislature’ (1978) 64 Cornell law Review 1 2. 
25 See Nwabueze Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa (note 7 above) 51. 
26 African Charter art 45(3). 
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role of the judiciary. In the famous case of Marbury v Madison,27 Marshall asserted: “It 
is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 
Marshall justified federal courts’ power to ignore enacted laws that were inconsistent 
with the Constitution on the ground that such laws fell outside the delegation of authority 
by the people to the government, as expressed in the Constitution.28 Judicial review, thus, 
removes issues of executive policy to the realm of adjudication.29 
Critiques of judicial review insist that it is an act of judicial usurpation or, at best, a 
“bald effrontery;”30 and that “given the principle of electorally accountable 
policymaking, all noninterpretive judicial review is illegitimate.”31 They argue that 
legislatures should legitimately resolve controversial issues, since courts are 
undemocratic and lacking in “the passive virtues”.32 In his dissenting judgment in Eakin v 
Raub,33 Justice Gibson maintained that judicial review violates the doctrine of separation 
of power and that “the construction of the constitution in this particular belongs to the 
legislature, which ought therefore to be taken to have superior capacity to judge of the 
                                                 
27 Marbury v Madison 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
28 As above, 176 (“That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in 
their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been 
erected”). 
29 See L Hartz The Liberal Tradition in America (1955) 16 (stressing that judicial review “implies a prior recognition of the 
principles to be legally interpreted”). 
30 Strong (note 8 above) 21. 
31 M Perry The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (1982) 37. Cf A Bickel The Least Dangerous Branch: The 
Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (1962) 19 (“[N]othing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in 
democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it be denied that the policy-making power of representative 
institutions, born of the electoral process, is the distinguished characteristic of the system. Judicial review works counter to 
this characteristic.”). 
32 See A Bickel ‘The Passive Virtues’ (1961) 75 Harvard Law Review 40. 
33 Eakin v Raub 12 Seg & R (PA) 330 (1825). 
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constitutionality of its own acts”.34 Michael Perry writes that “[i]f judicial review does 
not run counter to the principle of electorally accountable policymaking, it is at least in 
serious tension with it”.35 
Judicial review is probably the most puzzling of US cultural phenomena, but it is also 
perhaps the most admired feature of US constitutionalism.36 It is also a feature of many 
constitutional arrangements in Africa and elsewhere. Its overriding virtue and 
justification “is to guard against governmental infringement of individual liberties 
secured by the Constitution”.37 Regrettably, its fruits have been as varied as the types of 
regimes in which it has been institutionalised.38 Even those who invented the notion have 
not always exercised a good conscience in its application to advance the rights of 
minorities. Often, those who most loudly clamour for liberty do not most likely grant it. 
The Dred Scott case39 was one of several examples where the power of judicial 
review was of little assistance. There, the Supreme Court sanctioned the system of 
slavery and racism that existed until the civil war, abandoning the aspirational component 
of the US Declaration of Independence to the effect that all men are born equal. Plessy v 
                                                 
34 As above, 350. 
35 Perry (note 31 above), 9. 
36 See, in general, SB Prakash & JC Yoo ‘The Origins of Judicial Review’ (2003) 70 University of Chicago Law Review 
887. 
37 J Choper Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Supreme Court 
(1980) 64. 
38 See GJ Jacobsohn Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States (1993) 112 (stressing, “a critical 
factor in any comparative assessment of the institution [of judicial review] will be the extent to which a consensus may be 
said to exist with respect to a society’s defining political principles”). 
39 See Scott v Sandford 60 US 393 (1856).  
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Ferguson,40 which followed Dred Scott, legitimised racial desegregation in schools, 
notwithstanding the American Bill of Rights. It took 58 years of struggle—post Plessy v 
Ferguson—for the US Supreme Court to recognize the legitimate rights claim of African-
Americans to equal educational opportunities—in Brown v Board of Education of 
Topeka.41  
To be relevant, judicial review must be consistent with the overriding obligation of 
governmental officials to promote the progressive realization of those principles that gave 
definition to the nation. Those sworn to uphold the constitution have an obligation to 
advance the cause of constitutional principles.42 The rest of this chapter explores the 
theoretical and practical approaches to the realization of socio-economic rights in Africa 
through the judicial process. 
 
4.3  Interpretive Methodologies for the Advancement of Socio-economic Rights 
Many past democracies believed that the “self-restraint of the majority” would preserve 
the delicate balance between majority rule and respect for human rights, but the 20th 
century atrocities shattered that dream, hence the imperative for written constitutions in 
the post-World War II era. These constitutions incorporate written bill of rights, 
understandably because “the best legal guarantees of rights are the provisions in national 
constitutions which cannot be changed, or not without great effort.”43 The underlying, 
                                                 
40 Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 5370 (1896) (legitimising racial desegregation). See, in general, LWH Ackermann 
‘Constitutional Protection of Human Rights: Judicial Review (1989) 21 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 59. 
41 See Brown v Board of Education of Topeka 348 US 886 (1954). 
42 See Jacobsohn (note 38 above) 118. 
43 Cottrell & Ghai (note 2 above) 66. 
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albeit untested, assumption is that the constitutionalisation of rights is a necessary 
prerequisite, if not a sufficient condition, for their actual protection.44 
As Chapter One indicated, most African states have ratified or acceded to several 
universal and regional human rights treaties, including the ICESCR and the African 
Charter and many have domesticated these instruments, though such an exercise is not 
required of monist states. Many have made provisions for bills of rights, either as parts of 
their constitutional provisions or separately. Since remedies are at the heart of human 
rights protection regimes, most constitutions provide for an independent judiciary, with 
power to interpret and enforce human rights.45 (Many constitutions, indeed, regard courts 
as primary guardians of fundamental rights.46) The Constitution of Ghana provides: 
 
Where a person alleges that a provision of this Constitution on the fundamental 
human rights and freedoms has been, or is being or is likely to be contravened in 
relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, 
that person may apply to the High Court for redress.47 
 
                                                 
44 See R Hirschl ‘“Negative” Rights vs. “Positive” Entitlements: A Comparative Study of Judicial Interpretations of Rights 
in an Emerging Neo-Liberal Economic Order” (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 1060 1061. 
45 See eg Alg Const sec 139 (guaranteeing that the judicial power will safeguard fundamental rights); Angl Const secs 
120–21 (requiring courts to guarantee protection of the rights of citizens). See, in general, C Heyns ed Human Rights Law 
in Africa vol 2 (2004). 
46 See eg Burundi (2001), sec 52; Central African Republic (1995), sec 78; Chad (1996), sec 148; Comoros (2001), sec 31; 
Congo (2001), sec 135; Djibouti (1992), sec 71; Equatorial Guinea (1991), sec 95(b); Gabon (1991), sec 83; Gambia 
(1997), sec 132(1)(b); Ghana (1993), sec 33(1); Mali  (1993), sec 85; and Togo (1882), sec 99. 
47 Ghana Const sec 33(1). 
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The Constitution of Ghana also authorizes the High Court to issue such directions or 
orders, as it may consider appropriate, for purposes of enforcing or securing the 
enforcement of human rights.48  
A judicial approach to the advancement of socio-economic rights in Africa must take 
these developments as points of departures, especially as most constitutions commit 
judges to keep faith with constitutional provisions.49 In general, the judicial approach to 
the interpretation of rights will depend on different contexts, for example, whether a 
particular right is directly or indirectly enforceable and whether a right recognised at the 
international level is also recognised at the municipal level. The present writer takes the 
view that, irrespective of the context, courts can advance socio-economic rights in Africa 
through creative and extraterritorial interpretations.  
 
4.3.1 Interpreting Directly Enforceable Rights 
Where a constitution expressly guarantees socio-economic rights, as with the South 
African Constitution, the question is not whether they are justiciable, but how to 
implement them in a given case. The role and commitment of all actors—state and non-
state—in the society will dictate the level of implementation.50 The role of the judiciary 
in the implementation of these rights largely depends on the interpretive methodology 
                                                 
48 Above, sec 33(2). Such orders may include habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto.  
Above. 
49 See eg South African Constitution 1996 Schedule 2 (Oaths and Solemn Affirmations) (provoding: “I swear that, as 
Judge of the Constitutional Court, I will be faithful to the Republic of South Africa, will uphold and protect the 
Constitution and the human rights entrenched in it, and will administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or 
prejudice, in accordance with the Constitution and the Law. So help me God”). 
50 See, in general, V Govender ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in South Africa: Entitlements, Not Mere Policy 
Options’ in BK Goldewijk et al (eds) Dignity and Human Rights: The Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (2002) 75. 
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employed. In interpreting constitutionally guaranteed rights, the judiciary must 
determine, first, the meaning and scope of the guaranteed rights and, second, whether a 
challenged law or conduct conflicts with those rights.  
A constitution is not merely composed of a closed set of clear-cut rules; it deals with 
lofty ideals and principles. Many constitutional provisions are specific, like the 
qualifications for elective positions; others are not, but contain open-ended words like 
“equality” or “liberty”, words that permit some interpretive latitude. A constitution lays 
down, in Dworkin’s words, “general, comprehensible moral standards that government 
must respect but … leaves it to statesmen and judges to decide what these standards mean 
in concrete circumstances”.51 Deciding what these standards mean involves value choices 
and requires a genuine interpretation of enshrined rights.  
In determining the meaning and scope of guaranteed rights, a constitutional court 
should constantly remind itself that a constitution is not a document frozen in time but a 
living instrument to be applied to the changing needs of a society still in the process of 
maturation. A court must not read a bill of rights as the last will and testament, lest it 
becomes one. These provisions, like other constitutional provisions, are capable of 
growth and development over time in order to meet new social, political and historical 
realities often unimagined by its framers.52 The same philosophy should underpin the 
African Charter, which is a living instrument to be interpreted in the light of present day 
conditions and changing social attitudes.  
                                                 
51 R Dworkin Life’s Dominion (1993) 119. 
52 Cf Hunter v Southam [1984] 2 SCR 145 (Canada). 
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Courts should similarly construe a constitutional or statutory provision corresponding 
to a treaty provision in accordance with the meaning that international attributes to the 
treaty provisions. The reason is that when the legislature chooses to implement a treaty 
by a statute with the same words as the treaty, it may be assumed that the legislature 
intended to import provisions into municipal law with same effect as the corresponding 
treaty provisions.53 A treaty must be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its objects and purpose”.54 A fortiori, the ‘object and purpose’ of a human rights 
instrument demands that its provisions should be interpreted and applied in ways that 
make its safeguards practical and effective.55 
All genuine interpretation is necessarily creative, that is, it is “a matter of interaction 
between purpose and object”,56 and a creative interpretation is constructive, that is, it 
imposes “purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example 
of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong”.57 A constitutional court must also be 
policy-oriented, formulating and articulating the values of general validity and 
acceptance within a given society and infusing these values with meaning and vitality. A 
court must be guided at all times by a national ideology—what the Germans call the 
                                                 
53 See N Jayawickrama The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law: National, Regional and International 
Jurisprudence (2002) 159 (arguing, “to attribute a different meaning to the statute from the meaning which international 
law attributes to the treaty is to nullify the intention of the legislature and to invalidate the statute in part or in whole”). Cf 
Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 696 (HL) (“Faced with an international treaty which has been 
incorporated into our law, British courts should now follow broadly the guidelines declared by the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties”, above, 712 per Lord Scarman). 
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 23 May 1969 UN Doc A/conf 39/27 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention] art 31. 
55 See Loizidon v Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99. 
56 R Dworkin Law’s Empire (1986) 52. 
57 As above. 
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Volkgeist or national spirit. While decisions of a constitutional court in a democracy 
should serve the purpose of settling disputes between the parties before it or correcting 
individual mistakes in lower court judgments, its primary concern should be to elucidate, 
safeguard and develop the values inherent in a constitution. According to Barak, “The 
supreme court’s primary concern is broader, system wide corrective action. This 
corrective action should focus on two main issues: bridging the gap between law and 
society, and protecting democracy”.58 
African judiciaries must interpret constitutionally guaranteed rights in ways that 
trump governmental interest.59 These rights protect not only the individual in a 
democracy but democracy itself. Courts must not be very positivistic or legalistic in their 
interpretive attitudes; they should go for the spirit of the law in the defence of human 
rights. Rigorous textualism may be inconsistent with originalism, since the constitution-
making process is a product of compromises.60 Judges should seek logical consistency 
and the symmetry of the legal structure and should not lightly sacrifice certainty, 
uniformity, order and coherence on the altar of judicial dexterity, but they cannot extract 
the meaning of constitutional provisions from legal materials alone.61 Human rights 
embody both legal and moral rights, and moral decisions do not admit of mathematical 
                                                 
58 A Barak ‘The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Forward, A Judge on Judging: Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy’ 
(2002) 116 Harvard Law Review 16 27-28. 
59 Cf R Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977) chap 7 (arguing that rights are ‘trumps’ held by individuals that outweigh 
collective goals). Cf Patel v Attorney General [1968] Zambia LR 99 116 (where the Supreme Court of Zambia held that a 
Bill of Rights must be broadly construed in favour of the individual rather than in favour of the state). 
60 See M Tushnet ‘The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1288. 
61 Traditional constitutional courts assert that the constitutions themselves and domestic commentaries are the sole bases 
for the analysis and interpretation of their constitutions. See PJ Smith ‘States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal 
Perspectives’ (2003) 89 Vanderbilt Law Review 1 21. 
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certainty. A court may be “a negative legislator”,62 but it is a legislator nonetheless and 
should look for openings and create jurisprudence—through a creative interpretation of 
rights. 
In interpreting constitutional rights, African judiciaries should also be sensitive to 
their countries’ past, present and, indeed, future. As Sachs correctly points out, the Bill of 
Rights in each country “correspond to a felt need by a large number of people, and the 
form that it took—its design, its meaning in society, its mode of implementation—was 
heavily influenced by the particular historic needs and the evolution of legal culture at the 
time”.63 A constitutional court must also be guided by the social goals of a society in 
interpreting constitutional rights. As Justice Chaskalson explained in Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal:64 
 
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people 
are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of 
unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean 
water or to adequate health services. These conditions already existed when the 
Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to transform our 
society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at 
                                                 
62 Cited in AS Sweet Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (2000) 35. Kelsen defines a “negative 
legislator” as one who cannot make law freely because the decision-making is “absolutely determined by the constitution”. 
As above. 
63 A Sachs ‘Making Rights Work—the South African Experience’ in P Smith (ed) Making Rights Work (1999) 1 5 
(elucidating, inter alia, the context for the elaboration of the South African Bill of Rights). 
64 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SALR 765 (CC) [hereinafter Soobramoney case]. 
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the heart of our new constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to 
exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.65 
 
Refreshingly, many dicta emanating from some of Africa’s superior courts appear to 
support the above propositions. In Nafiu Rabiu v The State,66 the Nigerian Supreme Court 
stressed the necessity for liberalism in constitutional interpretation. Justice Udo-Udoma 
stated the rule thus: 
 
My Lords, it is my view that the approach of this Court to the construction of the 
Constitution should be, and so it has been, one of liberalism, probably a variation on 
the theme of the general maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat. I do not conceive it 
to be the duty of this Court so to construe any of the provisions of the constitution as 
to defeat the obvious ends the Constitution was designed to serve where another 
construction equally in accord and consistent with the words and sense of such 
provisions will serve to enforce and protect such ends.67  
 
In Government of the Republic of Namibia v Cultura,68 Mahomed CJ similarly 
observed that a constitution, which is an organic law, must be interpreted broadly, 
liberally, and purposively, to enable it to continue to play “a creative and dynamic role in 
                                                 
65 Above, para 8. Cf arguments of Mahomed DP in Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others (1996) 4 SA 671 (CC); (1996) 8 BCLR 1015 (CC) para 43 (though in a different 
context). 
66 Nafiu Rabiu v State (1980) FRN 509 (SC). Cf Okojie v The Attorney General of Lagos State [1981] 1 NCLR 218. 
67 As above, 519. 
68 Government of the Republic of Namibia v Cultura [1993] 3 LRC 175 (SC). 
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the expression and the achievement of the ideals and aspirations of the nation, in the 
articulation of the values bonding its people, and in disciplining its government”. And in 
Dow v Attorney General of Botswana,69 Aguda JA stressed that courts must not allow a 
constitution to be “a lifeless museum piece”, but must continue to breathe life into it from 
time to time as opportunity arises.  
 
I conceive it that the primary duty of the judges is to make the constitution grow and 
develop in order to meet the just demands and aspirations of an ever developing 
society which is part of the wider and larger human society governed by some 
acceptable concepts of human dignity.70  
 
The South African Constitutional Court has contributed remarkably to the 
elaboration of general principles on constitutional interpretation. Its jurisprudence is a 
tremendous advance in the field of international human rights law, and remarkably so as 
the country had no history of judicial activism in such matters.71 The Court’s unanimous 
judgment in the Makwanyane case72 provides a point of departure. The case dealt with a 
number of issues,73 but more importantly, it enabled the Court to lay down the general 
philosophy in interpreting bill of rights. According to the Court, “whilst paying due 
                                                 
69 Dow v Attorney General of Botswana [1992] LRC (Const) 623. 
70 Above, 668. 
71 M S Kende ‘The South African Constitutional Court’s Construction of Socio-economic Rights: A Response to Critics 
(2004) 19 Connecticut Journal of International Law 617 622. 
72 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
73 For a general review of Makwanyane case, see H Klug ‘Striking Down Death’ (1996) 12 South African Journal of 
Human Rights 61. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
192
regard to the language that has been used, [an interpretation of the Bill of Rights should 
be] ‘generous’ and ‘purposive’ and ‘give … expression to the underlying values of the 
Constitution’”.74  
The Constitutional Court put this principle to a decisive, albeit controversial, use in S 
v Mhlungu.75 There, the Court’s majority allowed persons involved in cases pending at 
the commencement of the Constitution to rely on rights in the interim Bill of Rights, 
despite the apparent provision in the Constitution to the contrary.76 According to the 
Court: 
 
An interpretation which withholds the rights guaranteed by Chapter 3 of the [interim] 
Constitution from those involved in proceedings which fortuitously commenced 
before the operation of the Constitution would not give to that chapter a construction 
which is ‘most beneficial to the widest amplitude’ and should therefore be avoided if 
the language and context of the relevant sections reasonably permits such a course.77 
 
The celebrated Grootboom case78 provides a good example of a court’s appreciation 
of the social and historical settings that should inform the interpretation and application 
                                                 
74 Makwanyane case (note 72 above) para 9; see also CS Steiker ‘Pretoria not Peoria FCIS v Makwanyane and Another, 
1995 (3) SA 391’ (1996) 74 Texas Law Review 1285 (praising the Makwanyane decision for both its faith in the 
transformative possibilities of law and the value of constitutional democracy). 
75 S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
76 See Constitution of South Africa 1996 sec 241(8) (“All proceedings which immediately before the commencement of 
this Constitution were pending before any court of law, including any tribunal or reviewing authority established by or 
under law, exercising jurisdiction in accordance with the law then in force, shall be dealt with as if this Constitution had 
not been passed”). 
77 S v Mhlungu (note 75 above) para 9. 
78 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Ors [2000] 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) [Grootboom case]. 
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of constitutional rights. The case involved the plight of desperately poor people in South 
Africa, who originally lived in terrible housing conditions in one of South Africa’s 
shantytowns.79 The group subsequently moved to privately-owned but unoccupied land 
that was included in an existing plan for the construction of low-cost housing.80 The 
landlord obtained an order evicting them from the land, which led to demolition of the 
shacks they had built.81 The evictees then occupied a public football stadium, though this 
lacked even the minimum, albeit inadequate, facilities that their shacks provided.82  
The evictees sued, claiming that the government’s housing policies, taken as a 
whole, failed to provide them with their constitutionally guaranteed right to access to 
adequate housing.83 In giving effect to the rights of access to adequate housing and the 
child’s right to basic nutrition, shelter, and basic health care services, the Constitutional 
Court insisted that the state must meet its positive obligation to devise funds, implement 
and supervise measures to provide relief to those in desperate need.84 It stressed that the 
exclusion of the “people in desperate need” from plans to provide housing to the poor 
were unreasonable because a “programme that excludes a significant segment of society 
cannot be said to be reasonable”.85 
The significance of the Grootboom decision lies in the Constitutional Court’s refusal 
to abdicate its responsibility to protect disadvantaged groups from unreasonable 
                                                 
79 See above, paras 2-3. 
80 See above, para 8. 
81 See above, paras 9-10. 
82 See above, para 11. 
83 See above, paras 11 & 13. 
84 See above, para 99. 
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executive decisions. The decision signals a new commitment to enforce socio-economic 
rights and reflects a model requiring the state and its agencies to act reasonably to 
discharge their constitutional obligations. The judgment meant that existing plans had to 
be adjusted to ensure that it contained an element that would provide housing 
opportunities for the “people in desperate need”,86 thereby altering housing policy in 
South Africa in a very tangible way. It shows that courts can get governments to reorder 
their economic priorities in order to serve those most in need. 
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court “went further than any other court in the 
world has gone in giving effect to socio-economic rights”,87 but it was prepared to defer 
to the government if there was a programme that had some “end in sight”.88 In other 
cases, the Court simply enforces guaranteed rights without giving deference to legislative 
judgment.89 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign,90 for example, alleged that 
the government violated the Constitution’s right to health care by not widely providing 
Nevirapine, which the World Health Organisation (WHO) said can prevent the spread of 
HIV/AIDS from pregnant women to their foetuses and babies.91 The government 
responded that its pilot programme was reasonable92 and that separation of powers 
                                                                                                                                                 
85 Above, paras 43 & 64. 
86 Above, para 64. 
87 T Roux ‘Understanding Grootboom - A Response to Cass R. Sunstein’ (2002) 12 Constitutional Quarterly 41 44. 
88 Above, para 65 (noting that, under the existing programme, “people in desperate need are left without any form of 
assistance with an end in sight”). 
89 See M Tushnet ‘Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review’ (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1895 1906. 
90 See Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign [2002] 5 SALR 721 (CC) [hereinafter TAC]. 
91 See above, para 1. 
92 The South African Government had embarked upon a pilot program for the distribution of Nevirapine at two public 
health centres in each province. The Government argued that a broader programme was not feasible as Nevirapine only 
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required courts to stay out of such issues. In a unanimous decision, the Constitutional 
Court ordered the government to provide the free Navirapine. The Court reiterated that 
“[t]he State is obliged to take reasonable measures progressively to eliminate or reduce 
the large areas of severe deprivation that afflict our society”.93 Applying this principle, 
the Court held the government’s inaction as unreasonable, since it “fail[ed] to address the 
needs of mothers and their newborn children who do not have access to these [pilot] 
sites”.94 
Continental courts also have broadened their interpretive toolkits to aid the realisation 
of socio-economic rights. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court held, in Gosselin v 
Attorney General of Quebec & Ors,95 that nothing in the jurisprudence suggests that 
section 7 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms places a positive 
obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life, liberty or security. However, 
the Court did not rule out the possibility of such an interpretation, arguing that the 
Charter must be capable of growth and not be frozen in time.96 In his dissenting opinion, 
Justice Arbour insisted that limiting section 7 to only negative rights is unduly restrictive. 
Relying on recent a jurisprudence, he also argued that “principles of fundamental justice” 
in sections 8 to 14 of the Quebec Charter entrench positive rights97 and that interpreting 
                                                                                                                                                 
worked when infected mothers used formula to feed their newborns and that it lacked the capacity to insure that women all 
over the country used formula to feed their babies. See above, paras 14-15. 
93 Above, paras 35-6. 
94 Above, paras 67. 
95 Gosselin v Attorney General of Quebec & Ors [2002] SCC 84. 
96 Cf Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927; Hunter v Southam Inc [1984] 2 SCR 145. 
97 See eg Schachter v Canada [1992] 2 SCR 679; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G(J) 
[1999] 3 SCR 46; and Blencoe v British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) [2000] 2 SCR 307. 
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the right to life otherwise would render it meaningless and undermine the coherence and 
purpose of the Charter as a whole. 
 
4.3.2 Interpreting Indirectly Enforceable Rights 
Where there are no direct human rights guarantees in a constitution or where these rights, 
though incorporated, are placed beyond judicial scrutiny, then the question turns on the 
interpretive methodology for the enforcement of these rights. Tushnet has correctly 
argued that non-justiciable rights need not be legally irrelevant.98 Such rights could be 
used to support interpretations that ordinarily would not be natural ones according to 
accepted standards of statutory interpretation. They could also be invoked to explain a 
court’s refusal to recognise other rights, where their recognition would impair the 
government’s ability to implement the non-justiciable rights.99 
The Indian Supreme Court100 has been exemplary in utilising non-justiciable 
provisions of the Indian Constitution of 1950 (as amended) to facilitate the 
implementation of socio-economic rights. India fashioned its post-independence 
Constitution101 in the era of the UDHR. Many of the fundamental rights provisions go 
beyond classic rights to impose constitutional duties on private actors and the state;102 
                                                 
98 See Tushnet ‘Social Welfare Rights’ (note 89 above), 1898. 
99 See above. 
100 Articles 131 – 133 define the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court. Inter alia, it exercises original jurisdiction in 
cases involving the government and appellate jurisdiction in a variety of cases; rules on cases involving constitutional 
interpretation; it exercises jurisdiction over civil cases that involve a substantial question of law with general importance. It 
is also an appellate court for some criminal cases, with power to grant special leave to appeal, with writ jurisdictions over 
questions of fundamental rights, and with the authority to issue advisory opinions. 
101 India gained independence from the UK in 1947.  
102 See eg Indian Constitution sec 15 (prohibition of discrimination), 17 (abolition of “untouchability”), and 21 (protection 
of life and liberty). 
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others endorse “positive discrimination” for historically oppressed groups.103 
Nonetheless, the Constitution bifurcates rights into the classic civil and political rights, 
which are termed fundamental rights, and other non-justiciable normative values—
directive principles—to guide state policy.104 The Constitution renders these directive 
principles non-justiciable.105  
For years, the Indian Supreme Court has managed to apply more substantive 
conceptions of equality to uphold rights to health, education, shelter, and others.106 In a 
number of Social Action Litigation (SAL)—beginning with People’s Union for 
Democratic Rights v Union of India,107 the Supreme Court deployed the directive 
principles to support the constitutionality of social legislation. In Manguru v 
Commissioners of Budge, Budge Municipality,108 the Court held that legislation is needed 
to implement the directive principles and that so long as there is no law carrying out the 
policy laid down in a directive, neither the State nor an individual can violate any existing 
law or legal right under the colour of following a directive. In the Union of India case, the 
Court found that the practice of employment of workers at sub-minimum wages violated 
                                                 
103 As above sec 15(4). 
104 International and domestic sources informed the directive principles. The international sources included the 1789 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the American Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of 
the Irish Republic, and the Constitution of Republican Spain. The local sources included the 1931 resolution of the pro-
independence Indian National Congress, which defined political freedom in the Indian context to include “real economic 
freedom of the starving millions”. VD Mahajan Introduction to Constitutional Law of India (1991) 365. Others insist that 
the distinction between the justiciable and non-justiciable provisions in the Indian Constitution arose not in the context of 
negative and positive rights but in the context of minority rights. See Austin The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a 
Nation (1966) 57. 
105 Indian Constitution sec 37. 
106 See PB Mehta ‘The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty’ (2007) 18(2) Journal of Democracy 70 71 (adding: “To one degree or 
another, the executive branch has responded by at least trying to make provisions for the guarantee of these rights”). 
107 People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India (1982) AIR 1473 SC (challenging private-sector employment 
policies in connection with the Asian Games that India hosted). 
108 Manguru v Commissioners of Budge, Budge Municipality (1951) 87 CLJ 369. 
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section 23’s prohibition of human trafficking and forced labour.109 It invoked the 
directive principles in the Indian Constitution to hold that the government had failed in its 
constitutional duty to protect workers and ensure that previously enacted statutes 
establishing a minimum wage were enforced.110 The Court reasoned that the inherent 
vulnerability and desperation associated with the dire poverty in India rendered a decision 
to take a job below the minimum wage an involuntary one.111  
In some cases, like Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Sabha v State of West Bengal,112 
the Court duly acknowledged the existence of financial constraints on the part of the 
government. Nevertheless, the Court insisted that the provision of medical facilities for 
citizens is a state’s obligation, which is not discharged by merely pleading such 
constraints. In other cases, the Supreme Court relied on the directive principles to found 
violations of the right to life where a government failed to provide facilities for education 
or shelter. In Laxmi Kant v Union of India,113 the Court held that the right of children to 
life and livelihood included the right to be protected against emotional and material 
neglect. In Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation,114 the Court interpreted the 
right to life to encompass the right to a safe working environment and the right to earn a 
living. On other occasions, the Court assumes “epistolary jurisdiction” and perform a 
more political task by setting up groups of experts to investigate living and working 
                                                 
109 People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India (note 197 above) 1475. 
110 As above. 
111 As above. 
112 Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Sabha v State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37. 
113 Laxmi Kant v Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 67. 
114 Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation (1986) AIR 180 SC. 
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conditions of workers. It justifies such a political role on the basis of the executive’s 
abdication of its constitutional mandate. 
Bundhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India115 provides a striking case study. The suit 
was initiated on behalf of workers in the stone quarries near the city of Delhi, through a 
letter challenging that the stone-crushers were bonded labourers forced to work under 
extreme and intolerable conditions. The letter cited a lack of housing, clothing, health 
care, clean water, and exposure to heavy air pollutions generated by stone crushing 
machines. Due to these intolerable conditions, according to the complaint, many of the 
workers took ill and some died from tuberculosis and related diseases. There were neither 
medical care to the victims nor compensation to their families. Relying on the report of 
its investigators, the Court held that the state had violated the right to life in section 21 of 
the Indian Constitution, including the right “to live in human dignity, free of 
exploitation”.116 It held that the directive principles provided authority to order the State 
to enforce legislations enacted to protect workers and further ordered the State to educate 
workers about their social and labour rights to prevent vulnerability to exploitation.117 
The Court justified its use of epistolary jurisdiction and third-party standing as necessary 
to protect the rights of vulnerable groups in India.118 
African judicial institutions should similarly treat the “directive principles” not as 
mere affirmations and declarations of common beliefs.119 Courts should assume that the 
                                                 
115 Bundhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India (1984) AIR 802 SC. 
116 As above, 806. 
117 As above. 
118 As above. 
119 See BO Nwabueze Ideas and Facts in Constitution Making (1993) 260. 
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social contract in Africa establishes a different kind of relationship between the 
individual and society than that represented by the limited-government paradigm. The 
Nigerian Constitution will serve as an illustration. The Constitution urges the state, within 
its ideals and objectives, to harness the nation’s resources to promote national 
prosperity120 and control the economy to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and 
happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice, equality of status and 
opportunity.121 It exhorts the state to direct its policy towards ensuring that the nation’s 
material resources are harnessed and distributed as best as possible to serve the common 
good;122 that the economic system is not operated in such a manner that permits the 
concentration of wealth or the means of production and exchange in few individuals or 
groups;123 and that suitable and adequate shelter and food, reasonable national minimum 
living wage, old age care and pensions, unemployment and sick benefits and welfare for 
the disabled are provided for all citizens.124 
Nigeria’s social order, according to the Constitution, “is founded on ideals of 
freedom, equality and justice”.125 In furtherance of this order, the Constitution guarantees 
to “every citizen” the “equal rights, obligations and opportunities before the law”. It 
prohibits the “exploitation of human and natural resources in any form whatsoever for 
                                                 
120 See Nigerian Constitution sec 16(1)(a). 
121 As above, sec 16(1)(b). 
122 As above, sec 16(2)(b). 
123 As above, sec 16(2)(c). 
124 As above, sec 16(2)(d). 
125 As above, sec 17(1). 
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reasons other than the good of the community”.126 It urges the State to direct its social 
policy towards ensuring that— 
 
all citizens, without discrimination on any ground whatsoever, have the opportunity 
for securing adequate means of livelihood as well as adequate opportunity to secure 
suitable employment; …there are adequate medical and health facilities for all 
persons; … children, young persons, and the aged are protected against any 
exploitation whatsoever, and against moral and material neglect; [and] provision is 
made for public assistance in deserving cases or other conditions of need.127 
 
As for education objectives, the Nigerian Constitution urges the government to direct 
its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational opportunities at 
all levels.128 It must strive to eradicate illiteracy by providing, “when practicable,” free, 
compulsory and universal primary education, free secondary education, free university 
education, and free adult literacy programme.129  
The Namibian Constitution similarly consigns what are usually categorised as socio-
economic rights to its Chapter 11 provisions entitled ‘Principles of State Policy’, though 
there are few enforceable provisions relating to children’s rights,130 rights to property,131 
                                                 
126 As above, sec 17(2)(a)&(d). 
127 As above, sec 17(3)(a)(d)(f)&(g). 
128 As above, sec 18(1). 
129 As above, sec 18(3). 
130 See Namibia Constitution, sec 15. 
131 As above, sec 16. 
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education,132 and to freedom of association, including “freedom to form and join 
associations or unions, including trade unions”.133 The directive principles require the 
state to actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, inter alia, 
policies aimed at ensuring that the health and strength of the workers are not abused; 
ensuring that economic necessity does not force citizens to enter vocations unsuited to 
their age and strength; actively encouraging the formation of trade unions to protect 
workers’ rights and interests; promoting sound labour relations and fair employment 
practices; ensuring that every citizen has a right to fair and reasonable access to public 
facilities and services; and ensuring that senior citizens receive pension adequate for the 
maintenance of a decent standard of living.134 Others include providing just and 
affordable social benefits for the unemployed, incapacitated and disadvantaged; ensuring 
that workers are paid a living wage adequate for the maintenance of a decent standard of 
living; raising and maintaining an acceptable level of nutrition and improving public 
health; and maintaining the ecosystems, essential ecological processes and biological 
diversity, and utilizing living natural resources on a sustainable basis. The Constitution 
concludes that its directive principles “shall not of and by themselves be legally 
enforceable by any Court, but shall nevertheless guide the Government in making and 
applying laws to give effect to the fundamental objectives of the said principles”.135 It, 
                                                 
132 As above, sec 20. Cf JC Mubangizi ‘The Constitutional Protection of Socio-Economic Rights in Selected African 
Countries: A Comparative Evaluation’ (2006) 2(1) African Journal of Legal Studies 1 10 (stressing, “the only constitutional 
socio-economic rights in the Namibian Constitution that can be categorised as such are the right to education, and to some 
extent, children’s rights and property rights”). 
133 Namibia Constitution, sec 21(1)(e). See also above, sec 21(1)(f) (providing for the right to withhold labour without 
being exposed to criminal penalties). 
134 Above, sec 95. 
135 Above, sec 101. 
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however, permits courts “to have regard to the said principles in interpreting any laws 
based on them”.136  
Clearly, some provisions under “directive principles” are scarcely suited to judicial 
determination. An example is the Nigerian Constitution’s provision that “the economic 
system is not operated in such a manner as to permit the concentration of wealth or the 
means of production and exchange in the hands of few individuals or of a group”.137 
Nevertheless, other provisions are capable of judicial determination or could, at least, be 
justiciable by legislation, as the Nigerian Supreme Court held in Attorney General Ondo 
State v Attorney General Federation.138 The case challenged the Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offences Act 2000,139 which the National Assembly enacted pursuant to 
section 15(5) of the 1999 Constitution.140 The Appellant argued, inter alia, that since 
Chapter II of the Constitution is not justiciable, it could not be subject of any enactment 
or law and, by implication, of enforcement.141 The appellant further contended that 
section 15(5) and all other provisions of Chapter II stand-alone and cannot be read with 
other provisions of the Constitution. 
                                                 
136 Above. 
137 See Nigeria Constitution, sec 16(2)(c). 
138 Attorney General Ondo State v Attorney-General Federation [2002] FWLR (Pt 111) 1972 [hereinafter Attorney 
General Ondo State case]. 
139 See Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 Cap 359 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2000 
[hereinafter Corrupt Practices Act] (prohibiting and prescribing punishment for corrupt practices and other related 
offences). 
140 Providing: “The State shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power”. See also Nigerian Constitution 2nd Sch Pt 
1 item 60(a) (conferring on the National Assembly the exclusive competence to legislate in “[t]he establishment and 
regulation of authorities for the Federation or any part thereof … to promote and enforce the observance of Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles contained in this Constitution”). 
141 See Attorney General Ondo State case (note 138 above) 2208. 
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The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Citing with approval the Indian case of 
Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Sabha v Bengal,142 the Court held that to accept such a 
restricted submission “is to fly in the face of settled principle of Constitutional 
interpretation that the duty of the Court is to read and construe together all the provisions 
of the Constitution, unless there is very clear reason that a particular provision of the 
Constitution should not be read together”.143 Reading the Constitution holistically, the 
Court concluded that the legislature has power to make laws to promote and defend the 
fundamental objectives and directive principles in the Constitution.144 This path-breaking 
decision, albeit not directly related to human rights, could lay the foundation for the 
development of socio-economic rights in Nigeria. 
Significantly, Ghanaian courts have also held that the enforceability of socio-
economic rights is not limited to those in the Bill of Rights, but that it extends to those in 
the Directive Principles of State Policy. In New Patriotic Party v Attorney General,145 the 
Court held, inter alia, that although the Directive Principles of State Policy are not in 
themselves legally enforceable by the courts, there are exceptions to this principle in that 
where Directive Principles are read together with other enforceable parts of the 
Constitution, they then become enforceable.146  
The logical conclusion from the above analysis is that affirmations in “Directive 
Principles” suggest a more active role for governments in securing the basic needs of 
                                                 
142 As above 2070. 
143 As above 2208. 
144 As above. 
145 New Patriotic Party v Attorney General (1996–97) SCGLR 729. 
146 Above, 788. 
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their citizens. Nwabueze sees such affirmations as parts of “the process of creating a 
national acceptance of, and attachment to, those beliefs and objectives, with a view to 
eventual growth of habits and tradition of respect for them”.147 
 
4.3.3 Interpreting Ratified but Unincorporated Instruments 
On many occasions, states simply ratify human rights treaties, including those 
guaranteeing socio-economic rights, without domesticating them in their municipal legal 
systems. What is the status of such unincorporated treaties? This question has been, and 
still is, a subject of debates. In principle, the applicability of a human rights treaty at the 
municipal level is a function of the relationship between international and municipal law. 
On this question, two main theories struggle for dominance—monism and dualism. The 
dualists insist that “international law and internal law are two separate legal orders, 
existing independently of one another”.148 For the monists, international law and internal 
law are part of the same order.149 For states favouring a dualist approach, the substantive 
norms of the (human rights) treaty must be “transformed” or “adopted” to become 
applicable in domestic law.150 Such systems are not prone to absorb international law into 
                                                 
147 Nwabueze Ideas and Facts in Constitution Making (note 119 above) 260. 
148 G Fitzmaurice ‘The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law’ (1957) 
II Recueil des Cours 5 70. 
149 As above. For a more recent analysis of this problem, particularly in the human rights field, see C Harland ‘The Status 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in the Domestic Law of state Parties: An Initial Global 
Survey through UN Human Rights Committee Documents’ (2000) 22(1) Human Rights Quarterly 187. 
150 See A Cassese ‘Modern Constitutions and International Law’ (1985) III Recueil des Cours 331. 
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the domestic legal system, “even if the underlying social values are similarly sympathetic 
to the rights in question”.151  
Generally, most civil law countries, such as Senegal, Cameroon, Benin, Niger, and 
Namibia, adopt monism, while most common law countries, such as Nigeria, Ghana, and 
Sierra Leone, adopt dualism. Two constitutional provisions will serve to illustrate this 
division. I turn again to the Nigerian Constitution, which is based on dualism. It provides: 
“No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law 
except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National 
Assembly”.152 Contrariwise, the Namibian Constitution is monist. It too provides: 
“Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules of 
public international law and international agreements binding upon Namibia under this 
Constitution shall form part of the law of Namibia”.153  
The African Charter, for example, became part of Namibia’s law through 
incorporation, but it became part of Nigerian law through a separate local enactment: the 
African Charter (Ratification and Enforcement) Act.154 Strangely, the Charter is silent on 
what should be done to those countries that have ratified it but never showed commitment 
to put in place appropriate domestic mechanisms. The African Commission also has not 
specifically enjoin the incorporation of the Charter way, perhaps mindful that there is no 
uniformity in the reception of international law in Africa. In 1989, however, the 
Commission recommended that Member States should “introduce[…] the provisions of 
                                                 
151 See BA Simmons ‘Why Commit? Explaining State Acceptance of International Human Rights Obligations’ available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/clep/documents/Simmons.pdf. 
152 Nigerian Constitution sec 12(1). 
153 Namibia Constitution sec 144. 
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Articles 1 to 29 of the African Charter . . . in their Constitutions, laws, rules and 
regulations and other acts relating to Human and Peoples’ Rights”.155 When Nigeria 
incorporated the Charter after its ratification, the Commission expressed its approval and 
hoped that such gesture should “set a standard for all Africa”.156 
Umozurike believes that “[t]he effect of a human rights treaty will be greatly reduced 
if it is not incorporated into law”.157 Umozurike is echoing a judicial mindset that insists 
on the non-justiciability of unincorporated international treaties. The common law 
tradition, which some African countries subscribe, avoids consideration of 
unincorporated conventional law. In Blackburn v Attorney General,158 the United 
Kingdom (UK) proposed to sign the Treaty of Rome to accede to the European 
Communities. The proposal was challenged and the English Court of Appeal said: “It is 
elementary that these courts take no notice of treaties as such … until they are embodied 
in laws enacted by Parliament, and then to the extent that Parliament tells us”.159 
The present writer urges African courts to interpret (unincorporated) human rights 
instruments in ways that do not diminish states obligations. They should fuse the 
normative content of international human rights norms into their own interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
154 See African Charter (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap A9 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. 
155 Resolution on the Integration of the Provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights into National 
Laws of States Second Annual Activity Report of the African Commission 1988–1989 Annex XI. 
156 See Civil Liberties Organization v Nigeria Comm No 129/94 para 17 (2000) AHRLR 188 (ACHPR 1995) reprinted in 
Ninth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission 1995-1996 Annex VI. 
157 UO Umozurike The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1997) 107. 
158 Blackburn v Attorney General [1971] 1 WLR 1037 (English CA). 
159 As above, 1039 per Lord Denning MR. Cf McWhirter v Attorney General [1972] CMLR 882 886-7 (where a similar 
challenge brought after the Treaty of Accession was signed by before its implementation by Act of Parliament). 
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domestic norms, by altering the content of the latter to reflect the former.160 The legal 
systems of our contemporary world no longer occupy separate spheres but overlap and 
interact. As Hunt convincingly argues: 
 
A norm of international treaty law may not be ‘part of’ domestic law in the sense that 
it gives rise to a right or obligation which is directly enforceable in domestic courts 
and on which individuals may therefore found their case, but, insofar as judicial 
recourse to it is permitted by the treaty presumption, to assist in the interpretation of 
domestic statute law, or its customary or near-customary status provides guidance in 
the development of domestic common law, it is clearly of legal relevance.161 
 
Another legal basis for the judicial recognition of the fundamental importance of 
human rights treaties is that some of these treaties merely codify customary law.162 There 
is reason, for example, to argue that the African Charter has acquired the status of a 
regional custom,163 binding on African states and creating obligations at the domestic 
level without the necessity for domestication. The first reason for this assertion is the 
universal ratification that the Charter has enjoyed in Africa. The second reason is that the 
Charter has a sui generis character; it is, to borrow a phrase from Drzemczewski, “a 
                                                 
160 See, in general, RB Lillich ‘The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law’ in H Hannum 
(ed) Guide to International Human Rights Practiced (1992) 239 (examining the use of international human right law to 
infuse constitutional and statutory standards in the US). 
161 Hunt (note 19 above) 41-2. 
162 For a discussion of the relationship between conventional human rights law and customary law, see T Meron Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989). 
163 In the Asylum case 1950 ICJ Rep 266, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognised the possibility for the 
existence of a local or regional customs amongst a group of states in their relations inter se, in addition to a general custom 
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treaty of a normative character which is developing an evolving notion of ‘Convention 
law’ which interpenetrates and transcends both the international and domestic legal 
structures”.164  
The Nigerian Supreme Court affirmed the sui generis nature of the Charter in Abacha 
v Fawehinmi,165 when it established that: “(a) the African Charter is a special genus of 
law in the Nigerian legal and political system; [and] (b) the Charter has some 
international flavour and in that sense it cannot be amended or watered down or 
sidetracked by any Nigerian law.”166 Earlier, in Chima Ubani v Director of State Security 
Services and Attorney General of the Federation,167 the Nigerian Court of Appeal held 
that the African Charter was superior to all municipal laws, including Decrees of the 
Military Government. It also held that Decree No. 12 of 1994 and the provision ousting 
the jurisdiction of civil courts were ineffectual in preventing the lower court from 
assuming jurisdiction in the case of an infraction of rights recognised and protected under 
the Charter. 
                                                                                                                                                 
binding on the international community as a whole. Local customs could also exist only between two states, as was held to 
exist between India and Portugal in the Right of Passage case 1960 ICJ Rep 6. 
164 A Drzemczewski European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: A Comparative Study (1983) 33 (arguing that 
the European Convention on Human Rights, though an international treaty, has given rise to a new type of law that defies 
classification as either international or domestic law). 
165 Abacha v Fawehinmi [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228 (SC Nig). 
166 Above, 347. Cf Gani Fawehinmi v Sani Abacha & Ors (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt 475) 710 (CA Nig) (holding that the 
African Charter has “an aura of inviolability unlike most municipal laws and may as long as it is in the statute book be 
clothed with vestment of inviolability”); and Oshevire v British Caledonian Airways Ltd (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt 189) 234 
(Nig). 
167 Chima Ubani v Director of State Security Services and Attorney General of the Federation CA Lagos unreported 
CA/L/260/96 7 July 1999 (on file with author). 
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Like municipal jurisprudence, international tribunals also stress the sui generis nature 
of certain types of treaties. In the Reservations to the Genocide Convention case,168 the 
ICJ said of the 1948 Genocide Convention: 
 
In such a convention the Contracting States do not have any interests of their own; 
they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of 
those high purposes which are the raison d’etre of the convention. Consequently, in 
a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages 
to States or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and 
duties.169 
 
In the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co case,170 the ICJ recognized that basic 
rights of human persons create obligations erga omnes, violations of which allows any 
state to pursue international remedies against any other state. States may also have legal 
interests in matters of general humanitarian nature, for example, on atrocities affecting 
human beings in another country. All of this shows that courts, including domestic courts, 
should not approach human rights treaties with the same conceptual apparatus as those 
normally used in traditional international law.  
                                                 
168 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention 1951 ICJ Rep 15. 
169 Above, 23. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 9 Dec 1948 78 UNTS 277 
[hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
170 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co case (Belgium v Spain) 1970 ICJ Rep 3. 
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The monism/dualism debate does not need to be resolved for the effective 
implementation of the African Charter or, for that matter, the ICESCR.171 The substantive 
provisions of the Charter, as interpreted by the African Commission, are integral parts of 
domestic law. Domestic courts should interpret the Charter with a general presumption 
that governments do not intend to legislate inconsistently with their obligations under 
international law.172 Otherwise stated, African judicial institutions should enforce the 
African Charter and similar instruments ratified by African states whether or not these 
instruments have been domesticated. The days of dualistic purity should be over in 
matters of human rights, in the interest of humanity. The focus should be the principle of 
pacta sunct servanda, the sacred principle that agreements are binding and are to be 
implemented in good faith.173 
 
4.3.4 Extra-territorial Interpretation of Rights174 
Whether for directly or indirectly enforceable or, for that matter, incorporated and 
unincorporated instruments, African judiciaries have greater possibilities to advance 
socio-economic rights if they engage in extraterritorial interpretation of rights. The 
constitutions of some African states, such as Angola, Cape Verde, Malawi and South 
Africa, expressly enjoin courts to invoke international and comparative law. Section 
                                                 
171 Cf Drzemczewski (note 164 above) 41 (calling for a transcendence of the monist/dualist dichotomy in relation to 
international human rights law stressing, “the domestic status of international legal norms is in reality a matter of degree”); 
FG Jacobs ‘Introduction’ in FG Jacobs and S Roberts (eds) The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law xxiv (1987) (regarding 
the monist/dualist antithesis as an oversimplification that must be viewed with caution). 
172 Cf Smith v East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] AC 736 765 HL (per Lord Reid). 
173 See Vienna Convention (note 54 above) art 26. 
174 See, in general, NJ Udombana ‘Interpreting Rights Globally: Courts and Constitutional Rights in Emergent 
Democracies’ (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 47; A Slaughter ‘Judicial Globalization’ (2000) 40 Vanderbilt 
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21(2) of the Constitution of Angola and section 17(3) of the Constitution of Cape Verde 
provide that constitutional and legal norms related to fundamental rights shall be 
interpreted and incorporated in the light of international instruments. Section 11(2) of the 
Constitution of Malawi enjoins the judiciary to “have regard to current norms of public 
international law and comparative law”. Section 39 of the South Africa Constitution, on 
its part, provides: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum— (a) 
must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; and (b) must consider international law; and (c) may 
consider foreign law”.175 
Comparative constitutionalism raises theoretical and normative problems. Can such a 
practice be justified in the absence of an express constitutional authorization? Should 
transitional judiciaries invoke international and comparative law to interpret constitutions 
that are products of different cultural and historical developments? What are the 
parameters of such an exercise; or are judges free to engage in a voyage of discovery 
without any compass? Comparative constitutionalism is met with the sovereigntist 
objection that ratified but unincorporated human rights treaties are not binding on 
domestic courts, let alone unratified treaties or even the jurisprudence of other 
jurisdictions. Such a practice is said to open the floodgate for application of laws born to 
different countries in different ages in different circumstances. Others argue that judicial 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal of International Law 1103 (arguing for a transnational communication between courts); and B Ackerman ‘The 
Rise of World Constitutionalism’ (1997) 83 Vanderbilt Law Review 771. 
175 Cf Interim Constitution of South Africa 1993 sec 35(1) (“In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law 
shall promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, where 
applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, and 
may have regard to comparable foreign case law”). There are basic differences between sec 39 of the 1996 Constitution 
and sec 35(1) of the 1993. Sec 39, for example, expands the interpretation imperative to non-judicial fora and modifies the 
judicial imperatives with regard to public international law. See H Webb ‘The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights 
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review derives from a court’s duty to enforce a nation’s constitution, not to interpret “a 
wholly different document”.176 
Comparative constitutionalism, its opponents insist, upsets the acculturation of a 
society through the legislative process. Since laws are imbedded in the culture of a 
people, it is wrong to disaggregate legislation from its cultural instantiation.177 Childress 
argues that “[e]ach legal system is autonomous and is perhaps incapable of legal 
transplant. Any transplant would be a rejection of the organic law that is part of that 
society and culture”.178 Opponents of comparative constitutionalism appeal to 
Montesquieu’s argument that laws “should be adapted in such a manner to the people for 
whom they are made, as to render it very unlikely for those of one nation to be proper for 
another”.179 They argue that comparative constitutionalism raise questions of democratic 
legitimacy. Modern liberal democracies tend to justify judicial authority in terms of the 
rule of law; and the rule of law produces an argument for “legislative sovereignty in its 
narrowest and least reflective sense”.180 They also fear the danger that judicial comity 
may one day require that a country’s Constitutional or Supreme Court reach a decision 
that is not in that country’s best interest.181 
                                                                                                                                                 
Interpretation and Comparative Constitutional Law’ (1998) 1 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 
205 208 n 13. 
176 JC Yoo ‘Peeking Abroad? The Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Precedents in Constitutional Cases’ (2004) 4 
International Legal Studies Working Paper Series available at http://repositories.edlib.org/ils.wp/4. 
177 See D Childress III ‘Using Comparative Constitutional Law to Resolve Domestic Federal Questions’ (2003) 53 Duke 
Law Journal 193 217 219. 
178 As above, 220. 
179 C de Secondat ‘Baron de Montesquieu’ DW Carrithers (ed) The Spirit of the Laws (1977) (1748) bk 1 ch 3 104-05. 
180 C Harlow ‘Voices of Difference in a Plural Community’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 339 341. 
181 See C Moon ‘Comparative Constitutional Analysis: Should the United States Supreme Court Join the Dialogue?’ 
(2003) 12 Journal of Law and Policy 229 245. 
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Many jurisdictions are reluctant to apply comparative constitutional analysis.182 As 
early as 1980, some lower courts in the US had approached the Alien Tort Statute from 
the prism of customary international law,183 but as late as 1997, Justice Scalia of the US 
Supreme Court still wrote that “comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of 
interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing 
one”.184 Ackerman agreed, arguing that the “spirit of the American Constitution requires 
limiting the scope of inquiry to American sources”.185 He continued: 
 
To discover the Constitution, we must approach it without the assistance of guides 
imported from another time and place. Neither Aristotle nor Cicero, Montesquieu nor 
Locke, Harrington nor Hume, Kant nor Weber will provide the key. Americans have 
borrowed much from such thinkers, but they have also built a genuinely distinctive 
pattern … As we lose sight of these ideals, the organizing patterns of our political 
life unravel.186 
 
Objections to comparative constitutionalism do not represent the whole truth. 
Comparative constitutionalism is “emphatically … relevant to the task of interpreting 
                                                 
182 See Barak (note 58 above) 114 (stressing the reluctance of the US Supreme Court in invoking comparative law); Moon 
(note 181 above) 240. 
183 See eg Filartiga v Pena-Irala 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980). See also CA Bradly ‘The Alien Tort Statute and Article III’ 
(2002) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 587. 
184 Printz v United States (1997) 521 US 898 921 n 11. Cf A Scalia ‘Commentary’ (1996) 40 St Louis University Law 
Journal 1119 (arguing that “international norms” should not control adjudication of domestic issues in the US courts). 
185 B Ackerman We the People: Foundations (1991) 3. 
186 As above, 3-4 6. 
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constitutions and enforcing human rights”187 and can be “helpful in the quest for a theory 
of the public good and right political order”.188 Even unincorporated human rights 
treaties, though not part of domestic law for states practicing dualism, could help to 
resolve uncertainty and ambiguity in domestic law.189 Resort to international 
jurisprudence could also provide guidance, perspective, inspiration or reassurance for 
judges and may help in elucidating different functional concerns to similar questions and 
in strengthening the quality of judicial decisions, by providing a benchmark against 
which such decisions could be judged.190 
In relation to human rights, comparative constitutionalism is legitimate and 
imperative for many reasons. First, the language of human rights has become global, 
spoken by political leaders and ordinary citizens, an apparent rediscovery that humanity 
is confronted with common problems. Dr. Johnson wrote many years back that people 
everywhere are prompted by the same motives, deceived by the same fallacies, all 
animated by hope, obstructed by danger, entangled by desire, and seduced by pleasure.191 
It is naïve for African judges to expect the breeze of globalisation to pass them idly by. 
No institution of government can now afford to ignore the rest of the world. 
A second but related justification is that, despite differences in historical development 
or the conceptual structure and style of operation that exist in different legal systems, 
                                                 
187 RB Ginsburg & DH Merritt ‘Fifty-first Cardozo Memorial Lecture: Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights 
Dialogue’  (1999) 21 Cardozo Law Review 253 282. 
188 DP Kommers ‘The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law’ (1976) 9 John Marshall Journal of Practice and 
Procedure 685 692. 
189 See R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696. 
190 See VC Jackson ‘Narratives of Federalism’ (2001) 51 Duke Law Journal 223 254-63. 
191 See BH Bronson (ed) Samuel Johnson: Rasselas, Poems, and Selected Prose (1971) 95. 
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these systems give the same or similar solutions to the problems of life. The reality is 
that, by reason of colonialism and imperialism, the legal systems of most African states 
are a mosaic, a hotchpotch of common or civil law as well as customary and Islamic 
laws. It is incorrect to assert that each legal system is autonomous. The bills of rights in 
Africa are generally composed in a very similar manner to those of the Western world 
and bear, in particular, the imprimatur of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.192 
These constitutions rest, to borrow Weinrib’s words, “on a shared constitutional 
conception that, by design, transcends the history, cultural heritage, and social mores of 
any particular nation-state”.193 Nearly all African countries assume a model that basically 
derives from those of liberal democracies, at least from a formal point of view.194  
The values that underpin modern constitutions—justice, democracy, freedom, 
equality, and the dignity of the human person—share a multinational history and 
universal acceptance. These values are standards for sound constitutional engineering, 
making it imperative for constitutional courts and lawyers to be comparatists. Dignity, for 
example, is the common denominator of our very humanity and is “above all price and so 
admits of no equivalent”. The UDHR also provides that “[a]ll human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights”195 and almost all other international human rights 
instruments contain similar provisions. A state cannot use its particular national or 
                                                 
192 Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 10 Dec 1948 GA Res 217 A (III) GAOR 3d Sess [hereinafter UDHR]. 
193 Weinrib ‘Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism’ in Jackson & Tushnet (eds) Defining the Field 
of Comparative Constitutional Law (2002) 3 15. 
194 See V Piergigli ‘The Reception of Liberal Constitutionalism and “Universal” Values in the African Bills of Rights: 
Ambiguities and Perspectives in the Turn of the Millennium’ trans at http://www.eur.nl/frg/iacl/papers/piergigli.html 
(noting exceptions in constitutional provisions concerning torture or slavery and forced labour, that is, practices that are 
either autochthonous or related to the colonial period). 
195 UDHR (note 192 above) art 1. 
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religious tradition to justify its failure to respect human dignity; neither could such failure 
be justified “in the name of majoritarian political processes”.196 
Dignity is a central value that animates the South African Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Section 39(a) of the South Africa Constitution 
provides that interpretation of the Bill of Rights “must promote the values that underlie 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”.197 
Justice O’Regan stressed as much, in Makwanyane’s case, when she held: 
 
Respect for the dignity of all human beings is particularly important in South Africa. 
For apartheid was a denial of a common humanity. Black people were refused 
respect and dignity and thereby the dignity of all South Africans was diminished. 
The new Constitution rejects this past and affirms the equal worth of all South 
Africans. Thus recognition and protection of human dignity is the touchstone of the 
new political order and is fundamental to the new Constitution.198 
 
The jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court also reveals a dynamic 
bent towards a global interpretation of rights. As the Court explained, again in 
Makwanyane’s case, “[i]nternational agreements and customary international law provide 
                                                 
196 H Botha ‘Comparative Law and Constitutional Adjudication’ (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
197 See also Makwanyane case (note 72 above) para 144 (where the Constitutional Court described the rights to life and 
dignity as “the most important of all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights” in the Bill of Rights); and 
generally A Chaskalson ‘Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of Our Constitutional Order’ (2000) 16 South African 
Journal of Human Rights 193. 
198 Makwanyane case (note 72 above) para 329. 
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a framework within which … [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and understood”199 
and these include both binding and non-binding public international law.200 The 
Makwanyane case itself provides a classic example of the Court’s invocation of 
international and comparative law. The Court assumed that an expansive comparative 
constitutional analysis was necessary in determining the constitutionality of the death 
penalty. It discussed decisions in the US, Canada, Hungary, India, the European Court of 
Human Rights, and the UN Committee on Human Rights, concluding that the death 
penalty was unconstitutional for being cruel and inhumane.  
In S v Williams201—the corporal punishment case—the Constitutional Court noted a 
“growing consensus in the international community” that judicially imposed whipping 
“offends society’s notions of decency and is a direct invasion of the right which every 
person has to human dignity”.202 The Court even drew upon decisions of sister 
institutions in Africa, to wit the Supreme Courts of Namibia and of Zimbabwe, wherein 
these courts held that corporal punishment constitutes inhuman or degrading 
punishment.203 In S v Ephraim,204 the Court ruled that “abduction [violates] the applicable 
rules of international law”.205 The ruling in S v Ephraim was particularly significant, 
                                                 
199 Above, paras 36-7. 
200 Cf K O’Regan ‘Human Rights and Democracy—A New Global Debate: Reflections on the First Ten Years of South 
Africa’s Constitutional Court’ (2004) 32 International Legal Information 200 207 (writing: “Like many South African 
courts before us, we find international law and comparative law most helpful in our jurisprudence. There is an emerging 
dialogue across continents and nations concerning democracy and human rights and we engage this dialogue in the 
development of our own Constitution in our own specific context”). 
201 S v Williams 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC). 
202 As above para 39. 
203 As above paras 31-32 34. 
204 S v Ephraim 1991 (2) SALR 553 (A). 
205 As above, 568. 
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given the practice in the US where an officer may, in the absence of an express ban 
treaty, abduct a foreigner and forcibly transport him to the US to stand trial. The US 
Supreme Court approved such a practice in United States v Alvarez-Machain,206 largely 
because of its traditional reluctance to apply comparative constitutional analysis in 
interpreting the US Constitution.207  
In recent years, the US Supreme Court has tried to redeem itself from this “frozen-in-
time” approach to interpretation and American jurists now freely discuss the merits of 
comparatism.208 Thomson v Oklahoma209 was one of the modern pioneer cases in this 
regard. There, a plurality of the Supreme Court found that the execution of a 15-year-old 
would violate the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 
The Court argued that “the conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency 
to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offence is 
consistent with the views that have been expressed by respected professional 
organizations, by other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the 
leading members of the Western European community. 
                                                 
206 See United States v Alvarez-Machain (1992) 504 US 655 670. 
207 See Barak (note 58 above) 114 (stressing the reluctance of the US Supreme Court in invoking comparative law); Moon 
(note 181 above) 240. 
208 See eg SD O’Connor ‘Remarks at the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law’ 
(2002) 96 American Society International Law Proceedings 350 (“Conclusions reached by other countries and by the 
international community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts”); WH Rehnquist 
‘Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks’ in P Kirchhof & DP Kommers (eds) Germany and Its Basic Law: Past, 
Present and Future—A German-American Symposium (1993) 411 412  (“Now that constitutional law is solidly grounded 
in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to 
aid in their own deliberative process”). 
209 Thomson v Oklahoma (1988) 487 US 815. 
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Since then, the Supreme Court has warmly embraced the influence of globalisation in 
American constitutional jurisprudence, for example, in Grutter v Bollinger,210 in which 
Justice Ginsburg referenced “the international understanding” concerning the duration of 
affirmative action programme; Washington v Glucksburg,211 in which Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority, provided as relevant background a lengthy footnote concerning 
foreign court decisions on the constitutionality of bans on assisted suicide; and Thompson 
v Oklahoma,212 in which the Court stressed the relevance of international views on death 
penalty. Others are Lawrence v Texas,213 in which the Supreme Court struck down a law 
criminalizing homosexuality for violating the Fourteenth Amendment, citing Dudgeon v 
United Kingdom,214 a 1981 European Court of Human Rights decisions that struck down 
the UK’s criminal sodomy laws; and Atkins v Virginia,215 in which Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, noted that executing the mentally retarded is a practice that has 
been “overwhelmingly disapproved” by the “world community”,216 a fact which supports 
the conclusion that such executions are prohibited by the Eight Amendment, being “cruel 
and unusual punishments”.217 Chief Justice Rehnquist exhibited a doublespeak when, in 
his dissenting judgment, he declared: “I fail to see, however, how the views of other 
                                                 
210 Grutter v Bollinger  (2003) 539 US 306. 
211 Washington v Glucksburg (1997) 521 US 702 718 n 16. 
212 Thompson v Oklahoma 487 US 815 830-31. 
213 Lawrence v Texas (2003) 539 US 558. 
214 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 45 Eur Ct HR Ser A. 
215 Atkins v Virginia 536 US 304 (2002). 
216 As above, 316 n 21. 
217 As above, 307 321. 
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countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court’s 
ultimate determination”.218 
There is, indeed, an emerging trend both within and outside the West towards an 
extraterritorial interpretation of constitutional rights that is both dynamic and edifying. 
Examples include the Australian case of Leask v Commonwealth,219 in which Justice 
Toohey cited the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v United 
Kingdom220 concerning extradition to a country permitting use of death penalty. In Mabo 
v Queensland [No 2],221 the High Court of Australia—the country’s highest court—
rejected, by a six to one majority, the doctrine of terra nullius, supporting its holding with 
the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and decisions from Nigeria, 
Canada, India, New Zealand and the US.222 In Australia Capital Television Pty v 
Commonwealth,223 the Court held as unconstitutional an Act allowing the government to 
pass legislation limiting or restricting the freedom of communication and broadcasting 
rights. In arriving at its decision, the Court looked to decisions from Canada, England, the 
US, and the European Court of Human Rights.224 
Other examples include the Canadian case of United States v Burns,225 which also 
cited Soering v United Kingdom; and the Hong Kong case of Shum Kkwok Sher v 
                                                 
218 As above, 324-25 (stressing, “if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we are looking, then the viewpoints of 
other countries simply are not relevant;” as above). 
219 Leask v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 579 615-16. 
220 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 161 Eur Ct HR Ser A. 
221 Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
222 As above, 40 48 83-83 123-24 137 164-65. 
223 Australia Capital Television Pty v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
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HKSAR,226 in which that country’s Court of Final Appeal cited Hashman & Harrup v 
United Kingdom,227 concerning specificity requirement of laws constraining freedom of 
speech. These courts also consult the jurisprudence of other municipal courts in 
constitutional interpretations. In The Queen v Keegstra,228 the Canadian Supreme Court 
considered whether the Canadian criminal code prohibited hate speech. In interpreting the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Court turned to American jurisprudence as well as 
international human rights law for assistance. Chief Justice Dickson justified such an 
approach by asserting that “international human rights law and Canada’s commitments in 
that area are of particular significance in assessing the importance of Parliament’s 
objective”.229 
Some constitutional courts in Africa have also participated in the international 
dialogue. In Mwellie v Ministry of Works,230 Namibia’s Constitutional Court considered 
decisions from India, US, Canada, England, Malaysia, South Africa and the European 
Court of Human Rights. African judges as a whole should promote judicial comity by 
opening their minds to new approaches, mindful that “other legal systems continue to 
innovate, to experiment, and to find new solutions to the new legal problems that arise 
                                                                                                                                                 
225 United States v Burns [2001] 1 SCR 283 para 53. 
226 Shum Kkwok Sher v HKSAR [2002] 2 HKLRD 793. 
227 Hashman & Harrup v United Kingdom (1999) Eur Ct HR Ser A. 
228 The Queen v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697. 
229 As above, 749-50. See, in general, L LeBel & G Chao ‘The Rise of International Law in Canadian Constitutional 
Litigation: Fugue or Fushion? Recent Developments and Challenges in Internalizing International Law’ (2002) 16 
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in International Law Issues’ (1996) 34 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 89 90-91. 
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each day, from which we can learn and benefit”.231 They should use their best skills and 
judgment to fit human rights law to new challenges that an evolving democratic society 
leaves at the doors of their courthouses.232 Convergence, not divergence, has been the 
mega-trend since the early 1980s and beyond. It is self-defeating for judges to stick to an 
unchanging line in a radically changed world.  
Human rights law can only develop if its jurisprudence is a dialogue rather than a 
monologue. If applied more frequently, African courts could use international and 
comparative norms to make justiciable many of the socio-economic rights that some 
African constitutions regard as mere “directive principles” of state policies. Of course, 
judges should necessarily take the history and changing conditions of their communities 
as points of departures, but they should not stop there; they should pay attention to legal 
developments in the rest of the world and to their role in keeping their countries in step 
with these developments. As the US Supreme Court stated, in Lawrence v Texas,233 
“times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons 
in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom”.234  
 
                                                 
231 SD O’Conner ‘Broadening Our Horizon: Why American Judges and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law’ 
International Judicial Observer June 1997 2 cited in RB Ginsburg ‘Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication’ (2004) 22(2) Yale Law and Policy Review 329 337. 
232 See JS Kaye ‘Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach’ (2004) 22(1) Yale Law and Policy Review 125. 
233 Lawrence v Texas (2003) 123 S Ct 2472. 
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 The African Commission as a Catalyst 
As a regional mechanism for the promotion and protection of human rights, the African 
Commission has come a long way since its inauguration in 1987. In its early years, the 
Commission was more careful than courageous and appeared to have been overwhelmed 
by the sheer width and breadth of its mandate.235 Its decisions were crude and queer, 
much like the early drawings of children. From these initial faltering steps, the 
Commission has walked and worked firmly to establish itself as a respectable human 
rights institution. It now interprets its mandate boldly and creatively. It has created a 
fairly accessible procedure for consideration of individual communications and has 
solved many of the initial procedural issues sensibly, such as those relating to 
admissibility.236 Its jurisprudence on local remedies is comparable to those developed by 
international tribunals elsewhere.237 Its framework for state reports on social rights 
appears generally comprehensive, though it could be improved upon to take account of 
changing needs. 
Like some of the tribunals earlier highlighted, the African Commission has relied on 
international human rights jurisprudence to extend the paradigm of human rights to basic 
needs of peoples, thereby departing from the original paradigm that focused on negative 
                                                 
235 See eg J Oloka-Onyango ‘Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalization: International Mechanisms, 
Non-State Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples’ Rights in Africa’ (2003) 18 American University International Law Review 
851 912 (noting that the Commission initially lacked the “creative intellectual flair that is always essential to turn the black 
letter of the law into an effective instrument to address the lived reality of the dispossessed”). 
236 See I Osterdahl Implementing Human Rights in Africa: The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
Individual Commissions (2002) 189. 
237 For an analysis of the local remedies rule under the African Charter, see NJ Udombana ‘So Far, So Fair: The Local 
Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2003) 97 American 
Journal of International Law (2003) 1. 
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freedoms. The African Charter enjoins the Commission to engage in international 
dialogue in its interpretive functions. The Charter provides that the Commission could—  
 
draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’ rights, the Charter of 
the United Nations, the … [Constitutive Act of the AU], the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United Nations and African 
countries in the field of human and peoples’ rights, as well as from the provisions of 
various instruments adopted within the specialised agencies of the United Nations of 
which the parties to the present Charter are members.238 
 
In The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and 
Social Rights v Nigeria,239 the African Commission created a right to housing even in the 
absence of an express guarantee in the African Charter. According to the Commission: 
 
Although the right to housing or shelter is not explicitly provided for under the 
African Charter, the corollary of the combination of the provisions protecting the 
right to enjoy the best attainable state of mental and physical health, cited under 
Article 16 above, the right to property, and the protection accorded to the family 
forbids the wanton destruction of shelter because when housing is destroyed, 
property, health, and family life are adversely affected. It is thus noted that the 
                                                 
238 African Charter art 60. 
239 See eg Social & Economic Rights Action Centre v Nigeria Comm No 155/96 2001–2002 African Annual Activity 
Report Annex V [hereinafter SERAC case]. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
226
combined effect of Articles 14, 16 and 18(1) reads into the Charter a right to shelter 
or housing …240 
  
The problem that remains is the old one: states’ unwillingness to take seriously a 
Commission they voluntarily created. African states’ record in implementing decisions of 
the Commission is abysmal, except for very limited exceptions. At each yearly summit of 
the OAU/AU Assembly, African leaders adopt the “Annual Activity Report” of the 
Commission, “commend[…] it for the excellent work accomplished during the past 
year,” and authorize its publication;241 in short, they do everything to flatter the 
Commission except to respect its recommendations. Sadly, the Commission is 
normatively deficient in sanctioning recalcitrant states.242 
Everyone hopes that the African Human Rights Court, established to “complement 
the protective mandate of the African Commission”,243 will make a positive contribution 
to the present unsatisfactory state of affairs. This optimism rests on the enhanced 
normative and structural framework of the Court, which, in principle, is not handicapped 
with the same deficiencies and weaknesses that beset the Commission. The Court is 
empowered to offer remedies to victims of human rights violations. Its Protocol provides 
that, “[i]f the Court finds that there has been violation of a human or peoples’ right, it 
shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair 
                                                 
240 As above para 60. 
241 See eg Decision on the 16th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights AU Doc 
Assembly/AU/7 (II) (2003) para 1. 
242 See EA Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1996) 108–09. 
243 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights OAU Doc OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT (III) [hereinafter Human Rights Protocol] art 2. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
227
compensation or reparation”.244 States Parties to the Court’s Protocol undertake “to 
comply with the judgment in any case to which they are parties within the time stipulated 
by the Court and to guarantee its execution”.245 The AU Executive Council, which 
replaces the OAU Council of Ministers, will monitor execution of the Court’s judgment 
on behalf of the AU Assembly.246 The Protocol enjoins the Court, in its annual report to 
the Assembly, to “specify, in particular, the cases in which a State has not complied with 
the Court’s judgment”,247 presumably to enable the Assembly to apply political and 
economic pressure on the recalcitrant state. These and similar provisions are intended to 
brighten the human rights landscape in Africa, but the effectiveness of the Court equally 
depends on states’ attitudes toward it. 
Pending the establishment of the Human Rights Court,248 or in spite of it, the African 
Commission should continue to develop human rights jurisprudence through 
communications lodged before it. Some commentators believe that advancing human 
rights jurisprudence in Africa will remain the greatest challenge facing the Commission 
in the years to come.249 Given the minimal number of communications on socio-
economic rights, compared to their civil and political counterparts, the Commission 
                                                 
244 Above, art 27(1). 
245 Above, art 30. 
246 Above, art 29(2). 
247 Above, art 31. 
248 The AU took a giant step towards making the human rights court a reality when its Assembly, at its 6th Ordinary Session 
in Khartoum, Sudan, in January 2006, elected the judges of the Court. The list of the elected judges and their tenure are: 
Sophia A.B. Akuffo (2-year term); G.W. Kanyiehamba (2-year term); Bernard Makgabo Ngoepe (2-year term); Jean Emile 
Somda (2-year term); Hamdi Faraj Fanoush (4-year term); Kelello Justina Mafoso-guni (4-year term); Jean Mutsinzi (6-
year term); Fatsah Ouguergouz (4-year term); Modibo Tountry Guindo (6-year term); El Hadji Guisse (4-year term); and 
Gérard Niyungeko (6-year term). See Decision on the Election of Judges of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights AU Assembly 6th Ord Sess AU Doc Assembly/AU/Dec100 (VI) (Jan 2006) para 2. 
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should additionally develop general comments on these rights, but such comments should 
not merely duplicate those of the existing UN human rights bodies. The Commission 
itself accurately noted that the “uniqueness of the African situation and special qualities 
of the African Charter” impose important tasks on judicial institutions, one of which is to 
interpret the Charter in a manner that is responsive to African circumstances.250 General 
comments are not hard laws and so are not imperative or obligatory, but they could 
provide materials for human rights advocacy and mobilization.  
The essential first step towards promoting the realization of socio-economic rights is 
diagnosis and knowledge of existing situation. The Commission should intensify its 
monitoring of actual situations with respect to each right in order to discover the extent to 
which it is, or is not, being enjoyed by intended beneficiaries. Such direct evidence could 
help the Commission to scrutinize government policies on socio-economic rights. The 
Commission should appoint a Special Rapporteur on socio-economic rights to co-
ordinate activities on these rights. The Rapporteur should liaise with States Parties and 
other stakeholders on the Commission’s behalf. This is particularly necessary because the 
Commission does not meet regularly. 
The Commission should also work closely with National Human Rights Institutions 
(NHRIs) to monitor states’ compliance with the Charter’s obligations. The Commission 
itself acknowledges that— 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
249 See Pityana ‘Preface’ to R Murray The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and International Law 
(2000) vi. 
250 See SERAC case (note 239 above) para 68. 
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the mission aimed at promoting human and peoples’ rights . . . would be carried out 
through the assistance and support of national or regional committees established for 
that purpose, and composed of eminent personalities, which should also help 
governments solve their national or local problems relevant to human rights, thus 
promoting a better awareness of issues related to human rights.251 
 
The Commission should work with states that have not yet established NHRIs and 
encourage them to do so and to fund these institutions in order to fulfil their mandates. 
NHRIs must be quarantined from executive and legislative controls, a problem that 
confronts most public institutions in Africa. NHRIs have potentially crucial roles to play 
in promoting and ensuring the promotion and protection of all human rights. Unlike the 
African Commission, NHRIs are grass-roots organizations; they are closer to national 
governments and are best suited, at least in principle, to monitor states’ implementation 
of human rights. NHRIs can take full account of international standards applicable to the 
country concerned only if they enjoy an important degree of autonomy. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has indicated the 
types of activities that can be, and in some instances already have been, undertaken by 
NHRIs on socio-economic rights. They include: “[t]he promotion of educational and 
information programmes designed to enhance awareness and understanding of 
[egalitarian] rights, both within the population at large and among particular groups such 
as the public service, the judiciary, the private sector and the labour movement; […] [t]he 
scrutinizing of existing laws and administrative acts, as well as draft bills and other 
                                                 
251 Resolution on the Establishment of Committees on Human Rights or Other Similar Organs at National, Regional or 
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proposals, to ensure that they are consistent with the requirements of the [ICESCR]; [and] 
[…] [p]roviding technical advice, or undertaking surveys in relation to [egalitarian] 
rights.”252 Others are “[t]he identification of national-level benchmarks against which the 
realization of Covenant obligations can be measured; [...] [c]onducting research and 
inquiries designed to ascertain the extent . . . [of] realiz[ation of particular egalitarian 
rights], either within the State as a whole or in areas or in relation to communities of 
particular vulnerability; […] [m]onitoring compliance with specific rights recognized 
under the Covenant and providing reports thereon to the public authorities and civil 
society; and […] [e]xamining complaints alleging infringements of applicable 
[egalitarian] rights standards within the State”.253 Each of these targets is relevant, 
mutatis mutandis, to the African human rights system.  
The African Commission should create opportunities for periodic interactions with 
national courts to update national judicial officers on the Commission’s emerging human 
rights jurisprudence and those of similar institutions. Such interactions will also give 
these officers opportunities to compare notes on best practices in the interpretation and 
application of socio-economic rights. The Commission should also collaborate with 
relevant civil society organizations (CSO) to publish and disseminate its decisions in the 
form of law reports. Agreed, some of the Commission’s decisions have been posted on its 
web site—several others are yet to be posted—but majority of Africans are unable to 
access these decisions largely because the Internet is still a luxury good in most of Africa, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sub-Regional Level (1989) Second Annual Activity Report of the African Commission 1988–1989 Annex VIII pmbl. 
252 See ECOSOC Commission on Economic Social & Cultural Rights Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights UN Doc E/C12/1998/25 (10 Dec 1998) para 3. 
253 Above. 
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even in urban areas. The Commission must find a more efficient way of circulating its 
decisions to a larger audience in Africa, including those in rural areas. Information and 
documents relating to human rights are too crucial to be accessible only by ‘experts’. The 
Commission’s decisions on socio-economic rights could serve the purpose of domestic 
litigation and provide tools for political mobilisation and campaigns. If effectively 
disseminated, such decisions could revolutionize struggles for a better life in Africa.254 
 
4.4 Socio-economic Rights and Limits of Judicial Process 
The analysis in the last two segments demonstrates that it is possible for courts in Africa 
to accommodate the notion of a strong interpretive obligation, that is, to construe 
domestic law consistently with international law, including unincorporated conventional 
law. The liberal attitudes of the African Commission and such municipal judicial 
institutions, like the South African Constitutional Court and Indian Supreme Court, 
should inspire African judges, particularly in those countries where there are no 
constitutional guarantees of socio-economic rights or where these rights are regarded 
merely as fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policies.  
When allowances have been made for judicial creativity, problems still remain on the 
application of judicial remedies to socio-economic rights, including questions of judicial 
competency and accountability and methodology. Judicial decisions with large-scale 
budgetary effects are problematic, creating tensions with democratic self-governance. 
Decisions about healthcare funding involve difficult decisions at the political level and 
                                                 
254 Cf R Kunnemann ‘A Coherent Approach to Human Rights’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 323 332 (arguing that 
socio-economic rights provide “the only means of self-defense for millions of impoverished and marginalized individuals 
and groups all over the world”). 
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functional levels—fixing the health budget and deciding what priorities should be met. 
Lord Lester and O’Cinneide share in these concerns: 
 
There are limits to what can be achieved by the judicial process in implementing 
fundamental rights. Courts cannot provide a remedy for every injustice. Judges lack 
the constitutional authority as well as the expertise to make political decisions about 
the raising and disposition of public revenue, or as to how public programmes should 
be designed and executed. The judicial branch cannot arrogate to itself the roles of 
the legislature or executive branches without usurping their separate and distinct 
public powers.255 
 
We concede that it is not the function of a court to govern a country. Furthermore, a 
judicial institution should be slow to interfere with rational decisions by the political 
organs and other authorities having responsibilities to deal with resource-related matters. 
Happily, the available jurisprudence shows that judges are conscious of limitations 
inherent in deploying the judicial process to advance socio-economic rights. So far, they 
have avoided going into detailed determination of policy and practice. One could 
reasonably assume that they will continue to define and observe appropriate parameters 
for the judicial function.256 
                                                 
255 Lord Lester & C O’Cinneide ‘The Effective Protection of Socio-Economic Rights’ in Economic, Social & Cultural 
Rights in Practice (note 1 above) 17 19. 
256 See An-Na’im (note 1 above) 7 (stressing, “the risk of judicial usurpation of the role of elected officials should be 
checked through practical adjudication, instead of denying a whole group of rights any possibility of judicial enforcement 
because of that risk”). 
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The South African Constitutional Court has particularly been exemplary in its efforts 
to balance state and individual interests while sensitive to separation of power concerns. 
In the TAC case,257 the Court reiterated the standard for judicial review thus: 
 
Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have multiple 
social and economic consequences for the community. The Constitution 
contemplates rather a restrained and focussed role for the courts, namely, to require 
the State to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to subject the 
reasonableness of these measures to evaluation. Such determination of 
reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves 
directed at rearranging budgets. In this way the judicial, legislative and executive 
functions achieve appropriate constitutional balance.258 
 
In the Soobramoney case,259 the issue was whether a public hospital had violated the 
South African Constitution for failing to provide renal dialysis services to a terminally ill 
man who suffered from diabetes, ischemic heart disease, and cerebro-vascular disease. 
Soobramoney claimed that the hospital’s refusal to treat him violated his right to health 
care and emergency medical treatment.260 The South African Constitution provides that 
                                                 
257 See TAC (note 90 above). 
258 Above, para 38. Cf Grootboom case (note 78 above) para 41 (“A court considering reasonableness will not enquire 
whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been 
better spent. The question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to 
recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the state to meet its obligations. Many of these 
would meet the requirement of reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this requirement is met”). 
259 Soobramoney case (note 64 above). 
260 See above, para 5-7. 
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“[e]veryone has the right to life” and that “[n]o one may be refused emergency medical 
treatment”.261 The hospital had produced evidence before the Court that it prioritised 
treatment for non-terminal patients because dialysis was a scarce resource. 
The Court rejected the claimant’s “emergency” assertion.262 Relying on the 
Certification case,263 the Court argued that the claim fell squarely under a more relevant 
right of access to healthcare facilities, also guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. It, however, 
observed that obligations imposed on the state with respect to these rights were 
dependent on available resources, and that in the circumstances of South Africa, an 
“unqualified obligation” to meet the health care and other needs “would not presently be 
capable of being fulfilled”.264 The Court rejected the “broad construction” of sub-section 
(3) of section 27—that emergency medical care included ongoing treatment of chronic 
illness—and argued that such a construction would make it “substantially more difficult” 
for the state to meet its primary obligation under sub-sections (1) and (2) to provide 
health care services to “everyone” within its available resources. It would reduce the 
resources available to the state for purposes of preventative health care and treatment of 
curable diseases.265 In his concurring judgment, Justice Sachs noted that rights, by their 
very nature, are shared and interdependent, meaning that a court must strike appropriate 
balances between the equally valid entitlements or expectations of a multitude of 
claimants. Such an exercise, according to him, should not be seen as imposing limits on 
                                                 
261 See Constitution of South Africa secs 11 27(3). 
262 See Soobramoney case (note 64 above) para 21. 
263 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 [hereinafter Certification case]. 
264 Soobramoney case (note 64 above) para 11. 
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those rights but as defining the circumstances in which the rights may most fairly and 
effectively be enjoyed.266 
After the Soobramoney decision, some commentators feared that the Constitutional 
Court would render the rights provisions in the South African Constitution ineffective.267 
Others argue that, from the standpoint of judicial precedent, Soobramoney did not 
contribute much to the understanding of socio-economic rights, neither did it “lay down 
any guidelines that could be followed when interpreting socio-economic rights so as to 
illuminate and indigenise jurisprudence on socio-economic rights”.268 The present writer 
takes the view that the Court was simply balancing competing interests and, in the 
process, dispelling fears about its inability to make policy choices in constitutional 
interpretation and its application to socio-economic rights. The Court successfully 
blended considerations of benefits and costs and simple cost efficiency within a policy 
perspective with attention to its limited institutional competence to interfere with 
“rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities 
whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters”.269 The State, the Court stressed, 
must “manage its limited resources” in order to address the many claimants in need of 
access to health care, housing, and social security, all aspects of the right to human life.270 
                                                                                                                                                 
265 As above, para 20. 
266 As above, para 54 (arguing, in relation to intervention by courts on such matters, that “institutional incapacity and 
appropriate constitutional modesty require us to be especially cautious”. As above, 58). 
267 E Bazelon ‘After the Revolution’ Legal Affairs Jan/Feb 2003 25 28. See also F Michelman ‘The Constitution, Social 
Rights and Reason: A Tribute to Etienne Mureinik’ (1998) 14 South African Journal of Human Rights 499 (for a critique of 
some parts of the judgment). 
268  C Ngwena & R Cook ‘Rights Concerning Health’ in D Brand & C Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
(2005) 135 137. 
269 Soobramoney case (note 64 above) para 29. 
270 As above, para 31. 
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Soobramoney illustrates that a constitutional court can satisfactorily navigate its way 
through socio-economic rights claims without violating separation of powers and 
legislative competence.271 
As regards extraterritorial interpretation of rights, a court must avoid the danger of 
unscientific juridical comparison by interpreting constitutional rights in ways that are 
system-specific. The South African Constitutional Court has repeatedly stressed that, in 
the final analysis, it is the South African Constitution that must be interpreted and that its 
provisions must be placed within the context of South African society.272 In the 
Makwanyane case, the Court held in balance its references to foreign jurisprudence with 
its reliance on indigenous African concept of ubuntu, which was taken to signal values of 
respect, dignity, compassion and solidarity.273 Another self-limitation on the judicial 
process is the imperative of maintaining uniformity and predictability to enable litigants 
and advocates alike rely on the continued application of the same rules. As Cody Moon 
pointedly asks, “when one constitutional court decides an issue one way and another 
reaches a different conclusion, who determines which court is correct?”274 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The full realization of socio-economic rights requires an institutional paradigm shift, 
including interpretative shifts by the judiciary. Africa’s judiciaries should ignore 
abstractions and give citizens a new sense of their governments’ concerns for their 
                                                 
271 See MS Kende ‘The South African Constitutional Court’s Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective’ (2003) 6 Chapman Law Review 137 147. 
272 See eg Williams case (note 201 above) paras 50 51. 
273 See Makwanyane case (note 72 above) paras 130-31 223-27. 
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welfare. They should move beyond the present judicial schizophrenia and use 
interpretative apparatuses that are different from those derived from a traditional premise 
of parliamentary or legislative sovereignty.275 They should develop appropriate 
enforcement apparatus for each human right. There is no monolithic model of judicial 
enforcement for all rights, however classified and regardless of local context.276 Human 
rights practitioners, on their part, must vary their scope and dynamics of litigation from 
one context to another rather than becoming settled in one methodology. Litigation and 
adjudication of socio-economic rights must be seen as a process, not an event.277 
There is a groundswell of public demand for the effective realization of socio-
economic rights in Africa. Africans deserve institutions that are flexible and responsive to 
the demand of the times. Being an integral and necessary part of constitutional 
engineering in Africa, and conscious of the great disparities in wealth in most countries, 
courts should make socio-economic rights to work. They must identify themselves with 
their “brethren” in order to advance peoples’ aspirations in their judgments. Strong and 
effective judiciaries are vital not only to the rule of law but also to economic 
development. These institutions deserve the respect and support of Africans only to the 
extent they contribute meaningfully to realize all human rights. 
Domestic courts should emulate the African Commission’s holistic approach when 
interpreting and applying relevant human rights instruments. An integrative interpretive 
                                                                                                                                                 
274 Moon (note 181 above) 245. 
275 For a contrary opinion, see J Griffith ‘Making Rights Work’ in Making Rights Work (note 63 above) 88 96 (“The elected 
representatives of the people must be entrusted with the ultimate decision-making authority. Higher-order people enforcing 
higher-order values are no alternative”). 
276 See An-Na’im (note 1 above) 7. 
277 As above, 16. 
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methodology will greatly enhance the development of human rights jurisprudence in 
Africa. If the judiciary does not take socio-economic rights seriously, then it does not 
take law seriously either—to paraphrase Dworkin.278 A judiciary that is complicit in the 
violation of human rights, whether civil and political or socio-economic, taints public 
confidence in domestic notions of justice. 
 
 
                                                 
278 Cf Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (note 59 above) 205. 
  
 
Chapter Five 
 
EXTENDING THE FRONTIERS OF OBLIGATIONS: TRANSNATIONALS AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Classical international law evolved as a state-centric phenomenon, recognising states as 
its sole subjects with direct rights and responsibilities.1 Individuals were merely objects—
foams on the waves of international law and politics. International law also excluded 
international organisations and transnational corporations (TNCs)2 from actively shaping 
international relations, both normatively and institutionally. The assumption was that 
only two political entities, equal in law and similar in form, could make a claim at 
international level. This assumption further suggests that non-state actors have no 
obligations and are not accountable for human wrongs. Given the complexity of 
contemporary international political and economic relations, the question is whether it is 
right to stick to this orthodoxy. 
                                                 
1 See R McCorquodale ‘The Individual and the International Legal System’ in M Evans (ed) International Law (2003) 
301; and A James Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (1986). 
2 I employ the phrase ‘transnational corporations’ (TNCs) holistically to include ‘multinational corporation’, though 
controversy surrounds their varying usages. See, in general, MT Kamminga & S Zia-Zarifi (eds) Liability of Multinational 
Corporations under International Law (2000); and P Muchlinski Multinational Enterprise and the Law (1995). 
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Should international human rights law extend obligations to non-state actors, in 
particular TNCs and international economic institutions (IEIs). Do these entities posses 
the personality and capacity to act internationally? On what authority could such capacity 
rests? To what extent should such obligations extend to socio-economic rights? In what 
ways do such obligations bind or constrain the duty-bearers? How can domestic and 
international tribunals enforce obligations on non-state actors? This Chapter investigates 
the horizontal obligations of non-state actors and the legal basis for holding such actors 
liable for human wrongs or for insisting that non-state actors should undertake certain 
positive measures to advance human rights.  
In the context of Africa, I argue that meeting human security and achieving 
egalitarian society demands the active involvement of all actors, including non-state 
actors, and that such involvement could be justified legally and morally. I start by 
providing reasons to jettison the state versus non-state orthodoxy in relation to human 
rights obligations. I proceed to examine how non-states actors, in particular TNCs, 
violate human rights in Africa. I, thereafter, interrogate the emerging norms on corporate 
human rights governance. 
 
5.2 Why State v Non-state Orthodoxy has Become Unrealistic 
Orthodox human rights framework, as represented in the international bill of rights and 
allied instruments, sought to protect the individual primarily from state absolutism, 
understandably because the state was the repository of power. This orthodoxy also 
developed in an era when international business transaction and economic 
interdependence were less prominent, but it has become obsolete in contemporary world 
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of the 21st century.3 “The international legal order”, says Zolo, “is quickly adapting to a 
more and more ‘global’ scenario, where state sovereignty is declining, new actors are 
surfacing and Grotius’ principle that individuals are not subjects of international law is 
withering away”.4  
Some commentators even view the traditional “subject/object” characterisation as 
unhelpful. According to Higgins, “the whole notion of ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ has no 
credible reality, and, in my view, no functional purpose. We have erected an intellectual 
prison of our own choosing and then declared it to be an unalterable constraint”.5 In the 
realm of human rights, Franck avoids the legal subjectivity altogether and insist on a 
moral priority for the individual as a rights claimant with regard to groups and states.6 
Others insist that a functional and constitutional approach will remove the subject/object 
rigidity.7 All of this approaches agrees with the ICJ’s opinion in the Reparations case:8 
“The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in 
the extent of their rights, and their nature depends on the needs of the community”.9 
                                                 
3 See SI Skogly ‘Economic and Social Human Rights, Private Actors and International Obligations’ in MK Ado ed Human 
Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (1999) 239 244. 
4 D Zolo ‘Peace Through Criminal Law?’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 727 727. 
5 R Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994) 49. 
6 T Franck ‘Individuals and Groups of Individuals as Subjects of International Law’ in R Hofmann (ed) Non-State Actors 
as New Subjects of International Law: International Law—From the Traditional State Order Towards the Law of the 
Global Community (1999) 97. 
7 See eg R Wedgwood ‘Legal Personality and the Role of Non-Governmental Organisations and Non-State Political 
Entities in the United Nations System’ in Hofmann (note 6 above) 21; D Thurer ‘The Emergence of Non-Governmental 
Organizations and Transnational Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role of States’ in Hofmann (above) 37 
53. 
8 Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Rep 174. 
9 Above, 179. 
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The involvement of non-state actors has moved from the informal to the formal plane, 
where critical changes are taking place. These actors are struggling, often successfully, to 
find voice at the international scene, either through participation in the elaboration of 
norms or through access to international tribunals. The idea that these actors should 
assume obligations in the field of human rights is gaining wide acceptance,10 though the 
global community is yet to make a leap from norm-candidates to binding norms.11 
According to Clapham, non-state actors generate certain rights and obligations “because 
the international legal order considers these rights and obligations as generally applicable 
and binding on every entity that has the capacity to bear them”.12  
Several factors account for this paradigm shift, among them a rethinking of the 
public/private distinction. Privatisation—“a shift toward provision by non-state 
organisations of certain classes of goods and services, or performance by those 
                                                 
10 See, in general, A Clapham Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006); JA Zerk Multinationals and 
Corporate Social Responsibility (2006); N Wahi ‘Human Rights Accountability of the IMF and the World Bank: A 
Critique of Existing Mechanisms and Articulation of a Theory of Horizontal Accountability’ (2006) 12 University of 
California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 331; D Aguirre ‘Multinational Corporations and the Realisation 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2004) 35 California Western International Law Journal 53 (examining the 
relationship between operations of MNCs and the realisation of socio-economic rights); F Megret & F Hoffmann ‘The UN 
as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’ (2003) 
25(2) Human Rights Quarterly 281; A Ramasastry ‘Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon, An Examination 
of Forced Labour Cases and Their Impact on Liability of Multinational Corporations’ (2002) 20 Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 91 96; J Paust ‘Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations’ (2002) 35 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 801 (examining corporate liability under human rights laws); SR Ratner ‘Corporations and Human 
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 443 (positing a theory of corporate responsibility 
for human rights protection); JC Anderson ‘Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out’ (2000) 2 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labour and Employment Law 463 467; C Jochnick ‘Confronting the Impunity of 
Non-State Actors: New Fields for the Promotion of Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 56 63; MK Addo 
(ed) Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (1999); JJ Paust ‘The Other Side of 
Rights: Private Duties under Human Rights Law’ (1992) 5 Harvard Human Right Journal 51; T Meron Human Rights in 
Internal Strife: Their International Protection (1987) 34; FC Newman & K Vasak ‘Civil and Political Rights’ in K Vasak 
(ed) The International Dimensions of Human Rights (1982) 125 152; and Y Dinstein ‘International Criminal Law’ (1975) 5 
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 55. 
11 Certain moral and legal principles or claims exist in international law—as well as domestic law—as candidates for the 
office or status of standards rather than as standards themselves. These lego-moral principles or claims are really nominees 
offered by nation-states to potential voters, that is, the states. These moral and legal principles we call norm-candidates. 
Although many such candidates are sometimes offered, not many are chosen as norms, and even when some are chosen, 
that choice often takes many years. See WF Langley ‘Children as Subjects of International Law: The Conquest of the 
Ideology of Care-Taking’ (1999) Review of International Affairs 40 43. 
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organisations of certain classes of functions, for the provision or performance of which 
government offices and agencies are exclusively or primarily responsible”—has blurred 
the public/private divide.13 Another is the realization that the state is no longer the only 
predator to be contained. The powers that private institutions—voluntary associations, 
trade unions, corporations, multinationals, universities, and churches—wield are, in 
principle, as oppressive and potentially as illegitimate as state power.14  
The end of the Cold War led to the emergence of a New World Order,15 which shifted 
the balance of power between states, with wider repercussions on the pre-existing 
Westphalia international order, what Hessbruegge calls “a ‘medievalization’ of 
international relations”.16 In this brave new world, states and non-states increasingly 
interconnect and a system of global governance now has superseded the strict allocation 
of authority associated with the Westphalian order, thereby eroding and complicating the 
understanding of traditional categories. Global markets have expanded significantly due 
to trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties, and domestic liberalization and 
privatization. Globalisation increases vulnerability, as states helplessly open up their local 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Clapham (note 10 above) 87.  
13 Wahi (note 10 above) 381-82. 
14 See A Cockrell Private Law and the Bill of Rights: A Threshold Issue of Horizontality, in Bill of Rights Compendium 
(2004) 3A-4. 
15 The emergence of the New World Order can be traced to the break-up of the bipolar configuration of power between 
the West, dominated by the United States, and the East, dominated by the then USSR. The break-up of the USSR, the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, and the Gulf War are symbols of the implementation of this New World Order. See P 
Lauderdale & P Toggia ‘An Indigenous View of the New World Order: Somalia and the Ostensible Rule of Law’ 
(1999) 34 Journal of Asian & African Studies 157 158. 
16 JA Hessbruegge ‘Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors’ (2005) 11 Buffalo Human Rights 
Law Review 21 21 (“The Westphalian order, consisting of one layer of states, is increasingly replaced by a multi-layered 
system similar to the feudalist medieval European empires, in which power was distributed among various layers of 
noblemen with the emperor having only partial control over his lands”. See also JT Mathews ‘Power Shift’ (1997) 76(1) 
Foreign Affairs 50 61. 
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economies to global markets and align them with global policies by lowering custom 
tariffs or making labour markets more flexible.  
In most of Africa, TNCs have literally invaded domains hitherto controlled by states, 
made possible by the weak post-colonial institutions. Many TNCs have moved some of 
their major operations from countries with strict regulations to those with less or, 
sometimes, no regulations. Together with IEIs, TNCs have much control over economic 
activities in developing countries. Their rules and macroeconomic policies play a 
significant role in shaping and directing globalisation. They overrun—yes, they 
overrun—dynamic sectors of many national economies such as extractive industry, 
pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, information technology, banking and finance, and 
insurance. They take independent decisions and actions—or in conjunction with states 
and international organizations—that raise controversial labour, environmental, and 
justice issues, with implications on living conditions of millions.17  
TNCs generate annual wealth that far exceeds most countries’ GDP. The World Bank 
reports that “the combined revenues of just General Motors and Ford ... exceed the 
combined GDP for all of sub-Saharan Africa and fifty one of the largest one hundred 
economies are corporations”.18 Similarly, a 2000 study comparing corporate sales and 
country GDP revealed that 51 of the 100 largest economies in the world are corporations 
and only 49 are countries.19 Most TNCs are more powerful than their host governments20 
                                                 
17 See L Reed ‘Great Expectations: Where Does the Proliferation of International Dispute Resolution Tribunals Leave 
International Law?’ (2002) 96 American Society International Law Proceedings 219 224. See, in general, G Kelley 
‘Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to Multilateral Corporations’ (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 483.  
18 World Bank World Development Report 1996 (1997). 
19 See S Anderson & J Cavanagh Institute for Policy Studies Top 200: The Rise of Corporate Global Power (2000) 3 
available at http://www.ips-dc.org/downloads/Top_200.pdf (“General Motors is now bigger than Denmark; 
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and are capable of destabilizing or, at the minimum, holding these governments hostage 
at will. Such dangers make internal regulation of markets by African states difficult, if 
not impossible. “Every African government”, says Ihonvbere, “has reason to watch its 
back”.21 
The next segment examines how TNCs violate human rights in Africa.  
 
5.3 How TNCs Violate Human Rights in Africa 
Africa is a continent where all kinds of hyenas attempt to get their teeth into its “rotten” 
(especially extractive) meat; where TNCs benefit from access to rich natural resource 
areas while local populations suffer from ethnic cleansing, torture and rape; where TNCs 
commit crimes against humanity with impunity in their host (or hostage?) states, crimes 
that they cannot contemplate, let alone attempt, in their home states; and where people 
get hurt and no one notices or feels responsible. Many Africans have been forcefully 
evicted or displaced due to the so-called large-scale development projects—such as dam-
building and other energy projects—contracted out to TNCs. Yet, the Vienna Declaration 
and Program of Action proclaims that, “while development facilitates the enjoyment of 
all human rights, the lack of development may not be invoked to justify the abridgement 
of internationally recognized human rights”.22 
                                                                                                                                                 
DaimlerChrysler is bigger than Poland; Royal Dutch/Shell is bigger than Venezuela; IBM is bigger than Singapore; and 
Sony is bigger than Pakistan”). 
20 See NJ Udombana ‘How Should We Then Live? Globalization and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development’ 
(2002) 20 Boston University International Law Journal 293 297 (“New global, mostly private, actors have emerged and 
are wielding greater influences”). 
21 JO Ihonvhere Economic Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization: The Case of Zambia (1996) 224.  
22 Cf Vienna Declaration and Program of Action 12 July 1993 Part I para 10 A/CONF157/23 (1993) 32 International Legal 
Materials 1661. 
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In Angola, private security companies, representing large diamond corporations, 
continue to brutalize local populations in the name of fighting illegal artisanal diamond 
mining known as garimpo. Hundreds of thousands of Angolan locals in the diamond-rich, 
employment-poor provinces are considered garimpeiros because the land on which they 
have lived and worked as small-scale traditional miners for centuries has been redefined 
as concessions, or “reserved” areas for corporations.23 In the diamond-rich Lundas 
provinces, even simple acts of farming, fishing or bathing in a river can result in cruel 
punishment by private security companies.24 
In some other countries, governments virtually cede sovereign and economic rights to 
TNCs, which create a state within a state. In 2005, steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal signed a 
contract with then Liberia’s transitional government giving his company virtual control 
of the vast Nimba concession area, including the country’s longest rail line and the port 
facilities in the town of Buchanan. In return, the company will provide such services as 
schools and health facilities for people in the area.25 In the DR Congo, local armed 
groups fighting for control of gold mines and trading routes commit war crimes and 
crimes against humanity using profits from gold to fund their activities and buy weapons. 
AngloGold Ashanti, which is part of Anglo American international mining conglomerate, 
has reportedly developed links with one such murderous group—the Nationalist and 
Integrationist Front (FNI). It helps the group to access the gold-rich mining site around 
                                                 
23 See R Marques ‘A New Diamond War’ Washington Post 6 Nov 2006 A21 (reporting on numerous cases of human 
rights abuses by private security companies in Angola, including flogging, humiliation, torture, sexual abuses, 
assassinations, sadistic rituals, and cutting off a trouser leg of citizens as a warning). See, in general, R Marques Operation 
Kissonde: The Diamonds of Humiliation and Misery (2006) (reporting on how guards working for three companies in the 
Cuango municipality in Lunda Norte province engage in beatings, humiliation, sexual abuse and enforced labour). 
24 Marques ‘A New Diamond War’ (note 23 above). 
25 See B Law ‘Liberia’s challenge’ BBC News Online 2 Nov 2006. 
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the town of Mongbwalu in the northeastern Ituri district and provides other financial and 
logistical support.26 The company won mining rights to the vast gold concession in 1996 
but could not start mining because of the war. A peace agreement was signed and a 
transitional government established in Kinshasa, but the central government failed to 
establish control of Ituri, leaving the areas around Mongbwalu in the hands of the FNI 
armed group.27  
For decades, Nigeria’s Niger Delta28 has been the site of major confrontations 
between its inhabitants and state security forces, resulting in extra-judicial executions, 
arbitrary detentions, and draconian restrictions on rights to freedom of expression, 
association, and assembly. On November 10, 1995, the Nigerian Government executed 
Ken Saro-Wiwa—then leader of Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP)—and eight other Ogoni indigenes, after a kangaroo trial. That sadistic 
execution marked a turning point in the struggle between human wrongs and rights in the 
Niger Delta. The genesis of the crisis is the utter insensitivity of TNCs that extracts an 
estimated 2.3 million barrels of Nigeria’s oil reserves daily from the delta. These TNCs—
Shell, Chevron, Mobil (part of ExxonMobil), Texaco (part of Chevron), Total and Elf 
(part of Total)—make billions of dollars at the expense of the human and peoples’ rights 
of deltans. Oil pollution has poisoned all known rivers, while acid rain from wasteful gas 
flares destroys flora and fauna. The impunity of these TNCs is enhanced by the tacit 
                                                 
26 See Human Rights Watch The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of Congo (2 June 2005) available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/drc0505/drc0505.pdf. 
27 Above. 
28 The Niger Delta is approximately the size of England and comprises nine oil-rich states in Nigeria’s federal structure: 
Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. 
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consent of a host state that is more concerned with profits from fossil fuels than the 
protection of its citizens’ rights.29 
On many occasions, TNCs disobey domestic court orders either in respect of 
injunctive relief or in the award of compensation, especially where such orders also 
conflict with state interests. Court judgments in the Niger Delta are used as mere 
“source[s] of factual evidence of the impact of oil operations”.30 In Chief Joel Anaro v 
Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria,31 a Nigerian court found Shell liable for 
negligence and breach of statutory duties—for oil spills that affected fish-ponds, fish 
channels, mangrove swamps, farm lands, riverines, and lakes and streams belonging to 
local communities. The Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages and 
compensation for loss of income from fishing rights, domestic animals, destruction of 
fishing grounds and materials, and awarded them 30.5 million naira (about 250,000 
USD). Backed by the military government, the defendant refused to pay, leaving the 
aggrieved without any further legal redress.32  
Both in Nigeria and DR Congo, TNCs routinely put their aircrafts at the disposal of 
government forces to use in fighting perceived dissidents and insurgents. Evidence at two 
                                                 
29 See, in general, Human Rights Watch The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in 
Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities (1999) (chronicling the adverse activities of these oil multinationals and how they 
suppress opposition with the cooperation of the government). Cf Amnesty International Ten years on: Injustice and 
Violence Haunt the Oil Delta AI Index: AFR 44/022/2005 3 Nov 2005 (“Ten years after the executions of writer and 
human rights campaigner Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other members of the Ogoni ethnic community horrified the world, 
the exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta continues to result in deprivation, injustice and violence.”). 
30 JG Frynas Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation Between Oil Companies and Village Communities (2000) 7 (a socio-
legal text that combines the analysis of concrete institutional arrangements with an investigation of personal experiences 
and perceptions of the legal system). 
31 See Chief Joel Anaro v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Suit Nos W/72/82 W/16/83 W/17/83 & 
W/20/85 RCD/36/89 (unreported).  
32 See ‘Law Report’ Living Apr – June 1998 20–21. 
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lawsuits in the US33—one in California state court and another in a federal court—
alleged that Chevron paid some Nigerian soldiers for services on 4 January 1999, the day 
several villagers in the Niger Delta were allegedly killed and homes set on fire.34 The 
evidence further revealed that the soldiers used Chevron-owned and -operated sea trucks 
and helicopters in Opia and Ikenyan later that day and on the Parabe oil drilling platform 
a half year earlier.35  
In 2006, a military judge in DR Congo ruled that three former employees of a 
Canadian mining company (Anvil)36 should face prosecution for complicity in war 
crimes.37 In 2005, Anvil confirmed that it loaned a plane and vehicles to the army, but 
said it “had absolutely no choice” than to accede to a government request for logistical 
support. “When the army arrives with AK-47s ... you give them what they want”, said 
Anvil spokesperson.38 He added that companies are obliged by law to comply with 
Congolese government requests, but the Congolese military prosecutor asked that the 
three be formally charged, having found that the Anvil employees “voluntarily failed to 
                                                 
33 A human rights NGO—Earth Rights International (ERI)—and other lawyers brought the lawsuits against Chevron on 
behalf of Nigerian residents. 
34 See W Baue ‘New Document Alleges Tie Between Chevron and Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria’ Social Funds 12 Aug 
2005 available at http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/1778.html. 
35 Above. See also D Baker ‘Chevron Paid Nigerian Troops After Alleged Killings: Villagers in Lawsuit Say 4 People 
Died—Oil Company Questions if Attacks Took Place’ San Francisco Chronicle 4 Aug 2005 available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/08/04/MNGAJE2I2K1.DTL. 
36 Anvil Mining Limited is incorporated in the Northwest Territories of Canada, with its business managed from its Perth 
office. Anvil Management NL (Australia) and Anvil Mining Holdings Limited (United Kingdom), has a 90 percent holding 
in Anvil Mining Congo SARL, which owns Dikulushi Mine. See Rights and Accountability in Development Congolese 
Military Judge Calls for the Prosecution of Former Anvil Mining Staff for Complicity in War Crimes 15 Oct 2006 available 
at http://raid-uk.org/docs/Press_Releases/Background_Brief_15_Oct_06.pdf. 
37 See K Patterson ‘African Tribunal Cites Canadian Company for Role in Massacre’ CanWest News Service (Ottawa) 17 
Oct 2006 available at http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=d7c6d1ea-3fb7-4a10-84df-
9595122e8908&k=15342.  
38 Above (quoting Robert LaValliere, who recalled that troops had commandeered vehicles at gunpoint in a previous clash 
with rebels earlier that year). 
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withdraw” the vehicles.39 The case itself is getting drown in waters of powerful intrigues, 
as the prosecutor is coming under intense political pressure to drop it.40 
During Liberia’s long-drawn civil war, Charles Taylor, who was bent on becoming 
head of state, relied entirely on non-institutional channels to prosecute his mindless war 
against his people. A consortium of North American, European and Japanese mining, 
timber and rubber companies colluded with Taylor and paid him staggering and almost 
unbelievable sums to secure unimpeded access to the iron ore mining consortium on the 
Liberia-Guinea border.41 In 1991, Taylor agreed to cooperate with the manager of 
Firestone’s rubber plantation in rubber production and marketing and was, in return, paid 
US $2 million annually.42 The British-owned African Mining Consortium Limited also 
paid to Taylor US $10 million a month to ship stockpiled ore on an existing railroad.43 
Taylor, who currently stands trial before the Sierra Leone Special Court for his 
complicity in that country’s brutal civil war, provides insights into the calibre of men 
who rule and ruin Africa. 
Oil revenue is aiding genocide in Darfur, Sudan. Several TNCs—Germany’s 
Siemens, France’s Alcatel, Switzerland’s ABB Ltd, Russia’s Tatneft, and PetroChina—
                                                 
39 Above. 
40 See Action Contre l’Impunite pour les Droits Humains Global Witness, Rights & Accountability in Development, 
Military Prosecutor in Kilwa Trial Recalled to Kinshasa: Political Pressure Intensifies After Former Anvil Mining Staff 
and Congolese Military Charged with Commission of or Complicity in War Crimes 26 Oct 2006 available at 
http://www.raid-uk.org/docs/Anvil_Dikulushi/Urgent_Appeal_ENG.pdf (condemning political interference in the Kilwa 
trial and appealing to President Joseph Kabila to demonstrate his determination to defend the rule of the law in the DR 
Congo). 
41 W Reno ‘Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor’s Liberia’ (1995) 16(1) Third World Quarterly 
115. 
42 See P Atkinson The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis (1997) 14.  
43 L Renda ‘Ending Civil Wars: The Case of Liberia’ (1999) 23 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 59 66. Cf M Meredith The 
State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (2006) 561 (“A British firm paid Taylor $10 million a month for 
permission to ship out stockpiled iron ore through the deepwater port of Buchanan”). 
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have ignored pleas by human rights groups and handed money to the Khartoum serial 
killers in exchange for Sudan’s oil.44 The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) is one of the main oil concession-holders in Sudan, with the largest share—40 
percent—in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). The Company 
has been investing in oil in Sudan since December 1996 and has exploited concessions in 
the Heglig and Unity oilfields and other productive fields. In July 2006, China started 
output from its concessions in the Melut basin, northern Upper Nile State in South Sudan, 
which will produce an estimated 200,820 barrels a day. China has invested over US$3 
billion in developing oil fields and building a 1,500 kilometres pipeline, refinery and port 
since 1998.45 This greedy corporate interest explains why China has opposed every effort 
by the UN Security Council to take robust actions against Sudan for its atrocities in 
Darfur.46  
These oil rigs and mines create few jobs for Africans. When they do, the take-home 
pays hardly take workers home, not to mention other slave-like conditions of work. The 
Chinese-owned Collum Coal Mining Industries, based in southern Zambia, have 
reportedly sent many poorly-paid mine workers underground without protective clothing 
                                                 
44 J Hari ‘How the World’s Biggest Corporations are Fueling Genocide in Sudan’ The Independent [UK] 19 Nov 2004 
(adding: “They simply have a morally neutral stance towards [the genocide].”). 
45 See Amnesty International Sudan/China: Appeal by Amnesty International to the Chinese Government on the Occasion 
of the China-Africa Summit for Development and Cooperation AI Index AFR 54/072/2006 (Nov 2006). 
46 See T Deen ‘Oil, Arms Stymie United Nations Effects on Sudan’ Inter Press Service (Johannesburg) 5 Nov 2004 
available at http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=26175. Cf ‘Never Too Late to Scramble’ The Economist 26 Oct 
2006 available at http://www.economist.com/world/africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8089719 (“It is clear, though, that 
China is not interested in pressing African governments to hold elections or be more democratic in other ways. That helps 
to explain why China directs so much money towards Sudan, whose odious regime can count on China’s support when 
resisting any UN military intervention in Darfur … The Chinese are supposed to be building an armaments factory as 
well”). See, in general, N Udombana ‘Still Playing Dice with Lives: Darfur and Security Council Resolution 1706’ (2007) 
28(10) Third World Quarterly 97 (analysing the Realpolitik that continues to derail efforts to end the Darfur genocide). 
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or boots, necessitating its temporary closure by Zambian authorities in June 2006.47 In 
April 2005, a massive and still unexplained blast levelled explosives factory on a 
premises owned by China’s NPC Mining Africa. The blast killed forty-six persons.48 In 
July 2006, six workers were shot and wounded at the Chinese-owned Chambishi mine in 
Zambia after rioting over wages.49 In its search for economic space around the world, 
China shamelessly ignores human rights atrocities in Africa. 
Many Chinese firms also refuse to hire and train locals for certain skills, preferring to 
bring in much of their own skilled labour. According to The Economist: 
 
China brought in thousands of its own workers to build the 1,860km (1,160-mile) 
Tazara railway between Lusaka and the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam in the 
1970s. It was finished ahead of schedule, but Tanzania and Zambia still have to rely 
on Chinese technical help to maintain it. African hopes of technology transfer may 
be over-optimistic.50 
 
The wage of an African worker in Chinese companies is low because wages in China 
are low, due to abundant cheap labour. The challenge is to get Chinese companies 
operating in Africa to moderate their harsh labour practices in their dealings with African 
workers. There is yet no evidence of any serious progress in this regard.  
                                                 
47 See J Reed ‘China’s Africa Embrace Evokes Imperialist Memories’ Financial Times 27 Sept 2006 available at  
https://registration.ft.com/registration/barrier?referer=http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Categories/RegionsCountries/Africa/AfricaGeneral?&batch_start=11&location=http%3A//www.ft.com/c
ms/s/afb649d8-4e51-11db-bcbc-0000779e2340.html. 
48 Above. 
49 Above. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
253
Perversely, Africa’s governments and their corporate collaborators hardly release 
accurate details of revenues generated from natural resources.51 Their secrecy is their 
power—like the heir of Samson—, but such cultic secrecies engender massive corruption 
by making it difficult for citizens to verify the accuracy of revenue information disclosed, 
if at all. Corrupt leaders then launder the undisclosed revenues to Swiss banks and other 
Western institutions that aid and abet corruption; yet the West tirelessly advocate good, 
transparent, and accountable governance for Africa.52 (Hypocrisy is the only evil that 
walks invisible.) In Nigeria and other countries, presidents combine as oil ministers, 
which “further limit[s] public scrutiny of the country’s oil sector”.53 Little wonder that, 
“over the past 40 years, about $300 billion oil wealth has disappeared from [Nigeria]”,54 
making the wealth of nations to become the poverty of peoples. “The power of corrupt 
governments,” says Open Society Justice Initiative,55 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 ‘Never too late to scramble’ (note 46 above). 
51 See eg Catholic Relief Services and the Bank Information Center Chad’s Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the 
Money in Africa’s Newest Petro-State Feb 2005 3 available at http://advocacy.crs.org/oil (reporting: “While some 
information on Chad’s oil revenues is made public, details regarding the calculation of revenues and many key 
agreements between the oil companies and the government remain secret”.). 
52 Cf Commission for Africa Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa (2005) 14 [hereinafter Our 
Common Interest] (urging foreign banks to repatriate money and state assets stolen from the people of Africa by 
corrupt leaders and “foreign companies involved in oil, minerals and other extractive industries [to] make their 
payments much more open to public scrutiny”). 
53 D Phillips ‘Nigeria on the Brink’ The Guardian [Nig] 1 Jan 2007 available at 
http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/editorial_opinion/article03. 
54 See O Adeniyi ‘Wolfowitz: Nigeria Has Lost $300 Billion to Corruption’ This Day [Nig] 17 Oct 2006 (quoting World 
Bank President). 
55 Open Society Justice Initiative Legal Remedies for the Resource Curse: A Digest of Experience in Using Law to Combat 
Natural Resource Corruption (2005) (reviewing some of the initiatives aimed at preventive transparency mechanisms 
against corporations, banks, and governments in natural resource-rich countries and exploring legal remedies as possible 
complements to these initiatives). 
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frequently derives from monopoly access to natural wealth and the support of private 
and governmental industry allies elsewhere in the world. Local populations suffer 
destruction of their immediate environment and official unaccountability, together 
with the social and economic devastation that follows: arbitrary eviction and 
dispossession, unlawful arrest or harassment, and neglect of healthcare, housing, and 
education.56 
 
Some TNCs use blackmail to cow African states from effectively regulating public 
health sectors. In 1997, South Africa enacted the Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Amendment Act to allow for compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. The aim 
was “to increase the availability of affordable medicines in South Africa,” through 
“generic substitution of off-patent medicines, transparent pricing for all medicines, and 
the parallel importation of patented medicines”.57 Forty pharmaceutical companies, 
comprising some of the world’s largest, filed a lawsuit against the government, claiming, 
inter alia, that the Act violated the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS).58 The fact is that Articles 31 and 2:1 of TRIPS, read in conjunction 
with Article 5.A.2 of the Paris Convention,59 provide authority for the issuance of 
                                                 
56 Above, 5. 
57 E t’Hoen ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha’ (2002) 
3 Chicago Journal of International Law 27 30. 
58 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 15 Apr 1994 WTO Agreement Annex 1C Legal 
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round (1994) 33 International Legal Materials 81. See S Boseley ‘At the Mercy of 
Drug Giants: Millions Struggle with Disease as Pharmaceutical Firms Go to Court to Protect Profits’ Guardian 12 Feb 
2001 available at www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4134799,00.html (reporting that approximately forty 
pharmaceutical companies were engaged in a legal challenge to sec 15(c) of South Africa’s 1997 Medicines Act). 
59 See FM Abbott ‘The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis’ (2001) 7 Widener 
Law Symposium Journal 71 74 (arguing that the TRIPS Agreement “manifestly permits governments to authorize . . . 
compulsory licenses”).  
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compulsory licences. TRIPS also have implications on rights to food, development, and 
health,60 making it imperative for governments to take necessary measures to safeguards 
human rights. 
The suit was dropped in 2001 due to bad publicity,61 but it revealed the tension 
between free trade and the promotion of public health. It also “set a despicable precedent 
by which corporations, mostly incorporated in South Africa as subsidiaries of their parent 
companies, could sue a sovereign government claiming rights and benefits under TRIPS, 
an international treaty accepted or ratified exclusively by states as members of the 
WTO”.62 Yet, as Marks argues, “governments and activists around the world are 
supporting the right of South Africa and other countries faced with poverty and the 
devastating ravages of the AIDS epidemic to import or manufacture generic versions of 
the AIDS treatment drugs at a fraction of the price the pharmaceuticals charge”.63  
Surely, the obligation to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil human rights in Africa 
cannot be left only to increasingly weak states. The next segment interrogates the human 
rights obligations that have built, and are building, around non-state actors, with a view to 
establishing, inter alia, the customary law basis of such obligations. 
 
                                                 
60 See eg ECOSOC ‘The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human 
rights Report of the High Commissioner’ E/CN4/Sub2/2001/13 (27 June 2001) para 2 (“[T]he TRIPS Agreement could 
affect the enjoyment of the right to health - in particular through its effect on access to pharmaceuticals”). 
61 See K DeYoung ‘Makers of AIDS Drugs Drop S. Africa Suit’ Washington Post 19 Apr 2001 A13 (reporting that the 
world’s major pharmaceutical companies planned to drop their suit against the South African Government due to the 
“public relations nightmare”). 
62 O Aginam ‘Between Life and Profit: Global Governance and the Trilogy of Human Rights, Public Health and 
Pharmaceutical Patents’ (2006) 31 North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation 901 911 
(querying: “One wonders if, conversely, the South African government or any other developing country could sue a 
corporation claiming benefits for a breach of an international treaty obligation.”) As above. 
63 S Marks ‘Health and Human Rights: The Expanding International Agenda’ (2001) American Society of International 
Law Proceedings 64. 
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5.4 Interrogating the Norms on Horizontal Obligations of Non-state Actors 
We begin our inquiry with the now celebrated case of SERAC v Nigeria,64 where the 
complainant made series of allegations against the Nigerian Government in respect of the 
oil consortium between the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) and Shell 
Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC). Among the uncontested allegations before 
the African Commission was that the oil consortium exploited oil reserves in Ogoni 
community with no regard for the health and environment of the local communities. It 
released toxic wastes into the environment and local waterways and neglected and/or 
failed to maintain its facilities, thereby causing numerous spills in the proximate villages. 
The resulting contamination of water, soil and air has had serious short and long-term 
health impacts, including skin infections, gastrointestinal and respiratory ailments, and 
increased risk of cancers, and neurological and reproductive problems.65 
The communication further alleged that Nigeria condoned and facilitated these 
violations, by placing the legal and military powers of the State at the disposal of the oil 
companies.66 It neither monitored operations of the oil companies nor required safety 
measures that are standard procedure within the industry. Rather, it withheld information 
from Ogoni communities on the dangers created by oil activities.67 The government 
failed to mandate oil companies or its own agencies to produce health and environmental 
impact studies regarding hazardous operations and materials relating to oil production. It 
refused to permit scientists and environmental NGOs from entering Ogoni to undertake 
                                                 
64 See Social & Economic Rights Action Centre & Anor v Nigeria Comm No 155/96 2001–2002 African Annual Activity 
Report Annex V [hereinafter SERAC case]. 
65 Above, para 2. 
66 Above, para 3. 
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such studies. It ignored the communities’ concerns on the impact of extractive activities, 
and responded to protests with massive violence and execution of Ogoni leaders.68 The 
government failed to require oil companies to consult communities before beginning 
operations, even when such operations pose direct threats to community and individual 
lands.69 
Welcoming the opportunity to “make clear that there is no right in the African Charter 
that cannot be made effective” and that “international law and human rights must be 
responsive to African circumstances”,70 the African Commission found that Nigeria had 
violated several articles of the Charter. It appealed—yes, not ordered, but appealed71—to 
the government to ensure protection of the environment, health and livelihood of the 
people of Ogoni; to ensure adequate compensation to victims of the human rights 
violations, including relief and resettlement assistance to victims of government 
sponsored raids; to undertake a comprehensive cleanup of lands and rivers damaged by 
oil operations; to ensure that appropriate environmental and social impact assessments 
are prepared for any future oil development; to guarantee safe operation of any further oil 
development through effective and independent oversight bodies for the petroleum 
                                                                                                                                                 
67 Above, para 4. 
68 Above, para 5. 
69 Above, para 6. 
70 Above, para 68. 
71 The African Charter vests the Commission with extremely limited powers. The Commission can only make 
recommendations to the offending parties, after what generally seems like an investigation rather than a judicial 
proceeding. See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted 27 June 1981 entry into force 21 Oct 1986 Doc 
OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev5 (1982) 21 International Legal Materials 59 [hereinafter African Charter or Charter] art 58(2). 
The Commission cannot condemn an offending state and cannot award damages, restitution or reparations. And “[w]ith the 
sovereignty of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Charter’s non-provision of alternative methods of 
compensation for victims of Human Rights violations, the said victims find themselves without any remedy”. African 
Commission, Non-Compliance of States Parties to Adopted Recommendations of the African Commission: A Legal 
Approach 24th Ord Sess OAU Doc./OS/50b (XXIV) para 6 (1998). 
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industry; and to provide information on health and environmental risks and meaningful 
access to regulatory and decision-making bodies to communities likely to be affected by 
oil operations. 
The African Commission, however, made no consequential orders against SPDC, not 
being a party to the African Charter and, hence, not being joined as a respondent. The 
Commission limited itself to the vertical obligations of states to prevent and punish 
corporate human rights abuses especially where failure to do so violate treaty obligations. 
The crux of the matter is whether TNCs, as non-state entities, should directly account 
for such egregious violations of human and peoples’ rights, given their capacity and 
propensity “to cause harmful impacts on the human rights and lives of individuals 
through their core business practices and operations, including employment practices, 
environmental policies, relationships with suppliers and consumers, interactions with 
Governments and other activities?”72 This Article argues that these global monsters 
should have direct, horizontal obligations to the peoples and communities within their 
sphere of operations. Increasing power and influence must entail increasing 
responsibility. Vesting TNCs with horizontal human rights obligations is a corollary of a 
State’s vertical and diagonal obligations to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil human 
rights.  
The above proposition, however, leaves unanswered the question of how to identify 
standards applicable to TNCs; or, to use Ratner’s formulations, 
 
                                                 
72 Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights E/CN4/Sub2/2003/12 (2003) [hereinafter Draft Norms for TNCs) pmbl. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
259
can decision makers transpose the primary rules of international human rights law 
and the secondary rules of state and individual responsibility onto corporations? If 
corporations are such significant actors in international relations and law, then can 
they not assume the obligations currently placed on states or individuals, based on 
those sets of responsibility?73 
 
The first segment interrogates the developed and developing international law on 
responsibility of non-state entities generally, while the second addresses the specific 
norms crystallizing around TNCs for human rights.  
 
5.4.1 The Legal Basis for Accountability of Non-state Actors 
In 1999, Kofi Annan called on corporate leaders to “a) support and respect the protection 
of international human rights within their sphere of influence; and b) make sure their own 
corporations are not complicit in human rights abuses.”74 For Amnesty International, 
“multinational companies have a responsibility. … Companies and financial institutions 
are organs of society [within the meaning of the UDHR]. … All companies have a direct 
responsibility to respect human rights in their own operations”.75 The Economist sums up 
the new paradigm thus: 
 
Today multinationals are under pressure as never before to justify their dealings with 
abusive regimes and their treatment of employees in developing countries. Firms 
                                                 
73 Ratner ‘Corporations and Human Rights’ (note 10 above) 492. 
74 K Annan A Compact for the New Century (31 Jan 1999) available at www.un.org/partners/business/davos.htm. 
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used to brush off criticism, saying that they had no control over third-world 
suppliers, and that politics was none of their business anyway. This is no longer good 
enough.76 
 
The practice of the UN Security Council also supports this shift in international legal 
paradigm. The Council, which bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security,77 has invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter to impose 
sanctions on non-state entities. It has also addressed resolutions to non-member states of 
the UN, acting on Article 2(6) of the Charter.78 One of the earliest resolutions targeted at 
non-state entities were Resolutions 232 of 1955 and 253 of 196879 dealing with the 
rebellion in the then Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Resolution 253, in particular, 
urged states and non-states members of the UN—“having regard to the principles stated 
in Article 2 of the [UN] Charter”80—to “prevent airline companies constituted in their 
territories and aircrafts of their registration or under charter to their nationals from 
operating to or from Southern Rhodesia and from linking up with any airline company 
                                                                                                                                                 
75 Amnesty International Human Rights Principles for Companies ACT 70/01/98 (1998). 
76 ‘Survey: Human-Rights Law; the Power of Publicity’ The Economist 5 Dec 1998 13. 
77 See UN Charter, art 24 (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on 
the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”). 
78 Above, art 2(6) (“The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in 
accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.”). 
79 See Security Council Resolutions 232 of 15 Dec 1966 and 253 of 25 May 1968. 
80 Resolution 253 (note 79 above) para 14. 
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constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia”.81 Since then, targeted sanctions 
against non-state entities have recurred in various Security Council resolutions.82 
The development of human rights in the last century deflated the balloon of 
subjecthood and vested individuals with rights and obligations at the international level;83 
and “individuals are the real subjects of international duties not only when they act on 
behalf of the State … [but also] in all cases in which international law regulates directly 
the conduct of individuals as such”.84 In the LaGrand case, the ICJ referred to the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 and concluded that “article 36, paragraph 1, 
creates individual rights”.85 In Onwo v Oko,86 the Nigerian Court of Appeal extended the 
protection of individuals within the State against the excesses of fellow citizens, insisting 
that where individuals invade others’ fundamental rights, the victims have rights against 
violators, as they would have done against the State. 
Several instruments support this proposition, including the African Charter, which 
articulates autonomous duties of individuals to other natural and legal persons, 
specifically the “family and society, the State other legally recognized communities and 
the international community”.87 The Charter urges individuals, inter alia, to “preserve the 
harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the 
                                                 
81 Above, para 6. 
82 See eg Security Council Resolution 1591 UN SCOR 5153d mtg para 3(c) UN Doc S/Res/1591 (2005) (imposing 
“smart sanctions” on all persons found to “impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the 
region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities,…”). 
83 On the position of individuals vis-à-vis international human rights law, see eg A Cassesse Human Rights in a Changing 
World (1990); H Lauterpacht International Law and Human Rights (1950). 
84 H Lauterpacht ‘General Rules of the Law of Peace’ in E Lauterpacht (ed) Collected Papers vol 1 (1970) 284. 
85 See LaGrand case (2001) ICJ Reports para 77. 
86 Onwo v Oko (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt 456) 584. 
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family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need”.88 By this and 
other provisions, individuals become duty-bearers in promoting and securing human 
rights up to the limits of their abilities.89 The UDHR provides that 
 
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of 
Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their 
jurisdiction.90  
 
“Every individual and every organ of society” excludes no one, no market, no 
corporation, and no cyberspace.91 While many of the UDHR’s provisions constitute 
binding custom, it is arguable if this bindingness extends to its preambles. However, the 
UDHR also provides that ‘everyone’ has duties to the community,92 and ‘everyone’ 
means everyone. All of this indicates that the notion of horizontal human rights 
                                                                                                                                                 
87 See African Charter (note 71 above) art 27. 
88 Above, art 29(1) (emphasis supplied). The individual is further obliged “[t]o serve his national community by placing his 
physical and intellectual abilities at its service;” and [t]o work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes 
imposed by the law in the interest of the society”. Above, art 29(2)&(6).  
89 Cf F Spagnoli ‘The Horizontal Priority of Economic Rights’ in N Udombana & V Besirevic (eds) Re-thinking Socio-
economic Rights in an Insecure World (2006) 21 26 (“Whereas forbearance is an equal obligation for all, states and 
individuals, active involvement is an obligation which comes in degrees. Our individual and active duties arising from 
economic rights are not the same towards everyone.”).  
90 Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 10 Dec 1948 GA Res 217 A (III) GAOR 3d Sess [hereinafter UDHR] 
pmbl. 
91 See L Henkin ‘The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets’ (1999) 25(1) Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 25. 
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obligations had been gestating for quite sometime, certainly before the NWO. As “organs 
of society”, TNCs have a responsibility to observe human rights in their operations.93 
There is also a shift at the instrumental level from immunity to accountability, with 
individuals now personally responsible for international crimes such as genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. As the Nuremberg Tribunal in the Trial of Major 
War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg 
Germany, “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities, 
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced”.94 The Nuremberg experiment was the precursor to 
subsequent international criminal tribunals, including the ad hoc International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR). The entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC)95 in 2002 now paves way for a permanent forum to hold individuals directly 
accountable for international crimes—genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity—when national justice systems are either unwilling or unable to act. 
                                                                                                                                                 
92 UDHR (note 90 above) art 29. 
93 Cf A Clapham & S Jerbi ‘Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses’ (2001) 24 Hastings 
International & Comparative Law Review 339 340 (arguing, “companies may not be in the habit of referring to themselves 
as ‘organs of society,’ they are a fundamental part of society. As such, they have a moral and social obligation to respect the 
universal rights enshrined in the Declaration”); Amnesty International Human Rights Principles for Companies ACT 
70/01/98 (1998) (maintaining that “multinational companies have a responsibility. … Companies and financial institutions 
are organs of society [within the meaning of the UDHR]. … All companies have a direct responsibility to respect human 
rights in their own operations”). 
94 The Trial of Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg Germany 
(1950) Pt 22 447. See also (1947) American Journal of International Law 172 188. Cf Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia UN Doc S/Res/827 (1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda SC Res 
955 49 UN SCOR (3452nd meeting) UN Doc S/Res/955 (1994); and the requirements of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court 37 International Legal Materials 999 opened for signature 17 July 1998. 
95 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court UN Doc A/CONF183/9 (17 July 1998). 
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In Prosecutor v Tadic Case,96 the Appeals Chambers of the ICTY upheld the legality 
of prosecuting non-state entities for violations of the laws and customs of war, including 
violations of Common Article 3 and the Additional Protocols.97 Similarly, in Prosecutor 
v Akayesu,98 the ICTR held that a breach of fundamental guarantees of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) was a “serious violation” entailing individual criminal 
responsibility.99 This responsibility extends to those who aids and abets, that is, those 
who knowingly provide practical assistance, encouragement or moral support having a 
substantial effect on the commission of crime.100 Rebel leaders, in particular, are 
responsible for the conduct of their members and may be “held so responsible by 
opposing parties or by the outside world”.101  
Private actors are being held liable in the US for torturous human rights violations, 
using the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).102 In Kadic v Karadzic,103 the US Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit rightly held that “the law of nations as understood in the 
modern era does not confine its reach to state action. Instead, certain forms of conduct 
violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under auspices of state or 
                                                 
96 Prosecutor v Tadic Case No IT-94-1-T Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 Oct 
1995). 
97 Above, paras 86-93. 
98 Prosecutor v Akayesu Case No ICTR-96-4-T Judgment (2 Sept 1998). 
99 Above, paras 616-17. Cf Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations of the Committee on Rights of 
the Child: Uganda CRC/C/15/Add80 para 34 21 Oct 1997 (“Violations of the rules of [IHL] entail responsibility being 
attributed to the perpetrators.”). 
100 See Prosecutor v Furundžija Case No IT-95-17/1 Judgment (10 Dec 1998).  
101 F Kalshoven & L Zegveld Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (3rd 
ed 2001) 75. 
102 See Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 28 USC sec1350.  
103 See eg Kadic v Karadzic 70 F3d 232 (2d Cir 1995) (involving a suit by victims from Bosnia-Herzegovina against a 
self-designated president of an unrecognized Bosnian-Serb entity). 
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only as private individuals”.104 The Court stated that “atrocities are actionable under the 
Alien Tort Act (ATCA), without regard to state action, to the extent that they were 
committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes”.105 “A private individual acts under 
color of law … when he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid”.106 
In Iwanowa v Ford Motor Co,107 which alleged Ford’s use of slave labour and the impact 
of that labour on the company’s profitability, the Court held: “No logical reason exists for 
allowing private individuals and corporations to escape liability for universally 
condemned violations of international law merely because they were not acting under 
color of law”.108 More on ATCA, shortly. 
There is, thus, no sound reason to leave out non-state actors in the framework of 
human rights obligations. Human rights are part of the state, part of the raison d’etre of 
the state, but they are more than just protective tools against a state’s predatory powers. 
They also regulate, or ought to regulate, relationships between non-state actors,109 but as 
the South African case against pharmaceutical companies illustrates, states are often 
unable to regulate the human rights behaviour of non-state actors due to imperatives of 
globalisation. The power imbalances that the new international order create make it 
increasingly difficult for weaker states to assert full control over policies that are central 
                                                 
104 Above, 239.  
105 Above, 244. 
106 Above, 245.  
107 Iwanowa v Ford Motor Co 67 F Supp 2d 424 (DNJ 1999). 
108 Above, 445. 
109 See F Spangnoli Homo Democraticus: On the Universal Desirability and the Not So Universal Possibility of 
Democracy and Human Rights (2003) 90.  
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to their ability to fulfil their socio-economic rights obligations.110 While human rights 
norms stress participation, non-discrimination, empowerment and accountability, 
globalisation norms stress free trade, growth, employment and sustainable development. 
Sometimes, these two sets of objectives are in opposition, making it difficult to establish 
a social and international order conducive to the enjoyment of all human rights.111  
The coercive use of conditionality by IFIs in shaping economic and social policies of 
debtor, mostly developing, nations represents a shift in governing power and a 
contraction of the political and economic independence of states.112 There is clearly a 
need for protection against the governing power, which should be available against every 
entity or sector where that governing power is in fact located.113 The international and 
domestic responsibilities of TNCs and these other actors should be engaged “insofar as 
their activities infringe upon the human dignity of those with whom they have special 
ties”.114 They should also be engaged “insofar as they cooperate with those actors whom 
international law already sees as the prime sources of abuses—state—[of a human 
rights]”.115  
The ICESCR enjoins international cooperation for the realization of its rights;116 
likewise the UDHR, which provides that everyone is “entitled to realization, through 
                                                 
110 See S Narula ‘The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under International Law’ (2006) 44 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 691 693-4. 
111 See Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights: Preliminary Report of the Secretary-General 
A/55/342 (31 Aug 2000) para 8. 
112 See Wahi (note 10 above) 382. 
113 See AS Miller ‘The Constitutional Law of the Security State’ (1958) 10 Stanford Law Review 620 634-42. 
114 Ratner ‘Corporations and Human Rights’ (note 10 above) 449. 
115 Above. 
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national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and 
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality”.117 All of this implicates states and 
non-state entities. Certain provisions in the ICESCR, including articles 11, 15, 22 and 23, 
further underline the essential role of international cooperation in facilitating the full 
realization of socio-economic rights. Article 23 specifically identifies “the furnishing of 
technical assistance” and other activities as being among the means of “international 
action for the achievement of the rights recognized”.118  
The ICESCR Committee emphasises that “it is particularly incumbent on States 
parties and other actors in a position to assist, to provide ‘international assistance and 
cooperation, especially economic and technical’ which enable developing countries to 
fulfil their core and other obligations”.119 In relation to the right to adequate food, the 
Committee made this important comment:  
                                                                                                                                                 
116 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted 16 Dec 1966 entry into force 23 Mar 
1976 993 UNTS 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] art 2. 
117 UDHR (note 90 above) art 22. Cf Millennium Development Goals 2000 para I–2 available at 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ [hereinafter MDG] (“We recognize that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to 
our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity 
at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world’s people, especially the most vulnerable and, in 
particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs”). 
118 Cf CESCR General Comment 3 ‘The Nature of State Parties’ Obligations (art 2(1) para 1 of the Covenant)’ (5th session 
1990) UN Doc E/1991/23 Annex III para 14; Declaration on the Right to Development 4 Dec 1986 GA Res. 41/128 (1986) 
[hereinafter DRD] art 4(2) (noting, inter alia, that sustained action is required to promote development in developing 
countries and called on states to co-operate for this purpose). On the nature of third state obligations under the ICESCR, 
see M Sepulveda The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(2003); R Kunnnemann ‘Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ in F Coomans & MT Kamminga (eds) Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (2004) 201; S Skogly 
‘The Obligation of International Assistance and Cooperation in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ in M Bergsmo (ed) Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden: Essays in Honour of 
Asbjórn Eide (2003) 403; P Alston & G Quinn ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 9 Human Rights Quarterly (1987) 186. 
119 See CESCR ‘The Right to Water (arts 11 and 12 of the Covenant)’ General Comment 15 UN Doc E/C12/2002/11 
para 3 26 Nov 2002 [hereinafter General Comment 15] para 38. Cf CESCR ‘The right to the highest attainable standard 
of health (article 12 of the ICESCR)’ General Comment 14 E/C12/2000/4 [hereinafter General Comment 14] para 45 
(endnote omitted). The CESCR has also stated that IFIs “should pay greater attention to the protection of the right to 
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While only States are parties to the Covenant and are thus ultimately accountable for 
compliance with it, all members of society—individuals, families, local 
communities, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, as well as 
the private business sector—have responsibilities in the realization of the right to 
adequate food. The State should provide an environment that facilitates 
implementation of these responsibilities. The private business sector—national and 
transnational—should pursue its activities within the framework of a code of conduct 
conducive to respect of the right to adequate food, agreed upon jointly with the 
Government and civil society.120 
 
Human rights are universal because they articulate truly essential values and “stem 
from the attributes of human beings which justifies [sic] their national and international 
protection”.121 Of course, the concrete rights differ widely in their nature and operation. 
Many of these rights have erga omnes obligations when they become jus cogens either 
through treaty or customary law. Some commentators consider the peremptory character 
of socio-economic rights as problematic, as they entail affirmative duties requiring the 
availability of resources to give effect to them.122 Nevertheless, to the extent that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
health in their lending policies, credit agreements and structural adjustment programmes”. Above, para 39. Cf CESCR 
‘The right to adequate housing (Art 11 (1))’ General Comment 4 [hereinafter General Comment 4] para 19 
(“International financial institutions promoting measures of structural adjustment should ensure that such measures do 
not compromise the enjoyment of the right to adequate housing”). 
120 CESCR ‘The Right to Adequate Food’ General Comment 12 (1999) [hereinafter General Comment 12] para 20.  
121 African Charter (note 71 above) pmbl. 
122 See eg T Meron ‘On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights’ (1986) 80 American Journal of International Law 1 
11 (noting that the jus cogens status of some socio-economic rights is problematic because they “involve clusters of rights 
whose components require scrutiny”). 
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rights apply universally, they apply without exception to non-state actors, on the principle 
of equality before the law, itself a general principle of law recognized by all civilized 
nations.  
 
5.4.2 The Crystallising Norms on Corporate Human Rights Behaviour 
Several initiatives have been undertaken in the recent past to control corporate behaviour. 
Some of these initiatives come by way of voluntary codes of conduct popularly called 
corporate social responsibilities (CRS) or corporate citizenship (as it is sometimes 
called). Others are externally imposed, but all conglomerate into a general duty by TNCs 
to protect persons within their sphere of influence from threats to their rights, even for 
indirect threats that are in some way connected to companies. This segment interrogates 
some of these initiatives and the crystallising norms. 
 
1. Corporate Social Responsibility 
The inadequacy of governmental actions in dealing with human rights issues, coupled 
with the increasing role of TNCs for human rights violations, led organised civil society 
to call for CSR policies. Triggered by civil society pressures and by their internal 
assessment of human rights-related risks and opportunities in their operating social and 
political environments, many TNCs have developed and some have attempted to 
implement a portfolio of activities to reduce, if not eliminate, negative side-effects and 
advance positive effects of their operations. They also generally recognise certain 
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universal human rights, although “[t]he levels of support vary according to the type of 
right, with labor rights ranking highest”.123 
CSR “represents a company’s commitment to explore and seize opportunities to 
enhance its overall contribution to society and sustainability while pursuing its core 
objective, which is value maximization”.124 Its premise is that “corporations, because 
they are the dominant institution of the planet, must squarely face and address the social 
and environmental problems that afflict humankind”.125 Is CSR the be-all and end-all 
response to human rights violations by TNCs? It is not, because such voluntary initiatives 
necessarily rely on ‘internal’ frames of reference and reflect what is politically acceptable 
within and among the participating entities, rather than what is objectively required by 
the human rights needs on the ground. They lack international legitimacy as they do not 
provide adequate accountability mechanisms. 
Self-regulation without an external frame of reference “cannot be relied on as the 
primary means for ensuring respect of basic human rights by TNCs.”126 In effect, CRS is 
not about human rights, but about corporations avoiding regulations, covering up the 
damage caused to communities and the environment, and maintaining public co-
operation with the corporate-dominated systems. Voluntary codes have become 
                                                 
123 M Wright & A Lehr Business Recognition of Human Rights: Global Patterns, Regional and Sectoral Variations ix 
(Dec 2006) available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Business-Recognition-of-Human-Rights-12-Dec-
2006.pdf (reporting on the human rights standards referenced or invoked by a cross-section of companies, collective 
initiatives, and socially responsible investment funds). 
124 F Amalric et al ‘Transnational Corporations and Human Rights: The Business Implications’ CCRS Working Paper 
Series NO 03/05 (2005) 3 n 5 available at http://www.humanrights.ch/cms/upload/pdf/050504transnationalcorps.pdf. 
125 E Westfield ‘Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility: Corporate Codes of Conduct 
in the 21st Century’ (2002) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 1075 1082 (citing P Hawken & W McDonough 
Seven Steps to Doing Good Business Inc Nov 1993 80). See, in general, CA Williams ‘Corporate Social Responsibility 
in an Era of Economic Globalization’ (2002) 35 University of California Davis Law Review 705. 
126 D Kinley & R Chambers ‘The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law’ (2006) Human Rights Law Review 447 492. 
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fashionable strategies for bolstering a company’s public image; avoiding regulation; 
gaining legitimacy and access to markets and decision makers; and shifting the ground 
towards privatization of public functions.127 Thus, CRS enables business to propose 
ineffective, voluntary, market-based solutions to social and environmental crises under 
guise of being responsible, thereby deflecting blame for problems caused by corporate 
operations and protecting companies’ interests. Such an insincere strategy hampers 
efforts to tackle the root causes of social and environmental injustice.128 
CSR should be seen as a beginning, not an end, in the search for practical rules to 
regulate corporate human rights behaviour. All stakeholders must constantly consider 
sustainable alternatives. One alternative should be to develop an understanding of home 
and host country responsibilities for negative impacts of foreign direct investment. 
Another is to move beyond the current “regulatory versus voluntary” policy divide to 
developing a balance between parent company accountability and intergovernmental co-
operation for access to justice in developing states. Still another option should be to 
encourage inter-governmental initiative on information sharing or notification where 
TNCs that have been the subject of censure at home establish operations abroad.129 
Stakeholders should also examine laws allowing challenges to corporate restructurings, 
whether they are adequate to deal with possible future personal injury or environmental 
                                                 
127 See C Fauset ‘Preface’ What’s Wrong with Corporate Social Responsibility? Corporate Watch Report 2006 (2006). 
128 Above. Cf Sub-Commission on Human Rights ‘Statement on Item 4c: Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and Question of Transnational Corporations’ U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/NGO/17 (2000) para IV (“Experience has shown 
that the efficacy of voluntary codes of conduct is very limited and sometimes temporary and that in most cases the 
corporations adopt them basically for image reasons (“greenwash”), which may even help them to win new markets.”). 
129 See H Ward ‘Transnational Corporate Accountability: Insights from South Africa’ Id21 Research Highlight 2 Oct 2002 
available at http://www.id21.org/society/insights43art5.html. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
272
claims. They should also establish clear understanding on when parent companies can be 
held accountable for negative impacts in developing countries.130 
The AU must play an active role in corporate governance, given that corporate human 
rights abuses are parts of challenges currently confronting Africa as a whole.131 It should 
urge TNCs operating in Africa to register their voluntary codes of conduct and similar 
initiatives with the AU Commission in Ethiopia. The Commission, in turn, should verify 
such initiatives against minimum applicable universal standards—including ILO Core 
Labour Standards—and monitor performance. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP)132 
should similarly empanel a Committee to undertake annual hearings on TNCs’ activities. 
It should particularly urge these corporations to publish audits of their operations in 
Africa and make them available to all stakeholders. The AU should urge TNCs to 
establish Investment Fund in the countries of operations, where a specific percentage of 
gross revenues should be channelled to local NGOs working on health, education, micro-
credit, and infrastructure development. 
 
2. Inter-governmental Initiatives 
                                                 
130 Above. 
131 Cf Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) adopted 11 July 2000 entry into force 26 May 2001 CAB/LEG/23 15 (as 
amended by the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union 11 July 11 2003) [hereinafter AU 
Act] pmbl (wherein Member States pledge “to take up the multifaceted challenges that confront our continent and peoples 
in the light of the social, economic and political changes taking place in the world”). 
132 The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) is one of the principal organs of the AU. See AU Act (note 131 above) art 5. Its 
establishment “is informed by a vision to provide a common platform for African peoples and their grass-roots 
organizations to be more involved in discussions and decision-making on the problems and challenges facing the 
Continent”. OAU Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African 
Parliament OAU Doc EAHG/3 (V) (2001) pmbl. The PAP is mandated, inter alia, “to (1) facilitate the effective 
implementation of the policies and objectives of the OAU/AEC and, ultimately, of the African Union; (2) promote the 
principles of human rights and democracy in Africa; [and] (3) encourage good governance, transparency and 
accountability in Member States”. Above, art 3(1–3). It presently has a mere “consultative and advisory powers”, but its 
“ultimate aim” is “to evolve into an institution with full legislative powers, whose members are elected by universal adult 
suffrage”. Above, art 2(3). 
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The absence of a binding ‘external’ constraint on corporate behaviour is not for want 
of attempt. Some governments and other agencies have embarked on initiatives to 
encourage companies to address human rights. In 2000 the US and UK met with some 
non-state actors, principally companies in the extractive and energy sectors and certain 
NGOs, to discuss means for companies in those sectors to protect and promote human 
rights. (Norway and Netherland have joined, with more than sixteen companies now 
participating in the process.) At the end of the meeting, the participants announced the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights to guide such companies in ensuring 
respect for human rights while maintaining the safety and security of corporate 
operations.133 These Principles partly reveal the nature of obligations of these 
corporations: 
 
Companies should use their influence to promote the following principles with 
public security: (a) individuals credibly implicated in human rights abuses should not 
provide security services for Companies; (b) force should be used only when strictly 
necessary and to the extent proportional to the threat; and (c) the rights of individuals 
should not be violated while exercising the right to exercise freedom of association 
and peaceful assembly, the right to engage in collective bargaining, or other related 
rights of Company employees as recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.134  
 
                                                 
133 See US State Department Fact Sheet on Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (20 Dec 2000) available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/001220_fsdrl_principles.html [hereinafter Voluntary Principles Fact 
Sheet]. 
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The role of TNCs in conflict-diamonds—diamonds sold to fund armed conflicts and 
civil wars135—sensitized the world to the concept of blood diamonds. In December 2000, 
the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 55/56,136 “express[ing] the need to give 
urgent and careful consideration to devising effective and pragmatic measures to address 
the problem of conflict diamonds”.137 Blood diamonds led to the regulation of the trade 
through the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a 2003 government-
launched voluntary system that imposes requirements on participants to certify that 
diamonds are conflict-free. Its elements, to use the language of Resolution 55/56, include 
the creation and implementation of a simple and workable international certification 
scheme for rough diamonds, based primarily on national certification schemes. It requires 
national practices to meet internationally agreed minimum standards, which should aim at 
securing the widest possible participation.138 Others elements are the need for diamond 
processing, exporting and importing States to act in concert; the need for appropriate 
arrangements to help to ensure compliance, acting with respect for the sovereignty of 
States; and the need for transparency.139  
The KPCS is effective in clear-cut civil conflicts between a government and a rebel 
movement, but it has proved grossly inadequate to check corporate misbehaviour, such as 
                                                                                                                                                 
134 Above. 
135 Diamonds have ignited and fuelled conflicts in such African countries as Angola, DR Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 
See eg P Billon ‘Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000’ (2001) 100 African 
Affairs 55 (examining how the spatial distribution of oil and diamonds in Angola guided and financed the military 
strategies of belligerents in the long-drawn Angolan conflict). 
136 See General Assembly Resolution 55/56 UN Doc A/Res/55/56 1 Dec 2000. 
137 Above), para 3. 
138 Above. 
139 Above. 
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in Angola’s Lundas region, where diamond companies that certify diamonds and the 
security firms protecting them meet out harsh justice. Governance in Angola has been left 
to representatives of corporations that are driven by profit, rather than human rights, 
motives.140 For the KPCS to succeed, all states must take tougher actions to prevent 
conflict diamonds from entering their territories. Some participating states have not 
shown sufficient vigilance to ensure the success of the Scheme. A recent report to US 
Congressional Committees indicates that conflict diamonds are entering the US because 
of major weaknesses in implementing the Clean Diamond Trade Act, which implements 
the KPCS.141 The highlighted weaknesses include lack of regular physical inspections of 
rough diamond imports and exports, poor statistics on rough diamonds and lack of plan 
for monitoring the Kimberley Process Authority (KPA). The report recommends 
improvement in accuracy of rough diamond statistics, periodic physical inspections of 
rough diamond imports and exports, and better oversight of the KPA.142 
The international community of states could also hold TNCs accountable on the basis 
of extraterritoriality principle, which allows jurisdiction for cases against companies 
registered or domiciled in home states in respect of damage sustained in third states.143 
                                                 
140 See Marques ‘A New Diamond War’ (note 23 above) A21. 
141 See US Government Accountability Office (GAO) Conflict Diamonds: Agency Actions Needed to Enhance 
Implementation of the Clean Diamond Trade Act GAO-06-978 (Sept 2006) available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06978.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report] (reporting that “because of weaknesses of the 
system, the United States cannot ensure that illicit rough diamonds are not traded”). Above, 38. See also Global Witness 
and Partnership Africa ‘GAO Report Condemns Weak US Effort to Combat Conflict Diamonds Press Releases 28 Sept 
2006 available at http://globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2.php?id=378 (“This [GAO] report shows that the US 
government has inadequately enforced the Clean Diamond Trade Act, undermining global efforts to keep conflict 
diamonds out of the legitimate diamond trade”). 
142 See GAO Report (note 141 above) 40-41. 
143 See eg European Parliament Resolution on the Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility COM(2001) 366 – C5-0161/2002 – 2002/2069(COS) 30 June 2002) available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2002-0278+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
(calling on Member States to incorporate the extraterritoriality principle in legislation). 
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The principle could allow home states to exercise due diligence in regulating their TNCs, 
especially “where it can be shown that the home state exercises decisive influence over 
the ability of TNCs to operate in an unregulated manner abroad”.144 According to Narula:  
 
Home state support for TNCs comes in a variety of forms: states negotiate bilateral 
and multilateral investment treaties that define the framework legal rights of TNCs; 
government export credit agencies offer overseas investment insurance to cover 
political risks, and in some cases commercial risks borne by TNCs; and regional and 
national development finance institutions offer private sector financing. Politically, 
home states have also played a role in the negotiation, rewriting, or enforcement of 
contracts that are heavily tilted in TNCs’ favor.145 
 
Hessbruegge also calls on home states to “take reasonable measures to prevent one of 
[their] transnational corporations from engaging in human rights infringing conduct in a 
developing state, if that state lacks the power, technical expertise or political will to fulfil 
its own diagonal obligations to protect”.146 These measures are human rights imperatives 
rather than favours to host states, particularly as powerful states, in the majority of cases, 
provide their TNCs with significant financial and political backing that enables them to 
control resources and markets in developing countries. 
 
3. Accountability through the Judicial Process 
                                                 
144 Narula (note 110 above) 728. 
145 Above, 763 (footnotes omitted). 
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International and national judicial institutions are also increasingly prying into 
corporate activities for damage to the environment, health consequences to workers and 
communities; for infringement of the principle of preventive measures; and for financial 
offences, among others. US courts, in particular, are reversing their traditional reluctance 
to exercise jurisdiction over human rights violations committed against foreign persons 
abroad. The 1789 ATCA, as supplemented by the 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act 
(TVPA),147 “offers the most attractive, and the most often used, opportunity for victims to 
obtain reparation orders”.148 It allows foreign nationals to bring suits in US federal courts 
for torts committed in breach of international law or US treaties.149 In the Filartiga 
case150—regarded as “the Brown v. Board of Education of trans-national law 
litigation”151—the court found that “deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official 
authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, 
regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus whenever an alleged torturer is found 
                                                                                                                                                 
146 See Hessbruegge (note 16 above) 83. 
147 See Torture Victim Prevention Act 28 USC sec1350 App. 
148 J Sarkin ‘Reparation for Past Wrongs: Using Domestic Courts around the World, Especially the United States, to Pursue 
African Human Rights Claims’ (2004) 32 International Journal of Legal Information 426 441. See, in general, J Lu 
‘Jurisdiction over non-state activity under the Alien Tort Claims Act’ (1997) 35 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
531. 
149 See eg Abebe-Jira v Negewo 72 F 3d 844 (11th Cir 1996) (alleging torture of Ethiopian prisoners); In re Estate of 
Ferdinand Marcos 25 F 3d 1467 (9th Cir 1994) (alleging torture and other abuses by former President of Philippines); 
Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic 726 F 2d 774 (DC Cir 1984) (alleging claims against Libya based on armed attack 
upon civilian bus in Israel); and Xuncax v Gramajo 886 F Supp 162 (D Mass 1995) (alleging abuses by Guatemalan 
military forces). 
150 See Filartiga v Pena-Irala 630 F2d 876 (2n Cir 1980). 
151 B Stephens ‘Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for 
International Human Rights Violations’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 1 13. 
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and served with process within United States borders, the ATCA provides 
jurisdiction”.152 
Although ATCA contemplated three traditional torts—violations against safe 
conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy,153—the landscape is 
changing. Many lawsuits have been brought against TNCs under ATCA, some 
successfully, others not. Doe v Unocal154 was the first case in which the Court held 
ATCA actions to apply to private corporations. The plaintiffs accused Unocal of 
knowingly using forced labour to construct its Yadana gas pipeline, which stretches 
through Burma into Thailand. Unocal contracted with the notorious military junta in 
Burma to provide security for the project. The junta forced local people to work to clear 
the way for the pipeline and its accompanying infrastructure. Soldiers used forceful 
tactics, such as murder and rape, to compel people to work. The Burmese villagers 
claimed that the California oil giant was liable for its complicity in the junta’s human 
rights violations.  
Unocal provided opportunity for the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to give 
“the most explicit judicial definition of complicity” in relation to corporations. The ruling 
stipulated three criteria for determining complicity: giving practical assistance to the 
actual perpetrator of a crime; the assistance having a substantial effect on the commission 
of the criminal act; and the company knowing that its acts would result in a possible 
crime even if it did not intend the particular crime. These principles “conform closely to 
                                                 
152 Filartiga (note 150 above) 880. 
153 See R Chambers ‘The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the Developing Law on Corporate Complicity in Human 
Rights Abuses’ (2005) 13(1) Human Rights Brief 14 16. 
154 Doe 1 v Unocal Corp 963 F Supp 880 (CD Cal 1997). 
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what is widely thought to be the current state of international law on this subject”.155 
They, however, “have no legal status as precedents in relation to business”, as of now,156 
because the Court did not decide Unocal on its merit, but vacated it when parties reached 
a settlement on 13 December 2004. Nevertheless, the settlement included direct 
compensation and “substantial assistance” via funds for programs to improve living 
conditions, health care, and education of the Burmese villagers, thereby advancing the 
right to an adequate standard of living. 
In Eastman Kodak Co v Kavlin,157 the plaintiff was involved in a contractual dispute 
with a Bolivian company and claimed a conspiracy on the part of the firm and the 
Bolivian authorities to imprison him. The District Court observed that “it would be a 
strange tort system that imposed liability on state actors but not on those who conspired 
with them to perpetrate illegal acts through the coercive use of state power”. Other cases 
include Wiwa v Royal Dutch Shell,158 for complicity in human rights abuses in Nigeria; 
and Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy,159 for complicity of the Canadian 
company in genocide in Sudan.160 Khulumani et al v Barclays161 was a setback in terms 
                                                 
155 Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises E/CN.4/2006/97 para 9 22 Feb 2006 available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/110/27/PDF/G0611027.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter Ruggie Interim 
Report] para 72. 
156 Above, para 72 n 25. Cf Chambers (note 153 above) 16 (arguing that, with the Unical settlement, “it is unknown where 
the law now stands”). 
157 Eastman Kodak Co v Kavlin 978 F Supp 1078 (SD Fla 1997).  
158 Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum 226 F 3d 88 (2d Cir 2000) (charging Shell with complicity in the 10 November 1995 
hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and John Kpuinen, two of nine leaders of MOSOP, in the torture and detention of Owens 
Wiwa, and in the wounding of a woman, peacefully protesting the bulldozing of her crops in preparation for a Shell 
pipeline, who was shot by Nigerian troops called in by Shell). See also Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum 392 F3d 812 (5th 
Cir 2004). 
159 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy 374 F Supp 2d 331 (SDNY 2005). 
160 As set out in the most recent decision, the complainant’s allegations are that “Talisman and the Government worked 
together to devise a plan for the security of the oil fields”; that Talisman “hired its own military advisors to coordinate 
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of the invocation of ATCA for corporate human rights abuses. An NGO, representing 
32,000 victims of the apartheid regime, instituted the suit against many TNCs (among 
them Barclay’s and Citigroup banks and such mining companies as Rio Tinto) for their 
alleged role in supporting and profiting from South Africa’s apartheid regime. The New 
York District Court held that ATCA does not provide for aiding and abetting theory of 
liability.  
Sometimes, a bill of rights influences a court’s interpretation and development of the 
common law in the equivalent situation. The jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court illustrates this proposition. Du Plessis v De Klerk162 was one of the 
early cases in South Africa where the issue of horizontal application of human rights to 
non-state actors came up for consideration. The owner of a private airline sued a 
newspaper for defamation in connection with a series of news stories asserting that the 
plaintiff had run guns to participants in the Angolan civil war. The newspaper argued that 
the Interim South African Constitution’s protection of freedom of expression insulated it 
from liability. A sharply divided Constitutional Court denied the existence of direct 
horizontal effect under the Interim Constitution. Writing on behalf of the majority, Justice 
Kentridge concluded that a common law infringement of an entrenched right, insofar as it 
is the basis of some form of governmental action, is subject to direct constitutional 
challenge. However, the Bill of Rights did not apply directly to the common law when 
                                                                                                                                                 
military strategy with the Government”; and that there were regular “meetings involving Talisman, Army intelligence, and 
the Ministry of Energy and Mining where Talisman would map out areas intended for exploration and they would discuss 
how to dispose of civilians in those areas.” Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy No 01 Civ9882 2005 WL 
2082847 *2 (SDNY 30 Aug 2005). See also Chambers (note 153 above) 16. 
161 Khulumani et al v Barclays, in re South African Apartheid Litigation 346 F Supp 2d 538 (SDNY 2004). 
162 See Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 SACLR LEXIS 1 (CC). 
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relied upon by a private party in a private dispute and where no act of government was 
relied upon to support the action.163 
 Justice Kriegler (joined by Justice Didcott) dissented, interpreting section 35(3) of 
the Interim Constitution164 to imply that values embodied in the Bill of Rights would 
permeate the common law in all aspects, including private litigation. He argued that the 
text of the Constitution revealed that its framers had proclaimed far more sweeping aims 
than the mere repression of state power and that the primacy of equality in the 
Constitution’s structure compelled horizontality.165 This dissenting opinion accords with 
earlier rulings by lower courts sanctifying horizontality. In Mandela v Falati,166 the 
Witwatersrand Division of the Supreme Court addressed the issue of horizontal 
application on the question whether an injunction to bar the publication of allegedly 
defamatory material was permissible. The Court held that the Constitution’s supremacy 
clause and section 7(2)—extending its application “to all law in force and all 
administrative decisions taken and acts performed during the period of operation of this 
Constitution”—implicitly supported the direct horizontal application of the Bill of Rights.  
In Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd,167 a military general brought a defamation case 
against a newspaper on the ground that its report contained false allegations accusing him 
                                                 
163 Above, 80-85. The Court’s conclusion was derived from sec 7 of the Interim Constitution, according to which the 
rights’ guarantees would bind all legislative and executive organs of the state at all levels of government, thus implying 
that the judiciary, while applying the common law between private parties, was not bound by the Bill of Rights. 
164 See South African (Interim) Constitution 1993 sec 35(3) (providing, “[i]n the interpretation of any law and the 
application and development of the common law and customary law, a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and 
objects of this Chapter”). 
165 Du Plessis (note 162 above) 198-201. For a detailed commentary, see D Futch ‘Du Plessis v De Klerk: South Africa’s 
Bill of Rights and the Issue of Horizontal Application’ (1997) 22 North Carolina Journal of International Law & 
Commercial Regulation 1009. 
166 See Mandela v Falati 1994 SACLR LEXIS 290 (SC). 
167 See Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 SACLR LEXIS 13 (SC). 
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of having committed racial violence. The Witswatersrand Division of the Supreme Court 
held that a defamatory statement relating to “free and fair political activity is 
constitutionally protected, even if false unless the plaintiff shows that, in all the 
circumstances of its publication, it was unreasonably made”.168 In developing the 
common law of defamation applicable between private parties, the Court applied the 
constitutional principle of freedom of speech and expression and proposed the balancing 
test of reasonableness as a defence, as opposed to the existing animus injuriandi test.169  
In Gardener v Whitaker,170 the Eastern Cape Division of the Supreme Court 
enunciated the rationale behind horizontality. The basic idea is that, since the foundation 
of society is to be found in the Bill of Rights, these rights would be undermined if the 
Constitution is limited to public law sphere to the exclusion of private law relationships. 
Thus, in Motala v University of Natal,171 a university’s admissions policy instituted an 
affirmative action program allowing a quota for the admission of Indian students to the 
medical school at the University of Natal and a non-uniform system for reviewing 
applicants. The Durban and Coast Local Division of the Supreme Court upheld a 
challenge to the policy, as constituting an unfair discrimination and, hence, a violation of 
the Bill of Rights. The Court also held the rights in question as capable of direct 
horizontal application.172 
                                                 
168 Above, 90. 
169 Above, 33-40. 
170 Gardener v Whitaker 1994 SACLR LEXIS 284 (SC). 
171 Motala v University of Natal 1995 SACLR LEXIS 256 (SC). 
172 See above, 22-23. 
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A combined reading of sections 8(2) and 173 of the final South African Constitution 
1996 appears to provide bases for the horizontal application of rights. Section 8(2) 
provides that the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person, “if, and to the extent that 
any of its provisions are applicable to such person taking into account the nature of the 
right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right”. Section 173 extends the power to 
develop the common law to the Constitutional Court. These sections, plus the fact that 
courts are bound by the Bill of Rights, lead to the conclusion that the Constitution ensures 
direct horizontal application of rights.173 Indeed, some provisions of the Constitution 
admits of explicit application against private parties, like section 9(3) prohibiting unfair, 
privatised discrimination; section 15(2) imposing obligations on state aided institutions in 
respect of religious observance; section 29(3) placing obligations on private schools; and 
section 12(1)(c) on the right to be free from all forms of violence on all from either public 
or private sources.  
In general, the Court must carry out a four-stage analysis to examine whether a 
horizontal application is suitable, in light of section 8(3).174 It must satisfy itself that no 
legislation gives effect to the right as between private persons. It must determine whether 
there is a common law rule that gives effect to such a right. In the absence of a legislation 
or common law rule that gives effect to this right, the court must develop common law 
rules to give effect to that right. In applying or developing a common law rule, the court 
may limit the right, provided the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1). 
                                                 
173 See D Davis Democracy and Deliberation (1999) 108-109; J Sarkin ‘The Common Law in South Africa: Pro Apartheid 
or Pro Democracy?’ (1999) 23 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 1 18. See also J Sarkin ‘The Drafting 
of South Africa’s Final Constitution from a Human-Rights Perspective’ (1999) 47 American Journal of Comparative Law 
67.  
174 Section 8(3)(a) of the South African Constitution 1996 requires courts, when applying a right to a private party, to give 
effect to the right by applying, or if necessary by developing the common law. 
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In Minister of Public Works v Khayalami Ridge Environmental Association,175 the 
Constitutional Court applied the right of access to housing against a private 
environmental organisation that attempted to obstruct a government plan to build a 
temporary camp for flood victims. The Court held that the government’s obligation to 
provide access to adequate housing outweighed other countervailing considerations, 
including absence of legislation authorising such a use and argument that the camp 
violated the municipal-planning scheme and environmental laws.  
Sprigman and others argue that the South African Constitution does not provide for or 
mandate, but only permits, a direct horizontal application of rights.176 They argue that the 
Constitution only preserves the indirect horizontal application of rights recognised by the 
Court in Du Plessis and that its section 8(3) is inconsistent with the scheme of direct 
horizontal application. They confine even indirect application of the Bill of Rights to 
those instances where legislation does not give effect to a right.177  
While debates about the direct horizontal application of rights in the South African 
Constitution continue, “we may”, says Wahi, “safely conclude that there exists a measure 
of direct horizontal application of certain rights and indirect horizontal effect with respect 
to other rights in the South African Constitution”.178 
The increasing judicialisation of corporate human rights behaviour shows that 
international law is not an unalterable orthodoxy. In the general conditions of life, today’s 
                                                 
175 Minister of Public Works v Khayalami Ridge Environmental Association 2001 (7) BCLR 652 (CC). 
176 See C Sprigman & M Osborne ‘Du Plessis is Not Dead: South Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the Application of the 
Bill of Rights to Private Disputes’ (1999) 15 South African Journal of Human Rights 25 30. 
177 See above, 37. 
178 Wahi (note 10 above) 393, citing FI Michelman ‘The Bill of Rights, the Common Law, and the Freedom-Friendly State’ 
(2003) 58 University of Miami Law Review 401 407-08. 
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unexamined faith may become tomorrow’s heresy (and vice versa). Although there are 
fixed poles between which judges exercise an interstitial competence—constitutions, 
statutes, precedents, public policy, etcetera—, there are also “leeways for judicial 
choice”, as Stone terms judicial discretion and lawmaking.179 Judges should walk through 
these “leeways” to work out norms on corporate accountability. 
 
4. The UN Draft Norms for TNCs 
The most comprehensive international statement on the human rights responsibilities 
of corporations was the UN Draft Norms for TNCs of 2003.180 The Draft Norms was 
prepared in response to the resolution of the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, 
wherein the Sub-Commission asked its Working Group on the Working Methods and 
Activities of Transnational Corporations to “contribute to the drafting of relevant norms 
concerning human rights and transnational corporations and other economic units whose 
activities have an impact on human rights”.181 The Draft Norms recognises the primary 
role of states in guaranteeing human rights,182 but it also set out the key human rights 
responsibilities of TNCs183 with some degree of specificity. It extends responsibilities to 
                                                 
179 J Stone Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings (1964) 234 274–78. 
180 See Draft Norms for TNCs (note 72 above). See, in general, Draft Commentary on the Norms of Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN4/Sub2/2003/XX 
E/CN4/Sub2/2003/WG2/WP1 [hereinafter Draft Commentary]. 
181 See UN Doc E/CN4/Sub2/RES/2001/3. 
182 See Draft Norms for TNCs (note 72 above) para 1. 
183 As above. See also pmbl (“Recognizing that even though States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the 
fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of, and protect human rights, transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, as organs of society, are also responsible for promoting and securing the human rights set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”) (italics in the original). 
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TNCs on the human right to equal opportunity and non-discrimination,184 right to security 
of persons,185 and the prohibition of forced or compulsory labour.186 Others are respect 
for national sovereignty,187 consumer protection,188 and environmental protection.189 The 
Draft Norms calls on TNCs and other business enterprise to adopt, disseminate, and 
implement internal rules of operation, “[a]s an initial step towards implementing these 
Human Rights Responsibilities”.190 
One of the strongest criticisms of the Draft Norms comes from John Ruggie—the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (SRSG).191 The SRSG negated the Draft 
Norms for the “near-universal opposition” to it by business and the disinclination by 
governments to adopt them.192 He further argues that its legal and conceptual foundations 
are poorly conceived and, therefore, highly problematic in their potential effects.193 He 
believes that, if implemented as a treaty, the Draft Norms could permit persons to sue a 
company for failing to provide extensive benefits to its employees and local 
                                                 
184 See above, para 2. 
185 See above, para 3. 
186 See above, para 4. 
187 See above, para 10. 
188 See above, para 13 (calling on TNCs to act in accordance with fair business, marketing, and advertising practices and to 
take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and quality of the goods and services they provide). 
189 See above, para 14. 
190 See above, para 15. 
191 John Ruggie, a Harvard professor, was appointed by the UN Secretary-General on 28 July 2005, pursuant to 
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2005/69 E/CN4/2005/L10/Add17 20 Apr 2005 [hereinafter Resolution 69], 
as approved by the Economic and Social Council Decision 2006/273 of 25 July 2005. 
192 J Ruggie Opening Statement to UN Human Rights Council Geneva 25 Sept 2006 available at http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Ruggie-statement-to-UN-Human-Rights-Council-25-Sep-2006.pdf [hereinafter Ruggie Address]. 
193 Above. 
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communities, or for failing to prevent localized violations of human rights. In the best 
case scenario, it would do little more than keep lawyers in gainful employment for a 
generation; while in the worst case, they would turn TNCs into more benign twenty-first 
century versions of East India companies, undermining the capacity of developing states 
to generate independent and democratically controlled institutions capable of acting in 
the public interest.194 
Notwithstanding these fault lines, the UN Norms set important benchmarks for future 
normative initiatives. Often, the creation of standards based on consensus leads to a 
lowest common denominator result.195 Thus, though not legally binding, the Norms point 
to the evolution of significant changes in global thinking about TNCs and the character 
and source of their regulation, with possible significant ramifications for domestic law.196 
The ideas embodied in the Norms, together with the global community’s support, also 
“illustrate the development in fact of a mechanics of interplay between national, 
international, public, and private law systems in allocating and competing for regulatory 
power. The regularization and institutionalization of these mechanics evidence 
transnational law coming into its own as a separate field of power”.197  
 
5. The SRSG and His Mandate 
                                                 
194 Above. 
195 See Amnesty International Letter to John Ruggie OSG/2006/30/ja 27 Apr 2006 available at http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Amnesty-Intl-comments-on-Ruggie-interim-report-27-Apr-2006.pdf [hereinafter Amnesty Letter].  
196 See LC Backer ‘Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law’ (2006) 37 Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review 287 287. 
197 Above. 
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The SRSG is mandated to identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility 
and accountability for TNCs and other business enterprises with regard to human rights; 
to elaborate on the role of States in effectively regulating and adjudicating the role of 
these entities with regard to human rights, including through international cooperation; to 
research and clarify the implications for these entities of concepts such as “complicity” 
and “sphere of influence”; to develop materials and methodologies for undertaking 
human rights impact assessments of the activities of TNCs and other business enterprises; 
and to compile a compendium of best practices of States, TNCs, and other business 
enterprises.198 This mandate “touches on foundational questions in the evolution of 
modern international law and governance”.199 
The SRSG submitted an Interim Report to the UN Human Rights Council in February 
2006200 and a fuller report in March 2007.201 In his Interim Report, the SRSG 
recommended a new approach for regulating TNCs’ activities, based on “principled 
pragmatism”. Under this approach, states would be the venue for calling TNCs to 
account; and he believes that rogue states that simply do not enforce human-rights 
standards would not easily weaken a treaty following this approach. Instead, a decision to 
enforce the standards would rest with governments of the corporations’ home countries. 
In his 2007 report, the SRSG noted that “it does not seem that the international human 
rights instruments discussed here currently impose direct legal responsibilities on 
                                                 
198 See Resolution 69 (note 191 above) para 1. 
199 John Ruggie Opening Statement to UN Human Rights Council Geneva 25 Sept 2006 available at http://www.reports-
and-materials.org/Ruggie-statement-to-UN-Human-Rights-Council-25-Sep-2006.pdf [hereinafter Ruggie, Address]. 
200 See Ruggie Interim Report (note 155 above). 
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corporations. Even so, corporations are under growing scrutiny by the international 
human rights mechanisms”.202 The SRSG reported on the many innovations that have 
occurred over the years in developing corporate responsibility and accountability. This 
Chapter has already examined some of these initiatives, but the SRSG was particularly 
enthused by soft law framework, which “exhibits innovation and policy diffusion”.203 
Some commentators criticise the SRSG’s “principled pragmatism” approach, 
concerned that it “may lead to underestimating the need for binding legal principles and 
guidelines as well as the state of applicable international law”.204 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Globalisation provides great opportunities to the world, but its benefits are unevenly 
shared and its costs are unevenly distributed. Africa has particularly not felt the 
distribution of benefits of globalisation in any significant way. The deep fault line 
between the rich and poor and the ever-increasing gap between the developed and 
developing countries pose a major threat to global prosperity, security, and stability. 
Multilateral institutions have a unique role to play in meeting the challenges and 
opportunities of globalization.205 Africa is part of the global community, and if the term 
                                                                                                                                                 
201 See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises A/HRC/4/035 9 Feb 2007 available at http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Documents/SRSG-report-Human-Rights-Council-19-Feb-2007.pdf (hereinafter SRSG Report). 
202 Above, para 44. 
203 Above, para 85 (adding: “The biggest challenge is bringing such efforts to a scale where they become truly systemic 
interventions”). 
204 Amnesty Letter (note 195 above). 
205 See Commission on Human Rights ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’ Res 2003/23 
pmbl (stressing, “globalization should be guided by the fundamental principles that underpin the corpus of human rights, 
such as equality, participation, accountability, non-discrimination, at both the national and international levels, respect for 
diversity and international cooperation and solidarity”). 
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has any meaning, then it must encompass “the one continent in which a genuinely global 
political, economic, and social program merges practical and moral considerations”.206 
The emergent global governance needs some fundamental readjustments, given the 
failure or inability of states to control the negative impact of globalisation, including 
corporate human rights abuses. Existing initiatives have not afforded sufficient 
guarantees for the protection of persons or environments from corporate wrongs. It is true 
that international law no longer possesses the aesthetic purity of a straight line, thereby 
losing the certainty, predictability and regularity of a normative pyramid.207 It is equally 
true that the last thing victims of human rights violations need are more un-enforced 
declarations, but these are no reasons to throw away the baby with the bath water. What 
is required for international law’s redemption is to deconstruct its contradictions, and 
then reconstruct it—what Rorty calls ‘therapeutic redescription.”208 As for TNCs, lines of 
enunciated principles must connect dots of practice if shapes of legitimate rules are to 
emerge. “There can be no substitute,” says Amnesty International, “for the elaboration of 
general norms and standards with general applicability to corporate and other business 
conduct”.209 
Although some domestic courts are increasingly taking on TNCs for human rights 
abuses, there are no corresponding international judicial mechanisms, especially where 
                                                 
206 H Kissinger Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the Twenty-first Century (2002) 209. 
207 See M Prost ‘Born Again Lawyer: FATU as an Antidote to the ‘Positivist Blues’’ (2006) 7(12) German Law Journal 
1037 1042. 
208 R Rorty Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) 9. 
209 Amnesty Letter (note 195 above). Cf Kinley & Chambers (note 126 above) 450 (“[A]n important element of the project 
to curtail human rights abuses by companies will be missing without a common, enforceable set of international standards 
to which transnational corporations are required to adhere, whether through domestic law or directly under international 
law.”). 
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domestic remedies are not available, adequate or sufficient. Whenever a general 
agreement is reached on those treaty norms that apply to TNCs, there will be need to 
elaborate and adopt additional protocols to permit individual and NGO petitions against 
TNCs before international human rights tribunals. Host and ratifying states could then 
annex such protocols to their joint venture and other agreements with TNCs, thus 
indirectly making them parties to such treaties. This is a guarded proposal, but it 
underscores the need for further research on the methodology for transposing existing 
human rights norms and mechanisms to TNCs. 
In the meantime—and probably in the long run as well—states will remain primary 
bearers of human rights obligations,210 but a narrow interpretation and application of the 
corpus of human rights subtract from its credibility. Non-states actors should be made to 
play active roles in vindicating human rights. TNCs, in particular, should become 
channels of blessings in advancing socio-economic rights in Africa, through active 
involvement in economic development. Like the OECD and the UN, the AU should work 
on elaborating standards for TNCs operating in Africa. African states and institutions 
should “adapt to a dynamic world and create regulation that protects all sectors of 
society”.211 
                                                 
210 Cf ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’ (note 111 above) para 1 (“Recognizes that, 
while globalization, by its impact on, inter alia, the role of the State, may affect human rights, the promotion and protection 
of all human rights is first and foremost the responsibility of the State”). 
211 Aguirre (note 10 above) 56-7. 
  
Chapter Six 
 
AN ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY:  
THE RIGHTS TO WORK AND TO SOCIAL SECURITY IN AFRICA 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter illustrates some of the propositions attempted in this thesis, using the rights 
to work and to social security (collectively social rights) as templates for analysis. It is 
both narrative and prescriptive, reviewing the international and municipal instruments on 
social rights and examining how wrong-footed policies and blind and bland 
implementation of neo-liberal economic programmes undermine the implementation of 
social rights in Africa. The Chapter calls on all stakeholders—the AU, its Member States, 
judicial institutions, and the civil society—to keep faith with the principle of indivisibility 
of all rights. It calls on states, especially, to adopt concrete and positive measures for the 
realisation of these rights.  
While using the African Charter as a template for analysis, the Chapter will call in aid 
comparative international law and jurisprudence, including instruments of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). It will also invoke aspects of political economy, 
since it prescribes an integrated approach for the advancement of social rights. 
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6.2 The Legal Regime on Social Rights in Africa 
Chapter One of the thesis discussed the “cross-cutting” nature of some rights, but some 
treaties make a point of enshrining “core” socio-economic rights. The African Charter 
guarantees such rights, including the right to work and equal remuneration for equal 
work;1 the right to “the best attainable state of physical and mental health,” including 
medical care for the sick;2 and the protection of the family, its morals, women, children, 
and the disabled.3 This Segment focuses on two social rights—the rights to work and to 
social security—as templates for analysis.  
 
6.2.1 The Right to Work in Text and Context 
Work is a human right because it is a means to an end—human survival. It is also a 
measure of human dignity, by creating the material wealth in society and making human 
flourishing possible. Work enhances social solidarity, which is vital for a society’s 
survival. Employment, which is integral to work, ensures income for people and plays a 
positive role in economic growth. It stimulates consumption and production and ensures 
the viability and expansion of the domestic market. The right to work, thus, is both an 
inherent and instrumental freedom. As an instrumental freedom, work promotes 
development and contributes generally to the expansion of human freedom.4  
                                                 
1 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted 27 June 1981 entry into force 21 Oct 1986 Doc 
OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev5 (1982) 21 International Legal Materials 59 [hereinafter African Charter or Charter] art 15. 
2 See above, art 16. 
3 See above, art 18. 
4 Cf A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 37 (“The effectiveness of freedom as an instrument lies in the fact that 
different kinds of freedom interrelate with one another, and freedom of one type may greatly help in advancing freedom of 
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Recognising the importance of work, the African Charter guarantees it as a human 
right: “Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory 
conditions, and shall receive equal pay for equal work.”5 In fact, the Charter uniquely 
views work as a duty, by providing that every individual has a duty “[t]o work to the best 
of his abilities and competence …”6 Commenting on the Charter’s provision, Sieghart 
notes: “This is how it in fact appears to many millions of subsistence farmers and their 
families [in Africa], who claim no ‘right’ to tend their crops, but would rapidly starve if 
they did not.”7 Sieghart’s claim is supported by many municipal constitutions in Africa, 
which also classify work as a duty,8 including those of Angola,9 Cape Verde,10 Egypt,11 
Equatorial Guinea,12 Libya,13 Mali,14 Mozambique,15 Sao Tome and Principe,16 and 
Tanzania.17 
                                                                                                                                                 
other types. The two roles are thus linked by empirical connections, relating freedom of one kind to freedom of other 
kinds”). 
5 African Charter (note 1 above) art 15. 
6 Above, art 29(6). 
7 P Sieghart The International Law of Human Rights (1983) 216 n.1. 
8 See, in general, C Heyns (ed) Human Rights Law in Africa (vol 2 2004) [hereinafter Human Rights Law in Africa] (citing 
right to work provisions in the constitutions of African Countries). 
9 See Constitution of Angola sec 46(1). 
10 See Constitution of Cape Verde sec 60(2). 
11 See Constitution of Egypt sec 13. 
12 See Constitution of Equatorial Guinea sec 25. 
13 See Constitution of Libya sec 4. 
14 See Constitution of Mali sec 19. 
15 See Constitution of Mozambique sec 88(1). 
16 See Constitution of Sao Tome & Principe sec 41(1). 
17 See Constitution of Tanzania sec 25(1). 
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The African Charter’s provision on the right to work is vaguely phrased, making its 
scope from the text alone unclear. Is Article 15 a noun or a verb? Does it vest a duty on a 
government to provide work, or is it merely a negative obligation to secure “equitable 
and satisfactory conditions” for work? I take the position that the Charter’s provision is 
not merely a verb, asserting something about a subject, but that it commits states to 
realise this right through a national employment policy that provides opportunities for 
work, with institutions and techniques to achieve that objective. This conclusion is 
fortified by the fact that one of the objects of the Charter, as reflected in its preamble, is 
the satisfaction of economic, social, and cultural rights.18 Besides, the primary 
responsibility of a state is the welfare of its citizens and the legitimacy of a government 
depends on whether it meets the basic needs of its citizens. A state’s authority to make 
binding law puts it in a unique position to generate revenue through taxes and other fees, 
which should enable it to obtain resources needed to fulfil cost-intensive human rights 
obligations.19 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’20 provisions on the right to work 
include the right “to free choice of employment”,21 while the ICESCR includes “the right 
of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or 
                                                 
18 Although the preamble is not part of a treaty’s substantive provisions, it can be taken into consideration when 
interpreting the treaty; in fact, consideration of the preamble is normally necessary in cases of doubt. See Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted 22 May 1969 1155 UNTS 331 entry into force 27 Jan 1980 [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention] art 31 (providing that “the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall . . . includ[e] its 
preamble”). 
19 See JA Hessbruegge ‘Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of Non-State Actors’ (2005) 11 Buffalo Human 
Rights Law Review 21 26. 
20 Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 10 Dec 1948 GA Res 217 A (III) GAOR 3d Sess [hereinafter UDHR]. 
21 Above, art 23(1). 
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accepts”.22 The Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa23 
requires States Parties to “guarantee women equal opportunities in work and career 
advancement and other economic opportunities”,24 such as “equality of access to 
employment,”25 “equal remuneration for jobs of equal value for women and men,”26 and 
“freedom to choose their occupation”.27  
The phrase “equitable and satisfactory conditions”, as used in the African Charter,28 is 
“highly subjective” and lacks any precise definition.29 Its equivalent provisions in the 
UDHR and ICESCR are not helpful either; they simply refer to “just and favourable” 
conditions.30 Further, none of these instruments prescribes the means for achieving these 
“equitable and satisfactory” or “just and favourable” ends. The European Social Charter 
(ESC)31 could provide some guidance on the interpretation of the African Charter’s 
provision, though it is not binding on African states. The ESC obligates its Contracting 
Parties to “issue safety and health regulations [for employers and workers]”; “provide for 
the enforcement of such regulations by measures of supervision”; and “consult, as 
                                                 
22 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted 16 Dec 1966 entry into force 23 Mar 1976 993 
UNTS 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] art 6(1). 
23 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa adopted 11 July 2003 
[hereinafter Women Protocol]. 
24 Above, art 13. 
25 Above, art 13(a). 
26 Above, art 13(b). 
27 Above, art 13(d). 
28 See African Charter (note 1 above) art 15. 
29 F Ouguergouz The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and 
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2003) 184 (arguing that “it would have been preferable to define [the phrase] more 
precisely”). 
30 UDHR (note 20 above) art 23(1); ICESCR (note 22 above) art 7. 
31 European Social Charter adopted 18 Oct 1961 529 UNTS 89 (entered into force 26 Feb 1965) [hereinafter ESC]. 
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appropriate, employers’ and workers’ organisations on measures intended to improve 
industrial safety and health”.32  
The right to work includes the corollary right to equal pay for equal work, which is an 
aspect of economic justice demanding fair compensation for a person’s labour in relation 
to others. This right is “precisely drafted” and defined in international treaties to be 
judicially enforceable.33 The African Charter provides that every individual “shall receive 
equal pay for equal work”.34 This is equivalent to the Women Protocol’s “equal 
remuneration for jobs of equal value”;35 the UDHR’s “just and favourable 
remuneration”;36 and the ICESCR’s “[f]air wages and equal remuneration for work of 
equal value”.37 In each case, the test is the standard of living the pay provides for the 
worker and his family, since living standards relate to the richness of a person’s life.38 
The UDHR links this “standard’ not only to factors of food, clothing, and housing—
which form a specific subject-matter in Article 11 of ICESCR—but also to health, 
medical care, social service, and security.39 Thus, the pay must be one “worthy of human 
dignity”,40 or “suitable” and “in proportion to his capacity and skill”,41 or “a decent 
                                                 
32 Above, art 3. 
33 See RR Churchill & U Khaliq ‘The Collective Complaints System of the European Social Charter: An Effective 
Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic and Social Rights?’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International 
Law 417 420 (arguing also that for rights such as equal pay or consultation rights in the workplace, a judicial remedy could 
be suitable). 
34 African Charter (note 1 above) art. 15. 
35 Women Protocol (note 23 above) art 13(b). 
36 UDHR (note 20 above) art 23(3). 
37 ICESCR (note 22 above) art 7(a)(i). 
38 See J Dreze & A Sen Hunger and Public Action (1989) 12. 
39 See UDHR (note 20 above) art 25(1). 
40 Above, art 23(3). 
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living”.42 In Malawi African Association v Mauritania,43 the African Commission held 
that “unremunerated work is tantamount to a violation of the right to respect for the 
dignity inherent in the human being”,44 a decision that further demonstrates the 
interconnectedness of all rights. 
The African Charter does not provide for the right to rest and leisure, but the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child45 understandably guarantees this right to 
children, including the right “to engage in play and recreational activities appropriate to 
the age of the child”.46 Universal instruments guarantee to workers the right to rest and 
leisure, starting with the UDHR, which guarantee includes “reasonable limitations of 
working hours” and “holidays with pay”.47 The ICESCR treats rest and leisure as part of 
“just and favourable conditions of work”; and includes the right to “remuneration for 
public holidays”.48 These other instruments may have influenced the African 
Commission in integrating the right to rest and leisure in its guidelines for states’ reports 
on socio-economic rights. The guidelines enjoin states to report on “the legislative or 
other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognised 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art XIV adopted 2 May 1948 Ninth International Conference of 
American States reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining To Human Rights in the Inter-American Systems 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71 17 (1988) [hereinafter American Declaration]. 
42 ICESCR (note 22 above) art 7(a)(ii). 
43 Malawi Afr Ass’n v Mauritania Comm Nos 54/91 61/91 98/93 164/97 & 210/98 1999–2000 African Annual Activity 
Report Annex VII. 
44 Above, para 135. 
45 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child adopted 11 July 1990 entry into force 28 Nov 1999 OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/TSG/Rev 1 [hereinafter African Child Charter]. 
46 Above, art 12. 
47 UDHR (note 20 above) art 24. 
48 See ICESCR (note 22 above) art. 7(d). 
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and guaranteed by the present Charter”, including the rights to rest, leisure, limitation of 
workers hours, and periodic holidays with pay.49 
The African Charter also contains no provision protecting vulnerable groups from 
forced or exploitative labour, which is surprising, considering that forced and exploitative 
labour, in particular of children, had been in practice long before the adoption of the 
Charter.50  One of the shortcomings of the Charter was its failure to adequately provide 
for rights of vulnerable groups, such as women and children. Separate treaties or “special 
protocols”51 now address these omissions. The African Child Charter, on its part, protects 
every child “from all forms of economic exploitation and from performing any work that 
is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral, 
or social development”.52 The relevant judicial institutions in Africa should interpret 
provisions abolishing child labour to include the right to compensation for work 
performed, as this is a necessary condition for abolishing the practice. Meanwhile, the 
Women Protocol guarantees to women the right to protection from exploitation by their 
employers;53 the equal application of taxation laws to women and men;54 and the “right of 
                                                 
49 See African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights State Reporting Procedure: Information Sheet No 4 [hereinafter 
State Reporting Procedure] available at www.achpr.org [hereinafter African Commission website]. 
50 See eg NJ Udombana ‘Child Labour and the Challenges of Human Rights in Nigeria’ (1998) 11(2) Lesotho Law Journal 
269. 
51 See African Charter (note 1 above) art 66 (providing “special protocols or agreements may, if necessary, supplement” 
the Charter’s provisions). 
52 African Child Charter (note 45 above) art 15(1). 
53 See Women Protocol (note 23 above) art 13(d). 
54 Above, art 13(j). 
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salaried women to the same allowances and entitlements as those granted to salaried men 
for their spouses and children”.55 
Although the African Charter does not expressly provide for the right to form and join 
trade unions, this right could be imputed from the Charter’s guarantee of the right to 
freedom of association,56 since the right to work implies the corollary right to organize or 
unionise in pursuit of workers’ common interests, including the right to strike. 
Comparative law and jurisprudence support this conclusion. The European Convention 
guarantees the right to freedom of association and links it with an individual’s “right to 
form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests”.57 Some scholars regard 
the Convention’s Article 11 as “unhelpful in its vagueness”;58 that is to say, “[t]he 
protection offered by Article 11 to the rights to freedom of assembly and association, is 
what might be described as bottom line protection”.59 In National Union of Belgian 
Police v Belgium,60 the European Court of Human Rights held that the right to form and 
                                                 
55 Above, art 13(k). 
56 African Charter (note 1 above) art 10. Cf UDHR (note 20 above) arts 20, 23 (guaranteeing the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association as well as the “right to form and to join trade unions”) and International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights adopted 16 Dec 1966 entry into force 23 Mar 1976 GA Res 2200 A (XXI); UN GAOR 21st Sess 
Supp No 16 UN Doc A/6316 (1966) 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] art 22 (assuring that “[e]veryone shall have the 
right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions”). 
57 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms opened for signature 4 Nov 1950 
ETS No 5 213 UNTS 221 as amended by Protocol No 11 (entry into force 1 Nov 1998) ETS No 155 (1994) 33 
International Legal Material 960 [hereinafter European Convention or ECHR] art 11(1). Cf ESC (note 31 above) art 5. 
58 S Lewis-Anthony ‘Case Law of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1994) 34A Yearbook of 
European Convention on Human Rights 27 37 & 43. 
59 Above. 
60 Nat’l Union of Belgian Police v Belgium 19 Eur Ct HR (ser A) (1975). 
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join trade unions is not a separate right but a part of the general right to freedom of 
association.61 
The European Court has, according to Mowbray, been “reluctan[t] to recognise the 
existence [of] unqualified substantive trade union rights, such as the right to strike”, 
arguably, because of “the Court’s desire not to encroach upon the regime of economic 
and social rights created by the European Social Charter”.62 However, in Swedish Engine 
Drivers’ Union v Sweden,63 the Court held that the right to form and join trade unions 
applies to a state in its capacity as an employer, whether the state’s relations with its 
employees is governed by public or private law.64 The Court reasoned that “[t]he 
[European] Convention nowhere makes an express distinction between the function of a 
Contracting State as holder of public power and its responsibilities as employer”.65 
Furthermore, the phrase “for the protection of his interests”, as used in the European 
Convention, is not redundant: it denotes purpose and shows that “the Convention 
safeguards freedom to protect the occupational interests of trade union members by trade 
union action, the conduct and development of which the Contracting States must both 
permit and make possible”.66 
                                                 
61 Above, paras 37–38. Cf B Hepple ‘Freedom to Form and Join or Not to Join Trade Unions’ (1994) 34A Yearbook of 
European Convention on Human Rights 162 168 (arguing that the specific reference to trade unions in Article 11 of the 
ECHR was designed to ensure that they would be treated as “associations” under the Convention, irrespective of their 
categorization and status under the domestic law of member states). 
62 A Mowbray Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights (2001) 563. 
63 Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v Sweden 20 Eur Ct HR (Ser A) 617 (1976). 
64 Above, para 37. 
65 Above. 
66 Above, para 40. Contra Nat’l Union of Belgian Police 19 Eur Ct HR (ser A) para 13 (Fitzmaurice J concurring) (arguing 
that the phrase “for the protection of his interests” may have made “certainty more certain”, but that it “does not strictly 
add anything of substance that would not already be there”). 
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The ICESCR expressly guarantees “the right of everyone to form trade unions and 
join the trade union of his choice . . . for the promotion and protection of his economic 
and social interests”.67 It guarantees to trade unions the right “to establish national 
federations or confederations” and the latter’s right “to form or join international trade-
union organizations”;68 obviously envisaging such organizations as the ILO. The 
ICESCR also guarantees to trade unions the right “to function freely subject to no 
limitations other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary … for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.69 Lastly, it guarantees the right to 
strike,70 which is the fulcrum of the right to work. 
These treaties subject the right to freedom of association (including trade union 
rights) to “claw-back clauses”, which permit, “in normal circumstances, breach of an 
obligation for a specified number of public reasons”.71 Under the ICESCR, the right to 
strike must be “exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country”,72 while 
the exercise of the right to freedom of association under the African Charter is predicated 
on the beneficiary “abid[ing] by the law”.73 The European Convention, for its part, 
prohibits any restriction on the exercise of the right to freedom of association, “other than 
such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
                                                 
67 See ICESCR (note 22 above) art 8(1)(a). 
68 See above, art 8(1)(b). 
69 See above, art 8(1)(c). 
70 See above, art 8(1)(d). 
71 R Higgins ‘Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties’ (1978) 48 British Yearbook of International Law 281. 
72 ICESCR (note 22 above) art 8(1)(d). 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
303
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others”.74 Furthermore, the right to freedom of association in the African Charter is 
subject to the obligation to “preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity” 
imposed by Article 29,75 but the Charter fails to define the terms “social and national 
solidarity”. Depending on the context, states could abuse such apparently harmless 
phraseology through subjective interpretations. Duties and ideals of solidarity may 
impinge, in clear and serious ways, on the Charter’s definitions of rights. Besides, the 
idea of solidarity, once threatened, may allow forced participation in an organization.  
Fortunately, the African Commission does not treat “claw-back clauses” as ghosts to 
be dreaded. It asserts that the mention of such a clause is not a license for states to use 
domestic laws to justify deprivation of personal freedoms.76 The Commission further 
states that “[t]he regulation of the exercise of the right to freedom of association should 
be consistent with States’ obligations under the African Charter . . . .”77 And, in Civil 
Liberties Organization (in respect of Bar Association) v Nigeria,78 the Commission 
stressed that “competent authorities should not enact provisions which would limit the 
exercise of this freedom. The competent authorities should not override constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                 
73 African Charter (note 1 above) art 10(1). 
74 ECHR (note 57 above) art 11(2). 
75 African Charter (note 1 above) arts 10(2), 29(4). 
76 See Purohit v Gambia Comm No 241/2001 2002–2003African Annual Activity Report Annex VII para 64. 
77 Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Association Fifth Annual Activity Report of the Afr Comm’n on Hum and 
Peoples’ Rts 1991–1992 Annex VII para 3 [hereinafter Resolution on Freedom of Association]. 
78 Civil Liberties Org v Nigeria Comm No 101/93 (2000) AHRLR (ACHPR 1994) reprinted in Seventh Annual Activity 
Rep of the Afr Comm’n on Hum and Peoples’ Rts 1994–1995 Annex VI [hereinafter CLO v Nigeria]. 
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provisions or undermine fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution and 
international human rights standards”.79 
 
6.2.2 The Right to Social Security in Text and Context 
Social security could be defined as the set of policy instruments implemented to 
compensate for the financial consequences of a number of risks should they occur.80 
Liebenberg defines it as “those measures that aim at guaranteeing a certain minimum 
subsistence level, as well as protecting the income of people in situations where it is 
imperilled [sic] owing to various contingencies”.81 These definitions are somewhat 
restrictive in that they are concerned more with replacing redistributive mechanisms that 
break down in the process of socio-economic change. In truth, social security is the 
employment of social means to prevent deprivation or vulnerability to deprivation.82 It 
includes formal (government regulated, public) and informal arrangements. Its two 
strands are social insurance and social assistance; the former is financed by contributions 
from employers and employees, with benefits accruing to contributors; the latter is 
financed by government revenue and targeted at those mostly in need.83 
                                                 
79 Above, para 15. Cf ‘Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Association’ Fifth Annual Activity Report of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1991–1992 Annex VII [hereinafter Resolution on Freedom of Association] 
para 2. 
80 See V Moore et al ‘The Concept of Social Security’ in MP Olivier et al (eds) Social Security Law: General Principles 
(1999) 7. 
81 S Liebenberg ‘The Right to Social Security: Response from a South African Perspective’ in D Brand & S Russell (eds) 
Exploring the Core Content of Socio-Economic Rights: South African and International Perspectives (2002) 147 155 
[hereinafter Exploring the Core Content of Socio-Economic Rights]. 
82 See J Dreze & A Sen ‘Public Action for Social Security: Foundations and Strategy’ in E Ahmad et al (eds) Social 
Security in Developing Countries (1991) 3 5 [hereinafter Social Security in Developing Countries]. 
83 See International Labour Office Introduction to Social Security (1984) 3–5. See, in general, ILO Constitution Annex 
III(f) (2004) (recognizing the ILO’s obligation regarding “the extension of social security measures to provide a basic 
income to all in need of such protection and comprehensive medical care”). 
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In Africa, social security is often thought of in terms of pension funds, medical 
insurance, and disability schemes.84 Either way, social security, like work, is important 
for the well-being of workers, their families, and the community as a whole. If properly 
managed, social security enhances national productivity and supports economic 
development. Empirical research has shown that countries with the best social protection 
systems have extremely high levels of productivity.85 An ILO report suggests that by 
offering good protection to their workforce, countries will further enhance the productive 
potential of their economies.86 This understanding probably explains why most Western 
societies place a high premium on social security, though they deceive their African 
counterparts into adopting phoney austerity measures, downsizing their work force, and 
leaving citizens to their own fate.87 
Mainstream international human rights instruments recognize social security as a 
basic human right; among these are the ICESCR,88 ESC,89 American Declaration,90 and 
the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.91 The ESC’s provisions is more expansive and 
covers four category of persons: “[a]ll workers and their dependents”, who are entitled to 
                                                 
84 See J von Braun ‘Social Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reflections on Policy Challenges’ in Social Security in 
Developing Countries (note 82 above) 395 396. 
85 See eg R Arjona et al ‘Growth, Inequality and Social Protection’ (2003) 29 Canadian Public Policy 119. 
86 See ILO World Labour Report 2000: Income Security and Social Protection in a Changing World (2000) 51–72 
[hereinafter ILO World Labour Report 2000]. 
87 Below Part III. 
88 See ICESCR (note 22 above) art 9. 
89 See ESC (note 31 above) parts I & II. 
90 See American Declaration (note 41 above) art 16. 
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“social security”;92 “[a]nyone without adequate resources”, who is entitled to “social and 
medical assistance”;93 “[e]veryone”, who is entitled to “social welfare services”;94 and 
“[d]isabled persons”, who are entitled to “vocational training, rehabilitation and 
resettlement, whatever the origin and nature of their disability”.95 The UDHR guarantees 
to “[e]veryone, as a member of society, … the right to social security”.96 It expands 
security in six specified eventualities: “unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
old age, [and] other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control”.97 The 
ICESCR similarly recognises “the right of everyone to social security, including social 
insurance,”98 but it fails to specify eventualities that could give rise to social security and 
insurance. 
Like general international human rights law, the African human rights normative 
structure guarantees the right to social security, though some of treaties are vaguely 
worded. The African Charter seemingly limits the right to social security to “[t]he aged 
and the disabled” who are entitled to “special measures of protection in keeping with 
their physical or moral needs”.99 The Women Protocol guarantees social insurance, inter 
                                                                                                                                                 
91 See Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights adopted 17 Nov 1988 OASTS No 69 (entered into force 16 Nov 1999) art 9. 
92 ESC (note 31 above) part I (12). 
93 Above, part I(14). 
94 Above, part I(13). 
95 Above, part I(14). 
96 UDHR (note 20 above) art 22. 
97 Above, art 25. 
98 ICESCR (note 22 above) art 9. 
99 African Charter (note 1 above) art 18(4). 
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alia, to women working in the informal sector100 and to “poor women and women heads 
of families including women from marginalized population groups”.101 The African Child 
Charter also guarantees to children the right to social security, which includes basic 
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services, and social services.102 For handicapped 
children, this guarantee includes the right to “special measures of protection in keeping 
with [their] physical and moral needs and under conditions which ensure […] dignity, 
promote […] self-reliance and active participation in the community”.103 
The ILO has taken pains to elaborate standards on social security, including the 
Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention;104 Equality of Treatment (Social 
Security) Convention;105 Employment Injury Benefits Convention;106 and Invalidity, Old-
Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention.107 Others are the Medical Care and Sickness 
Benefits Convention;108 Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention;109 
Employment Promotion and Protection Against Unemployment Convention;110 Home 
                                                 
100 See Women Protocol (note 23 above) art 13(f). 
101 Above, art 24(a). 
102 See African Child Charter (note 45 above) art 1. 
103 Above, art 13. 
104 See Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention No 102 adopted 28 June 1952 [hereinafter Convention 102]. 
This and other ILO conventions listed hereunder are available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/ convdisp1.htm. 
105 See Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention No 118 adopted 28 June 1962[hereinafter Convention 118]. 
106 See Employment Injury Benefits Convention No 121 adopted 8 July 1964 [Schedule I amended in 1980] [hereinafter 
Convention 121]. 
107 See Invalidity Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention No 128 adopted 29 June 1967[hereinafter Convention 
128]. 
108 See Medical Care and Sickness Benefits Convention No 130 adopted 25 June 1969[hereinafter Convention 130]. 
109 See Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention No 157 adopted 21 June 1982[hereinafter Convention 157]. 
110 See Employment Promotion and Protection Against Unemployment Convention No 168 adopted 21 June 1988 
[hereinafter Convention 168]. 
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Work Convention;111 and Maternity Protection Convention.112 As an illustration, 
Convention 102 obligates ILO Member States to comply, at the time of ratification, with 
at least three of the following parts of the Convention: medical care (“of a preventive or 
curative nature”113), sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, old age benefits, worker’s 
compensation, family, disability, maternity, and survivor’s benefits.114 Of the enumerated 
risks, States must also accept at least one provision concerning unemployment, old-age, 
workers’ compensation, disability, or survivors’ benefits.115 For medical benefits, for 
example, the protected persons shall comprise: 
 
(a) prescribed classes of employees, constituting not less than [fifty percent] of all 
employees, and also their wives and children; or 
(b) prescribed classes of economically active population, constituting not less than 
[twenty percent] of all residents, and also their wives and children; or  
(c) prescribed classes of residents, constituting not less than [fifty percent] of all 
residents; or 
(d) where a declaration made in virtue of Article 3 is in force, prescribed classes of 
employees constituting not less than [fifty percent] of all employees in industrial 
workplaces employing 20 persons or more, and also their wives and children.116 
                                                 
111 See Home Work Convention No 177 adopted 20 June 1996 [hereinafter Convention 177]. 
112 See Maternity Protection Convention No 183 adopted 15 June 2000[hereinafter Convention 183]. 
113 See Convention 102 (note 104 above) art 7. 
114 See above, art 2. 
115 See above. 
116 Above art 9. 
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Some ILO conventions seek to promote social security coverage for persons outside 
regular wage employment. The Home Work Convention provides that “national policy on 
home work shall promote, as far as possible, equality of treatment between homeworkers 
and other wage earners” in areas including statutory social security protection and 
maternity protection.117 Its accompanying Recommendation 184 proposes that social 
protection for home workers can be achieved through the extension and adaptation of 
existing social security schemes and/or through the development of special schemes or 
funds.118 The ILO has equally elaborated soft laws on social security, including the 
Income Security Recommendation of 1944.119 The Recommendation provides: “Social 
insurance should afford protection, in the contingencies to which they are exposed, to all 
employed and self-employed persons, together with their dependants”.120 Another is the 
Job Creation in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Recommendation of 1998, which 
calls on states to “review labour and social legislation”, inter alia, to determine whether 
social protection extends to workers in these enterprises, whether there are adequate 
provisions to ensure compliance with social security regulations covering the standard 
contingencies, and whether there is a need for supplementary social protection measures 
for workers in these categories.121  
                                                 
117 Convention 177 (note 111 above) art 4. 
118 ILO Recommendation Concerning Home Work No 184 para 25 adopted 20 June 1996 available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ english/recdisp1.htm. 
119 ILO Income Security Recommendation No 67 adopted 12 May 1944 available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ 
english/recdisp1.htm. 
120 Above, para 17. 
121 See ILO Job Creation in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Recommendation No 189 para 7 adopted 17 June 1998 
available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/recdisp1.htm (last visited 21 Nov 2005). 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
310
 
6.3 The Nature of Obligations on Social Rights 
After highlighting the general obligations of states in relation to social rights, this 
segment proceeds to examine these obligations in state practice, noting the general 
acceptance of regional and universal instruments guaranteeing social rights by African 
states and the constitutionalisation of these rights.  
 
6.3.1 General Obligations 
The fulfilment of social rights requires the existence of a planned policy of employment 
as well as special measures to help those who are disadvantaged in seeking jobs due, 
especially, to disparities based on sex or age. It involves measures designed to promote, 
in the language of the South Africa’s 1993 interim Constitution, “the protection or the 
improvement of the quality of life, economic growth, human development, social justice, 
basic conditions of employment, fair labour practices or equal opportunity for all”.122 It 
includes the provision of “technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, 
policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development and 
full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and 
economic freedoms to the individual”.123 
Social rights obligations also include making appropriate means of redress or 
remedies available to any aggrieved individual or group and putting in place appropriate 
                                                 
122 South Africa (Interim) Constitution 1993 sec 26(2). Accord Declaration on the Right to Development GA Res 41/128 
art 8(1) UN Doc A/RES/41/128 (4 Dec 1986) [hereinafter DRD] (urging states to “ensure, inter alia, equality of 
opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair 
distribution of income”). 
123 ICESCR (note 22 above) art 6(2) (referring to the steps necessary to achieve realization of the right to work). 
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means of ensuring governmental accountability.124 This is often a difficult measure to 
take because, unlike ordinary legal rights, “human rights” are primarily claims against the 
state itself and their enjoyments are made possible by limiting sovereignty. In relation to 
trade union rights, the state must create, through national laws, conditions that enable 
trade unions to strive to protect their members’ interests.125 A state’s failure to enforce 
private employers’ compliance with basic labour standards will obviously be a violation 
of its obligation to protect human rights; in particular, it may be a violation of the right to 
work or to just and reasonable conditions of work.126 Likewise a state’s failure to ensure 
that there is no work-related harassment on account of sex, race, ethnicity or opinions 
also violates its obligation to protect human rights.127 
The African Charter requires states to submit periodic reports “on the legislative or 
other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognised 
and guaranteed by the present Charter”.128 Under the African Commission’s guidelines 
on reports, states are expected to report, inter alia, on social security, particularly on the 
main features in force for each branch of social security, including benefits for medical, 
sickness, maternity, invalidity, old-age, survivor, employment injury, unemployment, and 
family.129 Additionally, states should report on factors and difficulties in realising the 
right to social security, the progress achieved on new forms of social security, the 
                                                 
124 See CESCR ‘Domestic Application of the Covenant para 2’ General Comment 9 UN Doc E/1999/22 Annex IV. 
125 See Nat’l Union of Belgian Police 19 Eur Ct HR at para 39. Cf Schmidt and Dahlstrom v Sweden 21 Eur Ct HR (ser A) 
at para 36 (1976) (stating that the state is at liberty to choose the means to be used towards this end). 
126 See ‘The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights 
Quarterly 691 194 [hereinafter Maastricht Guidelines]. 
127 Above, 695. 
128 African Charter (note 1 above) art 62. 
 
 
LLD Thesis: Shifting Institutional Paradigms to Advance Socio-economic Rights in Africa  
312
extension of existing schemes to further groups of the population, and the improvements 
in the nature and level of benefits.130 
Unlike the African Charter, the Women Protocol clearly specifies states’ obligations 
regarding social rights, including the obligation to “adopt and enforce legislative and 
other measures to guarantee women equal opportunities in work, career advancement, 
and other economic opportunities”.131 It further obligates states to “ensure transparency in 
recruitment, promotion and dismissal of women and [to] combat and punish sexual 
harassment in the workplace”;132 to “create conditions [that] promote and support the 
occupations and economic activities of women, in particular, within the informal 
sector”;133 and to “establish a system of protection and social insurance for women 
working in the informal sector and sensitise them to adhere to it”.134 The Protocol further 
commits states to “introduce a minimum age for work and to prohibit the employment of 
children below that age, and prohibit, combat and punish all forms of exploitation of 
children, especially [that of girls];135 to “take the necessary measures to recognise the 
economic value of the work of women in the home”;136 and to “guarantee adequate and 
paid pre- and post-natal maternity leave in both the private and public sectors.”137 For 
                                                                                                                                                 
129 See, in general, State Reporting Procedure (note 49 above). 
130 See above. 
131 Women Protocol (note 23 above) art 13. 
132 Above art 13(c). 
133 Above art 13(e). 
134 Above art 13(f). 
135 Above art 13(g). 
136 Above art 13(h). 
137 Above art 13(i). 
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women in distress, the Protocol commits states to ensure their protection and to provide 
an environment suitable to their condition and their special physical, economic and social 
needs.138 These are revolutionary provisions, if one realizes that majority of African 
women work in the informal sector where existing laws do not always recognize or 
remunerate such activities.139 
In the area of social rights, states’ obligations must be read in conjunction with 
specific obligations laid down under relevant ILO conventions and recommendations. (It 
is important to note that almost all African states’ have membership in the ILO.)140 The 
1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work is one response 
with particular emphasis on Core Labour Standards.141 The promotional Declaration 
states, inter alia, 
 
that all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions . . . have an 
obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to 
promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the [ILO] Constitution, 
the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those 
Conventions, namely: 
                                                 
138 Above art 24(a). 
139 See, in general, CK Omari Women in the Informal Sector (1995) (arguing “women’s participation in the informal 
business sector . . . cannot be thoroughly understood outside the framework . . . of the capitalist mode of production [and] 
the impact of international capital on the household economy”). 
140 Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries is available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm  
141 See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work July 1998 Doc CIT/1998/PR20A [hereinafter ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles]. 
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a. freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining; 
b. the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; 
c. the effective abolition of child labour; and  
d. the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.142 
 
The Declaration has been described as “a common vision of the necessary social 
dimension of progress”143 and its application to all ILO Member States regardless of 
ratification of relevant conventions as “nothing short of a revolution in legal terms”.144 It 
is within this context that such ILO conventions as the Employment Policy Convention145 
make good sense for Africa. The Convention provides that its State Parties shall “declare 
and pursue, as a major goal, an active policy designed to promote full, productive and 
freely chosen employment”.146 Such a policy should be aimed at ensuring that “there is 
work for all who are available for and seeking work”; that “such work is as productive as 
possible”; and that “there is freedom of choice of employment and the fullest possible 
opportunity for each worker to qualify for, and to use his skills and endowments in, a job 
                                                 
142 Above, para 2. 
143 F Maupain ‘The Liberalization of International Trade and the Universal Recognition of Worker’s Fundamental Rights: 
The New ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Follow-Up’ in LA Sicilianos & M 
Gavouneli (eds) Scientific and Technological Development and Human Rights (2001) 35 44.  
144 Above, 47. For a critique of the Declaration and a call for reforms of international labour rights generally, see Philip 
Alston, ‘‘Core Labour Standards’ and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime’ (2004) 15 European 
Journal of International Law 457 (positing that ILO Declaration may undermine the international labour regime). Contra 
F Maupain ‘Revitalization Not Retreat: The Real Potential of the 1998 ILO Declaration for the Universal Protection of 
Worker’s Rights’ (2005) 16 European Journal International Law 439 (assessing the impact of the ILO Declaration on 
fundamental rights in general and workers rights in particular and asserting that Alston’s thesis lacks a clear and coherent 
methodological framework). For a reply, see P Alston ‘Facing Up to the Complexities of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards 
Agenda’ (2005) 16 European Journal International Law 467. 
145 ILO Employment Policy Convention No 122 adopted 9 July 1964 entry into force 9 July 1965 569 UNTS 65. 
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for which he is well suited, irrespective of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, 
national extraction or social origin”.147 
The ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations gives further indications of relevant matters to consider in determining 
whether or not a state is implementing its obligations on the right to work.148 The relevant 
considerations, in relation to the ICESCR, include the “existence of discrimination in 
employment, on the grounds of political activity which neither constitutes an activity 
against the security of the State nor is incompatible with the requirements of the forms of 
the employment concerned; the existence of a penal offence of “leading a parasitic form 
of life”, without any express limit to the scope of that offence; the existence of model 
collective farm rules under which a member may terminate his membership only with the 
consent of the management committee; and the existence of special labour services in 
construction or agriculture in lieu of military service”.149 These criteria are relevant in 
explaining and determining states’ obligations on social rights under the African human 
rights system. 
Overall, African states have the obligation to promote a coherent and dynamic 
employment policy and attenuate, moderate and correct labour market trends. They must 
orient manpower and control recruitment and laying-off of workers. They must protect 
people in the workplace and ensure the right of workers to enjoy just and favourable 
conditions of work. They must enhance public and trade-union freedoms, since the right 
                                                                                                                                                 
146 Above, art 1(1). 
147 See Above, art 1(2). 
148 Sieghart (note 7 above) 216. 
149 Above (citations omitted). 
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to work means participation by workers in the life of the enterprise, which, in turn, 
provides a forum for citizenship and realization of the democratic ideal.150 
The jurisprudence of the African Commission shows integrative and imaginative 
approaches in explaining the nature of states’ obligations on social rights. In the Social & 
Economic Rights Action Center & Anor v Nigeria,151 the Commission held, inter alia, 
that “[t]he right to food is inseparably linked to the dignity of human beings and is 
therefore essential for the enjoyment and fulfilment of such other rights as health, 
education, work and political participation”.152 Earlier, the Commission held, in Union 
Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v Angola,153 that mass expulsion of certain West 
African nationals by the Angolan government threatens violation of certain egalitarian 
rights, including the right to work.154 In Pagnoulle v Cameroon,155 the Commission held 
that a denial of reinstatement to former professional capacity, despite amnesty to that 
effect, constituted a violation of the right to work under the Charter. According to the 
Commission,  
 
                                                 
150 See UN Economic & Social Council [ECOSOC] Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Second Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant UN 
Doc E/1990/6/ Add 14 (8 Oct 1996) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/ 
E.1990.6.Add.14.En?Opendocument paras. 45–46 (discussing Tunisia’s efforts to implement the ICESCR). 
151 Social & Economic Rights Action Centre & Anor v Nigeria Comm No 155/96 2001–2002 African Annual Activity 
Report Annex V [hereinafter SERAC case]. 
152 Above, paras 65–66. 
153 Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme v Angola Comm No 159/96 (2000) AHRLR 18 (ACHPR 1997) reprinted 
in Eleventh Annual Activity Report of the African Commission 1997–1998 Annex II. 
154 Above, at para. 17. 
155 Pagnoulle v Cameroon Comm No 39/90 (2000) AHRLR 57 (ACHPR 1997) reprinted in Tenth Annual Activity Report 
of the African Commission 1996–1997 Annex X. 
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by not reinstating Mr. Mazou in his former position after the Amnesty Law, the 
government has violated Article 15 of the African Charter, because it has prevented 
Mr. Mazou to work in his capacity of a magistrate even though others who have been 
condemned under similar conditions have been reinstated.156 
 
6.3.2 Acceptance of Universal and Regional Human Rights Standards 
Majority of African states are parties to several universal human rights instruments,157 
including ILO instruments. To illustrate, there are 48 African ratifications of ILO 
Convention 87; 52 ratifications of Convention 98 on Freedom of Association and 
Collective Bargaining; 53 ratifications of Convention 29; 52 ratifications of Convention 
105 on the Elimination of Forced and Compulsory Labour; 50 ratifications of Convention 
100; 53 ratifications of Convention 111 on the Elimination of Discrimination in Respect 
of Employment and Occupation; 46 ratifications of Convention 138; and 49 ratifications 
of Convention 182 on the Abolition of Child Labour.158 
The widespread ratification of socio-economic rights instruments indicates a 
willingness on the part of governments to accept binding obligations159 that will subject 
their policies to increasing external scrutiny. It also “suggests at least a formal 
                                                 
156 Above, at para. 29. 
157 For status of ratifications of universal human rights treaties, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/ RatificationStatus.pdf (providing status of ratification as of 3 June 2005). 
158 See ILOLEX Database of International Labour Standards available at www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/docs/declAF.htm 
(last visited 13 Nov 2005). 
159 See Vienna Convention (note 18 above) art 14(1) (“The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by 
ratification . . . .”). 
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commitment by African States to conform their national law and practice to international 
standards”.160 
 
6.3.3 Constitutionalisation of Social Rights 
The constitutionalisation of social rights—the constitutional enshrinement of rights and 
their protection by institutions, such as the judiciary, by way of judicial review and/or 
preview—has become a common feature in many African states. This may not be the 
only means of protecting social rights, but it is an “important mechanism for 
‘mainstreaming’ respect for the values associated with these rights in the law and policy-
making.”161 More than half of African states guarantee the right to work,162 including the 
rights to equal opportunity to gain a living by work which one freely chooses;163 to a 
healthy and safe working environment;164 to fair and equal wages;165 to rest and 
                                                 
160 C Anyangwe ‘Obligations of States Parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1998) 10 African 
Journal International & Comparative Law 625 626. 
161 D Ashiagbor ‘Economic and Social Rights in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2004) European Human 
Rights Law Review 62 72. 
162 See eg Alg Const sec 55; Angl Const sec 46(1); Benin Const sec 30; Burk Faso Const secs 18–19; Burundi Const sec 
45; Cape Verde Const sec 60; Cent Afr Rep Const sec 9; Chad Const sec 32; Congo Const sec 24; Cote d’Ivoire Const secs 
16–17; Egypt Const sec 13; Eq Guinea Const sec 25; Eth Const sec 41(1); Gabon Const sec 1(7); Ghana Const sec 24(1); 
Guinea Const sec 18; Libya Const sec 4; Madag Const sec 27; Malawi Const sec 29; Mali Const sec 19; Mauritania Const 
sec 12; Morocco Const sec 13; Mozam Const sec 88(1); Niger Const sec 25; Rwanda Const sec 30; Sao Tome & Principe 
Const sec 41(1); Sen Const secs 8 25; Sey Const sec 35; Tanz Const secs 11(1) 22(1); Togo Const sec 37; Uganda Const 
sec 14(b). 
163 See eg Cote d’Ivoire Const sec 17; Eth Const sec 41(2); Lesotho Const sec 29(1); Liber Const secs 8 18; Morocco 
Const sec 12; Mozam Const sec 88(2); Namib Const sec 21(1)(j); Nig Const sec 17(3)(a); Rwanda Const sec 30; Sao 
Tome & Principe Const sec 41(3); Sierra Leone Const sec 8(3)(a); S Afr Const sec 22; Tanz Const sec 22(2). 
164 See eg Angl Const sec 46(2); Cape Verde Const sec 62(1)(a); Cent Afr Rep Const sec 9; Cote d’Ivoire Const sec 19; 
Eth Const sec 42(2); Ghana Const sec 24(1); Guinea-Bissau Const sec 46(1); Lesotho Const sec 30(b); Liber Const sec 8; 
Mozam Const sec 89(2); Nig Const sec 17(3)(c); Sao Tome & Principe Const sec 42(1)(d); Sen Const sec 25; Sey Const 
sec 35(d); Sierra Leone Const sec 8(3)(c); Uganda Const sec 40(1)(a). 
165 See eg Angl Const sec 46(2); Benin Const sec 30; Burundi Const secs 45–46; Cape Verde Const sec 61(1)–(2); Chad 
Const sec 32; Ghana Const sec 24(1); Lesotho Const sec 30(a)(i); Liber Const sec 18; Madag Const sec 29; Malawi Const 
sec 31(1)(3); Mozam Const sec 89(1); Niger Const sec 25; Nig Const sec 17(3)(e); Sao Tome & Principe Const sec 
42(1)(a); Sen Const sec 25; Sey Const sec 35(d); Sierra Leone Const sec 8(3)(e); Tanz Const sec 23; Togo Const sec 37; 
Uganda Const sec 40(1)(b). 
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leisure;166 and to holidays with pay.167 These Constitutions also guarantee to workers the 
right to unionise168 and to strike in protection of their economic and social interests.169 
They protect workers against unfair dismissals170 and some constitutions specifically 
provide protection for women during maternity.171 Most African constitutions also 
guarantee the right to social security,172 including unemployment benefits,173 childhood 
and old age care,174 retirement benefits and pension schemes,175 sickness and incapacity 
                                                 
166 See eg Angl Const sec 46(2); Cape Verde Const sec 62(1)(e); Cent Afr Rep Const sec 9; Congo Const sec 28; Eth Const 
sec 42(2); Ghana Const sec 24(2); Lesotho Const sec 30(e); Mali Const sec 19; Mozam Const sec 89(1); Nig Const sec 
17(3)(b); Sao Tome & Principe Const sec 42(1)(e); Sey Const sec 35(d); Sierra Leone Const sec 8(3)(b); Uganda Const sec 
40(1)(c). 
167 See eg Congo Const sec 28; Eth Const sec 42(2); Ghana Const sec 24(2); Lesotho Const sec 30(e); Sao Tome & 
Principe Const sec 42(1)(e); Sey Const sec 35(d); Uganda Const sec 40(1)(c). 
168 See eg Alg Const sec 56; Benin Const sec 31; Burundi Const sec 47; Cape Verde Const sec 63(1); Cent Afr Rep Const 
sec 10; Congo Const sec 25; Cote d’Ivoire Const sec 18; Djib Const sec 15; Eth Const sec 42(1)(a); Ghana Const sec 
24(3); Guinea Const sec 18; Guinea-Bissau Const sec 45(1); Lesotho Const sec 31; Madag Const sec 31; Malawi Const 
sec 31(2); Mali Const sec 20; Mozam Const sec 90(1); Namib Const sec 21(1)(e); Niger Const sec 26; Rwanda Const sec 
31; Sao Tome & Principe Const sec 42(1)(b); Sen Const sec 25; Sey Const sec 35(g); S Afr Const sec 23(2)(a); Togo Const 
sec 39; Uganda Const sec 40(3)(a). 
169 See eg Alg Const sec 57; Benin Const sec 31; Burundi Const sec 47); Cape Verde Const sec 66; Cent Afr Rep Const sec 
10; Congo Const sec 25; Cote d’Ivoire Const sec 18; Djib Const sec 15; Eth Const sec 42(1)(b); Guinea Const sec 18; 
Madag Const sec 33; Malawi Const sec 31(4); Mali Const sec 21; Mauritania Const sec 14; Morocco Const sec 14; 
Mozam Const sec 91(1); Namib Const sec 21(1)(f); Niger Const sec 26; Rwanda Const sec 32; Sao Tome & Principe 
Const sec 42(1)(f); Sen Const sec 25; Sey Const sec 25(g); S Afr Const sec 23(2)(c); Togo Const sec 39; Uganda Const sec 
40(3)(c) (providing, in general, that the right to strike shall be exercised within the framework of the law and that the law 
may limit its exercise in the interest of national defence and security, or for services and public activities or vital interest to 
the community). 
170 See eg Cape Verde Const sec 62(2)–(3); Guinea-Bissau Const sec 46(2); Mozam Const sec 89(3). 
171 See eg Lesotho Const sec 30(d); Uganda Const sec 40(4). 
172 See eg Burk Faso Const sec 18; Cape Verde Const secs 62(1)(d) 69; Chad Const sec 40; Egypt Const secs 16–17); Eri 
Const sec 21(2); Eth Const sec 90; Madag Const sec 30; Malawi Const sec 13; Nig Const secs 16(2)(d) 17(3)(g); Sey 
Const sec 37. 
173 See eg Alg Const sec 59; Cape Verde Const sec 69(1); Egypt Const sec 17; Sey Const sec 37; S Afr Const sec 27(1)(c). 
174 See eg Angl Const sec 47(1); Benin Const sec 26; Burk Faso Const sec 18; Cape Verde Const sec 69(1); Chad Const 
sec 40; Congo Const secs 30 33; Cote d’Ivoire Const sec 6; Egypt Const sec 17; Malawi Const sec 13; Nig Const secs 
16(2)(d) 17(3)(f)); Sey Const secs 29(c) 36; Sierra Leone Const sec 8(3)(f); Tanz Const sec 11(1); Togo Const sec 33; 
Uganda Const VII sec 34(7). 
175 See eg Egypt Const sec 17; Guinea-Bissau Const sec 46(3); Lesotho Const sec 30(a); Nig Const sec 16(2)(d). 
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or disability protections,176 medical and health care,177 and widowhood and orphan hood 
protection.178 All national constitutions—with the exceptions of DR Congo, Libya, and 
Somalia—guarantee the right to freedom of association.179 
These constitutions obligate states to create conditions that render effective the 
enjoyment of social rights. For example, the Constitution of Eritrea urges the country’s 
National Assembly to “enact laws guaranteeing and securing the social welfare of 
citizens, the rights and conditions of labour and other rights and responsibilities.180 Others 
urge governments, inter alia, to achieve and maintain a high and stable level of 
employment and to provide technical and vocational guidance and training 
programmes.181 Still, others urge governments to “[g]uarantee the existence and efficient 
functioning of a national system of social security, with participation of contributors” and 
to support, motivate, regulate, and supervise private systems of social security.182 The 
Constitution of Seychelles is emblematic of these types of obligations. It urges the state, 
inter alia, 
 
                                                 
176 See eg Angl Const secs 47(1) 48; Benin Const sec 26; Cape Verde Const sec 69(1); Guinea-Bissau Const sec 46(3); 
Mozam Const sec 95(1); Nig Const sec 16(2)(d); Sierra Leone Const sec 8(3)(f); Tanz Const sec 11(1); Togo Const sec 33. 
177 See eg Angl Const sec 47(1); Congo Const sec 30; Egypt Const secs 16–17; Libya Const sec 15; Malawi Const sec 13; 
Uganda Const sec 20. 
178 See eg Sao Tome & Principe Const sec 43(1). 
179 Human Rights Law in Africa (note 8 above) 856. 
180 Eri Const sec 21(5). 
181 Lesotho Const sec 29(2). See also Burk Faso Const sec 20 (“The state sees to the constant amelioration of conditions of 
work and to the protection of the worker.”). 
182 Cape Verde Const sec 69(2). See also Mozam Const sec 95(2) (urging the Government of Mozambique to “promote 
and encourage the creation of conditions for achieving [social security]”). 
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a) to take necessary measures to achieve and maintain a high and stable level of 
employment, as is practicable, with a view to attaining full employment;  
b) . . . to protect effectively the right of a citizen to earn a dignified living . . .;  
c) to promote vocational guidance and training;  
d) to make and enforce statutory provisions for safe, healthy and fair conditions of 
work . . . ;  
e) to promote machinery for voluntary negotiations between employers and workers 
or their organisations with a view to the regulation of conditions of employment 
by means of collective agreements;  
f) to promote the establishment and use of appropriate machinery for conciliation 
and voluntary arbitrations for the settlement of labour disputes; [and]  
g) . . . to ensure the right of workers to organise trade unions and to guarantee the 
right to strike.183  
 
Many African states have also enacted labour legislations which, inter alia, define the 
rights of unions and professional associations; establish procedures for the creation, 
coalition, federation, and disbanding of trade unions; define permissible areas of 
activities for workers; and regulate collective bargaining processes. The post-apartheid 
South Africa has been particularly forceful in adopting legislative measures on social 
rights, understandably because it “inherited from apartheid conditions of extreme poverty 
and inequality accompanied by high levels of unemployment, a highly skewed income 
                                                 
183 Sey Const sec 35. 
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pattern, low wages and a severe lack of skills among the African population”.184 The 
Labour Relations Act;185 Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA);186 Employment 
Equity Act;187 and Unemployment Insurance Act188 are some of South Africa’s new legal 
standards on labour and social security. The Labour Relations Act seeks to strike a 
balance between the demand of international competitiveness and the protection of labour 
rights. It promotes collective bargaining as the preferred method of labour relations and 
sets terms and conditions of employment. The BCEA, on its part, seeks to balance the 
protection of rights of employees against the demands of higher productivity, improved 
efficiency, and the promotion of flexibility. It extends employment, work, and income 
securities to unorganised and vulnerable workers by setting floor minimum rights 
covering workplace issues—hours of work, overtime, leave, termination, health, et 
cetera.  
Civil courts provide remedies for human rights violations in Africa, but many states 
additionally establish arbitration agencies and policy-making institutions of social 
security and other institutions to promote and defend interests of workers. 
 
                                                 
184 C Cooper ‘Globalisation, Labour Law and Unemployment: The South African Case’ in M Biagi (ed) Job Creation and 
Labour Law: From Protection to Pro-action (2000) 233 233. 
185 See Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended by the Labour Relations Amendment Act 12 of 2002). 
186 See Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (as amended by the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Amendment Act 11 of 2002). 
187 See Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
188 See Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001. See also Human Rights Law in Africa (note 8 above) 1511 (highlighting 
these enactments). 
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6.4 Africa’s Scorecard on Social Rights 
This segment examines Africa’s scorecard in terms of practical measures adopted by 
states towards realising social rights and the effects of these measures on living standards 
of Africans. It asserts that the various schemes represent, in principle, steps towards 
fulfilling states’ obligations to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the rights to work and 
social security, though their effects are yet to be felt in a number of places.  The reasons 
for the dissonance between promise and performance are varied, but they include the neo-
liberal economic reforms in Africa, globalisation pressures, and authoritarianism leading 
to anti-labour policies.  
 
5.4.1 Progressive Realization Policies and Programs 
African states have actively been involved in elaborating and adopting soft norms, 
including resolutions and declarations of the UN aimed at poverty reduction and its 
eventual eradication. The Millennium Declaration, adopted during the Millennium 
Summit of September 2000, and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are examples 
of such soft norms.189 The Millennium Declaration commits UN Member States “[t]o 
promote gender equality and the empowerment of women as effective ways to combat 
poverty, hunger and disease and to stimulate development that is truly sustainable”.190 
The MDGs represent the standard for identifying and measuring global development 
objectives in the period up to 2015.191 It calls for international cooperation to eradicate 
                                                 
189 UN Millennium Declaration G.A Res 55/2 UN Doc A/Res/55/2 (18 Sept 2000) [hereinafter Millennium Declaration]; 
Millennium Development Goals available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ [hereinafter MDGs]. 
190 Millennium Declaration (note 189 above) para 20. 
191 MDGs (note 189 above). 
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extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender 
equality and empowerment of women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; 
combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and 
develop a global partnership for development.192 Attaining these lofty goals is expected 
to lead to a more peaceful, just, and prosperous world. 
Since employment generation remains “possibly the most pressing problem in 
Africa”,193  many African governments have, in response to their constitutional and other 
legal order,194 launched a wide range of public works programmes aimed at reducing 
poverty. In Ghana, youths are employed in afforestration and urban sanitation 
programmes.195 Kenya has also launched a poverty reduction strategy outlined in the 
short-term Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the long-term National Poverty 
Eradication Plan.196 The strategy seeks to reduce the incidence of poverty by 50 percent 
by 2015; empower the poor to earn income; reduce most major forms of inequalities; and 
increase productivity through human capital development, by investing in education and 
health.197 
                                                 
192 Above. 
193 UN Economic & Social Council [ECOSOC] Economic Report on Africa 2004: Unlocking Africa’s Potential in the 
Global Economy 14 para 32 UN Doc E/2004/17 (July 2004) [hereinafter ECOSOC Economic Report on Africa 2004]. 
194 See eg Eth Const sec 41(6) (urging the government to “expand job opportunities for the unemployed and the poor” and, 
in particular, to undertake programs and public works projects). 
195 See K Nwuke ‘Youth Employment Summit, Economic Commission for Africa’ Youth Employment in Africa (2002). 
196 See Ministry of Finance and Planning Government of Kenya Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2000). 
197 See above, paras 5.1–7.2. 
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Mozambique also launched its 1999 Plan of Action for the Reduction of Absolute 
Poverty for the period 2000–2004.198 The plan sought to fight poverty by addressing the 
political, economic, social, and cultural factors that have bearing on poverty.199 Under the 
plan, the government commits itself to launching programmes and projects at the 
national, provincial, and district levels, in line with its development goals.200 It also 
commits itself to addressing the country’s population growth rate and food security.201 In 
January 2002, Tunisia undertook a range of measures to tackle unemployment by 
launching, inter alia, the National Employment Fund (also known as the “21-21 
Fund”).202 The aim of the Fund is to “facilitate[e] the integration of job seekers, 
particularly the young, into the labour market”.203  
There are also few motions at the continental level. In September 2004, the AU 
Assembly convened an Extraordinary Summit on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in 
Ouagadougou in Burkina. The summit focused, inter alia, on how to empower Africans, 
open opportunities, and create social protection and security for workers through building 
a people-oriented environment for development and national growth based mobilisation 
of resources for implementation of adopted plans of action.204 The summit is expected to 
produce a Plan of Action leading to successive Declarations and Plans of Action against 
                                                 
198 G Saitoti The Challenges of Economic and Institutional Reforms in Africa (2002) 85; Republic of Mozambique Interim 
Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper (2000). 
199 See above, 85. 
200 See above. 
201 Above. 
202 ECOSOC Economic Report on Africa 2004 (note 193 above) 15. 
203 Above. 
204 For reports on the summit, see the AU website. 
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poverty, increasing unemployment and decreasing under-employment.205 These are 
commendable initiatives, but more action is needed to translate preaching into practice. 
 
5.4.2 More Aspiration than Actuality 
In 1990, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the then-OAU took stock of 
the political and socio-economic situation in Africa and concluded that the situation was 
“precarious”, despite many efforts deployed by its Member States to move the continent 
forward.206 Among other things, the Assembly found: “There has been [a] sharp decline 
in the quality of life in our countries as spending on public health, housing and education 
and other social services had to be severely curtailed. Food production has also fallen, in 
promotion [sic] to the expanding population”.207 Seventeen years after this Declaration, it 
is unclear if much has changed.  
Africa appears to be on the path of sustainable development even if, as the evidence 
shows, that path is a zigzag: one step forward, two steps backward. Africa achieved a 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 4.6 percent in 2004208—the highest in almost a 
decade. The continent’s economy is expected to remain “solidly above 5 per cent” in 
                                                 
205 Earlier continental efforts include the OAU, Declaration of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government on Employment in Africa OAU Doc AHG/Decl1 (XXVII) (1991) and the African 
Common Position on Human and Social Development in Africa, partially adopted by the OAU in its Declaration on Social 
Development OAU Doc AHG/Decl5 (XXX) (1994). 
206 OAU Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the 
Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World OAU Doc 
AHG/Decl1 (XXVI) (July 1990) para 5 (addressing the threat of the “marginalisation” of Africa in light of the progress of 
Eastern and Western Europe and the Americas in the 1990’s). 
207 Above, para 6. 
208 See Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Economic Report on Africa 2005: Meeting the Challenges of 
Unemployment and Poverty in Africa (2005) 34 [hereinafter ERA 2005] (attributing the growth to governments’ improved 
economic management, better performance of the agricultural sector and more stable political conditions in many 
countries). 
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2006, with the least developed countries (LDCs) “faring even better.”209 Strangely, these 
seemingly positive developments have not broken the cycles of unemployment and 
poverty in Africa. Available evidence shows that Africa is unlikely to eliminate absolute 
poverty by 2015.210 There is a wide gap between the employed and the unemployed 
though employable, and between those who have and those who suffer.  
Average unemployment rates in Africa have remained at around 10 percent since 
1995, the second highest in the world after the Middle East.211 A 2004 ILO Report 
similarly indicates that sub-Saharan Africa “has neither reduced its unemployment rate 
nor improved its high incidence of working poverty”.212 The most visible consequence of 
growing unemployment is growing poverty; the majority of citizens still lack elementary 
capabilities—“to be adequately nourished, to be comfortably clothed, to avoid escapable 
morbidity and preventable mortality.”213 According to the ECA Report, at least 61 
million more Africans go hungry today than in 1990.214 Africa’s poverty is the highest 
among all regions;215 and it is “pervasive, intensive, chronic, gender-biased”.216 Women 
                                                 
209 See UN World Economic Situation and Prospects 2006 (2006) iii [hereinafter World Economy 2006] available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2006files/wesp2006.pdf. 
210 See eg World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2004: Realizing the Development Promise of the Doha Agenda (2003) 43 
(concluding that even if Sub-Saharan Africa were to achieve a projected growth rate of 1.6 percent per capita, it would still 
be at the low end of the developing-country growth spectrum, “inadequate to make much of a dent in poverty and other 
MDGs”). 
211 See ERA 2005 (note 208 above) 61. 
212 ILO Global Employment Trends (2004) 3 available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/download/ 
trends.pdf. 
213 Dreze & Sen ‘Public Action for Social Security’ (note 82 above) 8. 
214 See ERA 2005 (note 208 above) xiii. 
215 See above, 91. 
216 Above, 93. 
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are particularly vulnerable because existing social norms limit their access to and control 
of productive assets.217 
Even for majority of Africans who are in employment, their “take home” pay hardly 
takes them home due to the slave wages they earn! The national minimum wage in 
Nigeria is N5,500 per month;218 that is the equivalent of US $42.8,219 hardly enough to 
maintain a household pet for three days in Western countries. Nigeria’s external reserves 
have increased tremendously in recent years, due to the political ferment in the Middle 
East and consequent rise in oil prices across the globe, but it is as if the more the external 
reserves increase, the more poverty increases. In South Africa, the income distribution is 
highly skewed because of the slave wages being paid to black Africans. The bottom 20 
percent of income earners in South Africa earn 1.5 percent of the national income, while 
the top 10 percent of income earners earn 50 percent of the national income.220  
The negative impact of HIV/AIDS on labour markets compounds Africa’s 
predicament. According to the ECA: “Young people who are HIV-positive eventually 
become ill with HIV-related diseases, increasing their absence from work, reducing their 
productivity and lowering their chances of employment”.221 The continuing “brain drain” 
compounds the problem. Thousands of Africans migrate to Western countries yearly in 
search of jobs, food, and freedom, at huge cost to Africa’s human resources and cultural 
                                                 
217 See above. 
218 See National Minimum Wage (Amendment) Act No 1 (2000) sec 2 (Nig) available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/LFN-
2000.htm (providing, “as from the commencement of this Act, it shall be the duty of every employer (except as provided for 
under this Act) to pay a wage not less than National Minimum Wage of N5,500.00 per month to every worker under his 
establishment”). 
219 Based on the international exchange rate as at 23 Mar 2006. 
220 See Cooper (note 184 above) 233. 
221 See ERA 2005 (note 208 above) 176. 
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identity.222 The crisis of brain drain is grave enough to justify the declaration of a state of 
intellectual emergency in Africa, a view that Sankore reinforces: 
 
If a key factor for anticipating the future development and productivity of any 
modern society is the number of intellectuals, thinkers, visionaries, professionals and 
skilled workers it produces, then Africa had better beware. The problem is not that 
the continent cannot produce highly trained and skilled human resources, the 
problem is that today they are being taken away faster than Africa can replenish 
them.223 
 
Africa’s low scorecard on employment generation and social security is due to a 
combination of external and internal factors, some of which are further examined below. 
 
1. Neo-liberal Economic Reforms 
Since the late 1980s and in breach of their treaty obligations,224 Africa’s Governments 
have abandoned the objectives of full employment for their citizens in favour of 
economic systems that provided for permanent pools of unemployment. They did so 
when they adopted multiple survival mechanisms, which included surrendering decision-
making autonomy to Western IFIs—the IMF and World Bank. These IFIs subsequently 
                                                 
222 Yaounde Declaration (Africa: Preparing for the 21st Century) AHG Decl 3 OAU AHG/Res 247-257 (XXXII) (July 
1996) [hereinafter Yaounde Declaration] para 6 (lamenting the “real brain-drain which, each year, strips Africa of tens of 
thousands of its sons and daughters, professors, scientists and other highly qualified human resources, which escape to the 
North as the continent progressively loses its cultural identity in the face of dominant foreign cultures”). 
223 Cf R Sankore ‘Africa: Killing Us Softly’ New African Nov 2005 9. 
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imposed Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) purportedly to deal with Africa’s 
economic fragility and non-response to previous development strategies. The reforms 
were aimed at stabilizing Africa’s external and internal balances, thereby promoting their 
growth.225 Under SAPs, African countries were required, inter alia, to liberalise their 
trade sector and eliminate distortions in price; devalue their currencies and remove 
government subsidies; reduce budget deficit and the size of the public sector; and 
privatise governmental parastatals.226 Such interventions were justified on the ideological 
but illogical grounds of economic neo-liberalism or what has come to be known as “the 
Washington Consensus”—the notion that market forces, not governments, should 
regulate the global economy.227 SAPs made the implementation of such policies a pre-
condition for debt re-scheduling, new loan facilities, and other concessions.228 
SAPs were flawed by a lack of distributional analysis and by poor sequencing of 
reforms, notably premature financial liberalisation.229 The IMF sought to apply the same 
prescriptions across board, notwithstanding that the march of Africans into the world 
economy does not follow a strait line. Non-capitalist modes of production are still norms 
in Africa and national financial, banking and monetary systems are quite unsophisticated, 
not to mention transportation and communications infrastructure, which, already weak, 
                                                                                                                                                 
224 “There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is 
required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.” GA Res 56/83 at 4 UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (28 Jan 
2002). 
225 P Engberg-Pedersen et al (eds) Limits of Adjustment in Africa: The Effects of Economic Liberalization, 1986–94 (1996) 
ix. 
226 See above, 7. 
227 R Falk Predatory Globalization: A Critique (1999) 1. 
228 See Limits of Adjustment in Africa (note 225 above) ix. 
229 For a critique, see P Collier & JW Gunning ‘The IMF’s Role in Structural Adjustment’ (1999) 109 Economics Journal 
634. 
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have disintegrated in many states.230 SAPs “provided only a partial solution [and] 
promoted reforms that tended to remove serious price distortions, but gave inadequate 
attention to the provision of social services. Consequently, only a few countries managed 
to achieve sustainable higher growth under these programmes”.231  
“Regardless of the merits of policies of trade liberalization”, says the UN Economic 
and Social Council, “the fact remains that in many African countries the reduction of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers has been associated with a sharp fall in employment, as 
consumers have switched from non-traded goods to imports”.232 SAPs, in particular, 
further deprived already impoverished Africans—many of who were already working for 
the equivalent of slave labour wages—and subjected the population to the whims and 
caprices of private entrepreneurs.233 SAPs reinforced authoritarianism in Africa, as most 
governments were intolerant of opposition to adjustment measures, like Babangida’s 
Nigeria.234 Even Ghana, the IMF’s showpiece of adjustment in Africa, repressed demands 
of significant sections of civil societies.235 
Many public servants were retrenched during the periods under review because 
achieving macroeconomic balance required reducing the budget deficit, which in turn 
                                                 
230 See TM Callaghy ‘The State and the Development of Capitalism in Africa: Theoretical, Historical, and Comparative 
Reflections’ in D Rothchild & N Chazan (eds) The Precarious Balance: State & Society in Africa (1988) [hereinafter The 
Precarious Balance] 67 78 (arguing that Africa is unlikely to become significantly capitalist in the near future given that 
the factors that could facilitate its development remain weak or nonexistent). Above. 
231 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (2001) para 24. 
232 ECOSOC Economic Report on Africa 2004 (note 193 above) 14 para 32. 
233 See, in general, DD Bradlow ‘The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights’ (1996) 6 Transnational Law& 
Contemporary Problems 47 56; B Rajagopal ‘Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesizing the Soft International Law of the IMF 
and Human Rights’ (1993) 11 Boston University International Law Journal 81 90 95–96. 
234 E McCarthy-Arnolds et al (eds) Africa, Human Rights, and the Global System: The Political Economy of Human Rights 
in a Changing World (1994) 147–52. 
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required downsizing the civil service system.236 Ghana reportedly retrenched 10,500 civil 
servants in 1987, 11,000 in 1988, and 12,000 in 1989.237 Of an estimated 320,000 
employees of approximately 200 state-owned enterprises, at least 39,800 were redeployed 
between 1988 and 1989238—a sizeable proportion of those affected were women.239 In 
some countries, retrenched workers suffered long-lived and deep losses of income. In 
Guinea, researchers found that the average unemployment duration of public-sector 
workers that were laid off between 1985 and 1988 exceeded two years and thirty percent 
were still unemployed in 1992.240 
Africa has not quite learned from these bitter lessons of history, as Bretton Woods’ 
institutions continue to bulldoze their way and impose their will on the continent, 
“without outsiders asking too many questions”.241 Many states are embarking on fresh 
rounds of market-centred economic reforms, which “equate[…] development primarily 
with economic growth by giving the private sector maximum freedom as the engine of 
growth,” and “growth is often measured to exclude attainment of social objectives like 
                                                                                                                                                 
235 See, in general, T Mkandawire & A Olukoshi (eds) Between Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of Structural 
Adjustment in Africa (1995) (analyzing the social, cultural, and political effects of African structural adjustment programs). 
236 See, in general, J Healey & M Robinson The Design of Economic Reforms in the Context of Political Liberalization 
(1995). See also Bradlow (note 233 above) 69; Rajagopal (note 233 above) 90. 
237 ILO From Redeployment to Sustained Employment Generation: Challenges for Ghana’s Programme of Economic 
Recovery and Development (1989) 35. 
238 Above, 37. 
239 T Manuh ‘Ghana: Women in the Public and Informal Sectors under the Economic Recovery Programme’ in P Sparr 
(ed) Mortgaging Women’s Lives: Feminist Critiques of Structural Adjustment (1994) 61 68. 
240 N McCulloch et al Trade Liberalization and Poverty: A Handbook (2001) 147. 
241 J Stiglitz ‘The Insider: What I Learned at the World Economic Crisis’ The New Republic 17 Apr 2000 at 57 (noting that 
the IMF “rarely allows sufficient time for broad consensus-building or even widespread consultations” in its ‘negotiations’ 
with receiver nations). See Rajagopal (note 233 above) 87 (“The Articles of Agreement of the IMF . . . were concluded at 
the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944.”). 
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[work, social security,] education and health.”242 Privatisation, commercialisation, 
downsizing, outsourcing, mergers and acquisitions, these and other emergent economic 
jargons have the hallmarks of earlier reform processes: new massive job losses, with 
consequent increase in spatial and temporal poverty of citizens. As Gathii explains, “by 
allocating resources away from supporting social services, market-centered development 
postulates that economic growth will follow since resources will be allocated to the most 
efficient members of a society—the captains of industry”.243 
It is clear that Africa’s governments are sailing by dead reckoning, as results cannot 
be checked by facts. At best, these new rounds of reforms “protect elites more than the 
lower rungs of the state apparatus”244 and enable Africa’s leaders to recentralise power 
and intensify the presidential tendencies of their regimes. The bleak situation is 
compounded by governments’ failure to put in place viable programs to cushion the 
effects of their phoney reforms.245 Governments merely preach to citizens to wait and 
hope for better days.246  
Most Western countries, including China, have made considerable improvements in 
their social security systems; “social security [including social assistance and 
unemployment benefits] expenditure as a percentage of GDP has risen” in the last 
                                                 
242 J Gathii ‘A Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa’s Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era of 
Market Centered Development’ (2003) 13 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 179 183 187. 
243 Above, 187. 
244 See NV de Walle African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (2001) 275. 
245 See ERA 2005 (note 208 above) 92 (stating that only “very few [African] countries provide specific measures to 
counter the adverse employment effects of globalization, liberalization and privatization”). 
246 See Yaounde Declaration (note 222 above) para 7. 
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decade.247 In 1990, social security expenditure expressed as a percentage of GDP was 
between twenty and thirty percent in most European countries.248 In Africa, “protection 
against the risk of unemployment is non-existent and there is little or no social 
assistance”.249  
Globalisation and the lopsided implementation of free trade have further complicated 
the feeble attempts of African states to realise social rights. The rapid dismantling of 
trade protection, deregulation of the capital and financial market, outsourcing of work,250 
relocation of plants, and technological and other developments have brought adverse 
economic and social consequences in many countries. The liberalisation of the market 
has allowed cheaper imports to flood Africa, leading to many job losses especially in 
industries such as clothing and textiles. In order to stay competitive, local industries have 
downsized their export sector and introduced labour saving technologies. Massive 
retrenchment has ensued and those affected have often been left in the cold particularly as 
there are no comprehensive and effective social insurance schemes in Africa.251 
Motivated by market-oriented economic doctrine and a perception of unions as being 
                                                 
247 ILO World Labour Report 2000 (note 86 above) 51; ‘China’s Social Security System Framework Takes Shape’ People’s 
Daily 14 Sept 2004 available at http://english.people.com.cn/200409/14/eng20040914_156987.html. 
248 ILO World Labour Report 2000 (note 86 above) 56. 
249 Above, 53. 
250 About 68 percent of companies surveyed in South Africa outsourced labour during 1994-98, with the majority of them 
coming from the blue-collar sector. See Cooper (note 184 above) 235 (referencing J Kelly ‘The Wage Settlement Survey’ 
Quarterly Report Mar 1999). 
251 See above. 
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obstructive to economic efficiency, many states have enacted labour laws that are 
incompatible with ILO standards.252 
 
2. Authoritarianism and Anti-labour Policies 
Anti-labour and anti-workers legislation still exists and persists in many parts of 
Africa. Some of these legislations were enacted during the era of authoritarianism and 
totalitarianism in Africa, but they still govern Africans from their graves, long after the 
enacting regimes have gone. In other countries, existing constitutional provisions on the 
right to work have been weakened or significantly changed. Nigeria’s controversial 
Labour Bill, which sought to amend the Trade Union Act of 1990—resulting in a 2005 
Amendment—is emblematic of the emerging anti-unionism in Africa.253 The Bill gives 
the Nigerian Minister of Labour exclusive power to decide which trade union should be 
registered and who should belong to such a union.254 It bars workers in certain sectors of 
the economy—aviation, health, electricity, and even education—from engaging in strike 
actions.255 It replaces labour centres with federating units.256 Government apologists see 
the bill as aiming at democratising and strengthening labour in Nigeria and enhancing 
                                                 
252 See, in general, G Biffl & J Isaac ‘How Effective are the ILO’s Labour Standards Under Globalisation?’ Paper 
presented at the IIRA/CIRA 4th Regional Congress of the Americas Centre for Industrial Relations, University of Toronto 
(25–29 June 2002) available at http://www.cira-acri.ca/IIRA CIRA docs/Isaac and Biffl.pdf. 
253 Trade Union (Amendment) Act (2005) (Nigeria) available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/TradeUnion(Amendment)Act2005.htm. For commentary on the legislation, see S Olukoya Modified, a Union Bill 
Still Gives Cause for Concern’ Asheville Global Report 16-22 Sept 2004 available at 
http://www.agrnews.org/issues/296/labor.html#3. 
254 Trade Union (Amendment) Act (2005) (note 253 above) art 8. 
255 See above art 6(6). 
256 See above art 7(2). 
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fundamental choices for workers.257 However, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) 
believes that the bill would do violence to the freedom of workers. The Bill, says the 
NLC President, “is vindictive, punitive and calculated to destroy the labour 
movement”.258 
Notwithstanding the trumpets of democratisation that seemingly blow across Africa, 
authoritarianism and personalisation of power is still the norm. Authoritarianism makes 
the realisation of human, including social, rights difficult, if not utterly impossible. There 
is generally a curious double feeling of trust and distrust between states and their judicial 
institutions. The independence of the judiciary has been seriously eroded in many states, 
due to executive and legislative lawlessness. The weakening of judicial institutions—
often through inadequate funding, understaffing, and poor training of judicial 
personnel—undermines efforts to check abuses of state power. The African Commission 
confirms that many governments deliberately work to weaken domestic courts, thereby 
hampering the smooth administration of justice.259  
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe frequently uses constitutional amendments to 
reverse unwelcome Supreme Court decisions and weaken constitutionally guaranteed 
rights and the rule of law.260 In Nigeria, some judges have been pressurised to recant after 
giving unequivocal orders. In March 2006, Justice Goodluck of the Abuja High Court 
recanted two days after giving a clear interim order, “protesting that what was indubitably 
                                                 
257 See JA Ogbodo ‘Reps Split Over Labour Bill’ Guardian News available at http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/news/ 
article01/080904. 
258 ‘Labour Bill: Govt, NLC Trade Words’ This Day [Nig] 26 Aug 2004 available at 
http:/news.biafranigeriaworld.com/archive/ 2004/aug/26/004.html. 
259 See CLO v Nigeria (note 78 above) para 14. 
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an order was an obiter dictum”. 261 On 12 January 2006, Justice Yusuf of the Oyo State 
High Court declared the constitution of a seven-man impeachment panel as illegal but 
later withdraws from the case, “willy-nilly, without adducing reasons for her decision to 
do so”.262 All of this is “a metaphor for the depth to which a section of the Judiciary has 
sunk, in a democratic dispensation”.263 To protest the serial disobedience of court orders 
by the Obasanjo Administration, the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA)—the umbrella 
body for lawyers—embarked on a two-day landmark boycott of courts throughout the 
country in March 2006. 264 The boycott was “the first time in a democracy and the second 
time in the history of Nigeria”.265  
The present writer submits that a government that chooses which section of the law to 
respect and that routinely violates the constitution and court rulings lacks the moral 
strength to insist on either due process or the rule of law. Justice Brandeis of the US 
Supreme Court underscored the point more elegantly in Olmstead v. United States,266 
when he declared: 
 
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to 
observe the law scrupulously. … For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its 
                                                                                                                                                 
260 Lord Lester ‘The Challenge of Bangalore: Making Human Rights a Practical Reality’ in (1999) 4 European Human 
Rights Law Review 273 277. 
261 See Editorial: ‘Conflicts and Intrigues in the Realm’ The Guardian [Nig] 21 Mar 2006. 
262 Above. 
263 Above (noting that the development is “a dangerous erosion of the independence of th[e judicial] arm of government”). 
264 See Editorial: ‘NBA Boycott of Courts’ Daily Champion [Nig] 17 Mar 2006 available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200603170170.html (reporting that the NBA stayed away from courts across the nation “to 
protest the non-adherence to the rule of law by all tiers of government”).  
265 Above. 
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example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds 
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy.267 
 
6.5 Options for Realising Social Rights in Africa 
Realising social rights in many African countries remains largely a fiction, more 
aspiration than actuality. Poverty still defines most of Africa. Oddly, Africa’s poverty has 
occurred in the context of a seemingly positive economic growth.268 The reason for this 
anomaly is that most countries view development solely as the growth of GDP or the 
promotion of industrialisation. Yet, the real index for measuring the success of a given 
society is the substantive freedoms that its members enjoy rather than its GDP.269 
“Development”, says Sen, “has to be more concerned with enhancing the lives we lead 
and the freedoms we enjoy”.270 Economic policies or blueprints make meaning only to 
the extent that they progressively help to liberate people from unemployment and misery. 
The failure of Africa’s seeming economic growth to reduce incidences of general and 
working poverty suggests that the current development mythologies and, in particular, 
                                                                                                                                                 
266 Cf Olmstead v United States 277 US 438 (1928) (Brandeis J dissenting). 
267 Above, at 485. 
268 See ERA 2005 (note 208 above) 92. Cf World Economy 2006 (note 209 above) (“Despite strong growth performance, 
many developing countries continue to face high levels of structural unemployment and underemployment which limit the 
impact of growth on poverty reduction.”). 
269 See Sen Development as Freedom (note 4 above) 18. 
270 Above, 14. Cf Dreze & Sen Public Action for Social Security (note 82 above) 12 (The object of public action should be 
the enhancement of the capability of people to undertake valuable and valued “doings and beings”). The authors define a 
person’s (formal) capability as “a set of functioning bundles, representing the various alternative ‘beings and doings’ that a 
person can achieve with his or her economic, social, and personal characteristics” but they admit that there are obvious 
problems in characterizing and analysing capabilities. See above. See also NJ Udombana ‘A Question of Justice: The 
WTO, Africa, and Countermeasures for Breaches of International Trade Obligations’ (2005) 38 John Marshall Law Review 
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“the nexus of growth, employment and poverty reduction” should be re-examined.271 
This segment examines the options available to Africa’s governmental, inter-
governmental and non-governmental institutions towards realising social rights. It 
deliberately adopts a holistic approach in its prescriptions, since the diagnosis is not 
merely legal. Changes aimed at the effective implementation of social and other 
egalitarian rights will not come solely from the formal framework of the African Charter 
or from the Charter bodies; they will come largely from political mobilisation and 
community participation in campaigns to protect these rights. 
 
6.5.1 Options for the African Union 
The AU should serve as pivot and catalyst for the promotion of social rights in Africa. 
The AU Act has reinvigorated some of the almost moribund organs of the OAU in ways 
that could promote the realisation of social rights in Africa.272 The AU Assembly 
determines the common policies of the AU and “receive[s], consider[s,] and take[s] 
decisions on reports and recommendations from the other organs” of the AU,” among 
other things.273 Another relevant organ is the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, 
                                                                                                                                                 
1153 1202 (“Life is primarily about promoting human dignity, happiness, and values; profit and GDP are means to these 
ends”).   
271 ERA 2005 (note 208 above) 92. 
272 See, in general, NJ Udombana ‘The Institutional Structure of the African Union: A Legal Analysis’ (2002) 33 California 
Western International Law Journal 69 (discussing the AU organs from an international institutional perspective). 
273 Above art 9(1). Other functions include considering requests for membership; establishing AU organs; monitoring the 
implementation of policies and decisions and ensuring all Member States’ compliance; adopting the budget; giving 
directives to the Executive Council on the management of conflicts, war, and other emergency situations as well as the 
restoration of peace; appointing and terminating judges of the AU Court of Justice; and appointing the Chairman of the AU 
Commission and his or her deputy or deputies and other commissioners and determining their functions and terms of 
office. Above. 
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which is “an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups of the 
Member States of the Union”.274 
A key organ that should continually feed the AU Assembly with sound 
recommendations should be the AU Executive Council, which replaced the OAU Council 
of Ministers. The Council is “composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or such other 
Ministers or Authorities as are designated by the Governments of Member States”.275 It is 
vested with wide variety of responsibilities, some of which are relevant to the realisation 
of social rights in Africa.276 It coordinates and makes decisions on policies in areas of 
common interest to the Member States. These include foreign trade; energy, industry and 
mineral resources; food, agricultural and animal resources, livestock production and 
forestry; water resources and irrigation; environmental protection, humanitarian action 
and disaster response and relief; and transport and communications.277 Other areas over 
which the Council has jurisdiction are insurance; education, culture, health, and human 
resources development; science and technology; nationality, residency, and immigration 
matters; social security, including the formulation of mother and child care policies, as 
well as policies relating to the disabled and the handicapped; and the establishment of a 
system of African awards, medals, and prizes.278  
It is important for all these key organs to pay greater attention to problems of 
unemployment and poverty in Africa and to offer pragmatic recommendations to 
                                                 
274 Above art 22(1). 
275 Above art 10(1). 
276 Above art 13(1). 
277 Above art 13(1)(a–f). 
278 Above art 13(1)(g–l). 
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Member States towards ameliorating these problems. Prioritisation is imperative for the 
advancement of social rights. The majority of Africans, particularly the poor, has grown 
cynical of the various poverty reduction strategies and now adopts a “wait-and-see” 
attitude. Governments should not blame citizens for being cynical, given the failure of 
previous experiments to deliver promised and expected results. Poverty reduction and 
eradication require more than pious Declarations and Plans of Action. It requires even 
more than NEPAD, which, being donor-driven, requires massive inflows of capital as the 
primary pre-condition for its success. According to NEPAD agenda, Africa will require 
$64 billion annually to achieve a seven percent annual growth rate. Part of this amount 
will come from domestic savings, assuming improved political and economic 
governance, but the “bulk of the needed resources will have to be obtained from outside 
the continent”.279 
 If the AU and its Members States want Africans to take them seriously over their 
poverty reduction mission, then they must look inward and take immediate and real 
action that will have positive effects on the standard of living of Africans. As a start, the 
AU should urge its Member States to establish a Social Fund aimed at improving 
employment opportunities in their countries. The Fund could increase the mobility of 
citizens and facilitate their adaptation to industrial changes, in particular through 
vocational training and retraining, and contribute to raising living standards. The Fund 
could also promote integration efforts in Africa.  
                                                 
279 Above, para 144. 
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The European Social Fund (ESF) has become the EU’s most important instrument for 
combating unemployment.280 The ESF has the primary task of combating long-term 
unemployment and facilitating the entry into working life of young people and of people 
exposed to exclusion from the labour market and of facilitating the adaptation of workers 
to industrial change and to changes in production systems.281 Since Africa did not feel 
embarrassed in patterning its integration agenda almost wholly on the European model, it 
should equally not feel embarrassed in taking precedents from programmes that have 
impacted positively on the EU’s citizens. 
The AU should take measures to facilitate the mutual recognition and acceptance of 
workers by Member States, including harmonising educational and vocational training 
manuals in Africa. Vocational training policies will promote the mobility of labour and 
enable workers to adapt to any negative consequences arising from integration. The AU 
should adopt a common policy on employment, social security and related issues to guide 
domestic policies and programs of Member States. Africa is still a jigsaw, with no 
common social and employment policies, other than general and vague objectives in 
some regional instruments like the AU Act and NEPAD. It is perfectly reasonable, for 
example, for the AU to adopt a Charter on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) as a 
way of creating jobs and improving the living conditions of Africans. SMEs are critical 
factors in economic growth; they are increasingly responsible for the creation of the 
                                                 
280 Commission of the European Communities Communication on European Social Fund Support for the European 
Employment Strategy at 2 COM (2001) 16 final (23 Jan 2001). 
281 The ESF has its legal basis on European Community law, as embodied in the Single European Act of 1986, the Treaty 
of the European Union (EU), and the Treaty of Amsterdam. See Single European Act 17 Feb 1986 (Luxembourg) & 28 
Feb 1986 (The Hague) 1987 OJ (L 169) 1; Treaty on European Union 7 Feb 1992 1992 OJ (C 191) 1 [hereinafter EU 
Treaty]; Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts 2 Oct 1997 1997 OJ (C 340) 1. 
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majority of jobs throughout the world; they are potential seedbeds for technological 
acquisition and innovation; and they could help create an environment for innovation and 
entrepreneurship. 
Again, the European Charter for Small Enterprises (ECSE)282 could serve as a 
template for such a scheme in Africa. The ECSE enjoins governments to focus their 
strategic efforts on ten action lines, which are vital to the environment in which SMEs 
operate. These action lines include education and training for entrepreneurship; better 
legislation and regulation; taxation and financial matters; and strengthening of 
technological capacity of SMEs.283 Some of these lines are relevant to Africa. The 
suggested African Charter on SMEs should commit governments into providing 
incentives and equal opportunity for access to credit and foreign exchange for all SMEs. 
It should commit them into simplifying and decentralising business registration in order 
to eliminate the link between high administrative burdens and corruption; this will 
facilitate enterprise creation. It should, moreover, commit governments into removing 
constraints to the development and growth of SMEs, in line with the ILO’s 
recommendations.284 The Charter should contain obligations for periodic reports by states 
                                                 
282 European Charter for Small Enterprises (ECSE) adopted in Lisbon on 13 June 2000 and approved at the European 
Council in Feira held on 19–20 June 2000 available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/charter/index_en.htm [hereinafter ECSE]. 
283 Others are cheaper and faster start-up; availability of skills; improving online access; getting more out of the single 
market; successful e-business models and top-class small business support; and developing stronger, more effective 
representation of SMEs’ interests at the EU and national levels. Id. 
284 ILO Job Creation in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Recommendation (note 121 above). Constraints in the way 
of SMEs could arise from a number of situations. It could arise from: difficulties of access to credit and capital markets; 
low levels of technical and managerial skills; inadequate information; low levels of productivity and quality; insufficient 
access to markets; difficulties of access to new technologies; and lack of transport and communications infrastructure. 
Above, para 6(2)(a–g). Constraints could also arise from inappropriate, inadequate, or overly burdensome registration, 
licensing, reporting, and other administrative requirements, including those which are disincentives to the hiring of 
personnel, without prejudicing the level of conditions of employment, effectiveness of labour inspection, or the system of 
supervision of working conditions and related issues. Above, para 6(2)(h). It could arise from insufficient support for 
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on their implementation of policies contained therein. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP), 
inaugurated in South Africa in 2004, could receive and consider such reports. 
The AU should also adopt special policies and common strategies targeting small 
scale and traditional farmers in rural areas and creating enabling conditions for private 
sector participation. Emphasis should be on “human capacity development and the 
removal of constraints to agricultural production and marketing, including soil fertility, 
poor water management, inadequate infrastructure, pests and diseases”.285 The African 
Investment Bank, when established,286 should give priority to investment in agricultural 
production. “Technological innovation and technology diffusion [also] hold enormous 
potential for accelerating agricultural output and productivity”, though most African 
countries, let alone small-scale farmers, lack the research capacity necessary for major 
breakthroughs.287 The AU should facilitate such research,288 by collaborating with 
relevant international institutions, including the Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
research and development and from difficulties in access to public and private procurement opportunities. Above, para 
6(2)(i–j). 
285 OAU Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa Assembly/AU/Decl7 (II) para 1. 
286 See Constitutive Act of the AU adopted 11 July 2000, entry into force 26 May 2001 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15 479 
(2000) (as amended by the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the AU 11 July 2003) [hereinafter AU Act] 
art 19 (providing for the establishment of financial institutions, including the African Investment Bank). The rules and 
regulations of the Financial Institutions are to be defined in subsequent protocols. Id. 
287 NEPAD (note 231 above) para 191. 
288 AU Act (note 286 above) art 3(m) (stating, as one of the objectives of AU, the “promot[ion of] research in all fields, in 
particular in science and technology”). 
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6.5.2 Options for Africa’s Governments 
The full implementation of social rights involves internal and external elements of a 
state’s governance.289 The right to work, in particular, “involves political imperatives that 
match or exceed those derived from other economic and social rights”.290 African 
governments must dismantle many of their domestic laws that undermine workers’ rights 
if they expect citizens to take their avowed human rights posturing seriously. They must 
not inhibit voluntary unionisms that pursue worker’s interests. As Fukuyama rightly 
maintains, “there is a natural, universal impulse towards sociability, which if blocked 
from expressing itself through legitimate social structures like the family or voluntary 
associations, appears in pathological forms like criminal gangs”.291  
Those African states that have not yet ratified relevant ILO conventions ought to do 
so without further delay. These conventions are vital to the enjoyment of social rights. 
Even states that have comprehensive legal regimes to secure these rights must implement 
strong, well-financed public policies to realise these goals. All states must place decent 
work at the heart of macroeconomic and social policies rather than treat employment as, 
to borrow Howse’s interesting phrase, “a kind of gratification to be postponed until 
unrestrained industrial or postindustrial capitalism produces high real incomes”.292 Fair 
and living wages are human rights, not acts of compassion. There is no excuse for 
                                                 
289 See NJ Udombana ‘Socio-Economic Rights and the Nigerian Worker’ (1999) 3 Modern Practice Journal of Finance & 
Investment Law 397 408. 
290 RL Siegel ‘The Right to Work: South Africa’s Core Minimum Obligations’ in Exploring the Core Content of Socio-
Economic Rights (note 81 above) 209 (stressing, “prolonged neglect of obligations to create and secure work can shift 
political support from one party or leader to another and bring down national governments and political orders”). Above. 
291 F Fukuyama Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995) 337-8 (stressing that it is the suppression 
of legitimate associations that allows “mafias” to appear “in places like southern Italy, the American inner city, Russia, and 
many sub-Saharan African cities”). Above. 
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governments or companies to pay slave wages to workers just because many of these 
workers are more concerned about job security and survival. Poverty is no excuse for 
slavery. 
Improving nationwide employment requires focusing on employability, employment 
creation, equity, entrepreneurship, environmental sustainability, education, and 
development. States must also safeguard and develop available natural and material 
resources for citizens’ benefits. Employment generation could prevent the morbidities 
and mortalities that frequently afflict Africa and could be a positive part of famine 
prevention efforts in a number of countries. During the prolonged draught in Cape Verde 
in the middle of 1970s, the government and other agencies provided relief almost 
exclusively in the form of employment for cash wages in makeshift work. “These 
preventive measures”, according to Dreze and Sen, “succeeded to a great extent in 
averting a severe famine. There were no reports of large-scale starvation deaths, and the 
overall increase in mortality seems to have been moderate”.293 
There is symmetry between education and work. Investments in education and 
training are fruitless in the absence of job opportunities; yet, poor people cannot 
maximize their potentials to lift themselves and their families out of poverty, due to lack 
of education. Africa’s governments should not merely invest in human capital through 
education; they should also focus energies on creating productive and remunerative work 
for the poorest citizens, with conditions of freedom, security and human dignity. They 
should enact regulations to compel public and private employers to pay special 
                                                                                                                                                 
292 R Howse ‘From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime’ (2002) 96 
American Journal of International Law 94 104. 
293 Dreze & Sen Hunger and Public Action (note 38 above) 135. 
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allowances to employees to reduce the impact of devaluation on employees’ incomes. 
Such allowances should not be considered as a ratio or basis for the quantitative 
determination of any legal or contractual right or any right derived from a collective 
bargaining agreement. Argentina has adopted regulations requiring employers to provide 
a monthly, non-remunerative allowance in addition to employees’ normal wages.294 The 
allowance is included in the basic salary, on a staggered and progressive basis, and 
subject to withholdings and contributions to social security. It is also included in the 
calculation of income taxes, vacations, bonuses, severance payments, et cetera.295  
Governments should regulate the exercise of free enterprise in order to meet the 
demands of sustainable development and prevent the social apartheid and exclusion that 
inevitably accompanies the liberalisation of trade. Free enterprise may be inevitable in an 
age of globalisation, but “[m]arkets, free or otherwise, are not a product of nature [but] 
are legally constructed instruments, created by human beings hoping to produce a 
successful system of social ordering”.296 Adaptability to globalisation imperatives should 
be balanced against the protection and security of the labour force.297 Governments 
should curb imports to protect local production, enable farmers and pastoralists to receive 
fair prices for their products, and, ultimately, create jobs. Most industrialized nations 
offer financial and technical support to their SMEs;298 and many European countries, in 
                                                 
294 EC Collins ‘Labor and Employment Developments From Around the World’ (2004) 38 International Law 149 149. 
295 Above, 150. 
296 C Sunstein Free Markets and Social Justice (1997) 384. 
297 See Cooper (note 184 above) 234 (arguing, “It is imperative in South Africa that whatever policies are followed address 
not only growth but a strategy for development which encourages job creation, and the alleviation of inequality and 
poverty”), above. 
298 ECOSOC Economic Report on Africa 2004 (note 193 above) 14 para 32. 
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particular Japan and Germany, jump-started their economies after World War II by 
deploying public money to develop infrastructure and assisting their SMEs.  
It is outrageous for Africa to insist that the IFIs offer the only good economic reform 
ideas and that adherence to their recommendations is the most important ingredient for 
success. Painfully, Africa’s increasing embrace of neo-liberalism does not indicate that 
the continent has an exit strategy. Africa must create its own development agenda, “based 
on the vision of what development should be and what it takes to bring it about—
courage, diligence and confidence”.299 A dogmatic adherence to the Bretton Woods’ 
traditional but questionable prescriptions—devaluation, reduction of the public sector, 
and removal of price controls—will only accelerate the slide to ruin. They have proved in 
the past to be nothing but bumpy rides to anomie, partly because of weak political and 
economic infrastructures and superstructures, as Chapter Three interrogated. The Western 
notion of development, as Ake astutely observed,  
  
does not encourage attention to the revolutionising of existing social relations of 
production as a likely or even possible stimulant of development. It does not 
encourage the disengagement of African economies from the exploitative structural 
links with Western capitalist economies. It encourages the perception of the process 
of development as the gradual solution of limited and technical problems within the 
context of the existing order. That is the sense in which the notion of development . . 
. limits the scale of change of African economies.300 
                                                 
299 A  Adedeji ‘Africa’s Strategic Outlook’ in A Adedeji (ed) Africa Within the World: Beyond Dispossession and 
Dependence (1993) 207.  
300 C Ake A Political Economy of Africa (1981) 143. 
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Even the IMF now acknowledges that there are social dimensions of the economic 
reform process that have to be addressed and that “[m]itigating the adverse effects of 
reform programs on poor groups should be an important aspect of the IMF’s policy 
advice and program design”.301 The basic policies that promote economic growth and 
reduce poverty include the absence of high inflation, functioning foreign exchange and 
financial markets, openness to foreign trade, effective rule of law, and delivery of key 
services such as education and health care.302 What Africa needs to put in place these 
policies are genuine statesmanship and political will, ingredients that have hitherto been 
in short supply in the continent.303 
 
6.5.3 Options for the Civil Society 
Chapter Five of this thesis focussed exclusively on the human rights responsibilities of 
transnationals, but corporations are part of the whole called non-state actors. Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) have, at the minimum, moral responsibilities to promote 
socio-economic rights in Africa. The rise in the number of CSOs in the last few decades 
may be “comparable in importance with the rise of the nation state in the nineteenth 
century”.304  
                                                 
301 Foreign Affairs & Policy Development and Review Departments IMF, Review of Social Issues and Policies in IMF-
Supported Programs 27 Aug 1999 8–9. 
302 For an overview, see S Devarajan et al (eds) Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons From Ten Case Studies (2001) 1–7. 
303 Cf NJ Udombana ‘The Summer Has Ended and We are Not Saved! Towards a Transformative Agenda for Africa’s 
Development’ (2005) 7 San Diego International Law Journal 5 60 (“It is the lack of visionary leadership or the pursuit of 
an alien vision that accounts for Africa’s inability to harness its abundant human and material resources to lift its citizens 
out of economic scarcity”). 
304 M Carbone ‘The Role of Non-State Actors in Development Policy: Perceptions and Changing Practices’ Courier ACP-
EU July–Aug 2003 at 14. 
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Although CSOs could be multifaceted in their many guises,305 they are the main 
analytical paradigms in African politics. Their increasing popularity lies, partly, in the 
fact that they represent the powerless and disenfranchised in society.306 They are the 
forces for societal resistance to state excesses and are organisationally, materially, and 
ideologically centrepieces of the civil movements and protests for reform and change.307 
A reinvigorated civil society certainly holds the key to social transformation in Africa, 
which probably explains why the AU has, as one of its visions, building “a partnership 
between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and 
the private sector in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among [African] 
peoples”.308 
NGOs, in particular, have made tremendous contributions to the development of 
human rights in Africa, often at huge human and material costs. They have given human 
rights issues both attention and notoriety, from lobbying governments and powerful 
groups to advocacy campaigns. In the past, majority of NGOs were preoccupied with 
civil and political rights, paying only lip service to socio-economic rights. Some focused 
on civil and political rights not by deliberate choice but because of the avalanche of 
totalitarian and authoritarian regimes that reigned in most developing countries in the 
                                                 
305 See P Gifford ‘Book Review’ (2000) 30 Journal of Religion in Africa 494 495 (reviewing N Kasfir (ed) Civil Society 
and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives (1998)). 
306 See P Chabal ‘Introduction: Thinking About Politics in Africa’ in P Chabal (ed) Political Domination in Africa: 
Reflections on the Limits of Power (1986) 1. Cf JF Bayart ‘Civil Society in Africa’ in Chabal (above) 109 (discussing 
notions of the state and civil society as they relate to political development in Africa). 
307 See M Bratton ‘Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa’ (1989) 41 World Politics 407 411–12. 
See, in general, JL Comaroff & J Comaroff (eds) Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: Critical 
Perspectives (1999) (presenting various scholars views on the implications of the civil society movement in Africa). 
308 AU Act (note 286 above) pmbl. 
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1970s and 1980s.309 These regimes created their own antithesis in the form of NGOs; the 
struggle produced a synthesis of democratisation that now sweeps across many of these 
countries.  
Given the dying dynasty of dictators in Africa, NGOs should refocus their advocacy 
and play a positive role in advancing social rights. Their demonstrated reluctance to 
advocate on these rights in the past contributed to their under-development. Yet, as 
Rubenstein argues, human rights NGOs can play a productive role in advancing socio-
economic rights by collaborating with partner organisations in the developing countries 
in lobbying for systems of services that meet needs in a manner consistent with human 
rights requirements; by advocating for resources from wealthy countries to fulfil socio-
economic rights; and by monitoring compliance by states with the increasingly explicit 
obligations, including core obligations to protect, respect, and fulfil socio-economic 
rights.310  
The landscape is gradually changing, with many NGOs beginning to pay closer 
attention to socio-economic rights. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)’s311 
Access to Justice Programme is one example of the shifting paradigms in human rights 
advocacy. The programme offers financial assistance, skilled legal advice, and 
information and network support to local organizations and interested groups in order to 
help individuals and communities in Africa gain access to tribunals and redress social and 
                                                 
309 See NJ Udombana ‘Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in Africa (2003) 24 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1209 1216 (stating, “between the Egyptian revolution in 1952 until 1998, Africa witnessed eighty-five 
coups or unconstitutional changes in government, seventy-eight of which took place between 1961 and 1997”). See also 
Van der ML ‘Emerging Electoral Trends in the Light of Recent African Elections’ (2001) 1 African Human Rights Law 
Journal 127 128. 
310 LS Rubenstein ‘How International Human Rights Organizations Can Advance Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: 
A Response to Kenneth Roth’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 845. 
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other socio-economic rights.312 These and similar initiatives must be acknowledged and 
commended. African NGOs should equally take up the challenge of advancing social 
rights in the continent. 
CSOs should publicise the economic plights of citizens and positively engage 
governments towards implementation of social rights. They should share information and 
opinions with the different organs of governments and offer advice to legislative 
committees on issues affecting citizens’ welfare. CSOs should not just think global and 
act local; they should, in Odinkalu’s apt words, “think economic and act political [and] 
must be prepared to contemporaneously think global, think regional, think local and think 
the people”.313 The pace and process of political democratisation in Africa have opened 
up space for labour movements to influence policy-making for the benefit of workers. 
They should not allow the opportunity to slip them by. They should mobilise workers 
against policies that perpetuate poverty and not passively accept governments’ 
macroeconomic policies and strategies, such as the refurbished SAPs in many states in 
the name of economic reforms. Africa took that road before, but its destination ended in 
destitution.  
Labour unions should fight against casualisation of work by multinationals, which is 
increasingly becoming a neo-colonialist strategy to exploit Africans and perpetuate 
inequalities. They should also resist the growing privatisation and outsourcing of public 
service works, since the prospects of those retrenched finding alternative jobs are slim in 
                                                                                                                                                 
311 Information regarding this initiative is available on the ICJ website available at www.ICJ.org (last visited 5 Dec 2005). 
312 See eg Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists available at http://www.icj-kenya.org/ahraj.asp (last 
visited 5 Dec 2006). 
313 CA Odinkalu ‘International Policies, African Realities: Human Rights and Democracy in Africa’ (2000) available at 
www.africaaction.org/rtable/chi0002.htm. 
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an era of high unemployment. As stakeholders in Africa’s economy, labour movements 
should also be cooperative in order to improve service deliveries by Africa’s public 
servants. The patrimonial civil service is defined by absence of professionalism and by 
apathy, leading to many unauthorised absenteeism, lateness, idleness, and poor output.  
Africa’s workforce must play an instrumental role in economic growth; if not, it will 
become a mere mercenary force.314 An ineffectual civil service is self-destructive; it is 
incapable of supporting economic growth and enhancing higher standards of living; and it 
is incapable of supporting those institutions that make the effective realisation of social 
rights possible. Labour movements should collaborate with their governments towards 
improving work ethics in the public service in order to increase productivity, raise private 
incomes, and enable the state to finance social insurance schemes. Freedom is not merely 
an individuals’ autonomy, independence, or self-government; it includes efforts to realise 
an individual’s potentials, which sometimes require help from others.315 
Africa’s labour movements should also join their governments in the continuing 
campaigns for more debt relief and cancellation by Western countries and their 
“Clubs”.316 These unsustainable debts have deleterious effects on prospects for long-term 
                                                 
314 Cf F Spagnoli Homo Democraticus: On the Universal Desirability and the Not So Universal Possibility of Democracy 
and Human Rights (2003) 417 (arguing, “you cannot make the best of your life and you cannot develop your possibilities 
when you focus on pleasure and desire and when you dislike the efforts necessary to develop”).  
315 See above.  
316 In July 2005, the Group of Eight (G8) Industrial Countries, meeting in Gleneagles, United Kingdom, agreed to cancel 
the debt of the 18 poorest nations, 15 of which are in Africa. Under the deal brokered by British Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair, the G8 will fund debts to the World Bank and the ADB, while “existing IMF resources” will cater for debts owed to 
the IMF. The G8 also promised to boost aid for developing countries by $50 billion (£28.8 billion), to provide rapid and 
flexible multilateral and bilateral debt relief for post-conflict countries and to allocate grant financing for reconstruction 
needs. See ‘The Gleneagles Communiqué’ BBC News UK Edition (2005) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/g8_gleneagles_communique.pdf [hereinafter Gleneagles Communiqué]; and 
‘G8 Leaders Agree $50bn Aid Boost’ BBC News UK Edition 8 July 2005 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
business/4662297.stm. See, in general, Udombana ‘The Summer Has Ended’ (note 303 above) 5 et seq (analysing the debt 
cancellation in the context of international development law). 
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economic growth and prosperity. The debt overhang is a human rights burden. It is the 
greatest threat to development, democracy, and the realisation of social rights in Africa. It 
undermines any marginal gains that aid may have brought to Africa, as the continent’s 
foreign debts are serviced with foreign aid.317 Increasingly, development funds are being 
diverted into loan repayments and, of course, to graft. So long as Africa is laden with the 
heavy yoke of debt, so long will the enterprise of reducing and ultimately eradicating 
poverty remain a mirage.318 The struggle for debt cancellation in Africa must be waged 
from all fronts; and labour movements have a crucial role to play in mobilizing public 
opinion for this noble cause. Any opportunity to contribute in reducing Africa’s 
handicaps towards self-fulfilment should not be wasted. 
CSOs, in general, should check future reckless lending, borrowing, and spending in 
Africa and should monitor conditions, policies, and outcomes in both lending and 
borrowing countries. Eternal vigilance must remain the price of liberty because the 
hunger for abuse of power is never satisfied.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This illustrative Chapter maintains that the African Charter and other regional human 
rights instruments are unique for many reasons, not the least of which is their integration 
of all human rights and making them justiciable. These rights require positive and 
negative obligations on the part of states; and, no matter how they are phrased, states 
have obligations to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil social rights. Africa has made 
                                                 
317 See T Ayodele et al ‘African Perspectives on Aid: Foreign Assistance Will Not Pull Africa Out of Poverty’ Cato 
Institute Economic Development Bulletin 14 Sept 2005 at 1 available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/edb/edb2.pdf. 
318 See Udombana ‘The Summer Has Ended’ (note 303 above) 33–34. 
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commendable progress in ratifying or acceding to regional and international human rights 
instruments, in constitutionalising social rights, and in initiating poverty reduction 
policies and programmes. The rapid efforts at integrating human rights into the political 
and economic policies and discourses of African states, at least de jure, is commendable, 
given their initial reluctance to embrace the culture of respect for human rights. Much, 
however, remains towards turning these positive statements of hopes into certainties. 
 
 
 
  
Chapter Seven 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation started on the premise that all human rights are indivisible and 
interdependent. It asserts that socio-economic rights are normative and rejects the 
viewpoints that these rights are non-justiciable. It further argues, to use King Jr., that 
“peoples everywhere can have three meals a day for their bodies, education and culture 
for their minds, and dignity, equality and freedom for their spirits”.1 The thesis calls for 
an institutional paradigm shift that will move the discourse on rights from the realm of 
rhetoric to reality in Africa. It argues that Africa cannot actualise socio-economic rights 
unless all stakeholders take the indivisible human rights seriously.  
The thesis identified states as not only stakeholders but also as primary human rights 
duty bearers. It examined the nature, including the minimum core contents, of obligations 
on socio-economic rights, and the inherent weaknesses of governance structures that 
encumber the realisation of these rights in Africa. It argues that a majority of Africa’s 
governments have not come to grips with their pivotal role in promoting economic and 
social conditions needed to reduce, if not eradicate, poverty; if and when they do, they 
will cease from propaganda and commence the real war against destitution and want. The 
starting point must be to strengthen institutions of governance and adopt measures that 
are conducive to the satisfaction of basic needs.  
                                                 
1 ML King Jr ‘Acceptance Speech’ 10 Dec 1964 (on the occasion of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo) available 
at http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1964/king-acceptance.html. 
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The standard of living of a country has a strong positive influence on that country’s 
propensity to experience and sustain democracy. In Africa, there is no standard to 
measure living, as absolute poverty still defines the continent. Yet, poverty is the greatest 
threat to peace, sustainable development, and democracy. There can be no lasting peace 
and democracy in a state of permanent hunger, where governments deliberately fail to 
secure the basic needs of citizens, whether male or female, children, or adults. The 
advancement of education and healthcare, the creation of jobs, the development of labour 
relations, and the securing of social security are essential preconditions for achieving 
social peace and establishing social democracy, which is an extension of political 
democracy. Otherwise stated, “It is only through a process of empowerment [of the 
people] that the future of a democratic Africa lies”.2 
Contemporary international law sees sovereignty as a normative concept of 
responsibility, requiring “a system of governance that is based on democratic and popular 
citizen participation, constructive management of social diversities, respect for 
fundamental human rights, an equitable distribution of national wealth, and opportunities 
for development”.3 Since employment generation is a major route out of poverty in 
Africa, governments should place it at “the heart of the poverty battle”.4 No state can 
sustain growing unemployment rates for long, because at some point, diminishing 
                                                 
2 J Ihonvbere Economic Crisis, Civil Society, and Democratization: The Case of Zambia (1996) 284–85. 
3 J Cilliers Human Security in Africa: A Conceptual Framework For Review (2004) 39. Cf NJ Udombana ‘Articulating the 
Right to Democratic Governance in Africa (2003) 24 Michigan Journal of International Law 1209 1212 (“International 
law is no longer the power base of a tyrant who rules directly by naked power or through the apparatus of a totalitarian 
political order. Its object of protection, in modern times, is the continuing capacity of a population to express and affect 
choices freely about the identities and policies of its governors.”). See, in general, W Friedmann The Changing Structure of 
International Law (1964). 
4 Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Economic Report on Africa 2005: Meeting the Challenges of Unemployment 
and Poverty in Africa (2005) 92 [hereinafter ERA 2005]. 
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demand will limit economic growth. On the other hand, the creation of decent work 
implies decreased poverty and provides the essential precondition for future economic 
growth. Reducing youth unemployment and utilising their high potential avoids what the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) calls “the creation of a huge cadre of frustrated, 
uneducated or unemployable young people, which could have a devastating impact on 
long-term development prospects”.5  
Judicial and quasi-judicial institutions have vertical obligations with the legislative 
and executive branches to advance all human rights through integrative and creative 
interpretations of relevant instruments. The development of a dynamic and coherent 
domestic jurisprudence that resonates with international standards and translates into 
tangible socio-economic rights enjoyment depends on judicial willingness to depart from 
outmoded interpretive methodologies. Thus, while the legislature and executive lay down 
broad frameworks on socio-economic rights, the judiciary should seize every opportunity 
to amplify their scope and, where necessary, give directives to public authorities on their 
implementation. The thesis has shown how some tribunals in Africa, both national and 
regional, are increasingly adopting a holistic interpretive methodology on socio-economic 
rights. The rest of Africa’s judiciary will do well to embrace this new interpretive 
paradigm, which could make a world of difference in securing human rights.  
The state of human insecurity in Africa demands action by non-state entities, which 
requires a shift in orthodox human rights conceptions and the elaboration of a binding 
normative framework to constrain non-state actors. The prevailing tone and texture of 
contemporary life call for an international legal regulation of transnational corporations 
                                                 
5 ILO ‘Global Employment Trends 2004: Record Joblessness, But Relief May Be on the Way’ World of Work Magazine 27 
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(TNCs) and other non-state entities in order to provide a framework for a new 
international world order. Voluntary self-regulations are good, but they are no longer 
sufficient. There is really no principled reason for failing to attach binding obligations to 
these economic monsters for the entire spectrum of human rights. Pending the elaboration 
of such binding norms, however, TNCs must wake up to the clarion call to relieve 
poverty in Africa. “The private sector”, says Amalric, “should not only have a business 
interest in respecting legally binding human right[s] norms, but also a direct business 
interest in respecting non-binding norms and in protecting, promoting and fulfilling 
human rights in general”.6  
Previous eras of globalisation did not adequately embed market forces within 
frameworks of rules and values that could secure the needs of humanity and the desire for 
social justice.7 As in the past, so it is now: contemporary globalisation aims at 
maximising profits, with little concern for human rights. Such a goal represents an unmet 
opportunity for a critical mass of humanity. The system of international law aids and 
abets this abnormality by sustaining an unequal relationship between a powerful North 
and a weak South or the so-called Third World,8 and by allowing TNCs and other 
privileged entities to violate the rights of the less privileged South with impunity. By 
                                                                                                                                                 
Apr 2004 available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/magazine/50/get2003.htm. 
6 F Amalric et al ‘Transnational Corporations and Human Rights: The Business Implications’ CCRS Working Paper Series 
NO 03/05 (2005) 3 available at http://www.humanrights.ch/cms/upload/pdf/050504transnationalcorps.pdf. 
7 See J Ruggie Opening Statement to UN Human Rights Council Geneva 25 Sept 2006 available at http://www.reports-
and-materials.org/Ruggie-statement-to-UN-Human-Rights-Council-25-Sep-2006.pdf. 
8 See M Koskenniemi From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Reissue with a New 
Epilogue 2005) 606-7. Cf M Bedjaoui Towards a New International Economic Order (1979) 50 (arguing that 
international law “consisted of a set of rules with a geographical basis (it was a European law), a religious-ethical 
inspiration (it was a Christian law), an economic motivation (it was a mercantilist law) and political aims (it was an 
imperialist law)”). 
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failing to provide adequate assistance to, and cooperation with, the weak, international 
law promotes transgressive rather than transformative and stabilizing ends. 
A claim to human rights implies an imperative, nondiscretionary requirement that 
should trump uninhibited pursuit of economic interests, including the imperative to give a 
human face to globalisation. Human rights demand that economic activities should be 
rooted in procedural justice, in those crucibles that make for fairness and legitimacy of 
the “game”—transparency, accountability, and predictability. International law must take 
a sensible and sensitive stand on these imperatives, by prohibiting and enabling, 
restraining and empowering corporate human rights governance. Achieving this end 
entails reconstructing international law into a “language of beneficent transformation”,9 
one that accommodates the growing threats that globalisation poses to human and 
peoples’ rights and that allows the poor and weak to take on the rich and powerful on 
equal terms. 
It may well be that fighting poverty and adopting compensatory policies are, as 
Donnelly puts it, “functions of the state and not of the market”.10 Gewirth thinks that 
markets cannot guarantee sufficient funds to meet basic goods and opportunities, which 
“must be securely provided as needed” and, therefore, that “the state, as a community of 
rights, should be the primary, even if not the only, respondent of these rights”.11 Others 
go even further and argue that “the business of business is business” and that corporations 
                                                 
9 Koskenniemi (note 8 above) 611. 
10 J Donnelly ‘Ethics and International Human Rights’ in Ethics and International Affairs (2001) 153 (arguing 
that fighting poverty relates to justice, rights and obligations, rather than efficiency, and that “[m]arkets are simply 
unable to deal with them . . . because they have no vocation for this.”) Cf J Donnelly International Human Rights (1998) 
160 (noting: “Markets seek efficiency and not social justice or human rights for all”). 
11 A Gewirth The Community of Rights (1996) 59. 
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should do no more than pursue the maximisation of shareholders’ value.12 All of these 
claims may be true, but it is disingenuous to insist on a watertight compartment of 
responsibilities in an increasingly interdependent world. As Sen convincingly argues, 
“while much can be done [to reduce poverty] through sensible government policy, it is 
important to integrate the role of the government with the efficient functioning of the 
economic and social institutions—varying from trade, commerce and the markets to 
active functioning of political parties, …”13 
Economic pursuits are not inherently immoral; indeed, “the more immediate case for 
the freedom of market transaction lies in the basic importance of that freedom itself. We 
have good reasons to buy and sell, to exchange, and to seek lives that can flourish on the 
basis of transactions”.14 This insight accords with Aristotle’s clear diagnosis: “wealth is 
evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of 
something else”,15 which is “the good of human beings”.16 If human flourishing is the 
principal goal of economic choices, then TNCs, being dominant global actors, should 
work to improve the social welfare of persons within their sphere of influence. Such a 
cause makes inordinately good business sense, since the stability of markets depends on 
the latter joining in the crusade to eradicate poverty. 
                                                 
12 Amalric et al (note 6 above) 1 (quoting Milton Friedman 1970). 
13 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 162. 
14 Above, 112 (adding: “To deny that freedom [of markets] in general would be in itself a major failing of a society.”). 
15 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (D Ross trans 1980) bk I sec 5 para 7. 
16 Above, bk I sec 7. Cf K Marx The Economic and Philosophic Manuscript (1884) (arguing for a reorientation of 
economic preoccupations). 
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In Nigeria’s Niger Delta, the Government’s and TNCs’ abilities to stifle one form of 
protest—litigation—has led to different, more troublesome, forms of protest.17 ‘Like 
play, like play,’ as Africans would say, an “inconsequential” teething problem has 
deepened into septic abscesses. After years of skulking in the shadows to bemoan the 
plundering of their land, the Niger Delta youth now embarks on a sustained and brutal 
military campaign against Nigeria’s oil industrial complex. They routinely abduct and 
murder local and foreign oil workers (some are released after payment of huge ransom), 
blow up flow stations at will, and detonate explosions like Christmas crackers.18 Such 
dreadful violence is the militants’ way of imposing sanctions on usurpers of their natural 
wealth and resources. For them, any means to recover what has been unfairly 
appropriated is a fair game. Their brutalities have forced oil consortiums to significantly 
cut production,19 with consequent loss of revenue, while simultaneously breeding 
paranoia and a culture of vengeance. Caught in this crossfire are ordinary citizens who 
daily straggle and struggle to earn a living under an insupportable system. 
The illustrative study on the rights to work and social security underscores the 
potential that could exist for realising socio-economic rights if all stakeholders—states 
and non-state actors, including judicial institutions and civil society organisations—unite 
                                                 
17 See JG Frynas Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation Between Oil Companies and Village Communities (2000) 226. 
18 See eg S James & C Amanze-Nwachukwu ‘Militants Storm Shell Facility, Kill Two’ This Day [Nig] 16 Dec 2006 
available at http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=65841 (reporting on how Niger Delta militant youths attacked a 
Nigerian military formation at the Nun River Flow Station of Shell Petroleum at Oporoma, Bayelsa State, killing “at least 
two soldiers” with several others wounded and three oil workers held hostage”); C Amanze-Nwachuku & A Ogbu 
‘Militants Bomb Shell, Agip in Port Harcourt’ This Day [Nig] 19 Dec 2006 available at  
http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=66104 (“True to their threats of a massive onslaught on multi-national oil 
companies in the Niger Delta, suspected militants yesterday beat the water tight security by Shell Petroleum Development 
Company and bombed the residential area.”). 
19 See ‘Shell’s Nigeria Output Cut by 20%’ BBC News Online 13 Jan 2006 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4608702.stm (reporting that Shell has cut its Nigeria oil output after a pipeline 
explosion and the kidnapping of four foreign oil workers). 
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their wills and strengths to advance all human rights. The African Union (AU) and its 
organs have special roles to play in promoting socio-economic rights in Africa, since 
improving living standards in Africa is one of AU’s goals. 
Some think that Africa is predestined to be poor, that some long-lost ancient curses 
cause its poverty and failures. These troubling, reckless, and irritating assertions have 
contributed to Africa’s inadequate self-image in the comity of nations. Those who make 
these false claims fail to acknowledge that Africa was the cradle of civilisation20 and that 
ancient Egypt provided the first reliable system of irrigation known to mankind, besides 
its skills in architecture, writing and painting.21 Understanding and appreciating Africa’s 
contribution to human existence is a part of the process of reconstructing the identity and 
self-confidence of its peoples.22 Africa’s poverty is not a strand in the tapestry of 
primordial causation. Many of the continent’s difficulties are home-made and, from a 
universal perspective, wholly unnecessary. It is the lack of visionary leadership or the 
pursuit of an alien vision that accounts for Africa’s inability to harness its abundant 
human and natural resources to lift its citizens out of economic scarcity.  
The poverty of leadership in Africa has persisted largely due to the poverty of the 
constituency. Africans have been so accustomed to the diffused darkness of dictatorship 
and tyranny that they find it difficulty to raise themselves up to the penetrating lights of 
democracy and good governance. This indifference is understandable. When one lives 
                                                 
20 AU Commission Africa Our Common Destiny: Guideline Documents (2004) 3 (“Africa was the birthplace and source of 
civilization for the longest period in the history of humanity, a period that people persist in describing wrongly, as 
“Prehistoric” using one sole criterion—’lack of written records’”.) See also New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) (2001) para 4 (“Modern science recognizes Africa as the cradle of humankind . . . Africa’s status as the 
birthplace of humanity should be cherished by the whole world as the origin of all its peoples.”). 
21 See, in general, G Guest The March of Civilization (1974). 
22 See NEPAD (note 20 above) para 14. 
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everyday in the midst of absurdity, it becomes far easy to behave respectfully to it. 
Notwithstanding, Africans have a right to demand that their continent should no longer be 
an exception to the rule. People protect themselves by rising in defence of the rule of law. 
Africans can shape the character of leadership and, a fortiori, their future destiny by not 
sweeping fundamental issues under the carpet. It is patently wrong to leave the task of 
saving Africa to some pseudo messiahs or opportunistic foreign powers.  
This thesis concludes on a hopeful note. (Africa needs hope if it is to summon the 
courage to work for human survival.) We believe that Africa is not a lost cause, despite 
current challenges in realising human security. We believe that the human entity is 
endowed with intelligence and vision to regulate its conduct and constantly recreate its 
existence and that Africa is not an eception. We believe, finally, that the stigma of a 
universal black and African failure—the so-called Afro-pessimism—will melt away 
when all stakeholders begin to work towards reconstructing the continent through new 
institutional and other paradigms. 
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